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Summary 
The thesis is concerned with the relationship between psychoanalysis and tragedy, and the 
way in which psychoanalysis has structured its theory by reference to models from tragic 
drama-in particular, those of Sophocles and Shakespeare. It engages with some of the 
most recent thinking in contemporary French psychoanalysis, most notably the work of 
Jean Laplanche, so as to interrogate both Freudian metapsychology and the tragic texts in 
which it claims to identify its prototypes. 
Laplanche has ventured an `other-centred' re-reading of the Freudian corpus which seeks to 
go beyond the tendency of Freud himself, and psychoanalysis more generally, to unify and 
centralise the human subject in a manner which strays from and occults some of the most 
radical elements of the psychoanalytic enterprise. The (occulted) specificity of the Freudian 
discovery, Laplanche proposes, lies in the irreducible otherness of the subject to himself 
and therefore of the messages by which subjects communicate their desires. I argue that 
Freud's recourse to literary models is inextricably bound up with the `goings-astray' in his 
thinking. Laplanche's work, I suggest, offers an important perspective from which to 
consider not only the function which psychoanalysis calls upon them to perform, but also 
that within them for which Freud and psychoanalysis have remained unable to account. 
Taking three tragic dramas which, more or less explicitly, have borne a formative impact on 
Freud's thought, and which have often been understood to articulate the emergence of `the 
subject', I attempt to set alongside Freud's own readings of them, the argument that each 
figures not the unifying or centralising but the radical decentring of its principal 
protagonists and their communicative acts. By close textual analyses of these three works, 
and by reference to their historical and cultural contexts, the crucial Freudian motif of 
parricide (real or symbolic) which structures and connects them is shown ultimately to be 
an inescapable and inescapably paradoxical gesture: one of liberty and autonomy at the cost 
of self-division, and of a dependence at the cost of a certain autonomy. 
The purpose of the thesis is not an attempt to define the essence of the `signatories' 
Sophocles, Shakespeare or Freud. Nor is it to produce another psychoanalytic or even a 
`Laplanchean' reading of tragedy in any applied or programmatic manner. It is rather, from 
a psychoanalytic/Laplanchean perspective, an effort to disclose at the level of these three 
specific and individual tragedies the decentring and dislocation of subjectivity which Freud 
continued to foreclose at the level of his own theoretical elaborations. 
The thesis is divided into four parts-a general `theoretical' Introduction, followed by three 
Chapters dealing with each literary text: `Oedipus Tyrannus: Myth, Tragedy and Reading 
Other-wise'; `Julius Caesar: Interpreting (Freud) with Freud and Shakespeare'; and 
`Hamlet: Too Much in the Sun'. 
ill 
Note 
All citations from the two main Shakespearean texts, Julius Caesar and Hamlet, are taken 
from the Arden editions. Short references to other works by Shakespeare are taken from 
The Norton Shakespeare. Quotations from Plutarch are referenced in relation to each book 
(e. g. Romulus or Caesar), and use of Thomas North's versions is indicated where 
necessary. Citations from Oedipus Tyrannus generally use the Lloyd-Jones translation and 
presuppose the Greek original reprinted parallel to it. Occasional choices of alternative 
translations, and my own alterations of Lloyd-Jones's English, are noted in the text. 
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Introduction 
Conjunctions 
It would be impossible to list, in strict accordance with a certain academic protocol, 
all the previous texts that have engaged or sought to engage with the topic that is the focus 
of this thesis. The relationship between tragic drama and psychoanalytic theory has been 
variously traced, probed or challenged in a more or less direct manner and to varying 
degrees, by Armstrong (P. ) (2001), Garber (1987), Girard (1977), Goux (1993), Green 
(1979), Lacoue-Labarthe (1977), Lupton and Reinhardt (1993), Lyotard (1977b and 1989), 
Rudnytsky (1987), Simon (1988), Vernant (1988) and Winter (1999). Yet this diverse 
cluster of formidable names, which involves only some of the most recent and the most 
prominent, opens onto network upon network of others whose range and whose scope 
would be incalculable. The problem is the essence of the topic itself. That is, the 
conjunction between tragic drama and psychoanalysis, for better or worse, is one that has 
always borne at its root the claim to a certain cognateness which would, in advance, 
implicitly contaminate the critical discourse of each by the other. On the one hand: finding 
support for its own conceptual apparatus in the exemplars and denominations inherited 
from, in particular Oedipus Tyrannus and Hamlet, psychoanalysis, as Jean Laplanche has 
argued, is `originally at home in its reflections on Sophocles [and] Shakespeare [... ]' 
(Laplanche 2000A [1992e] p. 221). Tragedy has always been `within' psychoanalytic 
theory. In part, the latter is a response to it. On the other hand: insofar as classical 
psychoanalysis positions itself as the answer or solution to the enigmas of those texts, some 
of Freud's grander claims, if taken at face value, would suggest that psychoanalysis has 
always already been at work `within' tragic drama, just waiting to be decrypted and 
disinterred. In part, psychoanalysis is characterised, or characterises itself as a continuation 
and development of tragedy. So forceful has this mutual conjunction proved that on the 
horizon of any critical engagement with either (psychoanalysis or tragedy) there looms the 
ineluctable question of both (psychoanalysis and tragedy). Whether or not an individual 
author ever formulates an overt response to this question, the question still remains, like an 
imperative whose interpellating demand cannot not be heard. Any critical approach to 
tragic drama `after Freud' cannot fail to express, or, at the least, implicitly presuppose an 
attitude to Freud. Nor, by the same token, is it possible critically to approach Freud without 
taking account of the constitutive role which tragic drama plays in his thought. It is easy 
enough to begin cataloguing books and papers which deal with the conjunction between 
psychoanalysis and tragedy; the difficulty would be where to draw the line and terminate 
the procedure. 
A conjunction, however-as we have just termed it-is not necessarily a happy 
encounter. It can, equally, describe a fraught relation of hostility, a battle between opposed 
interests (OED, sense 2c). More to the point, it can describe what is no real encounter at all, 
but the illusion which screens an actual disjunction, such as the merely apparent or virtual 
proximity of stars as witnessed by the earthbound astronomer (OED, sense 3). There can be 
no doubt that from the fields of classical and Shakespearean studies alike, some of the most 
vociferous voices to have emerged with an overt response to the advent and event of 
psychoanalysis have been of those who labour to repudiate its claims and to affirm its 
relationship to its favourite tragedies as one of incompatibility or of misleading 
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appearances. For all that, of course, their texts do not cease to be at once texts `on' 
psychoanalysis and Freud as much as `on' tragedy and tragedians. But these indigenous 
defenders against the colonial masters of the psychoanalytic empire have fought 
(sometimes justifiably and productively, sometimes much less so) to affirm a diremption 
between psychoanalysis and its privileged literary object-a diremption that would 
challenge the claim to an intrinsic or cognate relation to tragedy on which psychoanalysis 
has thrived since its beginnings, a disjunction that would never have been visible from the 
perspective of the psychoanalysts. The Greek `subject', and especially the one on the Greek 
stage, is not the Freudian subject; nor is the Shakespearean one. The epistemological field 
occupied by Freud and his patients is alien to that of fifth-century Athens and early-modern 
London. Not all of those who rehearse these familiar arguments remain blind to the fact, 
and to the continuous need patiently to study and investigate it, that the epistemological 
world which oversaw the birth of psychoanalysis was nonetheless already and complexly 
burdened with debts to those two precursors. One could cite, in this regard, the two very 
different books by Jean-Joseph Goux (1993) and Philip Armstrong (2001), concerning 
Greek and Shakespearean culture respectively. Yet even their efforts to unravel the 
epistemological heritage of psychoanalysis, and thereby to look afresh at the Freudian and 
post-Freudian claims made on tragedy, remain anchored to the conviction that an 
irreducible difference or alterity will always compromise those latter, and mark the 
apparent conjunction that has determined them as illusory: as misled, seductively 
misleading and even dangerous. 
This is not the place to attempt a detailed critique of the many and varied attacks on 
psychoanalysis which have been emerging from the classicist and literary establishment 
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from the start. But, of course, the general project of this dissertation constitutes a broad 
response to them nonetheless. ' It is to be emphasised straightaway that this thesis aims to 
take seriously and to develop in quite specific ways both the claim that tragedy is internal to 
the fabric of psychoanalysis and that psychoanalysis continues to offer a crucial insight into 
the enigmas of tragic drama. This, but not in the service of simply defending, reiterating or 
reaffirming the Freudian reading of the literary texts that are the subject of its individual 
chapters-whatever the implied unity of the term `Freudian' might suggest (for it will be a 
crucial supposition throughout that a Freudian reading is never univocal). What I intend to 
establish in what follows is the function of difference, alterity, disjunction within specific 
tragedies themselves, tragedies to which in one way or another Freud finds himself 
impelled at certain moments in the itinerary of his thinking. To stick to our convenient 
term: `conjunctions' already internal to these tragedies individually-that is, the 
conjunction between a particular text and its mythological, historical or literary 
antecedents; between one protagonist and another in specific scenes as they happen or as 
they are reconstructed; and, most significantly and most paradoxically, between a 
protagonist and himself-these are in advance, decisively problematic. They convey a 
manifest simplicity, unity or coincidence that is only ever apparent-that conceals, in ways 
which Freud was not always adequately prepared to recognise, dislocation, division and 
rupture, as well as the ghostly enigmatic space which fills the resultant breach. The force of 
this rupture, or, what we will go on to call more precisely, this `otherness' which operates 
within and at the level of the tragic texts will be mobilised to clarify but also productively 
1 Goux's text in particular, though, will be crucial, and will be considered in detail in chapter one. (Chapters 
two and three will, implicitly, continue a critique of his captivating argument. ) I have drawn attention to 
Philip Armstrong's somewhat hubristic desire to 'get psychoanalysis out of Shakespeare' in a short review of 
his book, (2002). 
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to challenge and reach beyond both the dominant tendencies of Freud's readings of them 
and of his own Sophoclean- and Shakespearean-indebted theoretical apparatus. It is the 
charge of this thesis that the conjunction between psychoanalysis and tragic drama is 
neither simple nor merely virtual, but is to be located in a mutual, if often muted, attempt to 
think the complex, the non-simple; to account in different guises for an otherness which 
would radically compromise the possibility of any simple relation to or conjunction with 
the other or the self, as such. 
In this Introduction I want to unpack the meaning of this charge, and to do so by 
explicating and justifying the terms which appear in the title of the thesis: What 
`otherness'? What psychoanalysis? Which tragedies, and why? Broadly, I wish to do so in 
the following ways: 1) To consider the historically and theoretically specific moment at 
which Freud calls upon and claims for the first time to be able to read and understand the 
two great specimen texts of psychoanalysis, Oedipus Tyrannus and Hamlet; 2) To introduce 
and elaborate, on the basis of that (historical and theoretical) timing, what we might 
provisionally call the `methodological' apparatus of the project, namely the work of the 
psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche; 3) To delimit the principal connecting motif through which 
Freud and our three tragedies are to be put to work; 4) To outline briefly the argument and 
procedure of each chapter. 
These objectives will be organised into twelve sequential sections. 
6 
Freudian drama 
Writing about a book by Anton Erhenzweig, The Psychoanalysis of Artistic Vision 
and Hearing, Jean-Francois Lyotard (1989) argues that in considering the infiltration of 
Freud's clinical thought by tragic themes, 
[w]e must [... ] grasp the fact that Freud's belief in or acceptance of the 
Sophoclean and Shakespearean scenarios [of Oedipus Tyranmcs and 
Hamlet] is first of all a belief in the theatrical space where these scenarios 
are acted out, the space of theatrical representation, and in the 
scenography that constitutes and defines this space 
(p. 156) 
We shall attempt to give some response to this necessity later in the Introduction, though in 
a way which will not perhaps accord with Lyotard's own demands or beliefs. It must be 
said, however, that any exhaustive effort to define what drama or the space of theatrical 
representation `meant' to Freud would amount to the momentous task of sifting through 
what Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, in his critique of Lyotard's paper, describes as one of the 
most pervasive metaphorical networks in the Freudian corpus (1977 p. 176). 2 If, as we will 
see, even up to Freud's last ever major work, tragic drama has an embodied voice carried 
especially by Sophocles and Shakespeare, their shared medium of the theatrical stage 
always had, in the abstract as it were, a singular attraction for him. In this connection one 
could mention the theatrical simile which structures Freud's account of the transference, or 
the comparable invocation of ostensibly masochistic spectatorship in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. 3 But equally, one would have to take account of the persistence of the figure of 
the dramatic stage across the shifts and upheavals that punctuate Freud's entire career: even 
if he and Breuer never once cite Aristotle, the cathartic method which they pioneered in 
- Lacoue-Labarthe inevitably positions his own and Lyotard's work as stages in this task. 
3 Respectively: Freud (1915 [1914]); and (1920) p. 227. 
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Freud's `pre-psychoanalytic' days would be only the most obvious of these. 4 In this section, 
it is my purpose merely to focus on one moment of punctuation or upheaval in Freud, and 
to connect it decisively with the first clarified emergence in his thinking of the two 
principal dramatic texts which have continued to lead a privileged and embodied life in 
psychoanalytic theory. 
Lyotard's paper (and by extension Lacoue-Labarthe's) is indebted to a short essay 
by Jean Starobinski on Freud's recourse to tragic models (1967), which had originally 
appeared as a Preface to an edition of Ernest Jones's famous monograph Hamlet and 
Oedipus (1949). 1 will not rehearse Starobinski's argument here; I will merely cite its first 
two sentences: 
Returning from vacation on 21 September 1897, Freud in Vienna wrote a 
letter to Wilhelm Fliess in which he serenely set forth a negative 
assessment of his results. He could no longer accept the early seduction 
hypothesis which had been the basis of his theory of hysteria. 
(Starobinski 1967 p. 148)5 
It is on 15 October of the same year, Starobinski will quickly point out, that Freud wrote 
again to Fliess, excitedly this time, with the first germs of what would come to be known as 
the Oedipus complex and with the interpretations of Oedipus and Hamlet which would take 
a central position in his later work. The above lines are remarkable, however, for a reason 
which becomes clear as soon as one reaches the end of Starobinski's essay: nothing is ever 
made of their import. Starobinski will have proceeded to give what has come to be regarded 
as a seminal excursion into the career-long treatment Freud gives of Sophocles' and 
Shakespeare's texts, without ever having said another word on the `seduction hypothesis' 
' Freud and Breuer (1893-5) passim. 
5 Fliess was a Berlin-based ear and throat specialist with whom Freud conducted an intense, even passionate 
friendship. The main period of their correspondence, of which only Freud's letters remain (Freud 1985 [1887- 
19041), lasted from 1887 to 1902. 
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which he begins by recalling Freud had abandoned. Starobinski invokes it, then abandons it 
too 
It cannot be argued or, as is perhaps the case with Starobinski, presupposed that the 
abandonment of the seduction theory prior to the emergence of `the Freudian reading' of 
these two plays, is a point of merely historic or anecdotal interest. Whatever significance 
the theatre in general, or these two plays specifically, had always had for Freud, the fact 
cannot be ignored that Oedipus Tyrannus and Hamlet become as it were readable for him 
not at one of many possible moments along a straight and already marked out path of 
research, but at a crucial moment of rupture, of disjunction, when Freud had lost his way. 
The seduction theory, or neurotica as Freud sometimes called it, will become one of 
the major preoccupations of this dissertation, and we will elaborate it more fully in the 
following sections. For now let us only say that it had been an attempt to account for the 
pathogenic force of the premature and traumatic intrusion of adult sexuality, by an alien 
agency, into the passive infantile subject. With it, Freud had posited that behind particular 
scenarios recollected by neurotic and hysterical patients there lay concealed from 
consciousness the unassimilable remembrance of a real event of infantile sexual abuse. 
Now, the portion of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) in which Freud first publicly sets 
forth his interpretative discoveries of October 1897 has been so well-quoted and probed 
elsewhere as to need no reciting here. Instead, let us turn to one of his great retrospective 
works, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940 [1938]), his final text in fact, where these 
discoveries are recalled and, to some extent, replaced in the disjointed theoretical context of 
their appearance. In considering the role of childhood in the orientation of an individual's 
adult life, says Freud in chapter seven, 
9 
[o]ur attention is first attracted by the effects of certain influences which 
do not apply to all children, though they are common enough-such as 
the sexual abuse of children by adults, their seduction by other children 
(brothers or sisters) slightly their seniors, and, what we should not expect, 
their being deeply stirred by seeing or hearing at first hand sexual 
behaviour between adults (their parents) mostly at a time at which one 
would not have thought they could either be interested in or understand 
such impressions, or be capable of remembering them later. [... ] 
However instructive cases of this kind may be, a still higher degree 
of interest must attach to the influence of a situation which every child is 
destined to pass through and which follows inevitably from the factor of 
the prolonged period during which a child is cared for by other people 
and lives with his parents. I am thinking of the Oedipus complex, so 
named because its essential substance is to be found in the Greek legend 
of King Oedipus, which has fortunately been preserved for us by a great 
dramatist. The Greek hero killed his father and took his mother to wife. 
[... ] 
[A]version to [the concept of the Oedipus complex] is so great that 
people try to silence any mention of the proscribed subject and the most 
obvious remainders of it are overlooked by a strange intellectual 
blindness. One may hear it objected that King Oedipus has in fact no 
connection with the construction made by analysis: the cases are quite 
different, since Oedipus did not know that it was his father that he killed 
and his mother that he married. What is overlooked in this is that a 
distortion of this kind is inevitable if an attempt is made at a poetic 
handling of the material, and that there is no introduction of extraneous 
material but only a skilful employment of the factors presented by the 
theme. The ignorance of Oedipus is a legitimate representation of the 
unconscious state into which, for adults, the whole experience has fallen; 
and the coercive power of the oracle, which makes or should make the 
hero innocent, is a recognition of the inevitability of the fate which has 
condemned every son to live through the Oedipus complex. Again it was 
pointed out from psychoanalytic quarters how the riddle of another 
dramatic hero, Shakespeare's procrastinator, Hamlet, can be solved by 
reference to the Oedipus complex, since the prince came to grief over the 
task of punishing someone else for what coincided with the substance of 
his own Oedipus wish-whereupon the general lack of understanding on 
the part of the literary world showed how ready is the mass of mankind to 
hold fast to its infantile repressions. 
(pp. 421-7) 
Thus: seduction-Oedipus complex-Oedipus and Hamlet. The entirety of the 
relevant passages from this last instance of Freud reading Freud covers several pages; 
elision in the above is necessary and extensive. But of what I have cited, enough is 
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preserved to indicate a prior ellipsis on the part of Freud himself It will take us some time 
to identify it clearly. Nonetheless, let us first of all emphasise that before he invokes 
Sophocles and Shakespeare, Freud raises the spectre of seduction, even if, in effect, he says 
nothing specific concerning the seduction theory itself Seduction in its generality is then 
rapidly superseded by an issue to which is attached `a higher degree of interest', namely the 
Oedipus complex, which will occupy him for at least the next seven pages (pp. 422-9). In 
recapitulating the evolution of his thought Freud thus recalls his understanding of Oedipus 
and Hamlet to have emerged within a field of his research that is decisively not that 
pertaining to seduction. What, precisely, is at stake in this shift from the one to the other? 
That is the question we are endeavouring to address. But we must be careful to avoid a 
pitfall into which critics and historians of psychoanalysis have regularly stumbled. Even 
and especially on the basis of Freud's 1938 retrospective it cannot be supposed that the 
concept of the Oedipus complex, which enabled Freud's interpretations of the two plays, 
and which in the above account predominates over the issue of seduction, led on smoothly 
from Freud's loss of faith in the etiological significance of the latter, or in any way simply 
succeeded the seduction theory. The rupture or disjunction for which we are attempting to 
account is more fundamental than any notion of succession or supercession which Freud's 
own late reconstruction might lead us to assume. 
Among recent texts published on Freud's early work, one need not look far to find 
such assumptions embodied in claims that the Oedipus complex provided Freud with an 
expedient tool for irresponsibly reducing the truth of, say, parental sexual abuse to nothing 
more than a universal infantile wish. On this view, Freud is seen to have lost faith in the 
reality of sexual abuse and to have taken immediate shelter in an appeal to its polar 
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opposite, fantasy: your father never molested you; you just wanted him to. It is a familiar 
enough criticism, 6 and one which has always carried a particular appeal since, as we have 
stressed, it is in the immediate wake of the abandonment of the seduction theory that Freud 
makes his first great interpretative recourse to tragic drama, that is, to the imaginary space 
of literary invention. For Philip Armstrong, for example, it is exactly the perceived swing 
from reality to fantasy in September 1897 that makes possible the readings of tragedy 
which appear less than a month later. Opening his discussion of Freud's first appeal to 
Sophocles and Shakespeare, he claims that 
[e]xamining his own childhood memories, Freud `finds' [in September 
1897] that [seduction] scenes are fantasies, produced by the child's desire 
for one parent and its corresponding jealousy towards the other. Thus the 
material presented to the analyst by the client-the very stuff of 
psychoanalysis-whether in the form of memories, fantasies or dreams, 
will henceforth be read as fiction. 
(2001 p. 18) 
From Armstrong's perspective, the schema which we suggested above, seduction- 
Oedipus complex-Oedipus and Hamlet, would translate as reality-*fiction-*dramatic fiction. 
Casting away the reality of seduction, he implies, Freud reduces the data provided by the 
patient to the same epistemological level as imaginative literature. 
It is true that in the letter of 21 September, outlining the reasons for having rejected 
the neurotica, Freud remarks to Fliess on `the certain insight that there are no indications of 
reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has 
been cathected with affect' (Freud 1985 [1887-1904] p. 264). 7 We will return to the precise 
implications of this insight later on. But for now it is necessary to clarify the fact that it 
6 Such unhelpful assumptions, which Freud's own retrospective works cannot be exonerated from having 
assisted in generating, have been most strongly set forth in connection with the so-called `memory wars'. The 
most notorious instance of many such attacks on Freud's `failure of courage' over the truth of child sex abuse 
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does not amount to a self-authorised licence merely to promote the realm of fiction or 
fantasy at a commensurate cost to the category of reality. Freud goes on in the letter to 
propose two quite different responses to his finding. Firstly, he suggests that scenes 
recounted by patients as childhood memories might be adult fantasies projected back onto 
childhood. This is a position which he will never take up exhaustively, and will later 
expend a great deal of energy refuting in the work of others. ' Secondly, and more 
importantly, he says that with the abandonment of the neurotica `the factor of hereditary 
disposition regains a sphere of influence from which I had made it my task to dislodge it' 
(1985 [1887-1904]p. 265). It is in relation to this factor that the path taken by Freud after 
the abandonment of the seduction theory is to be situated. Arguably, as we will see, so too 
is one of the most dominant and problematic threads in the fabric of Freud's entire corpus. 
If in 1897 he ceases to accept the reality of the scenes presented to him by his patients, he 
does not just re-approach them as ungrounded fantasies or fictions per se: he rather seeks 
the more fundamental reality on which he believes they are based. By extension, it is to be 
underlined that he does not turn to dramatic fiction having given up on simple factual 
reality and sought refuge in the imaginative realm of pure fantasy: his great interpretative 
turn towards tragic drama corresponds to and coincides with this effort to identify a reality 
elsewhere. 
Here are Freud's first words to Fliess on Oedipus and Hamlet: 
A single idea of general value dawned on me. I have found, in my own 
case too, [the phenomenon ofJ being in love with my mother and jealous 
of my father, and I now consider it a universal event in early childhood 
was perpetrated by Masson (1984). (The paradox should be added, though, that it is thanks to Masson that we 
have a complete English translation of Freud's letters to Fliess. ) 
As to Freud's other reasons, I reproduce the full text of this crucial letter as an Appendix. 
8 It amounts to what will become the Jungian theory of retrospective fantasies [Zurückphantasien]. Freud's 
most extended attack upon it can be found in the Wolf Man case history (1918 [19141). 
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[... ] If this is so we can understand the gripping power of Oedipus Rex, in 
spite of all the objections that reason raises against the presupposition of 
fate [... ] [T]he Greek legend seizes upon a compulsion which everyone 
recognises because he senses its existence within himself Everyone in the 
audience was once a budding Oedipus in fantasy [... ] 
Fleetingly, the thought passed through my head that the same thing 
might be at the bottom of Hamlet as well [... ] How does [Hamlet] explain 
his irresolution in avenging his father by the murder of his uncle [... ]? 
How better than through the torment he suffers from the obscure memory 
that he himself had contemplated the same deed against his father out of 
passion for his mother [... ]? 
(1985 [1887-1904] p. 272)9 
Yes, the advent of what will come to be known as the Oedipus complex is announced 
within less than a month of 21 September, and yes, it is articulated with and by an 
interpretative reference to the two tragedies, which will remain basically unaltered until the 
end of Freud's career. But the `Oedipus complex', named as such, will not appear in 
Freud's published work until 1910.10 It is never once mentioned in his foundational Three 
Essays in the Theory of Sexuality (1905b). 11 Nor is it one year later in his discussion of his 
`Views on the Part Played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses. Instead, the latter 
paper stresses the privileged etiological role of inherited or congenital details: 
Accidental influences derived from childhood having [... ] receded into 
the background, the factors of constitution and heredity necessarily 
gained the upper hand [... ] but there was this difference between my 
views and those prevailing in other quarters, that on my theory the `sexual 
constitution' took the place of a `general neuropathic disposition' 
(Freud 1906 [1905] pp. 275-6) 
From October 1897 the Oedipus complex is `there', its discovery has been made; but it 
leads a marginal existence for thirteen years, unassimilated into any significant theoretical 
context. What, as Freud puts it, gains the upper hand after the seduction theory, is the 
9 The interpolation in square brackets is provided by the editor of the correspondence. The elisions are my 
own. 
10 Freud (1910b). 
11 A single point invoking the Oedipus complex is appended in a footnote which is added to the text in 1920. 
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investigation of sexuality and psychopathological illness which is firmly grounded in the 
hereditary, constitutional and biological reality of the human subject. First and foremost in 
this regard are the well-known oral, anal and phallic `stages' of libidinal development, set 
forth in the Three Essays. It must be added as well that beyond 1910, once the Oedipus 
complex has been formalised, the notion of the traumatic event will reappear in Freud, but 
only to be annexed to this new and dominant essentialism. His account of the typical or 
`primal' fantasies (of seduction, castration and parental coitus) will come to be grounded in 
the pseudo-science of phylogenesis and the notorious claim that the violent events of the 
primal horde are the unconscious and transindividual mnemic inheritance of the entire 
species. 
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Recounting the significance of seduction, and then the `more important' factor of 
the Oedipus complex, what Freud's 1938 retrospective does not explicitly disclose is the 
broader and deeper shift which took place in 1897, and which, at first, left the Oedipus 
complex in abeyance. Somewhat schematically for now, we can say that this more 
fundamental, tectonic movement consisted in the following. Before September 1897 Freud 
had been endeavouring to conceptualise the traumatic introduction of sexuality into the 
subject from the outside: that is, by the contingent external agency of a typically perverse, 
adult other. With the abandonment of the seduction theory, his attention turns to a sexuality 
conceived in terms of wholly endogenous pressure: that is, sexuality is seen to emerge from 
an origin already and constitutively internal to the subject himself, be it based upon general 
human biology or upon specific biological and genetic inheritances. 
By insisting on this deep shift in the direction of Freud's thought, we are not 
attempting to detach the Oedipus complex from his appeal to the tragedies, nor to reduce 
12 See Freud (1916-7 [1915-7]) pp. 417-8. We will be returning to the primal horde later. 
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the significance of the discovery of Oedipal loves and their corresponding jealousies for his 
interpretations of them. We are, however, emphasising that the Oedipus complex and the 
readings of Oedipus and Hamlet-profound discoveries in their own right-emerge on the 
very cusp of this broader movement. It is not my purpose to show in any direct detail how 
the Oedipus complex, once it does become fully formulated in Freud's published material, 
often risks being annexed to the theories of the subject's constitutional sexual foundation. 
But it is crucial to recognise that, from the outset, the tendency which propels those latter 
theories already contaminates Freud's Oedipal readings of tragedy. Note that, discussing 
Oedipus in the letter of 15 October, Freud invokes in passing `the objections that reason 
raises against the presuppositions of fate'. In response, he appeals to the gripping power of 
the play upon its audience, which he says must be a result of their all having experienced 
the desire to do as Oedipus does. Such desire is `a universal event'. Oedipal sexuality, from 
the moment of its theoretical inception, is conceived as being outside the sphere of 
contingency, and firmly located in necessity. It is programmed, no less than Oedipus' 
inadvertent transgressions are decreed in advance by fate. In the 1938 text we cited earlier, 
Freud makes the same point, this time directly construing the presence of fate as a 
necessary poetic distortion of the scandalous Oedipal theme: `the coercive power of the 
oracle', he says `which makes [... ] the hero innocent, is a recognition [on the part of 
Sophocles] of the inevitability of the fate which has condemned every son to live through 
the Oedipus complex'. Not only does the content of Sophocles' Oedipus story illustrate the 
objects of Oedipal desire and hatred; its deterministic unfolding dramatises the non- 
contingency of the Oedipal phase in every subject. As a final reference, I point to an 
analogous passage from an earlier retrospective, Freud's Autobiographical Study: 
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The poet's choice, or his invention, of such a terrible subject seemed 
puzzling; and so too did the overwhelming effect of its dramatic treatment 
[... ] But all of this became intelligible when one realized that a universal 
law of mental life had been captured in all its emotional significance. 
Fate and the oracle were no more than materialization of an internal 
necessity [ ... 
]. 
(1925 [1924] p. 247, emphasis added) 
If Freud produces the rudiments of his Oedipal reading of tragedy almost 
immediately after (and certainly only after) having discarded the seduction theory, then we 
must remain alert to the more fundamental development on which it remains based. 
Oedipus Tyrannus poetically figures forth the universal necessity which propels each and 
every human being: it is, on Freud's reading, internal; it originates from the inside. Thus in 
the October letter and in 193 8, what matters in Hamlet is not why, like the Theban, the 
Dane too should wish to kill his father and unite with his mother (that question is never 
raised), only the fact that this automatic complex of feelings pertaining to Hamlet has 
already been usurped by his uncle and acted out `by proxy'. Freud certainly reads Oedipus 
and Hamlet as dramatic fictions, but, crucially, as fictions founded upon a universal human 
reality which is as unavoidable as fate. Tragic drama enters Freud's thought at the moment 
at which the latter starts out on the entirely new path that Freud had suggested to Fliess in 
September, with the emphasis now on a pre-ordained schema of psycho-sexual 
development. 
It is the theoretical suppositions and blind-spots that structure this emphasis which 
this dissertation seeks to move beyond, in order both to challenge the tendency which 
`gains the upper hand' in Freud's work after 1897 and to reconsider the tragic texts from 
which it takes its interpretative exemplars. 
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The theory of seduction 
The above account of the tectonic movement in Freud's thought during the autumn 
of 1897 is heavily indebted to a paper by Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis. 
`Fantasme originaire, fantasmes des origines, origine du fantasme', first published in 1964, 
was translated into English in 1968 as `Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality'. In part, the 
purpose of the paper-whose implications it would not be unreasonable to state that 
Laplanche has spent the remainder of his solo career unpacking, reworking and 
developing-was to liberate Freud's early work from the silence in which it had been 
immured for well over half a century. Re-mobilising it, moreover, the paper sought to 
question and overturn Freud's later, heavy reliance on biology, constitution and the dubious 
schema of phylogenesis. In the present section, setting tragic drama aside for a time, I want 
to outline the theory of seduction in a little more detail, and I will call upon Laplanche and 
Pontalis's further elaborations in order to do so. 13 `Theory of seduction' rather than 
`seduction theory' :I invoke the genitive in my subtitle, at least, so as to be clear that our 
principal concern is not with the empirical factuality of sexual abuse in general or in 
particular, but with the logic and the structure by which Freud attempts to conceptualise the 
traumatic event. 
We have already asserted that the theory of seduction was an attempt to account for 
the pathogenic force of the premature and traumatic intervention of adult sexuality in the 
subject's psychical life. Let us unpack this statement. In the `Project for a Scientific 
Psychology' (1950 [1895]) Freud proposes that sexual trauma occurs in two stages 
13 For an elegant and more detailed account of the theory of seduction, and of the Emma case especially, see 
Laplanche (1970), chapter two. 
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separated by puberty. At this point he holds to the pre-psychoanalytic assumption of the 
child's sexual innocence before genital maturation. The first stage, the empirical occurrence 
of abuse, happens at a period in which the passive infantile subject is somatically and 
psychologically incapable of assimilating sexual experience, This `pre-sexual' sexual event 
is not subject to repression, since it can carry no traumatic meaning as such for the 
unprepared recipient. At the second stage, after puberty, another event occurs which need 
not itself have any sexual content, but which reawakens the memory of the first by some 
associative connection with it. Within the subject, conceived as now having progressed 
towards sexual maturity, the first scene undergoes repression belatedly because of the 
endogenous excitation that is thus elicited at a distance. 
The best known exemplification of this procedure of deferred repression is the case 
of Emma. She comes to Freud with a literal agoraphobia: she is subject to a compulsion not 
to go into shops alone, and attributes this compulsion to a memory from the time she was 
twelve. She had gone into a shop to buy something, and seen two shop-assistants, one of 
whom she had found sexually attractive, and both of whom had been laughing at her 
clothes. Emma had run away in an `affect of fright' (p. 353). This memory Freud labels 
`Scene I'. Analysis reveals an earlier and hitherto unremembered scene, `Scene II', dating 
from the time Emma was eight. It consists in two occasions on which she had gone into a 
small shop. The shopkeeper had grabbed at her genitals through her clothes and grinned. 
Her conscience now pricked her for having returned and endured the same experience. 
After the second time she had not returned. Freud proposes that through an associative 
network (shop assistants, laughing, clothes) the event of the later Scene I had revived the 
memory of Scene II. The latter, to which Emma claimed no conscious access prior to 
19 
analysis, had at this second stage been repressed and wholly substituted in her conscious 
mind by Scene I. Her pre-pubertal sexual retardation at the time of Scene H had meant that 
the seduction by the grinning shopkeeper `ha[d] only become a trauma by deferred action 
[Nachiräglichkeit]' (p. 356). 
There are several points to note here. Firstly, in accounting for the intrusion of 
sexuality into a subject who is (albeit falsely) presumed innocent, we have, in Laplanche 
and Pontalis's words, `a subject who is pre-subjectal [and] who receives his existence, his 
sexual existence, from without' (Laplanche and Pontalis 1964 p. 11). Sexuality, in 
pathological cases, is seen to break in prematurely from the outside, `from the other' (p. 
10). But this is only half the story. The seduction theory, secondly, has a specific and 
complex temporality (the formulation of the two stages) which means that trauma is located 
neither in Scene II nor Scene I exclusively, but in the interplay between them. With Scene 
II we have the experience, the event itself, without affect; with Scene I we have traumatic 
excitation and the defensive action of repression, but without the experience. Thirdly, then, 
we have a complex spatiality too. The first, external event happens and provokes 
insufficient unpleasure to motivate any defensive psychological mechanism. As yet 
unrepressed but also unassimilable, it remains in limbo, a `foreign body' unworked over 
and isolated. 14 What precipitates defensive action is the unpleasure elicited by the 
associative reawakening of Scene II by Scene I. More precisely: the origin of this 
unpleasure is the evoked recollection of Scene II. That is, the external event becomes an 
`inner event' : sexuality, initially introduced from the outside, now breaks out fully from 
'a Laplanche and Pontalis readily invoke the term `foreign body' to describe the psychologically unintegrated 
status of the external event. It is taken from Freud and Breuer's Studies on Hysteria: `We presume that 
psychical trauma-or more precisely the memory of the trauma-acts like a foreign body which long after its 
entry must be continued to be regarded as an agent that is still at work' (1893-5 pp. 56-7). 
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within, taking the ego by surprise and suffering the belated (nachträglichen) procedure of 
repression. 
This, then, in a necessarily condensed form, is the theory Freud claims to abandon 
in the letter of 21 September 1897. 
Having established this much, let us look in more depth at Jean Laplanche's solo 
work in order to grasp the significance of the (belated) retrieval of the seduction hypothesis 
with which he has been engaged for nearly forty years. The following few sections will set 
out much of the conceptual material and terminology that will be called upon in the three 
principal chapters of the dissertation. '5 
Freud's `Copernican revolution' and the work of Jean Laplanche 
Following his work with Pontalis, and in a gesture which he has been careful to 
emphasise is merely schematic, Laplanche has nominated the different organising 
principles which govern Freud's thought before and after the September letter as 
`Copernican' and `Ptolemaic' respectively. The terms are not strictly his own but are 
suggested by Freud's essay `A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis' (1917), in which he 
famously compares his psychoanalytic discovery to the blow struck by Copernicus to 
human narcissism. As Copernicus revealed the earth not to be the centre of its universe, so 
Freud, Freud says, revealed the conscious human subject not to be the centre of his. Man 
feels himself to be supreme master within his own mind, but psychoanalysis has shown that 
`the ego is not master in its own house' (Freud 1917 p. 143). 16 
15 I have, of course, no intention of trying to condense the entirety of Laplanche's enterprise into the available 
space. The most comprehensive general introduction, in English, to Laplanche's work is Fletcher (1999). 
' Freud also cites an intermediate blow between heliocentrism and psychoanalysis: the Darwinian discovery 
of man's animal descent. 
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However true this comparison may generally be, the problem with it from 
Laplanche's perspective is that in the very process of decentring the human subject Freud 
rarely managed not to recentre it. In his paper on `The Unfinished Copernican Revolution' 
(1999A [1992f]), Laplanche takes the most illustrative example of this from the same 1917 
essay. There, Freud insists that the psychoanalytic postulation of man's heteronomy is 
founded on its discovery of an otherness, something `alien' or `foreign' (i. e. the 
unconscious) which dislodges the centrality of the ego: 
In certain diseases [he says] [... ] thoughts emerge suddenly without one 
knowing where they came from [... ] These alien guests even seem to be 
more powerful than those that are at the ego's command [... ] Or else 
impulses appear which seem like those of a stranger, so that the ego 
denies them; [... ] the ego says to itself `This is an illness, a foreign 
invasion'). 
(Freud 1917, p. 141-2) 
No sooner has Freud described this decentring foreign presence, however, than he proceeds 
to reduce its foreignness altogether. `Psychiatry [in general]', he continues, `denies that 
such things mean the intrusion into the mind of evil spirits from without'; and 
`psychoanalysis [specifically] sets out to explain these uncanny [unheimlich] disorders' (p. 
142). It says to the ego: 
`Nothing has entered into you from without; a part of the activity of your 
own mind has been withdrawn from your knowledge and from the 
command of your will [... ] [Y]ou do not recognise it as a derivation of 
your own rejected instincts [... ]' 
(p. 142) 
The decentring of the ego is thus affirmed at the cost of domesticating the intruder, of 
reducing the alterity of the invading other to another part of the subject which the subject 
does not recognise as such. For Laplanche it is the conclusion of Freud's prosopopeia to 
the ego which is most telling: "`Turn your eyes inward, look into your own depths, learn 
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first to know yourself" (1999A [1992f] p. 143). In Freud's invocation of the Delphic 
imperative `Know Thyself (a formulation which will recur, and not unproblematically, in 
and/or in relation to each of the three tragedies we will be addressing) the subject becomes 
comfortably regrounded once more. Certainly the ego is displaced from its central position, 
but only to be replaced by the unconscious, the latter now taking on the role of the subject's 
innermost core, a self of which his ego denies ownership but which it is the task of 
psychoanalysis precisely to help him re-assimilate. Nothing has entered into you from the 
outside: everything that intrudes upon you from an origin which seems so obscure in fact 
emerges from inside you, it is you, your-self. 
It is, Laplanche argues, only on a superficial reading that the astronomical 
revolution inaugurated in the modern era by Copernicus'7 can be limited to an analogous 
replacement of geocentrism by heliocentrism. Within the latter system, he points out, the 
apparently fixed position of certain stellar constellations led to the conclusion that they 
were at a distance from earth incommensurable with the internal distances of the solar 
system. Copernican heliocentrism, that is, made conceivable the infinity of the universe, 
and thus the possibility of the absence of any centre whatsoever (1999A [1999f] pp. 55ff). 
As we will witness, it is Laplanche's charge that the equivalent discovery in Freud-if we 
are to stick with Freud's own comparison-was actually established, only to be formally 
abandoned, before 1897.18 
17 Laplanche does take pains to recognise the historical precedents to Copernicus's work. See Laplanche 
(1999A [1992fJ) pp. 53ff. 
18 It should be added that in connection with the possibility of a radical and permanent decentring, Laplanche 
privileges the name of Copernicus above that of Darwin, since the Darwinian discovery has historically been 
so easily (if falsely) reclaimed in the interests of human narcissism. That is, the revelation of man's 
connection to the chain of evolution has not inhibited him from perceiving himself as its telos and crowning 
glory. See Laplanche (1999A [1992fJ) pp. 80-1. 
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The domesticating gesture which Freud commits upon the alien of the unconscious 
in 1917 can be `endlessly demonstrate[d]' throughout Freudian thought (Laplanche 1999A 
[1992f]. p. 67). Beyond 1897 it is the Freudian gesture par excellence. The claim to a 
Copernican decentring of the subject ceaselessly gives way to the same Ptolemaic 
recentring of the subject back upon himself, with the consequence that Freud is habitually 
drawn towards promulgating endogenous models of psychical development. Laplanche 
calls these retrograde movements `goings-astray' (fourvoiements). We have mentioned 
already Freud's recourse to biology and phylogenesis in accounting for sexual and fantasy 
life. To these attempts to give the subject a quasi-programmatic ('fated') grounding, we 
should add Freud's late postulation, in his second metapsychological topography, of the 
innate id. In each case Laplanche sees an attempt to give the subject a `foundation', but one 
which is already somehow proper to the subject, which already belongs to him, and leaves 
the notion of a centred subject ultimately intact. Data presented in an analysis is always 
reducible to the depths of the subject's own interior, his self which it is the task of analysis 
to enable him to know better. 
Laplanche has continued to remain dissatisfied with this psychoanalytic Ptolemaism 
in which `[e]verything [comes] from the interior [... ], like rabbits or doves from a magic 
box of tricks' (1999A [ 1992a] p. 133). He perceives it to be endemic in the broad 
community of Freud's progeny: biologism persisting with the Kleineans, a specific 
centredness with the ego-psychologists, and the ghost of phylogenesis never having been 
fully exorcised. For him, sustaining Freud's Copernican revolution, in all the radicality 
which it claims for itself, entails a return to the theory of seduction. Not, it must be stressed, 
to so-called `recovered memory therapy', but to the theoretical and practical possibilities 
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opened up in Freud's pre-1897 work for holding open the concept of a decentred subject 
which eventually slipped from his grasp. It will be seen that this return involves a 
reworking of Freudian categories and Freudian metapsychology, as well as a correlative 
reconceptualisation of the human subject with respect to two distinct yet inseparable 
formulations of an irreducible alien- or other-ness. 
Interpreting Freud with Freud 
Let us quickly establish that Laplanche's rereading of Freud, in its retrieval of 
concepts that Freud himself claimed to have abandoned, is neither an `un-Freudian' nor a 
random or subjectively determined procedure. Everything in Laplanche's work points to the 
conviction that if we are to take seriously that most Freudian enterprise of disclosing the 
heteronomy of the subject, then we must be ready to rethink the routes which Freud is not 
always successfully led to take in the process of disclosure. 
As early as 1968, in a paper entitled `Interpreter [avec] Freud', he outlines the need 
for a critical approach to Freud which would above all be inspired by the Freudian 
discovery. 19 That is, a systematic interpretation that would take account of the object of 
Freud's own interpretative thought. For Laplanche, the Freudian oeuvre, across all its 
transmutations and upheavals, is impelled by a single theoretical necessity or `exigency' 
(exigence) that is constitutively linked to the object of its analysis: namely the formation 
and development of the human subject. The fundamental charge here is that the vicissitudes 
of Freud's thought are oriented by the vicissitudes of what it is he tries to think. More 
recently, in the `Copernican Revolution' essay, Laplanche has formalised this charge in a 
19 The essay is in part conceived as a response to Paul Ricoeur's appropriation or `reflexive relocation' of the 
Freudian oeuvre into an overtly extrinsic, philosophical domain. Cf. Ricoeur (1967). 
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parody of Haeckel's law, which Freud was fond of citing. According to Haeckel, 
`ontogenesis repeats phylogenesis': i. e. the development of the individual repeats the 
development of the species. Laplanche's `law' runs as follows: 20 `theoretico-genesis 
reproduces ontogenesis': i. e. the development of the theory of the subject is constrained to 
follow the path of the subject's development (Laplanche 1999 [ 1992f] p. 81). On this view, 
the Ptolemaic recentring which dominates Freud's work after 1897 is drawn forward by the 
very narcissism (the Ptolemaism) of the human subject itself, which Freud claims, after 
Copernicus, to have sought to wound. 
The argument depends on a disjunction in the astronomical-psychological analogy. 
In astronomical speculation there was a Ptolemaic school, then a Copernican school; the 
universe itself cannot be said to have been Ptolemaic and then Copernican. In the 
psychological domain, Freud's Ptolemaic shift after 1897 corresponds to the narcissism of 
the human subject which `gains the upper hand', so to speak, after a prior (indeed primary) 
Copernican situation which the former ceaselessly labours to mask. 
Here, then, is the central thesis of Laplanche's enterprise: Freud's abandonment of 
the theory of seduction connives, at a theoretical level, with the subject's own constitutive 
need to mask his heteronomy and (what amounts to the same thing) his primary dependence 
on the intervention of the human other. 
Before taking this up we must add a few further remarks by way of clarifying two 
propositions mentioned earlier. Firstly: it was said that separately labelling Freud's thought 
(as Copernican and Ptolemaic) on either side of the September letter was to make a 
distinction that is schematic. However useful the distinction is practically, it is not to be 
20 I place 'law' in inverted commas since Laplanche remains wary of any attempt to derive an orthodoxy from 
Freud's work. See Laplanche (1999A [ 1992b]) p. 147. The notion of `law' in `Laplanche's law' must be 
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supposed that the official loss of the seduction theory marked an absolute break. As to 
specifics, the question of the traumatic event continues, of course, to preoccupy Freud until 
the last; and the temporal schema of Nachtraglichkeit makes several resurgences in other 
contexts. 21 More generally, and by a logical extension of Laplanche's interpretative 
method, if Freud's thought, like its object, conceals or occludes, in its very evolution, the 
most radical elements of its foundation, that is not to say they disappear altogether. The 
truly Copernican discovery of human heteronomy persists long after 1897, albeit in a 
subterranean fashion, moving subtly against the more dominant Ptolemaic grain. Neither 
the narcissistic human subject, nor the post-1897 Freud can wholly conjure away the ghost 
of its forgotten origin. Interpreting Freud with Freud is not about choosing one Freud over 
another (early Freud instead of late Freud, Freud the philosopher instead of Freud the 
biologist... ), but putting the dominant tendencies of his thought `to work', alongside these 
coextensive, if marginalised, threads. 22 This procedure, to make a second clarification, 
marks the supposition I mentioned near the outset: namely, that a Freudian reading is never 
univocal. The charge holds for his readings of tragedy as much as for his conceptualisations 
of subjectivity. Invoking Laplanche's work in order to reconsider three tragedies which 
bore a special significance for Freud is not an effort to supersede Freud's approach to them, 
nor an effort to reinstate it mechanically. It is to attempt to grasp (as we have begun to do) 
understood as a strategic parody of the Ptolemaism it seeks to overturn. 
2' See especially Laplanche and Pontalis (1964). 
22 `Putting Freud to work' is a later description of the same interpretative principal mapped out in 1968. See 
Laplanche (1999A [1992b]) p. 147. On this point, I should add that in the text of the present dissertation when 
I refer to something 'in Freud' or to `Freud' as signator of his corpus, it is to be assumed that what is meant is 
his work in general, across all its shifts. Any appeal to particular portions of his work, or to the different 
organising principles which dominate them will be clearly marked (as for example `pre-' or `post-1897 
Freud') and always with the understanding that such distinctions are, as Laplanche concedes, somewhat 
schematic. 
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the movement in Freud's thought which governs that approach, and (furthermore), `with 
Freud', to begin to move beyond it. 
What, then, is this radically decentred, Copernican origin, which Freud's thought 
and its object work homologously to occlude? 23 
The general theory of primal seduction: otherness and the enigma 
For Laplanche the sexually constitutive function of the external other in Freud's 
special (pathological) theory of seduction must be recognised in terms of its wholly general 
relevance: that is, as a fundamental or `primal' anthropological situation (Laplanche 1987a 
pp. 89-90). The confrontation of the pre-subjectal subject by verbal and non-verbal 
gestures which it is ill-equipped to decode just is structural to its interpersonal existence. 
The relation between the infant24 and the adult world cannot not be asymmetrical. Nothing 
of the pre-subject's psychological development can be presupposed; adult activity, on the 
other hand-and this includes its activity in relation to the infant-bears within it a 
developed psychological complexity (be it normative or perverse). By definition the infant 
is the passive recipient of currents of meaning from the outside, which it lacks the internal 
resources to assimilate properly. 
23 For the following three sections at least, I will be speaking in the broadest terms of some of the fundamental 
tenets of Laplanche's enterprise. He often describes the evolution of his own work in terms of a spiral: a 
series of progressive returns and re-traversals of familiar concepts and problematics. It is in the interests of 
clarity that, with some exceptions, I refrain from overtly referencing and cross-referencing the various books 
and papers by Laplanche in and across which these ideas have, in this way, been developed. My two principal 
resources, however, are his own book-length condensation of his ongoing research (1987a) and the more 
recent papers collected in Laplanche (1999A). 
24 The tern should be taken literally: in fans = speechless. 
28 
Laplanche calls these centripetal intrusions enigmatic messages. 25 The specificity of 
the term `enigmatic' is conceptually vital here. A riddle is posed, as a puzzle, with an 
answer in mind. In Laplanche's terminology, an enigma, which he often ties to the word 
Rätsel in Freud's German, 26 is not consciously posed as something soluble or to be solved 
at all. The enigmatic message is enigmatic in two corresponding ways, tied, ultimately, to 
the structural asymmetry of the adult-child relationship. Firstly, and straightforwardly, the 
adult message, qua adult, will always exceed the interpretative capacity of its pre-subjectal 
addressee. Secondly, however, the adult message, qua deriving from a psychically mature 
other, cannot be assumed not to exceed the intentional capacity of its addressor. The 
enigmatic message, if it is enigmatic to its recipient, is first of all enigmatic to its sender. 
The second point here demands explication. In Freud's special theory of seduction, 
sexuality comes from without. Desire is firmly on the side of the other, the seducer. Now, 
long after 1897 Freud remains intellectually sensitive to the gestures of parental nurture 
which mediate the infant's relation to its own bodily zones ('don't touch yourself there! ' 
etc... ). But the question of the adult's investment in all of this now invariably goes 
unposed. The desire of the other becomes a closed avenue. Laplanche attempts to reopen it 
by insisting that the adult's relation to the child cannot be evacuated of unconscious 
content. The verbal, physical and behavioural messages with which the other confronts the 
child, he argues, will in general always be compromised by the unconscious desire of the 
sender. 27 On the side of the adult other, the enigma of the enigmatic message bears on 
25 This phrase is generally preferable to `enigmatic signifier' with which, strictly speaking, it is synonymous; 
for it remains difficult, after Lacan's formulation of the Symbolic, to speak of a signifier without implicitly 
privileging (or being thought to privilege) verbal communication. Laplanche's focus with the notion of the 
enigma is any gesture, whether verbal or not, with which the other confronts the subject. 
26 It does only appear as a word in Freud, and lacks the conceptual status to which Laplanche has elevated it. 
2' This is, at bottom, a generalisation of Freud's notion of unconsciously compromised signification-the 
parapraxis or slip. See Freud (1901) esp. chapters five and six. 
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everything in the adult's address to the child which is not reducible to its conscious or 
material content. There are three further points to be made in connection with this. 
Firstly: if Freud's tendency after 1897 is to close off or airbrush out the desire of the 
other, then it is, nonetheless with Freud that Laplanche endeavours to reactivate it. The 
enigma model presupposes an important conceptual distinction that persists legibly in 
Freud's German, but which has been lost by his translators and many of his Ptolemaic- 
based adherents. There are, so to speak, two `others' in Freud: der Andere and das Andere. 
The first refers to the concrete other which we have been discussing: the other human being 
in whose orbit the infant, as infant, is primally and necessarily caught up. The second 
denotes the impersonal other, the `other thing', which is to say, the unconscious. With this 
wholly Freudian distinction, the fundamental rule of the enigma emerges as follows: that 
the other (der Andere) and his message are always other to him-/it-self 
Secondly: it is to be shown how this otherness-to-himself of the other (der Andere) 
generates not just the possibility but the necessity of the production of the other (das 
Andere) in the infant. But let us first recognise that if Laplanche's insistence on the primacy 
of the other in this formation sounds Lacanian, it is not. For Lacan the (capitalised) Other of 
the Law is the domain whose structural prohibition inaugurates the constitutive splitting 
(Spaltung) of the subject. 28 The metaphysical character of this formulation is visible in the 
Lacanian aphorism, `there is no Other of the Other' (il nya pas d'Autre de Z'Autre). It is 
clear in this (insofar as Lacan is ever clear) that the bearer of the Law, the one who 
promulgates it, seems to vanish; there is only Law, which-somehow-gets transmitted to 
the subject. With Laplanche's return to Freud's der/das Andere distinction, the emphasis 
rests firmly upon the very process of this transmission and the unconscious compromise 
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which inhabits the real, concrete other's (with a small `o') relation to the infant: there is 
always an other (an unconscious dimension) of the other (mother, father, carer) and of the 
other's message, be it one of prohibition ('you'll have it chopped off! '... ), over-attention or 
anything else. 29 
Finally: what is at stake in Laplanche's return to the seduction theory is clearly not 
an attempt to reassert the reality of traumatic sexual abuse over its refutation by the appeal 
to fiction or fantasy. With the enigma Laplanche moves beyond the polarised terms that 
structure the `recovered'- and `false'-memory debate in order to assert that even the most 
everyday procedures of caring for and relating to the infant are not finally reducible to their 
purely material reality, infiltrated as they are by a traumatic (unassimilable) content. 
Primal seduction and primary repression: implantation, translation/metabolisation 
It is in relation to a third category, neither reality nor fantasy, but what Laplanche 
calls the `category of the message', that the development of the infant's psychical apparatus 
is inaugurated, that he forms psychically: which is to say, he forms an unconscious. 
Whatever his detractors such as Jeffrey Masson believe30 it should be noted that, in 
theory at least, reality and fantasy are not polar opposites for Freud. The Laplanchean 
category of the message is the heir to a domain which Freud calls `psychical reality'. Its 
existence is broached in The Interpretation of Dreams where Freud states his inability to 
28 See Lacan (1958). 
,9 Lacan's aphorism is cited and specifically taken issue with in Laplanche (1987b) pp. 303-4. Its implicit 
failure to recognise the human agency of the transmission of the Law is, of course, an extension of Freud's 
own aforementioned omissions post-1897. Laplanche originally trained with Lacan in the 1950's, but has over 
the years set out his fundamental disagreements with Lacanian psychoanalysis, and his own theoretical 
displacement of much of its conceptual apparatus. Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that the phrase 
`enigmatic signifier', if not its specific Laplanchean conception, is in fact taken from Lacan (1957); see p. 
166. 
30 See note 6 above. 
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say `[w]hether we are to attribute reality to unconscious wishes' (1900 p. 782). We can 
immediately recognise here the discovery told to Fliess in the September letter, that when it 
comes to the unconscious one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been 
cathected with affect. Frequently, in Freud the domain of psychical reality will mean little 
more than psychological or subjective reality: if it feels real to you, it is as good as real for 
analytic purposes . 
31 But Laplanche attempts to reinvigorate the promise of its earliest 
formulations. 
In order to take stock of this attempt we must first elaborate the central role played 
by the notion of Nachträglichkeit (Strachey's `deferred action') in Laplanche's return to the 
seduction theory, and, especially, in his reworking of the concept of primary repression. 32 
Within psychoanalysis, this German term has elsewhere been appropriated in two polarised 
(and, for Laplanche, equally unhelpful) ways: one he labels `determinist', the other, 
`hermeneutic'. The determinist model of Nachträglichkeit supposes that patient material 
(say, fantasy) presented in analysis is causally and directly related to and comprehensible in 
terms of, the factual reality of a past event, which it is the business of analysis to retrieve 
from the annals of the patient's unconscious. The hermeneutic model supposes that the 
material which the patient presents now as being in relation to his past is only a subjective 
construction from the present which he has projected back in time. Thus in the one case, the 
reality of the patient's past governs his orientation in the present; in the other, his present 
31 See e. g. Freud (1916-7 [1915-7]) p. 415. 
32 Laplanche is not the only eminent figure in France to have returned to the temporality of Nachträglichkeit. 
Once again we have Lacan to thank for its having resurfaced at all (1953), although he never attempts to 
develop it in any systematic way. Jacques Derrida (1967) and Jean-Francois Lyotard (1988) have both 
returned to and generalised the concept in different ways which are comparable to Laplanche. While the 
present dissertation makes some small recourse to the work of both thinkers, it does not presume that their 
individual approaches to Freud are interchangeable or would fit together like tessera. The debts and 
differences which inhabit their work on the issue of Nachtraglichkeit alone would demand a thesis (at least) in 
themselves. 
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retroactively governs his past. Laplanche seeks to negotiate a route between these opposed 
models. Let us return to the question of primary repression. 
The formation of the subject's unconscious in relation to the enigma of the other 
again comes down to a structural, even logical necessity. 
Laplanche avers that all mechanisms in the analytic terminology of Freud and 
beyond-introjection, projection, identification, projective identification, denial- 
presuppose a subject: I introject, I project, I deny... None of them, strictly speaking, can be 
considered `primal'. All of them must be secondary procedures insofar as they are 
undertaken by the subject in relation to something in the outside world which must in the 
very first place have impinged upon him: I deny this revelation (which has been presented 
to me); I introject this other person (whom I knew and with whose loss I have been 
confronted). Each psychical procedure presupposes the prior, centripetal registration of that 
which is denied, introjected or whatever else. Each operates in the aftermath of that 
registration. What is primal-that to which the subject responds from the inside-is always 
that which comes from the outside, from the direction of the other. 
The same would have to apply to repression, of course. Thus when Laplanche 
speaks of `primary repression' (which is to say, the formation of the unconscious), it is on 
the understanding that it is the first of the subject's lifelong series of repressions, but that it 
must nevertheless presuppose the prior, primal movement of the other upon which it bears 
secondarily. From this perspective the postulation of a primordial unconscious (an id) is 
clearly intolerable. Laplanche sticks rigorously to the notion of a repressed unconscious, 
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rather than the in-built one, to which other repressions are magnetised, that is the nucleus of 
Freud's second topography. 33 
How, then, does he account for primary repression? 
He suggests that for the infant the other's enigmatic messages are at once exciting 
and baffling. The infant will not know what is being signified, only that he is being 
signified to. He is interpellated by an in-flowing current of (unconsciously conflicted) 
meaningfulness. Laplanche calls this deposit, the delivery of the enigmatic message so to 
speak, implantation. This primal phase is a putting-into-the-inside, from the outside, of 
something which is unassimilable: in effect, a foreign body. The implanted message 
provokes the foundational question: what does the other desire of me? What does the other 
want? It demands active work on the part of its passive recipient. The latter must attempt to 
respond to incoming messages, to interpret them, ill-equipped as he is to do so-(we might 
even say, precisely because he is ill-equipped to understand). What has been put into him 
by the other (der Andere) must be broken down, bound, integrated-in short, made sense 
of. Thus, as with Freud's special theory of seduction, a two-stage process: a primal 
inscription by the other of a message that is enigmatic (and first of all to the other himself), 
and a second phase of reinscription which is the subject's effort to comprehend what has 
been centripetally deposited within. 
It is in the process of this second phase that repression necessarily emerges. In 
accounting for this, Laplanche wholly rejects Lacan's proposal (1957) that repression 
amounts to a substitution of signifiers. The infant's attempt interpret the implanted message 
may be seen in these terms, but for Laplanche the unconscious itself forms around 
everything which cannot be successfully integrated by that attempt. To shore up this 
33 The latter is still to be `put to work', however. See Laplanche 1999C. 
34 
argument, he consistently draws upon one of Freud's earliest theorisations of the 
unconscious, which appeared in a letter to Fliess: `A failure of translation', says Freud in 
December 1896, `-that is what is clinically known as "repression"' (1985 [1887-1904], p. 
208). In Laplanche, the work the infant must do with the enigmatic message is a work of 
translation from verbal and non-verbal adult language. But this labour of translation, like 
translation in the everyday sense, is definitionally imperfect. It entails a remainder, a 
necessary space of non-translation, which Laplanche calls the a traduire (the untranslated 
or, to-be-translated). The unconscious is born of the residue of the translation of the other's 
message, of all that remains un-symbolised, unintegrated by the interpellated infant. 34 
Laplanche will extend this formulation to all subsequent repressions. 
In this account of primary repression we can perceive the importance of a 
generalised notion of the temporality of Nachträglichkeit, or `afterwardsness' (apres coup) 
as Laplanche renders it: its diphasic schema being transposed into the two moments of 
implantation and translation, of inscription and reinscription. We can also see why 
Laplanche is keen to remobilise Freud's use of das Andere to describe the unconscious. The 
latter's genesis is radically, constitutively linked with the external other (der Andere). Das 
Andere is itself irreducibly alien, other, since it comes first and foremost-primally-from 
the intrusion of the other human being. The `inner event' of its formation is the after-effect 
(apres coup) of the external event of enigmatic seduction. 
By way of introducing another of Laplanche's terms for the procedures of 
repression, it is worth making clear that in describing thus the placing within the subject of 
3' In making the very un-Lacanian move of situating the unconscious as the un-symbolised, Laplanche 
remains very much with Freud'. Lacan's famous edict about the unconscious being structured as a language 
is hardly Freudian at all, since, for the latter. the unconscious contains no contradiction, no syntax, and 
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the unconscious as an `internal foreign body', he is not positing a simple transmission of, 
say, the parental unconscious to the child. On the contrary. If it is, in part, the compromise 
of the other's message by his unconscious that makes it enigmatic, it is the enigmatic result, 
precisely, which demands active work by the recipient. Alongside translation, Laplanche 
also invokes the notion of metabolisation. As in the digestive process, as much as possible 
of that which is put inside must be decomposed and recomposed: broken down into its 
constituent parts and reassembled into a completely different entity. Lacanian formulations, 
such as `the unconscious is the discourse of the Other', or `the child is the symptom of the 
parents' miss the profound reshaping, and the remainder produced thereby, which 
Laplanche attempts to articulate in the adult-child relationship. 35 Out of his passivity before 
the seduction of the other, the child is constrained not simply to receive but (secondarily) 
actively to do something with (to translate, to metabolise, to decompose and recompose) 
compromised, implanted signifiers. 
Translation/metabolisation: if they are pertinent not only to primary repression but 
to all subsequent repressions, what do they amount to in concrete terms? In brief and, for 
now, in relation only to the child, all of the domains of active psychical production can be 
situated on this level: representation, fantasy, primal fantasy, infantile sexual theories and 
so on. Indeed, if we are to refuse to rely on the assumption of spontaneous or programmed 
(i. e. deterministic) sexual development, we should also have to situate the Oedipus complex 
in this secondary position: not, then, as an `internal necessity', but as one internal response 
therefore no "language' whatsoever (except, precisely, as thing-presentations). The Lacanian unconscious in 
fact sounds rather more like the Freudian pre-conscious. 
35 These formulae are cited in Laplanche (1999A [1992b]) p. 160. 
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(privileged, perhaps, among others) to parental gestures which come in and are received 
from the outside. 36 
To return to the `third domain' we mentioned above. `Psychical reality', says 
Laplanche, `is not created by me [i. e. the subject]; it is invasive' (1999A [1995] p. 193). If 
the unconscious is generated by and is the repository for the waste-products of 
metabolisation, the a traduire of translation, then its contents relate neither to the empirical 
fact of an event, nor to its sheerly subjective invention. There are events, certainly, and not 
merely retroactive ('hermeneutic') back-projections from the present; but these past events 
cannot be understood in terms of factual reality alone. If, as Freud says, one cannot, with 
the unconscious, distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathected with affect, it 
is because it (the unconscious, conceived as an internal foreign body) consists in the failed 
translations of that which is originally not reducible to material reality but nonetheless does 
not cease to have been an event-namely, the primal exogenous intervention of the other. 37 
The first person singular 
I do not intend to trace Laplanche's entire allogenic `putting to work' of Freudian 
metapsychology. But it must be pointed out that the formation of the unconscious by 
primary repression does not, definitively does not, amount to an addition within the subject. 
There is no subject as such prior to the intervention of the external other and the 
36 With regard to the long passage which we cited from Freud's 1938 Outline, note that although Freud 
separates the issue of seduction from that of the Oedipus complex, he nonetheless remarks that Oedipal 
desires 'follow [... ] inevitably from the factor of the prolonged period during which a child is cared for by 
other people and lives with his parents'. `Inevitably' is the crucial word here. It is an effort to secure the 
Oedipus complex in the realm of programmed universality, and to withdraw it from contingency. And yet, the 
point remains that the Oedipus complex only emerges out of the prolonged relation with the parents. Is it not, 
then, implicit, even in Freud, that the Oedipus complex is a psychical formation which first requires their 
intervention? 
37 We are to return to psychical reality- and the related question of unconscious fantasy in chapter one. 
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corresponding establishment of the internal other. In this regard, I cite Laplanche's essay, 
`Seduction, Persecution, Revelation': 
[I]t is important to emphasise that [primary] repression is a correlate of 
the constitution of the ego, of the entity that says T. We must therefore 
think of a process that is not in the first person, and perhaps not even in 
any person. However, any model [... ] is necessarily exposed to the risk of 
being captured by identity-based thought, which is, in the last analysis, a 
Ptolemaic model. 
(1999A [1995] p. 183) 
That primary repression should be a correlate of the constitution of the ego-the `I'-can 
be demonstrated by insisting upon the generalised notion of apres coup (Nachträglichkeit) 
mentioned above. Quite simply, if we are not going to rely on the essentialism or 
Ptolemaism which came to predominate in Freud, we cannot posit an entity that says `I', 
and that does the repressing, but that would exist prior to the infant's exposure to external 
alterity. It is only by virtue of his passive interpellation by the external other that the infant 
is constrained to respond actively within. The `I' of `I translate', or of `I repress', is brought 
about by this structural constraint to translate (and thus to `repress'-to fail to translate). 
The unconscious is not formed as an entity that is supplementary to the ego; disjunctive and 
at odds as they may be, they are the co-genitive after-effect of a primal intrusion. 
The paradox of this, at the level of the human subject, is central to Laplanche's 
entire enterprise, and will be crucial in the following chapters of the present dissertation. 
The origin of the subject is `Copernican': that is, the subject-as subject-forms in, and by 
virtue of its existence in, the orbit of the external other. Moreover, thanks to the enigmatic 
relations of that orbit, it forms as a subject by virtue of receiving and producing an internal 
other. The subject is thus originarily decentred: decentredness is at its origin (the relation to 
the external other), and is its origin (the subsequent formation of the psychical apparatus, 
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the remaindered production of the `other thing' within). Yet the production of this `other 
thing' demands an autonomous `I' who carries out the producing. The ego, the self is 
established out of the need to translate the message of the external other, and in opposition 
to everything which that translation fails to symbolise and integrate. That is, only in the 
moment of radical and originary self-alienation, necessitated by translation and repression, 
can a self, an `I', be identified, through which the verbs of translation and repression could 
be conjugated. The Copernican origin of the subject is what makes it necessary for there to 
be an `I', but also what makes the first person singular a thoroughly inadequate pronoun. 
The subject is, in Laplanche's words, constitutively ipso- or auto-centric. It forms 
itself as an autonomous self in the very movement which makes it already im-proper to 
itself. It becomes its own centre of gravity by sealing off the external other (the 
establishment of the ego) and sealing in the untranslated/unmetabolised elements of the 
other's traumatising message (the internal foreign body of the unconscious). `I translate', `I 
repress': the otherness which makes these grammatical conjugations possible is utterly 
effaced in that making-possible. The first person of the `I' is provoked by, and by sealing 
`outside' of it (`not-I'), an originary movement which the self-presence and singularity of 
an `I' seeks to mask. 
With regard to `Laplanche's law', we can perceive afresh that the evolution of 
Freud's thought (and, it is Laplanche's charge, psychoanalytic thought in general) is 
ipsocentric in a correlative manner. `Nothing has entered into you from without', Freud 
says to the ego in 1917. From Laplanche's perspective, this repudiation of the exogenous is 
exactly what the ego wants to tell itself The numerous conceptual `foundations' which 
Freud, after 1897, laid for ontogenesis-biology, constitution, phylogenesis, and thus the 
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closing off of the other's desire, the unconscious as/or id which is really only the innermost 
part of you-all of these can be seen to connive at a theoretical level with the subject's own 
egoic belief in its auto-foundation: its-self as its basis and centre. 
If Freud's thought is dominated by Ptolemaism, it is because the object of his 
thought is constitutively and paradoxically dominated by it too. The subject centres itself, 
becomes a subject, in the moment of its radical (Copernican) decentring. 
Stressing this parallel between Freud's thought and its object, and labouring to 
break from their reciprocal ipsocentrism, Laplanche reworks the famous, and fairly late, 
Freudian maxim Wo es war, soll Ich werden (there where there was id shall the ego come to 
be), proposing the alternative: Wo es war, wird (soll? muss? ) immer noch Anderes sein. 
There where there was id, there will be always and already the other (1999A [ 1992f] p. 83). 
In this alternative, es (id) could, of course, be replaced by any `core' foundation of 
subjectivity which psychoanalytic theory offers, or even, again, by the grammatical first 
person. 3' It is, Laplanche argues, the responsibility of analysis to uphold as irreducibly 
alien the otherness (der Andere and das Andere) which is the condition of possibility for the 
`I' that forms itself by occluding it. The task of the present dissertation will be to endeavour 
to bear witness to the irreducible alterities which inhabit our (Freud's) three tragedies, and 
to the specific ways in which they can be shown to resist the exigency of narcissistic 
closure by which Freud's post-1897 thought becomes contaminated. 
Beyond the primal situation: the question of cultural production 
It has already been mentioned that the enigma-translation model pertains not just to 
primary repression but to all subsequent psychical productions and repressions in the life of 
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the subject. Rather than follow the many general routes by which Laplanche demonstrates 
this, let us narrow our focus by drawing things back towards the domain of our central 
concern. What does Laplanche's return to Freud have to contribute to our understanding of 
cultural production? 
We will respond to this under two different, but equally valid, conditional rubrics. 
Firstly: it could be legitimately stated that nothing in Laplanche's mature writing 
engages in detail with a work of cultural production. 39 Nowhere in his corpus, that is, do we 
find a psychoanalysis of, say, a literary text, in the `applied' form that we find, for example, 
in Freud. His reasons for this are set out in a quite recent paper, `Transference: its 
Provocation by the Analyst' (1999A [1992e]), which, along with another, `Sublimation 
et/ou inspiration' (1999B), marks his general orientation with regard to cultural production 
in the most obvious sense of painting, literature, drama etc. 
Applied psychoanalysis, which has been vulnerable to critical attack since its 
inception, is unequivocally rejected by Laplanche. He argues that the schema of 
application, of applying the `clinical' to the `non-clinical', can only be necessary if one 
presumes that Freud's inaugural gesture of founding the analytic treatment has no 
antecedents in human history, no correspondences that are already beyond the clinic. 
Insisting on the importance for Freud's thought of the `non-clinical', Laplanche designates 
a kinship between analytic procedure and certain privileged sites `outside' analysis-the 
foremost of these being, precisely, cultural production. 
This field, he goes on, bears within it-one might even say: as its constituting 
property-a model of what is, for Laplanche, the most radical strain of the Freudian oeuvre. 
38 Which in German is precisely the word for the ego: Ich. 
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For it is the site which is situated from the first `beyond any adequation of means to a 
determinate effect' (1999A [I 992e] p. 224). Artistic creation is a cultural `message', which 
is, by its very essence, enigmatic. The cultural message is addressed to an indeterminate, 
anonymous and multiple recipient; and its reception by this plural and non-specific body 
will by definition produce an effect that is not exhaustively determined by its originator: 
The recipient's relation to the [cultural work] is [... ] different from the 
author's, a partial inversion of it. But [... ] the relation is essential, a 
renewal of the traumatic, stimulating aspect of the childhood enigma 
(1999A [1992e], p. 224) 
It is important to hear both sides in this; for in a sense, they are one and the same. There is 
the recipient and the author: the former being stimulated by the message of the latter, 
interpellated and constrained to respond by interpretation or even (and especially) his own 
cultural work. And that is the point. Such a model of creative production and creative 
response proposes that the author himself will in the first place have been the recipient of 
antecedent cultural messages to which his own is, first, a reaction, or, as Laplanche puts it: 
4a repercussion, which prolongs and echoes the enigmatic messages by which the Dichter 
himself was bombarded' (1999A [1999e] p. 244). In other words, the site of cultural 
production is a re-opening of the subject's originary relation to the other. The cultural 
legacy of any author will always entail the translation or metabolisation of its own heritage. 
The author's work is primarily a reshaping, a reworking of the messages which originally 
interpellated him, be they in the form of particular myths or stories, or more general codes 
of genre, tradition, anti-tradition and so on. The cultural message arrives replete with its 
own de- and re-compositions of the messages of the others that precede it (for it is, as much 
as anything else, a message about and back to them). The stimulating, enigmatic character 
39 1 am deliberately excluding from this claim any reference to Laplanche's doctoral thesis on Hölderlin 
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of cultural production thus has two inseparable bases: on the one hand, the provoking of a 
response which can be neither exhaustively determined nor authorised by the appeal to a 
naive conception of originating intention; on the other, an alterity relating to its own 
forebears (whose work is governed by the same principle of indeterminate reception) 
which, strictly speaking, would make the author's signature as inadequate as the first 
person singular of the ego. 
This is not to say that the singularity of an author or his work gets subsumed. The 
notorious psychoanalytic tendency to efface it (stereotypically, by dragging everything 
back to the hermeneutic nucleus of parricide and incest) can, of course, be traced to 
Freud-but again, and precisely, to a Freud who after 1897 had lost what Laplanche sees as 
the basis for a radical account of the possibility of cultural transmission and individual 
creative production. Once everything becomes pre-ordained and `fated' at the level of the 
subject, one can easily bring to bear a cavalier interpretative determinism on works of 
culture. 40 With Laplanche, the emphasis, as ever, rests on transmission: Interpellation 
brings about singularity. It is the very burden of an enigmatic heritage which requires 
creative, individual production, which demands the singular reshaping that will in turn 
become one constituent of a new and incalculable heritage. Applied or exported 
psychoanalysis cannot function within a Laplanchean framework. The cultural domain, as a 
domain in which the necessity of transmission and translation are the visible mainstays of 
its possibility and endurance, remains `outside' psychoanalysis only so long as 
(1961)-an early text written tinder the direction of Lacan. 
40 Even Lacan, when he attempts to counter the Oedipalising strategy of classical and applied psychoanalytic 
interpretation (1972), remains tied to the notion of the signifier and the Symbolic. In positing the unconscious 
as the repository of a universal Law, he can be seen to return to a structure that is no less transindividual than 
Freud's notion of phylogenesis. If the unconscious just is the discourse of the Other, what is there, at the level 
of the subject, to differentiate your unconscious from mine? one author's from another's? For a critique of 
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psychoanalysis continues to disavow the category of transmission and the role of the 
other(s) in the domain of psychic life. 
So is a `Laplanchean' reading of a cultural work possible? 
This brings us to our second rubric. It could, and with equal legitimacy, be stated 
that Laplanche's entire corpus is nothing less (even if it is also something more) than the 
extended treatment of a single body of cultural work: namely, the Freudian oeuvre. To say 
so is not to reduce Laplanche's respect for Freud the scientist, and it is not to imply that the 
method of reading Freud with Freud amounts to a psychoanalysis of psychoanalysis. 
In a manner that is consistent with the views on cultural production we have just 
sketched, Laplanche situates Freud's work as a site of reception as well as transmission. 
This can be witnessed in two ways. First of all, there are the predecessors who influence 
and the progenitors who take up the Freudian project. We have had too limited a space to 
provide the details of Laplanche's treatment of these; but to name only a few one could 
mention, on one side, thinkers as diverse as Georg Groddeck41 and Arthur Schopenhauer42 
(and, indeed, Copernicus), and on the other side, Klein, Lacan and the ego psychologists. 43 
What was brought to Freud, what in Freud's own heritage he gathered up and laboured (not 
always successfully) to rework and recompose within the parameters of his own singular 
and developing thought these elements, Laplanche argues, inform the insights as well as 
the blindnesses which have been carried forth by his legacy and redeveloped in their turn. If 
applied psychoanalysis cannot obtain within a Laplanchean framework, it is because 
Laplanche's entire framework is built around problematising the `within': the within of 
Freudian-Lacanian transindividualism see Laplanche (1987a) pp. 29-45, and the `Transference... ' paper we 
are presently expounding, pp. 225-6. 
41 See Laplanche (1999C), esp. pp. 142-63. 
42 See Laplanche (1999A [1992fJ). p. 67. 
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Freud's own oeuvre as much as the corresponding object which it is dedicated to 
conceptualising. 
Indeed, secondly and equally, Laplanche's interpretative proposition regarding the 
occlusive connivance between Freud's thought and its object situates the Freudian corpus 
within a more general and, in effect, unendable relation of antecedence which makes 
particular but enigmatic demands with regard to Freud's futural reception. Freud's oeuvre 
is an attempt to think and to master the question of subjectivity-a gesture which is not 
only already `non-clinical' and which predates psychoanalysis, but the very gesture in 
which Laplanche perceives the origin of the subject as such. Freud's legacy is not, for him, 
a clear or univocal message, but one unavoidably saturated by contradictions and 
coverings-over: it expects and demands translation, decomposition and recomposition. It is 
regarded as a product of its received heritage and its privileged object. As itself a source of 
transmission, the singularity of its discovery, for Laplanche, is sought as much in what it 
expresses as what it represses and disclaims. 
I do not wish to reduce Laplanche's corpus to an mere interpretative performance of 
the general theory of seduction; but the parallel is, I suggest, fundamental to his enterprise, 
and offers a fresh and suggestive starting point for any attempt to reckon with Freud's own 
theoretical relationship to cultural production. Bearing in mind the exposition and 
suggestions which we have put forth under our two separate rubrics, let us now attempt to 
delimit what was earlier and only provisionally described as the `methodological' 
procedure of this dissertation. 
43 On these see Laplanche (1987a), esp. part two. 
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Putting Freud to work with tragedy 
Psychoanalysis is not master in its own house. I repeat, though now more fully, the 
first quotation of this Introduction: `Can it not be maintained', says Laplanche, `that 
[psychoanalysis] is originally at home in its reflections on Sophocles, on Shakespeare, on 
jokes? In culture, therefore' (1999A [1992e] p. 221). As the condition of possibility for the 
endurance and renewal of cultural productions, the notions of interpellation, transmission 
and translation antedate their disclosure by early psychoanalytic theory (and thus their 
formalisation, `with Freud', by Jean Laplanche) in regard to ontogenesis more generally. 
Psychoanalysis cannot be exported to culture, since the very persistence of culture already 
and visibly entails the procedures which are at the heart of Freud's most radical, if 
marginalised, discoveries concerning subjectivity. But, moreover, psychoanalysis is, and 
will always and already have been itself a site of cultural reception. It will never be enough 
to say: `Freud and/or psychoanalysis interprets cultural works, like those of Sophocles or 
Shakespeare, in this or that manner'. The activity of interpretation presupposes the 
stimulation and incitement of interpellation. In other words: whatever they produce 
creatively by way of interpretation, Freud himself, and psychoanalysis itself will always 
have been in a relationship to culture which is not extrinsic to the evolutionary laws of 
cultural production themselves. From the very outset-originally-psychoanalysis is, in 
part at least, an active response, a translation (with all its necessary failures) of cultural 
works or messages. It forms and establishes itself in the attempt to master the textual 
enigmas of such `others' as Sophocles and Shakespeare. They are irrevocably lodged, 
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implanted within it-an internal alterity in relation to which psychoanalysis will have 
emerged as it-self. 
The most fundamental assumption in what follows, then, is that if the tragic texts of 
Sophocles and Shakespeare do not `belong' to psychoanalysis, nor are the interpretative 
strategies of psychoanalysis improper or inadequate to them. Sophocles and Shakespeare 
exist originarily and constitutively within the fabric of psychoanalysis, whose interior- 
whose `within'-is already thereby fractured, not fully proper to itself, but indebted to 
these others the messages of whom it has sought to master. 
It follows that our implicit starting point is the charge that in Freud's project of 
seeking to master the textual enigmas of Sophocles and Shakespeare something goes 
unassimilated, gets lost or repressed along the way. It will by now be clear that I believe 
these repressions are bound up with the abandonment of the seduction theory, which was 
announced to Fliess less than a month before Freud wrote to him on 15 October 1897 with 
his interpretations of Oedipus and Hamlet. The work of the following three chapters is 
directed towards articulating and rendering explicit the functions of otherness, the enigma, 
transmission and translation as they operate within our three tragedies themselves: that is, 
those things which I have tried to suggest already structure their own general relation, as 
cultural messages, to psychoanalytic theory. 
For Laplanche the task of the analyst is not, and by definition of course cannot be, 
the attempt to master or to solve the enigmas of the patient's psychic life. The task is one of 
reconstruction. This cannot be understood in a naive sense of mnemic retrieval, of a full 
and exact reproduction of `what actually happened' or `what actually happened when... ' 
For a start, if the unconscious is the repository of psychical reality, then the analyst's 
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bearing towards its contents cannot be governed by the assumption that they are reducible 
only to material events, or to memories that would relate solely to a material reality. 
Between the analyst and the patient-itself a renewed and stimulating relation of subject to 
other-what is to be reconstructed is a process which would include the message, the 
subject's attempt to translate or metabolise it, and what was lost in that effort: 
The aim is not to restore a more intact past [... ] but to allow in turn a 
deconstruction of the [patient's] old, insufficient, partial and erroneous 
construction, and hence to open the way to the new translation, which the 
patient, in his compulsion to synthesize (or, as the German Romantics 
might have put it, in his `drive to translate'), will not fail to produce. 
(Laplanche 1999A [1992b] p. 164) 
It would be both hubristic and irresponsible to identify the project of literary 
interpretation with the task of the analyst in the treatment. These remarks on the process of 
deconstruction and reconstruction remain pertinent, however. In its most general 
orientation, the intention of the present thesis is not to supply a simply alternative or final 
reading of the tragic texts which impact upon Freud. It is not to present them in a `more 
intact' form than Freud left them. It is, rather, to attempt to comprehend how, and by what 
governing principles Freud works to synthesise them with his own, correlatively 
developing interpretative apparatus. On the basis of this, it is to begin to disclose at the 
level of these three great and important texts, what has remained unsynthesised by, and 
unassimilated into the theory. 
The selection of tragedies that I will be considering -Oedipus Tyrannus, Julius 
Caesar, Hamlet-is, therefore, wholly determined in advance by Freud. They are texts 
which had a special importance for him. Moreover, fully in accordance with the dominant 
tendency of Freud's thought after 1897, all three feature what, to be consistent with the 
terms we have already mapped out, can be described as a centring of subjectivity: a 
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principal protagonist's assumption of an identity, and a dramatic reconstruction of the 
epistemological field which makes that assumption possible. Laplanche often calls the letter 
in which Freud disclaims the seduction theory the `letter of the equinox'. The term of 
course refers to the letter's dispatch on 21 September. But it also resonates with the 
astronomical model that Laplanche seeks to reinvigorate, and positions the letter as a sort of 
fulcrum point on which the swing from an exogenous to an endogenous model of 
ontogenesis is hinged. Our three tragedies can be considered analogously `equinoctial'. 
Each is cuspid. Each is positioned, in the context of its production and/or in the historical 
field wherein its drama takes place, at a moment of disjunction, upheaveal, transition. With 
Oedipus Tyrannus we have the dramatic treatment of an archaic legend, onto which is 
transposed the philosophical revolution of Sophocles' fifth-century Athens-a revolution 
which sought to dispose of the claims of ancestry and affirm the egoic sovereignty of the 
rational human subject. With Julius Caesar we are confronted with the second Republican 
revolution of Rome, the assertion of liberty and political autonomy against the infiltration 
of external control in the form of (alleged) tyranny. With Hamlet we have an implicitly 
Protestant framework in which the ostensible failure of the ancestor's message generates a 
hero whose apparent interiority has so often been connected with the inauguration of 
modernity. I will reserve the textual and contextual elaboration of these points for the 
individual chapters themselves. For now it is only necessary to note that the critical heritage 
of all three tragedies, before, with and after Freud, has continued to be preoccupied with 
their articulation and affirmation of `the subject' as autonomous: Oedipus the fifth-century 
philosopher; Brutus the revolutionary libertarian, Hamlet the modern, interiorised human. 
My argument, my `thesis' is that in dramatising the different points of equinoctial 
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transition, each text can be seen to demonstrate the very decentring which makes such 
autonomous closure-or, rather the illusion of it-possible. 
As a final point, I would emphasise the fact that I will be drawing on the resources 
of psychoanalysis generally and Laplanche especially to work towards this end. Not, to 
repeat, in order to reinstate psychoanalytic mastery, but to displace the assumption of 
mastery by putting Freud face to face with the disjunctions and alterities which already 
inhabit these texts but have remained unintegrated by their psychoanalytic recipient. The 
readings which I produce of the tragedies are not, however, `Laplanchean'. Or, more 
exactly, they are Laplanchean precisely insofar as they do not presuppose a hermeneutic or 
programmatically applied system of interpretation which the generic suffix would imply 
(hence the provisional character of our use of the term `methodology') . 
In each case it is a 
question of requiring and allowing the text, in its singularity, to `open the way' towards a 
renewed and developed psychoanalytic approach. 
Parricide and drama 
In the second preface to The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud's first major 
solo publication, and the book in which he begins to set out what will become the dominant 
themes of parricide and incest, he describes the death of a man's father as `the most 
important event, the most poignant loss of [his] life' (p. 47). The loss of the father, this 
`event', is the principal tie which connects our three tragedies; not, however, as a biological 
inevitability, but as a structural necessity which both enables and compromises the 
subject's self, its T. 
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Freud's intellectual relationship to `the space of dramatic representation', as 
Lyotard puts it, is closely bound to the structural importance he accords to the death of the 
father. 44 As early as 1905-6 he records his concurrence with the view that tragic drama 
grew out of sacrificial rites relating to the sacrifice of the goat (tragos) (1942 [1905-6] p. 
122-3). Nearly a decade later, when he returns to the origin of tragedy in Totem and Taboo 
(1913 [1912-3]) it is in the context of laying a `foundation' for psychoanalysis-a basis for 
the psychological origin of the subject which reaches back to the prehistoric period. 
In Totem, he borrows from Darwin the (ultimately mythical) model of the primal 
horde-the primeval tribe of sons, ruled over by a vicious, tyrannical and sexually 
prohibitive father. Freud describes their revenge upon the primal father: united in courage, 
they killed him and devoured him. For Freud, their cannibalistic gesture manifests not only 
the sons' hatred of their tyrant: 
The violent primal father had doubtless been the feared and envied model 
of each one of the company of brothers: and in the act of devouring him 
they accomplished [an] identification with him, and each one of them 
acquired a portion of his strength. 
(1913 [1912-3] p. 203) 
The primal father is murdered in order that the brothers gain their liberty; and yet in 
becoming free of him, they become him-quite literally placing him inside themselves, 
incorporating/internalising him. They are freed from the father in the act of identifying with 
him: they identify with him in order to free themselves. As we will be seeing in more detail 
in chapter two, Freud's account of the immediate aftermath of this parricidal event is 
directed by a logic of apres coup. It is a crime that occurs before, but which is seen to 
'a It was said at the outset that I wish to give only some form of response to Lyotard's question regarding 
Freud's `belief' in dramatic representation. What I have to say here is related solely to the interests of the 
present thesis, and concerns only the intellectual dimension in which Freud tries to think the ritual of tragic 
drama. My comments are in no way intended to displace the imperative nature of Lyotard's more general 
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bring about, the concept of a `crime' (p. 222). 45 Now, it is the brutal collective life of this 
horde which, through the appeal to phylogenesis, Freud will go on to situate as the inherited 
core of contemporary psychic life. 46 But innate memory traces are not the only means by 
which the actions of the horde are shown to persist beyond their immediate provenance. 
Freud argues that the sense of guilt which is, for the first time, awakened by this parricide 
lies at the heart of ritualistic, totemic sacrifice and collective festivals in general. Their 
implicit purpose is to be both a triumphant repetition of the first libertarian deed and a 
commemorative homage to its victim. Tragedy too, he claims, participates in this 
ambivalent replay: a purgative display of suffering and death which is to be enjoyed as well 
as lamented (pp. 217-29). 
I do not, of course, find Freud's view convincing in any literal sense, and I have no 
intention of working through it in detail here. But it is crucial to recognise that he perceives 
tragic representation as both a repetition of and a monument to the inaugural death of the 
primal father-an event in which the sons' free themselves from a paternal and tyrannical 
`other'; but in which that freedom is attained at the paradoxical cost of incorporating him 
and bearing him within. 
It is hardly a coincidence that the three tragedies which are to be examined in this 
thesis as being important for Freud, have the death of a father or father-figure as a central 
motif. My concern is with the gesture of parricide as the event by which the subject-the 
hero-is brought into being as subject, assumes his identity, in relation to it. Within each 
tragedy the echo of the Delphic imperative (Know Thyself) will recur as a possibility only 
questioning of Freud's privileging of theatre as such, nor the project of rethinking psychoanalysis in relation 
to alternative forms of representation. 
4' I snake no attempt to reduce or to justify the problematic character of this formulation. For an extremely 
productive treatment of it see Derrida (1982). 
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in connection with the elimination of the paternal other, be that a real or quasi-symbolic 
gesture. At the centre of the individual argument of each chapter, however, my purpose is 
to demonstrate that the liberty or autonomy which is achieved remains compromised by the 
prior and determinate registration of the paternal other. `Self-knowledge' is made possible 
by the elimination of an alterity which already and constitutively inhabits the interior of, 
and thus fractures the self Incorporation-metabolisation: there is in Laplanche the ghost of 
a suggestion that his own model of the metabola, of interiorising, breaking-down and 
recomposing (in short, psychically digesting) the parental other, might be instructive in 
putting to work Freud's primal myth. 47 It is my intention to bring to bear the paradox which 
Freud describes in the primal crime upon three of the texts which, in the Freudian schema, 
represent its ritual repetition, even if in Freud's interpretations the avenue of the other 
always and nonetheless remains closed. 
Before giving chapter summaries, a further, proleptic point should be made. I have 
already given one or two indications of Laplanche's displacement of the centrality of the 
Oedipus complex. For him it is not an internal or universal necessity, but a secondary 
formation, a creative production which emerges as one means among others of synthesising 
childhood interventions from the outside. The preoccupation with fathers and sons in this 
dissertation is not to be understood, therefore, as a reinstatement of an Oedipal theme. I am 
far less concerned with any hero's `Oedipal' trajectory than with the prior relation to 
alterity on which the hero's subjectivity is first of all based. The Oedipus complex will re- 
emerge, certainly; but I am engaging with the issue of parricide in a `strategic' way, so to 
speak. That is to say, as one expression of a more general and more fundamental question: 
46 See again Freud (1916-7 [1915-7]) p. 415 
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namely as the privileged site of (and one could say: the privileged metaphor for) the 
subject's relation to the pre-existing, external other: his originary dependence upon that 
other and his correlative and constitutive need to seal himself off from (and, in these texts, 
eliminate) that other. Remaining within the limits of these tragedies and the role to which 
parricide is assigned in them, my concern runs the risk of looking andro-, perhaps even 
hetero-centric. I would merely say that, firstly, while the present work is patently 
preoccupied with male characters, its own itinerary is determined by Freud's privileging of 
the texts which it endeavours to re-read. Secondly, that in sticking with this itinerary, it 
does not seek to shut down the questions of sexual difference and sexual dissidence. On the 
contrary, while it does not engage with them directly at all, it nonetheless labours towards a 
more radical perspective within which they might be reopened. I insist, again, on the fact 
that parricide here is a strategic concern. It describes what Laplanche regards as the primal 
relation of subj ecthood. Formations of gender, sexuality or Oedipality remain in a 
productive relation of subjective response to the intervention of alterity: the most urgent 
questions to be posed connect to precisely how such responses are provoked and made 
possible by this radical relation to the other. 48 
Thebes, Rome and Denmark 
I will quickly outline the procedure of the chapters which follow. 
47 See Laplanche's comments on the oral basis of incorporation and the digestive process of egoic 
metabolisation in (1999C) pp. 105ff. and 113. 
" It is worth noting that in Shakespeare studies, feminist texts like those of Kahn (1981) and Adelman (1992) 
have been concerned with the `initiation' of (especially) masculine subjects in tragedy and beyond. 
Illuminating as their work has been, it remains tied to the assumption that the coming into being of the subject 
is an engendering: i. e. the coming into being of a gendered subject. Laplanche, as we have seen, places the 
assignment of gender in a secondary relation to the primal situation of seduction. We cannot understand the 
former without first interrogating the latter. On the theory of seduction and the modalities of sexuality and 
sexual polarisation see Fletcher (2000). 
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Freud's claim regarding the death of the father as the most important event in a 
man's life is biographical. It is invoked in the Preface to the dream book in connection with 
the death of Jacob Freud on 28 November 1896. The Interpretation of Dreams is, as will be 
seen in chapter one, a text written in mourning for Jacob Freud. With this in mind, each of 
the following chapters sets out with an explicit reference to Dreams, and, what is more, to 
the ways in which Freud can there be seen to identify-as a (bereaved) son-with the 
principal `sons' in Oedipus Tyrannus, Julius Caesar and Hamlet. In challenging the 
perceived unicity and self-identity of these tragic figures, I am in no way attempting to 
suggest that Freud's identifications with them are misguided or can be used to pursue a 
psycho-biography of Freud. In each case it is simply a question of acknowledging Freud's 
often implicit gestures of identification, and of attempting to locate within them the 
elements which can in part be mobilised to pursue a more complex reading of filial 
subjecthood than Freud's own explicit interpretative take on the tragedies might seem to 
give. 
I dedicate one chapter to each tragedy. Each chapter has a specific set of concerns 
relating to particular issues in Freud and/or Laplanche, and to the character and heritage of 
the individual tragedy itself The chapters are, however, intended to work on a cumulative 
basis overall; they therefore cross-reference one another in implicit as well as explicit ways. 
Chapter one attempts to extend and develop several of the points raised in this 
Introduction. It proposes a double reading of Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus and Freud's 
appropriation of that tragedy in the service of his elaboration of the Oedipus complex. 
Drawing on Goux (199' 3), it attempts to situate Freud within what Goux calls the 
`Oedipean' heritage of philosophy, and to co-ordinate this tendency with Freud's post-1897 
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Ptolemaic drift. The chapter does not set forth as such another `psychoanalytic' reading of 
Oedipus, but, rather, suggests that in distinction from the myth which it reworks, 
Sophocles' play from the outset problematises and subverts the Oedipean posture of its 
philosophical reception. Through a close reading of it, and with particular attention to the 
enigmatic theological agency of the daimon, I suggest that the text can be shown to `answer 
back' to the presuppositions on which Freud's initial reading of it is based, and to reaffirm 
the allogenic character of the hero/subject's parrincestual transgression. 
Chapter two shifts the focus from the Greek tyrannus to the early modern English 
tyrant and his problematic dramatisation in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar. The tragedy is 
one by which Freud always remained fascinated, and to which he makes many `minor' 
references throughout his published work. My starting point, however, is the question of 
why, in spite of this preoccupation, Freud never ventures a thorough and consistent 
interpretation of it in the way he does for Oedipus and Hamlet. Taking up Freud's 
description of primal tyrannicide/parricide in Totem and Taboo (one text in which 
Shakespeare's play is a palpably absent reference) I argue that Freud's elaboration of the 
`primal crime' is bound to a logic of afterwardsness to whose implications he nonetheless 
remains blind. I propose that Julius Caesar is governed by afterwardsness: in its relation to 
its sources, to the historical event it dramatises, and as regards its own awareness of itself as 
a repetitious textual and dramatic event. The exclusion of the tragedy from Freud's 
principal book on tyrannicide will be seen to be an effect of Shakespeare's own articulation 
of enigma and otherness-forces which threaten the self-presence which Freud is led to 
assign to the primal, parricidal event. 
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Chapter three is concerned with Hamlet and modernity-a connection which Freud 
points out in his first published engagement with the play. It aims to challenge the inherited 
assumption that Hamlet `repudiates' or `forecloses' the ancestral call, by setting alongside 
Old Hamlet's ghostly imperative to his son Laplanche's conceptualisation of the violent 
variant of implantation, intromission. Hamlet will be seen not as a figure of the modem 
subject who is free to forget the dead, but as one who is constrained by the violence of the 
other's message to act out, rather than in, the memory of his dead father. The notorious 
question of Hamlet's interiorised subjectivity, I argue, must be recast in terms of his prior 
interpellation by the Ghost, an event which has a significant correspondence with the text's 
own interpellation by its generic ancestors. Fulfilling the revenge command entails putting 
the father to death for a second time. The parricidal posture which is implicit in the required 
murder of Claudius will be seen as a double bind in which Hamlet's saturated dependence 
on the paternal other is disrupted only by the fulfilment of the other's desire. 
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Chapter One 
Oedipus Tyrannus: Myth, Tragedy and Reading Other-wise 
The action of the play consists in nothing other than the process of 
revealing, with cunning delays and ever mounting excitement-a 
process that can be likened to the work of a psychoanalysis-that 
Oedipus himself is the murderer of Laius, but further that he is the son 
of the murdered man and of Jocasta. 
Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams 
Re-situating Oedipus 
This chapter seeks to propose something more than (another) psychoanalytic 
reading of Oedipus Tyrannus. Its impetus derives from some of the few direct remarks 
which Laplanche has made concerning the Oedipus complex and its privileged role in 
psychoanalytic thought. I cite one of these from New Foundations for Psychoanalysis 
(1987a): 
[... ] the Oedipus complex is in a sense subject to contingency [... ] After 
all, what will remain of the classic Oedipal triangle [... ] in a few decades 
or a few hundred years? Is anyone prepared to bet on the survival of the 
Oedipus on which Freud bases his arguments? Is anyone prepared to 
claim that human beings will cease to be human beings if it does not 
survive? 
(p. 90) 
On the view that ontogenesis proceeds from a primary relation with alterity and the 
invasiveness of the other, the postulation of a non-contingent Oedipus complex is 
intolerable. Although Laplanche has not produced a single, sustained analysis of the 
Oedipus complex, it is clear that it is not for him, as it was for Freud, the `shibboleth' of 
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psychoanalysis. This is not to say that Laplanche rejects it: he acknowledges its prevalence 
and significance, but is concerned to approach it as a secondary formation-secondary in 
relation to the prior, structurally necessary intervention of the human other, and thus as a 
portion of the creative psychical response which that intervention provokes. In analysis, he 
says elsewhere, Oedipal reference should be used not as a hermeneutic key to decode the 
innate and innermost desires of every patient, but in order to `retrace [... ] the paths of a 
structure of family relations offered culturally to the individual since childhood as a 
privileged system of self-theorization' (I 999A [ 1992b] p. 164 n. ]). 
In what follows I will be concerned with Sophocles' text as one, singular version of 
the myth which has given its name to this privileged structure of kinship relations. My 
trajectory will entail intervowen analyses of the myth (in its permeation of Western 
thought) and its specifically tragic rendering. It is my central charge that, in its distinction 
from the myth, Sophocles' tragedy articulates the provoking force behind the Oedipal 
crimes of parricide and incest, in terms of the eponymous subject's more fundamental (i. e. 
primal) relation to an enigmatic alterity. I want to argue that while-and indeed, because- 
Freud's own clinical thought in general can be shown to be strongly oriented by the 
philosophical heritage of the Oedipus myth, it remains blind to the specificity of the 
tragedy. The primal and determining crime of the latter, I suggest, is intersubj ective, and 
features a constitutive inscription upon the passive body of the son by the father, which in 
terms of its collective remembrance in the play, is comparable with the scenes of paternal 
chastisement described by Freud (and since taken up by Laplanche) in `A Child is Being 
Beaten' (1919a). 
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Before re-opening the issue raised in the Introduction regarding how Freud goes 
about interpreting Oedipus Tyrannus, I will begin by outlining a point which, it will be 
seen, is inseparable from it: namely, the privileged relation which Freud perceives between 
himself and Oedipus as thinker. 
The divination of `riddles' 
In the second volume of his biography of Freud, Ernest Jones (1967) relates the 
occurrence of a `curious incident' on the occasion of Freud's fiftieth birthday. A group of 
his adherents in Vienna presented him with the gift of a medallion carrying on one side a 
profile of Freud in bas-relief, and on the other a Greek design of Oedipus answering the 
Sphinx encircled with an inscription taken from Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus: 
`O1 TA KAEIN' AINIFMA T' 'HIiHKAI K, PA TIE TOE 'I NANHP. 
Jones offers the following translation: `Who divined the famous riddle and was a man most 
mighty' (1967 p. 15). 1 It is a somewhat overdetermined rendering, one which perhaps 
mystifies, in the verb `divine', the intellectual skills of both Freud and Oedipus in the face 
of their respective `riddles'; but we will have cause to address the significance of this in a 
moment. In any case, Jones tells us that at the presentation of the medallion when Freud 
read the inscription, 
he became pale and agitated and in a strangled voice demanded to know 
who had thought of it. He behaved as if he had seen a revenant, and so he 
had. After [Paul] Federn told him it was he who had chosen the 
inscription Freud disclosed that as a young student at the University of 
Vienna he used to stroll around the great Court inspecting the busts of 
former famous professors of the institution. He then had the phantasy, not 
1 Jones attributes the translation to a colleague named Dr. Hitschmann. 
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merely of seeing his own bust there in the future, which would not have 
been anything remarkable in an ambitious student, but of it actually being 
inscribed with the identical words he now saw on the medallion. 
(p. 15) 
Forty-nine years later, and ever loyal to Freud, Jones 'fulfil[led]' the `youthful wish' of the 
founder of psychoanalysis by adding to the bust of Freud that had since been erected in the 
University Court the same Sophoclean inscription as that on the medallion. `It is', he tells 
us, `a very rare example of such a day-dream of adolescence coming true in every detail, 
even if it took eighty years to do so' (p. 15). 
This wish fulfilment, as it is referred to by Jones who acts like a belated deus ex 
machina to bring it about, adds another ring to a concentric pattern of `riddle-solving' 
which is legible in this brief but significant anecdote. Let us go back a few stages in order 
to break it down into its three principal moments. The first concerns Oedipus' solution 
('divination' as Jones wants to call it) of to klein' ainigmata. The line from Sophocles, cited 
and translated in Jones's text, is lifted from the final Choral speech in the Exodos of the 
Oedipus Tyrannus (1525). What is at stake here is of course Oedipus' solution to the 
(famous) riddle of the Sphinx-an event which is moreover connected with the other 
riddles that confront the hero in the course of the tragedy: the identity of Laius' killer, the 
origin of Oedipus' birth, and, what is the sum of these two, the riddle of his very identity: 2 
Tiresias: This day shall be your parent and your destroyer. 
Oedipus: How riddling and obscure in excess are all your words! 
[hös pant agan ainikta kasaphe legeis] 
Tiresias: Do you not excel in answering such riddles? 
Oedipus: You taunt me in matters in which you shall find me great! 
(43 8-441) 
The second moment might be described as Freud's identification with Oedipus as 
riddle-solver. It is a dynamic, which as other commentators have noted elsewhere, persisted 
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throughout Freud's career, and, as Jones's anecdote suggests, seems to have preceded 
biographically the discovery of psychoanalysis as such. 3 In her article `Oedipal Textuality: 
Reading Freud's Reading of Oedipus' (1986), Cynthia Chase points out that the writing of 
The Interpretation of Dreams takes form both consciously and unconsciously as an 
`Oedipal' endeavour. No less than Oedipus' inquiry, she argues, Freud's investigation into 
dreams is undertaken in relation to and for the sake of the (dead) father. In the second 
Preface, Freud offers the dream book as `a portion of my own self-analysis, my reaction to 
my father's death' (Freud 1900 p. 47; cited in Chase 1986 p. 58). If Oedipus' tragic career 
is definitively marked with the confrontation by and `divination' of riddles, so too is 
Freud's, and from the moment he first asks himself in just what the compelling power of 
Sophocles' play resides. 4 `Freud riddles', says Chase: `Do dreams have a meaning? What 
meaning? Why is it distorted? And in the course of interrogating the significance of dreams 
he comes to interrogate the significance of audience response to dramatic presentation, and 
the particular riddle of the universal effectiveness of the Oedipus Tyrannus for generation 
after generation of audiences' (Chase 1986 p. 58). The Interpretation of Dreams-a 
foundational text for psychoanalytic theory-thus addresses itself to the riddle of the riddle: 
the riddle of why the riddle of the Phocal crime should be so absorbing. The riddle of 
dreams and of the extraordinary power of the Oedipus play intersect and become explicable 
for Freud in terms of the theory of wish fulfilment and the `internal necessity' of 
parrincestual desire. `[Oedipus'] destiny moves us', Freud explains in 1900, `only because 
it might have been ours-because the oracle laid the same curse upon us before our birth as 
2 We will have more to say about these connections below. 
3 Rudnytsky (1987) has a good deal to say on Freud's identification with Oedipus, including the medallion 
incident. In his biographical account, however, he also traces Freud's privileged relation to the tragedy much 
further back than 1900 or even 1897: see esp. pp. 11-12. 
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upon him [ ... 
] Here is one in whom the primeval wishes of childhood have been fu filled' 
(Freud 1900 p. 364, emphasis added). Thus, writes Chase, Freud answers the riddles before 
him `by the discovery of repression and by positing the unconscious' (Chase 1986 pp. 58- 
9). Oedipus fulfils our desire no less than do our dreams. A practical psychoanalysis, Freud 
argues in the famous passage which we have cited as an epigraph, will, therefore, resemble 
the action of the play; the analyst who divines the riddle of the analysand's dreams will 
enact, as did Oedipus, `a process of revealing' (Freud 1900 p. 363). In sum, then, Freud's 
reading of Oedipus, and the terms in which his analysis is couched, constitute both a deeper 
explication and a singular repetition of the achievement of Sophocles' hero as it is summed 
up by Sophocles' Chorus: the solution of the klein' ainigmata. 
The third concentric ring entails, as we have said, the addition that Jones makes to 
the bust of Freud in Vienna. This gesture, no less than the presentation of the medallion in 
1906, implies the further identification by his colleagues of Freud with Oedipus. That is, 
the augment Jones gives the Viennese statue seems to betray a complicit investment in the 
notion of Freud-as-Oedipus, an institutionalising inscription of the riddle-solving 
endeavour of Freud and, what is more, perhaps of psychoanalysis itself Oedipus solves 
riddles, Freud solves riddles and the riddles of riddles, and, on the authority of his 
solutions, the practising analyst will continue along the same trajectory `divining' the 
riddles of the analysand in order to engage a `process of revealing'. 
Is there not, however, in Jones's description of his respectful gesture a kind of 
circular irony set in play that works against this institutional shoring up of Freud as riddle- 
solver, and indeed against the Chorus's summation of Oedipus as just such a diviner? 
Contrary to what Chase's argument might imply there is, as we will see, a great deal of significance in the 
fact that The Interpretation of Dreams is not the first arena in which Freud poses this riddle. 
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Oedipus, son of Laius, of course `divine[s] the famous riddle'; Freud in his turn divines the 
riddle of the riddle of the extraordinary force of the tragedy that bears the hero's name. 
Oedipus' destiny, Freud says, moves us because it could have been ours; the riddle of the 
play's effectiveness can be solved by a psychoanalytic understanding of the mind and of the 
experience of seeing its deepest desires played out: Oedipus fulfils our `primeval wishes' . 
The answer to the riddle of the riddle lies with wish fulfilment. And yet, how does Jones 
describe the monumental entrenching of Freud as riddle-solver-the addition of the 
Sophoclean inscription to the bust-except as precisely... a wish fu filment. Certainly 
Jones's benevolent but belated gesture attempts to consolidate the identification of Freud 
with Oedipus. But does not his description of this act put the contrary into play as well? In 
other words, does it not allow us legitimately to ask whether Freud really does divine the 
riddle of Sophocles' play (in terms of wish fulfilment) or whether the possibility of 
divining such a riddle is itself no more than a wish fulfilment, a dream? 
As we will see, what is ultimately at stake in this anecdotal reference is the very 
inadequacy of the term `riddle' to describe the provocative demand of the Sphinx. As was 
pointed out in the Introduction, a riddle presupposes the possibility of its being 
satisfactorily answered and thus solved. An `enigma' (which has its definitive root in the 
Greek ainigma that appears in Sophocles' text) is that which demands a response which 
will always be inadequate, which will always carry a certain remainder. An enigma cannot 
be `solved' because the logic behind an enigma can never be exhaustively revealed. As we 
move now to consider the comparable intellectual paths taken by Freud and his 
identificatory hero Oedipus, we will continue to invoke the term `riddle' in relation both to 
the Sphinx's question and to the status of Sophocles' text as a `riddle' for Freud. We will 
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continue in this, but only in order, eventually, to disclose its absolute redundancy. It is, we 
will suggest, precisely and specifically the enigmatic character of that which Sophocles' 
Oedipus is thought to have `solved' which constitutes his tragedy, and which problematises 
and interrupts Freud's indentificatory and interpretative `solution' to the text. 
Freud and Oedipus: comparable methodologies 
Let us begin our investigation by addressing our first quibble regarding the 
translation offered by Jones of the line from Sophocles. The verb reproduced by Jones to 
translate Bide (from oida, to know) is `divine'. We have not called this substitution an 
instance of mistranslation but of overdetermination. To divine can be to perceive, to 
understand, even to conjecture. But the verb is also freighted with mysticism: to divine is to 
prophesy, to make out or interpret by supernatural or magic insight what is hidden, obscure 
or unintelligible to ordinary faculties (OED, sense 1); and it remains rooted etymologically 
to the Latin divinus (from divus, a god). Our objection is that both Freud and Oedipus 
before him find cause to define the methodology of their own riddle-solving by the 
constitutive rejection of any such mystified origins of thought; a rejection which the root of, 
and the associative burden carried by, Jones's rendering will not tolerate. 
Freud solves the riddle of dreams. In the first chapter of The Interpretation of 
Dreams Freud presents a survey of the existing literature on the subject, or at least that 
which has any claim to being 'scientific'. He offers only a brief paragraph on `the 
prehistoric view of dreams', because it has less to do with science than with foretelling the 
future (1900 p. 58). The peoples of prehistory, he acknowledges before moving swiftly on, 
treated dreams as `revelations from gods and daemons'; the position adopted towards 
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dreams by philosophers during this period was thus `naturally dependent to some extent 
upon their attitude towards divination in general' (1900 p. 58). Freud's survey only begins 
in detail, then, with Aristotle, for whom dreams had `already become an object of 
psychological study' (1900 p. 58). He recalls Aristotle's famous demystification of the 
`daemonic' in the Divinatore per somnum. Here the philosopher describes dreams- 
especially veridical dreams-as `daimonic, but not divine [e gar physis daimona, all' ou 
theia]'(Aristotle 1996 463 b14-15): not divine because they do not come from any 
supernatural agent, but daimonic (daimona) simply because they nevertheless give the 
impression that they do. 5 As David Gallop has glossed this passage: `A supposed prevision 
of some event that actually happens is uncanny. For it is just as if some agent had warned 
us of its imminence [... ] But nothing of the kind is really true' (Aristotle 1996 463 b14-5 
n. ). Freud will return to Aristotle's insight in the last chapter of The Interpretation of 
Dreams. There he tells us that the respect paid to dreams in antiquity is `based upon a 
correct psychological insight and is the homage paid to the uncontrolled and indestructible 
forces in the human mind, to the "daemonic" power which is the dream-wish [... ]'; in other 
words, all that, he says, `which we find at work in the unconscious' (1900 p. 775). From the 
beginning to the end of the dream book, then, Freud-following Aristotle-is attempting to 
articulate his project (the interpretation of dreams) in a manner definitively opposed to the 
mystification of divination, instead locating the `daemonic' force recognised in antiquity 
before Aristotle firmly in the unconscious. Not only can the riddle of dreams not be solved 
by the appeal to external agencies; but the psychoanalytic method of doing so is elaborated 
in a space from which supernatural agencies have been definitively exorcised. 
5 Daimon is, of course, the Greek root of 'daemon'. 
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Oedipus solves the famous riddle of the Sphinx. But from the evidence presented in 
the play, Sophocles' Oedipus would appear to wish, no less than Freud, to operate in a field 
of thought that is exclusively 'rational'. During the Prologue the Priest, whom Oedipus has 
asked to speak on behalf of the children gathered before his palace, appeals to Oedipus to 
repeat now the exemplary greatness he showed in defeating the `cruel singer' on his arrival 
at the city (36). That victory, he says, proved Oedipus to be the `first of men' when it came 
to `dealing with the higher powers [daimones]' (34); and now it is said and believed that 
Oedipus was at that time given `extra strength [... ] by a god [theos]' (38). Oedipus makes 
no immediate response to this. Instead, he stakes his claim to independent endeavour during 
his argument with Tiresias. Once he has browbeaten the prophet into revealing what he 
claims to know (namely, that Oedipus is himself the killer he seeks) Oedipus begins to 
disparage his interlocutor's supposed insight as a diviner. He takes as his ammunition 
Tiresias's impotence in the face of the Sphinx: 
Why, come, tell me, how can you be a true prophet [mantis]? Why when 
the versifying hound was here did not you speak some word that could 
release the citizens? Indeed, her riddle [ainigma] was not one for the first 
comer to explain! It required prophetic skill, and you were exposed as 
having no knowledge from the birds or from the gods. No, it was I that 
came, Oedipus who knew nothing, and put a stop to her; I hit the mark by 
native wit [gnome], not by what I learned from birds or from the gods 
(391-6) 
The speech represents not only a personal attack on the prophet; it is also an attack on his 
art, the staging of an opposition between two very different kinds of understanding. 
Oedipus denigrates Tiresias' traditional mantic wisdom, the knowledge revealed in external 
signs sent by the gods. But he also opposes to it his own gnome, a term laden with scientific 
and philosophical significance in fifth-century Athens. 
6 It describes his modern, sophistic, 
6 See Knox (1957) p. 125 
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capacity to reason, 7 to think for himself and figure things out: his `native wit' as Lloyd- 
Jones neatly translates it. Oedipus does not need to look outside himself for the answer to 
the Sphinx. Her riddle, so he claims, could not be solved by an appeal to divine agencies. 
Now there is an ostensible dissimilarity at the heart of this parallel between the 
exclusively non-divinatory modes of reasoning propounded by Freud and by Sophocles' 
tragic hero. Freud's principal concern is to exorcise original mysticism (the daimonic) from 
the riddle which is his object of study, namely the dream. The riddle does not emerge from 
a daimonic source. As we know, however, in the Oedipus Tyrannus Sophocles makes it 
explicit in the Priest's plea that the Sphinx is herself a daimon (34); therefore Oedipus' 
pronouncements on his own gnome appear to refer only to his ability to solve her riddle 
without help from the birds or the gods. The daimonic source of the riddle does not seem to 
be called in to question. This ostensible discrepancy, however, in fact encloses a far more 
radical connection between the methodologies of Freud and Oedipus in answer to their 
respective riddles than we have hitherto suggested. In order to identify it let us first briefly 
attempt to situate Sophocles' play historically and culturally. 
Deprojection: the defeat of the Sphinx 
Bernard Knox (1957), in a book part of whose project was to disentangle Oedipus 
Tyrannus from psychoanalytic interpretations, writes that Sophocles' Oedipus, in his 
character and mode of action, is inseparable from the extraordinary intellectual revolution 
of fifth-century Athens. 8 This radical enlightenment was marked by the birth of a new 
confidence in the power of man's rational activity and the affirmation of a secular view of 
7 On Sophocles' use of the word gnome and its relation to sophism see Gould (1970, trans. ) 398 n. 
8 The thesis is also taken up in a more recent text by Goldhill (1986) pp. 199 if. 
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human progress and the human condition. As its emblem commentators have often 
appealed to the celebrated Choral `Ode to Man' in Sophocles' Antigone, 9 with its 
encomium to the civilising power of `formidable' man as the master of nature. Man has 
conquered the earth, the sea, wild beasts, even sickness by his own knowledge (sophos) and 
skill (rechne); with speech and thought he has created the pinnacle of civilised achievement, 
the polis; and man has `taught himself these virtues. It is no coincidence, as Knox shows, 
that also during the course of the Oedipus Tyrannus Oedipus will be metaphorically 
presented as helmsman (conqueror of the sea), ploughman (conqueror of the land), and 
hunter (pursuer and tamer of wild nature) (Knox 1957 p. 111). Sophocles' treatment of the 
Oedipus myth explicitly identifies the hero with the ego-centred revolution of the fifth 
century. Oedipus is an autodidact who claims to succeed by native wit alone; a Periclean 
tyrannus whose right to the crown of Thebes is not inherited but won. 10 He is a 
philosopher; he defeats the Sphinx not with violence, like Bellerophon who kills the 
Chimaera or Perseus the Gorgon, but with intelligence, gnome. Oedipus refuses traditional 
wisdom. Instead his speech is riddled with the vocabulary which characterises the 
unparalleled critical and creative activities of fifth-century science, philosophy, and 
medicine. He questions, examines, infers; his progress is marked by human endeavour, not 
by signs divined from the birds and the gods. Protagoras the sophist, Knox recalls, had said 
that `Man is the measure of all things'; and what is Oedipus' answer to the Sphinx, but 
`Man' (Knox 1957 p. 110)? 
Knox reads this intellectual revolution as the narcissistic movement of 
`anthropocentrism' (p. 110). But it represents more. There is, as Jean Joseph Goux has 
9 See lines 33-332-375. 
10 On the similarities between Oedipus and Pericles see Knox (1957) pp. 23,63-4 and 77. 
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argued in Oedipus, Philosopher (1993), a crucial distinction to be made between 
anthropocentrism and the new posture taken on in the intellectual disciplines during the 
fifth-century. Radical upheavals in philosophy, art and politics evince rather what Goux 
calls the posture of anthropocentring: 
For it is no longer a question of unwittingly attributing human qualities to 
the world, of projecting onto being an array of motives, feelings and 
intentions that belong to the human soul alone [which is implied by 
`anthropocentrism']. Quite the contrary, it is a matter of recognising that 
such projections have already been made, and of withdrawing those 
investments that had charged the universe unduly with human pathos, in 
order to restore them to the self 
(p. 119) 
The earliest evidence we have of this movement is offered by Xenophanes of Colophon, 
who, Goux tells us, `recognizes that the gods (at least the gods as people imagine them to 
be) are only projections emanating from man [... ]"The Ethiopians [says Xenophon] say of 
their gods that they are snub-nosed and black; the Thracians claim that they have blue eyes 
and red hair"' (Goux 1993 p. 119). The withdrawal of projections leads to the recognition 
that the beings earlier viewed as supernatural are products of the human imagination. Man 
realises himself not simply as the egoistic centre of the universe but also as the source and 
agent of all that has been projected onto it. Thus for the first time man discovers the world 
as an object (rather than a sign) and comes to situate himself as subject. Socratic dialogue, 
democratic debate, foreshortening in painting, optical correction in architecture-all these 
developments manifest the taking into account of the unique viewpoint of a thinking, 
perceiving, desiring subject (p. 121). If the mythical Oedipus' answer proves fatal to the 
versifying hound, 
it is because [says Goux] the answer `man' typifies the anthropocentring 
move whereby all gods, demons, or other monsters are recognized as 
mere products of the human imagination, related back to man, and thus 
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disavowed as independent beings with powers of their own. She does not 
have to be killed in bloody hand-to-hand combat [... ] Oedipus has only to 
withdraw his projective belief by reducing every enigma to man, by 
establishing man as the unique source and agent; that is all it takes to 
make the Sphinx vanish before his eyes. 
(p. 120) 
The aforementioned comparison between Oedipus and Pericles is revealed to be yet deeper 
in an anecdote told by Plutarch. When a sudden eclipse of the sun terrifies Pericles' 
helmsman, the Athenian leader places his cloak before the helmsman's eyes and explains 
that the eclipse is caused by no more than the intervention of an opaque object like the 
cloak. The helmsman is, says Goux, given a lesson in perspective. Pericles teaches him to 
regard the universe not as a series of celestial hieroglyphics whose meaning must be 
divined by a seer, but as subject to the laws of optics. Pericles triumphs over `the sacred 
terror of darkness' with a wisdom that runs counter to that of the diviners; `[a]nd in this 
respect his intellectual victory [... ] has the same meaning as Oedipus' triumph over the 
Sphinx' (p. 129). For `[b]y situating himself as a viewpoint on the world', Goux tells us, 
echoing Protagoras, `as the central and unique measure of all things, man simultaneously 
acquires the objective view that solves all riddles, calms all terrors, hurls all Sphinxes into 
the abyss' (p. 129). 
Let us be clear that Goux claims to be concerned less with Sophocles' tragedy than 
the myth on which Sophocles' draws and the cultural milieu which defines the intellectual 
stance of the hero that inhabits his tragedy. Goux suggests, then, that when the mythical 
Oedipus answers the Sphinx, and when Sophocles' Oedipus talks about his past victory 
(and his future enquiries) like a fifth-century philosopher, the very nature of that first 
victory, of the answer `Man' that he gave, cannot simply be read as a triumph over the 
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Sphinx on her own terms, but as a deprojection of belief in the daimonic character of the 
riddle's origin. 
If the riddle-solving postures of Freud and Oedipus seem to overlap further in this 
reduction of daimonic origins, however, it is no question of fortuitous similarity. In fact for 
Goux, Western thought at least since Descartes has founded itself on the deprojective 
posture, and Freud too is caught in its lure. If we are to attempt to understand this claim, we 
must first trace Goux's argument concerning the myth of Oedipus in a little more detail. 
The monomyth and its `Oedipean' perversion 
There is inadequate space here to give Goux's thesis the detailed critique that it 
deserves. Let us simply note that for him Oedipus' story is a mythic anomaly which, since 
the Enlightenment, has become as it were the perverse and retrospective primal scene of 
Western philosophy. Goux presents a contrastive mythological analysis of Greek myths of 
royal investiture-Perseus, Bellerophon, and Jason. In all of these he finds the following 
sequence of motifs: (1) An oracular warning is given to the present king that a male child 
(the hero-to-be) is a threat to his life. (2) The young hero escapes from the murderous 
intentions of the king. He flees or is sent to grow up elsewhere, until he comes into conflict 
with a new 'father-king who, fearing for his own life assigns the hero a dangerous task or 
trial. (3) The trial takes the form of a violent confrontation with a (female) monster. The 
hero succeeds with the help of a god, a sage, or his future bride. (4) The hero's triumph 
over the monster enables him to marry the daughter of the king. 
What concern us immediately are parts 3 and 4. The fourth episode insofar as it 
involves marriage to the daughter of a king confers on the trial which leads to it the status 
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of an initiatory passage bearing the symbolic force of matricide. By reference to structural 
anthropology, Goux demonstrates that the essential dimension of the masculine puberty 
rite, becoming a (heterosexual) man, consists in the symbolic death of the mother's child 
and his renaissance into the paternal milieu as the son of his ancestors. It entails, he argues, 
a violent separation from the mother, and an incorporation into the fathers' world with the 
acquisition and status of `manhood' that makes marriage and procreation possible (p. 42). 
Now in heroic myths the young hero's combat with the dangerous female monster typically 
allows him to liberate a woman and acquire a kingdom. Goux traces this motif to its earliest 
form and shows that the confrontation originally involved the actual ingestion by the 
monster of the hero, who thus kills her from within only to be victoriously regurgitated. 
The hero is both the one who is swallowed, who dies symbolically, and the one who kills 
the swallower; so that on the one hand his victory over the monstrous female can only be 
achieved once he has undergone a symbolic death, and on the other, part of him dies, so to 
speak, with the monster. To be sure, the myths in Goux's analysis present moderated 
versions of this extreme configuration of the male rite of passage. " But what is significant 
is that in this `monomythic' structure, as Goux calls it, the killing of the monster remains a 
decisive phase in the itinerary of the hero; the one which makes possible the liberation of 
the woman: `at the moment of victory over the monster and thus at the moment of initiatory 
renaissance, the young woman is always liberated and obtained in marriage' (p. 47). 
In the case of the Oedipus myth the father-king indeed receives an oracular warning 
of impending danger from his son, and Oedipus is left exposed and brought up in Corinth 
't E. g. Bellerophon kills the Chimaera by dropping lead into her mouth, which melts in the heat of her own 
breath. She remains killed `from within'. Goux also mentions an Attic vase painting that shows Jason being 
regurgitated in front of Athena by the dragon who guards the 
Golden Fleece. 
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as the child of Polybus and Merope. And the Sphinx certainly conforms to Goux's 
requirements as the mother-monster that must be at once courted and conquered. He states: 
[... ]a seductive woman and a devouring dog [... ] The Sphinx, and not a 
father, is the being to whom is imputed the torture and death of the son- 
because of the desire she arouses. It is [... ] significant that in certain 
versions, the Sphinx is held to be an animal that makes young people 
uneasy because of the sexual relations she would seek to have with them. 
Here can be read the young man's dangerous desire for negative, dark, 
animal femininity [... ] [The initiand] has to experience the fact that his 
own desire for the dark mother is lethal. It is this confrontation alone that 
allows, after a symbolic death, the hero's rebirth with a new identity. 
(pp. 36-7) 
But for Oedipus there is no trace of the trial imposed by the second king. Rather there is an 
altercation with the true father, Laius, which in fact leads to parricide. The killing of the 
Sphinx is not an assigned task: `Oedipus braves the encounter of his own free will' (p. 11). 
But it is also not even a killing. The Sphinx, appalled by the audacity of the man who is 
able to think of the answer to her riddle, simply commits suicide. There is no violent 
confrontation, no warrior's daring. Oedipus remains singularly unseduced by the Sphinx, 
and the bride-prize is his own mother. `It is as if , Goux claims, `explaining the riddle was 
not a complete and adequate trial, not sufficient to endow the hero with the full capacity to 
marry the princess' (p. 11). If Oedipus fulfils the fourth phase in a perverted fashion 
(incest) it is because he has failed to undergo fully the trials of initiation. Rather he has 
`short-circuited [the Sphinx's] disturbing charms with a well-chosen word [Man]', which 
amounts not to necessary monstricide but to the `intellectual avoidance of seduction by the 
monster, and the philosopher's dispensation from the task of murdering her' (pp. 37-8). In 
Goux's analysis at least-and this claim will prove crucial to our subsequent argument- 
Oedipus will not be initiated into the kinship of the fathers; rather, he murders his father, 
then in his encounter with the Sphinx asserts the autonomy of his own reason. Thus, Goux 
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states, Oedipus emerges not, as for Freud, as the emblem of a universal pattern of desire, 
but as a skewed version of the norm: `it is the monomyth (in its amply attested universality) 
and not the singular history of Oedipus that contains the truth of masculine destiny and 
desire' (p. 31). 
We will return to this bold statement later in the chapter. For the moment we may 
note that according to Goux his analysis of what he calls the `Oedipean' posture-the self- 
bastardising, autodidactic avoidance of initiation-makes it possible to trace its later 
appearances conclusively. `Oedipus', he argues, `is the inventor of this new posture 
destined for a great future that singularizes the West' (p. 163). Its presence in Freud's own 
intellectual heritage is palpable. In order to grasp this, let us resume the question of 
philosophy and its relation to Oedipus. 12 
The Oedipean posture of philosophy 
Goux identifies the Cartesian revolution, Descartes' setting himself up as a thinker 
with no master but himself-cogito ergo sum-as being radically bound to Oedipus' 
subversive anthropocentring undertaking (pp. 159-63). But it is Hegel, in his Aesthetics 
(183 5) who first explicitly mentions Oedipus and identifies him as a fully inaugural figure 
for philosophy; and we will not be surprised to find that, as Freud will claim in The 
Interpretation of Dreams seventy years later, the career of Oedipus, for Hegel too, stages a 
process of revealing: 
The Sphinx propounded the well-known conundrum: What is it that in the 
morning goes on four legs, at mid-day on two, and in the evening on 
three? Oedipus found the simple answer: a man, and he tumbled the 
Sphinx from the rock. The explanation of the symbol lies in the absolute 
12 In the interests of space and clarity Goux's detailed and complex account of the Oedipean posture taken by 
Western philosophy must be rather abbreviated. See Gout (1993) chapters eight and nine. 
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meaning, in the spirit, just as the famous Greek [Delphic] inscription calls 
to man: Know thyself. The light of consciousness is the clarity which 
makes its concrete content shine clearly through the shape belonging and 
appropriate to itself, and in its [objective] existence reveals itself alone. 
(Hegel 1835 p. 361) 
For Hegel, Egyptian works of art are obscure; a symbol or a hieroglyph does "`not signify 
[... ] itself but hint[s] at another thing with which it has affinity and therefore relationship"' 
(Hegel 1835; cited in Goux 1993 p. 164). Egyptian symbolism lacks the autonomy of an 
idea that is clear and transparent to itself, disallowed from operating in the pure realm of 
`the spirit'; it is rooted in the materiality of the symbolised object. The Sphinx bearing a 
riddle, and herself, as hybrid, mired in an animal materiality, thus becomes representative 
of this regime of what Hegel calls the `unconscious symbolic' (Die unbewusste Symbolik). 
But Oedipus, who confronts and ostensibly defeats the Sphinx, finding the answer in 
`Man', makes the monstrosity of unconscious symbolism vanish; consciousness of self is 
`revealed', following the Delphic imperative (gnöthi seauton), above and beyond the 
materiality of its origin. Oedipus `moves beyond' unconscious symbolism, Goux states, 
[b]y making man the source of all meaning. That is why Hegel purely and 
simply identifies Oedipus's response, `man' (the position of an essential 
anthropocentring before the alterity of the enigmatic), with the 
Apollonian and Socratic formula `know thyself. The light of 
consciousness, which is consciousness of self, obliterates all enigmatic 
alterity, suppressing the dimension of the unconscious. 
(Goux 1993 p. 165) 
Goux's term `suppressing' is vital here. After Hegel his student Ludwig Feuerbach 
will radicalise the Oedipean posture yet further in order to absorb all transcendence and 
reclaim for man all that he has inappropriately transferred onto imaginary beings: `the 
absolute dissolution of theology into anthropology' (Feuerbach 1843; cited in Goux 1993 p. 
168). But it is not until Nietzsche that philosophy will begin to understand that its primal 
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Oedipean scene has been misrecognised, that its `tragic core [... ] and the irreducible 
obscurity that it maintains' have to be realised (Goux 1993 p. 171). On his descent from the 
mountain Zarathustra, like Feuerbach, is disabused of illusions of the divine: `this god 
whom I created was man-made and madness, like all gods! Man he was, and only a poor 
specimen of man and ego' (Nietzsche 1883; cited in Goux 1993 p. 170). The father is 
overthrown: God is dead; man realises himself as sole creator and, thus newly inflated, 
becomes `superman'. Freed from his erstwhile attachment to the illusion of Heaven, the 
superman sets himself the supreme goal: the conquest of the Earth. Goux presents the 
analogy of this project with the full horror entailed in the extreme fulfilment of 
anthropocentring in the following way: `the Son has killed the Father; he has used his 
Reason against all the Mysteries, and, having taken the Father's place he is laying claim to 
mastery and possession of Matter' (Goux 1993 p. 176). Nietzsche had said as much from 
the outset in The Birth of Tragedy (1872). Hegel did not take full account of the tragic 
character of Oedipus' story. Nietzsche's thought encompasses and affirms the horrific 
counterthrust and aftershock that is the logical consequence of that Oedipean position: 
I see this insight as quite clearly present in the terrible trinity that shapes 
Oedipus' fate: the man who solves the riddle of nature-of the dual 
natured Sphinx-must also, as his father's murderer and his mother's 
lover, transgress the sacred codes of nature. 
(Nietzsche 1872 p. 47) 
It is of no surprise, then, that Freud appeals to Oedipus as and when he does. It is 
hardly an unprecedented move. Quite the contrary; the implicit identification of Freud with 
Oedipus in The Interpretation of Dreams-his posture of riddle-solving and his postulation 
of the `daemonic' as no more than the internal processes of the unconscious-in fact takes 
place in a space that is opened up by the Oedipean gesture, at least in so far as it has been 
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understood by philosophy since Hegel. Freud's relation to the tragic hero is thus more 
profound, and more complicated, than perhaps he or Ernest Jones was aware. By aligning 
Freud with his philosophical predecessors Goux suggests that Freud, after Nietzsche, 
rediscovers the horror entailed in the inaugural Oedipean gesture that was disavowed by 
Hegel, and re-inscribes it in terms of a dynamic and topographic logic. If consciousness of 
self is founded on the suppression of the Sphinx, the unconscious comes to figure the dark 
pulsional-parrincestual-side of that response. `It is as if, Goux argues, 
the unconscious of the human subject has taken the place-which had 
become collectively vacant-of modes of symbolising that had been 
historically surpassed, and has relocated that place in itself, on that `other 
stage' where, cut off from the clear light of consciousness, those 
symbolizations remain active. 
(p. 178) 
Of course, Goux registers what he considers to be the limitation of Freud's discovery of the 
Oedipus complex in the latter's attribution of the castration threat to the human father rather 
than the monster-mother who is attested in the monomyth. For the present, however, let us 
simply note that we have circled back, albeit with a deeper insight, thanks to Goux, to an 
important statement that we cited from Cynthia Chase. She claims, we recall, that in The 
Interpretation of Dreams Freud answers the riddles before him `by discovering repression 
and by positing the unconscious'. Goux does not mention the dream book; he tells us, 
though, that `the interplay of the conscious and the unconscious'-the eruption into 
consciousness of parapraxes, symptoms, dreams-is the `continuous disappearance of the 
Sphinx, and her return, with the persistence of the twofold instinctual destiny that her 
unaccomplished murder promises and activates' (p. 178). If Freud does articulate the 
project of interpreting dreams along the lines of Oedipus' riddle-solving career, it is 
because the possibility and the necessity of that project were established by the Oedipean 
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posture. For this reason, and having disclosed all that Freud's Oedipean heritage had 
foreclosed, Goux, like Chase, tells us that `[i]t is no surprise that Freud discovers the 
unconscious and the Oedipal drives at the same time' (Chase 1986 p. 179, emphasis 
added). 
Deprojection? The Oedipean and the Ptolemaic 
Now the deprojective (Oedipean) turn ostensibly permeates, and certainly troubles, 
Freud's thinking in its entirety. As early as 1901 Freud proclaims that `a large part of the 
mythological view of the world, which extends a long way into the most modern religions 
is nothing but psychology projected into the external world (Freud 1901 p. 321). It is of 
course an insight which derives from his experiences with neurotic, hysteric and psychotic 
patients-whose illnesses, before the advent of psychiatry, had been attributed to daemonic 
possession. 13 As Laplanche points out, Freud's book on the origin of religion Totem and 
Taboo furnishes one of the most comprehensive discussions of projection. Comprehensive 
precisely in that it presents us with a continuum, going from the perception of so-called 
bodily sensation, said to be what creates the external world, to paranoiac projection 
(Laplanche 1999A [ 1992d] pp. 246-7). Laplanche takes up the moment in Totem and 
Taboo where Freud enters into a dialogue with his colleague Wilhelm Wundt on the 
ambivalence of the `primitive' notion of taboo, as something that is both sacred and impure. 
Wundt suggests an originary concept of `the demonic': `the objectified fear of the 
"demonic" power that is believed to lie hidden in a tabooed object' which only later splits 
into veneration and loathing (Freud 1913 [1912-13)] p. 77). Freud makes a simple and 
profoundly rationalist objection, however: `Neither fear nor demons can be regarded by 
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psychology as "earliest" things, impervious to any attempt at discovering their antecedents. 
It would be another matter if demons really existed. But we know that, like gods, they are 
creations of the human mind' (p. 78). For Freud, veneration and loathing are from the 
outset divided; the ambivalence of the signifier is secondary, for him, to an originary 
ambivalence of the drives (Laplanche 1999A [1992d] p. 245). The pathological process in 
paranoia, says Freud, makes use of the same mechanism: 
Spirits and demons [... ] are only projections of man's emotional 
impulses. He turns his emotional cathexes into persons, he peoples the 
world with them and meets his internal processes again outside himself- 
in just the same way as that intelligent paranoiac, Schreber, found a 
reflection of the attachments and detachments of his libido in the 
vicissitudes of his confabulated `rays of God'. 
(Freud 1913 [1912-13] p. 150)14 
The deprojection of metaphysics back to metapsychology, however, is, as 
Laplanche has continued to demonstrate, not so much a solution to the riddle of theogeny as 
a displacement of the idealism that metaphysics entails. Marx had already launched an 
analogous attack on the Feuerbachean resolution of religious essence into human essence, 
on the grounds that human essence is itself not an `abstraction inherent in each single 
individual [... but... ] the ensemble of the social relations' (Marx 1845 p. 157). Any account 
of projection necessitates a description of the prior-indeed primary-insertion (or 
`implantation') into the projecting subject of what it is that he comes to expel before 
meeting it again outside himself. Laplanche's Copernican reading of Freud, while it 
explicitly operates on a different register, can nevertheless be seen as a continuation of 
Marx's critique. He notes that as early as 1956 F. Pasche and M. Renard had raised an 
13 On the homology between neurosis and religion see esp. Freud (1907) 
' -' Daniel Paul Schreber and the evidence of his ! Memoirs are the subject of Freud's major treatise on 
psychosis (1911 [19101). In the above citation, Freud is explicitly invoking Schreber's hallucinogenic 
projections onto the outside world of a psychological crisis perceived by Freud as being purely internal. We 
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objection to the idealism entailed in the thought of Melanie Klein by situating projection at 
the origin (cited in Laplanche 1999A [1992a] p. 133). `Everything comes from the interior; 
objects, whether good or bad, only emerge [... ] like rabbits or doves, from [a] magic box of 
tricks' (Laplanche 1999A [1992a] p. 133); but, as we saw in the Introduction, this tendency 
within psychoanalysis pertains first of all to Freud. The centrifugal expulsion entailed by 
projection is, Laplanche points out, a process whose subject, both grammatical and real, is 
`the subject' himself (p. 134). To deproject, to repatriate gods, demons and monsters-be 
they the pantheon of `primitive' gods or the God of Schreber's paranoid mind-back into 
the human breast is therefore to suppose the subject's primary plenitude; to displace their 
originary existence to within the subject, without ever accounting for the (centripetal) 
movement which constitutes the projecting subject as subject in the first place. 
Let us suggest, then, that the Copernican/Ptolemaic tension that Laplanche identifies 
in Freud's thinking is in part co-ordinated by the Oedipean heritage that is traced by Goux. 
In order to clarify this point, let us re-cover, as rapidly as possible, and try to develop, some 
material familiar from the Introduction. 
The radicalness of the other at the heart of Freud's discovery, at least as Laplanche 
reads it, is essentially its double character. That is to say that before 1897 the unconscious 
is elaborated as the result of repression; it is constituted as an internal foreign body Das 
Andere: the other thing in us which is put inside us by the (human) other: Der Andere. 
Laplanche concedes that it is only in the most schematic way that we might wish to date 
Freud's Ptolemaic going-astray (fourvoiement) from the letter of the equinox (21 
September 1897), for both these terms will persist long after 1897, and Freud will not cease 
will be returning to the question of inside/outside 
in relation to (ipsocentric) psychoanalytic conceptions of 
psychosis in chapter three. 
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to affirm the alien character of the unconscious (Laplanche 1999A [ 1992f] pp. 60-65). 
After 1897, however, the dominant tendency, on the other side of Freud's Copernican 
advances, is to relativise the discovery: to `reintegrate the alien' under a constant `pressure 
to return to self-centredness' (Laplanche 1990A [1 992fJ pp. 65-66). In 1917, when Freud 
sets forth his claims regarding the Copernican blow to human narcissism committed by 
psychoanalysis, he tells us that the revolutionary discovery of his science is that `the ego is 
not master in its own house'; it has been displaced by the discovery of an internal alien, 
whose impulsive force feels like `a foreign invasion' (Freud 1917 pp. 141-2). But he says 
that psychoanalysis seeks to explain these `uncanny' disorders by assuring the subject that: 
`Nothing has entered into you from without; a part of the activity of your 
own mind has been withdrawn from your knowledge and from the 
command of your will... [Y]ou do not recognise it as a derivation of your 
own rejected instincts. 
(p. 142-3 emphasis added) 
As in his argument with Wundt, Freud's logic here is profoundly rationalist: the subject is 
not possessed by foreign or daemonic forces: in spite of how it feels, everything comes 
from the inside. But in this conception, the internal other (the unconscious), stripped of its 
radical alterity, becomes nothing more than the receptacle of those instincts rejected by the 
subject; and there is no room at all for any conception of the originary (human) other: 
`nothing has entered into you from without'. At once his own Ptolemy and his own 
Copernicus Freud simultaneously announces the radical alterity entailed in his discovery 
(the subject's constitutive otherness to itself) and reduces it to an ultimately accessible, 
knowable, part of the subject. '' It is, then, crucial for us to recognise that the moment in 
which the subject is thus recentred, when Freud's original proposition of constitutive 
15 As Laplanche points out: `Certainly the ego is not master of its own house, but it is, after all, at home there 
nevertheless' (Laplanche 1999A [1 992f] c p. 67). 
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alienness gives way to the conception of a closed, auto-centred subject, is also the moment 
in which the uncanny alterity of evil spirits, daemons and gods becomes rationalised, can be 
reduced without remainder, that is, to a projection of metapsychology which already, 
originarily, belongs to the subject. It is hardly coincidence that Freud should echo the 
Apolline imperative that Hegel invokes in his celebration of the triumph of Oedipean 
reason: `Turn your eyes inward, look into your own depths, learn first to know yourself 
(1917 p. 143, emphasis added). Everything becomes clear, knowable, reducible to an ipso- 
centric mechanism-and the work of a psychoanalysis becomes `nothing other than a 
process of revealing'. 
We cite for a second time this passage from The Interpretation of Dreams, in which 
Freud compares the work of analysis to the action of Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus, 
because Freud solves the riddle of the riddle of that tragedy according to the same 
Ptolemaic/deprojective logic: his `Oedipal' reading of Sophocles' text is thoroughly 
'Oedipean'. 
Freud tells us in The Interpretation of Dreams that a `tragedy of destiny 
[Schicksalstragödie]' is one whose `tragic effect is said to lie in the contrast between the 
supreme will of the gods and the vain attempts of mankind to escape the evil that threatens 
them' (Freud 1900, pp. 363-364). The lesson learned by the spectator of such a tragedy is 
one of `submission to a divine will and recognition of his own impotence' (p. 364). Freud's 
consistent definition of Sophocles' play as an instance of Schicksalstragödie, and the role 
that it plays in his elaborations of the Oedipus complex, have long been noted. 
16 In this 
connection, for my part, I will simply insist on a point which was raised in the Introduction. 
There, we cited two crucial passages in which Freud addresses Oedipus Tyrannus: his first 
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(from October 1897) and his last (from 1938). In both, let us recall, Freud raises the 
question of Schicksal or destiny in Sophocles' text as a hypothetical objection to his 
interpretation, only to reassimilate it into his interpretative regime: 
I have found, in my own case too, [the phenomenon of] being in love with 
my mother and jealous of my father, and now I consider it a universal 
event in early childhood [... ] If this is so we can understand the gripping 
power of Oedipus Rex, in spite of all the objections that reason raises 
against the presupposition of fate; and we can understand why the later 
`drama of fate' [Schicksalsdrama] was bound to fail so miserably. Our 
feelings rise against any arbitrary individual compulsion as is 
presupposed in Der Ahnfrau and the like; but the Greek legend seizes on 
a compulsion which everyone recognizes because he has felt traces of it 
in himself. Every member of the audience was once a budding Oedipus in 
fantasy. 
(Freud 1985 p. 272) 
[The] essential substance [of the Oedipus complex] is to be found in the 
Greek legend of King Oedipus, which has fortunately been preserved for 
us by a great dramatist [... ] The ignorance of Oedipus is a legitimate 
representation of the unconscious state into which, for adults, the whole 
experience has fallen; and the coercive power of the oracle, which makes 
or should make the hero innocent, is a recognition of the inevitability of 
the fate [Schicksal] which has condemned every son to live through the 
Oedipus complex. 
(1940 [1938] pp. 422-427) 
As we know, each of these passages articulates the interpretation of Oedipus in a space 
which definitively does not pertain to seduction: the first, since it emerges less than a month 
after the letter of the equinox; the second, since Freud speaks of the play only in relation to 
the Oedipus complex-a factor of infantile life to which, he has already claimed, `a higher 
degree of significance' attaches (1940 [1938] p. 422). And both passages follow the same 
movement: the tragedy of Oedipus appears to reveal something about childhood sexuality 
in general; there is an objection-that Oedipus acts against his manifest intentions, that it is 
not his desire but the alien desire of the oracle that he fulfils; but, Freud insists, we can 
9. 16 See Starobinski (1967); Bronfen (1995) p. 12; Winter (1999) pp. 55-5 
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make sense of this because the `fate' that drives him is only a manifestation of unconscious 
desire (one that is general, common to everyone). In Freud's response to the objection we 
can of course recognise the very posture which Goux calls deprojection-the external, 
supernatural force which manifestly drives Oedipus is in fact no more than a figure for 
something that is already and only within the hero's own mind. 
Thus for Freud the Sophoclean tragedy becomes assimilable to the Oedipus 
complex only insofar as the totality of what drives the hero `from the outside' can be 
reduced to `internal pressure'. I stress, with and after Freud, that the tragedy of Oedipus and 
the complex that bears his name appear within Freud's writing in the manifest absence of 
the seduction theory for two reasons. Firstly, because the deprojection of fate and the oracle 
which Freud's reading necessitates, signifies a totalising gesture on his part, which a theory 
of the unconscious based principally on repression (rather than a preformed sexual 
constitution or an innate id) will not tolerate. If Oedipus Tyrannus so moves us, Freud 
claims, it is because it seizes on a compulsion that `Every member of the audience was once 
a budding Oedipus in fantasy'. Fate and the oracle, in the tragedy, constitute the distorted 
register not simply of Oedipus' or of Sophocles' unconscious but of `the unconscious'-a 
universal, transindividual dimension. '7 Secondly, because in Freud's own accounts of the 
evolution of his thought he does not hesitate to concede that his interpretation of the 
Oedipus play was preceded by a reinterpretation of the subject in a parallel manner. In his 
17 This totalising move carries its own aporias as to how it is that Freud conceptualises the role of unconscious 
desire in the process of composition. For at no point does he decide whether what makes Sophocles' hero 
representative of adult desire is Oedipus' ignorance or 
Oedipus' Ignorance. That is to say: Freud's solution to 
his own hypothetical objection consistently leaves us wondering, does this `distortion' belong to the ethos of 
the hero-as if he were a being with his own psychological make up, or is it a function of the prior 
arrangement of the muthos, out of which 
Oedipus emerges, himself uncontaminated by the repression which 
characterises `human' adults of whose unconscious 
desire he becomes representative after the fact'? For two 
answers to this question, both radically opposed, yet 
both authorised b,, - Freud's account of the play, see 
Vernant (1988b), and Starobinski (1967). 
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Autobiographical Study (1925 [1924]) he tells us of the `error' into which he once fell as a 
result of having believed the stories of seduction told to him in analysis. At last he was 
`obliged to recognize that these scenes of seduction had never taken place and that they 
were only fantasies which my patients had made up'. 
When I had pulled myself together I was able to draw the right 
conclusions from my discovery: namely, that the neurotic symptoms were 
not related directly to actual events but to wishful fantasies, and that as far 
as the neurosis was concerned psychical reality was of far more 
importance than material reality [... ]I had in fact stumbled for the first 
time on the Oedipus complex. 
(pp. 217-8) 
In this oversimplification of the shifts which took place in 1897 Freud states his `error' as 
having been one of `imputing to the "outside" something that concerns the "inside"' 
(Laplanche and Pontalis 1964 p. 9). According to Freud (retrospectively at least), the 
seduction scenes recounted by neurotics are no more than the defensive and projective 
distortions of the positive component of the Oedipus complex: nothing has entered into 
them from without. 
Freud's Ptolemaic going-astray (fourvoiement), then, both facilitates and is 
facilitated by the Oedipean posture of deprojection that he unabashedly takes on in the 
name of scientific reason. Yet the reduction of fate to the unconscious made in the service 
of solving the riddle of the riddle of Sophocles' tragedy will succeed only in displacing the 
riddle elsewhere: namely, `back' into the primordial constitution of the subject. The 
idealism that this entails is perhaps nowhere better expressed than in Freud's case history of 
Little Hans, where the patient poses a serendipitous question to his father after Freud has 
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introduced the notion of the Oedipus complex into his analysis: `Does the Professor talk to 
God, as he can tell all this beforehand? ' (Freud 1909a p. 204). 18 
The reality of the message: a child is being beaten 
If we are to move beyond this idealism, however, and re-approach Oedipus 
Tyrannus from a renewed psychoanalytic perspective, we must be prepared to `put to work' 
the category of psychical reality in which Freud, in the Autobiographical Study, situates 
`wishful fantasies'. In that text, it is called upon not, as it might be, to disrupt the opposition 
of fantasy/reality, but to shore it up in the service of explaining the subjectively- 
experienced power of fiction or fantasy as against the force of material reality. Laplanche's 
reworking of this third category, in relation to his theory of the enigmatic message, opens 
up a perspective from which to see outside the Ptolemaic-deprojective logic which governs 
Freud's reinterpretation of the subject after 1897, and his corresponding approach to 
Sophocles' `tragedy of destiny'. 
In his paper `Between Determinism and Hermeneutics: A Restatement of the 
Problem' (1999A [1992b]) Laplanche returns to Freud's famous work on masochistic 
fantasies `A Child is Being Beaten' (1919a). Here'Freud attempts to account for the 
vicissitudes entailed in the sexual fantasy brought to analysis by several patients in whom 
the Oedipal attachment to the father had developed into an adult perversion. It can be 
summed up, at least in the final form that it takes, as `a child is being beaten'. The 
fantasising child's role at this stage is simply that of `looking on' (1919a p. 186). This is, 
however, only the third stage in a complexly developed series which Freud attempts to 
break down into the following schematic sequence: 
'8 Cf. Laplanche (1999A [I 992b]) d p. 160. 
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1) My father is beating a child (a little brother or sister) 
2) I am being beaten by my father 
3) A child is being beaten (I am probably looking on). 
Only phases one and three are directly accessible to consciousness. The second phase, `the 
most important and momentous of all', Freud says, is inaccessible-an unconscious fantasy 
which `has never succeeded in becoming conscious. It is a construction of analysis, but is 
no less a necessity on that account' (p. 185). As to the first stage Freud 'hesitate[s]' to call 
it a fantasy and inclines towards deeming it real: `It is perhaps rather a question of 
recollections of events which have been witnessed, or of desires that have arisen on various 
occasions' (p. 185). This real scene is variable in its details, and perhaps because of this, 
bears witness to having been lived. 
Laplanche concentrates on the relation between the first two scenes. Crucially, he 
notes that Freud calls the second scene an `original fantasy' (ursprüngliche Phantasie). 
This term shows that for Freud fantasy proper only begins with the second scene, but also 
that it works against the conception of primal fantasies based on a transindividual heritage: 
`An unconscious fantasy may thus be 'original' without ceasing to be the product of an 
individual process and without any need to refer to the archetypal and the unconscious of 
the species' (Laplanche 1999A [1992b] p. 156). This discovery allows Laplanche to return 
to the additions with which Freud elaborates the description of the first scene. Freud tells us 
that here the child being beaten is usually a little brother or sister whom the fantasising 
child hates. He therefore reformulates the first phase as: My father is beating a child 
(brother-or-sister)/whom I hate/he loves only me'. Thus contrary to Freud's attempt to 
situate the first phase as the recollection of material reality, it is clear that the real events 
that have taken place between the family protagonists are something quite different from 
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material sequences. `If a little brother or sister is being beaten in the presence of the child', 
Laplanche avers, `it is not like beating an egg-white in the kitchen' (p. 156). The beating 
scene is presented to the child; the father is addressing himself to the spectator. `My father 
is beating a child/whom I hate/he loves only me': These elaborative elements are not simply 
factual or perceptual components of the scene. `We are perfectly safe in proposing', 
Laplanche says, `that [they] constitute [... ] an interpretation or, more precisely, a 
translation, made in the past by the child and reconstructed in the analysis: [... ] My father 
is beating [in front of me] the child [little brother-or-sister] whom I hate. "It means [das 
heisst] : My father does not love this other child, he loves only me" (Freud 1919 p. 187)' 
(Laplanche 1999A [1992b] p. 157). 
For Laplanche, the term `interpretation' `lends itself too readily to the facile 
explanations of hermeneutics'; whereas `translation' facilitates the notion of the (enigmatic) 
message: `What is translated, specifically, is not a natural, or even an historical sign, but a 
message, a signifier or a sequence of signifiers. In order for there to be a translation, 
someone must have meant something' (Laplanche 1999A [1992b] p. 157). If 
psychoanalysis lost the structure of transmission after the abandonment of the seduction 
theory it is because `psychoanalysis with and since Freud has omitted to note that 
repression and the unconscious exist in the other before being present in the child' (p. 158). 
This blindness, Laplanche points out elsewhere, leads to the striking implication in all of 
Freud's case histories that the fathers of Freud's patients `have no unconscious' : `At the 
origin of the Oedipus complex [as Freud describes it] there is no Oedipus complex' 
(Laplanche 1999A [1992b] p. 190. The act of, say, beating one child in front of another is 
culturally and unconsciously freighted, primarily on the side of the father who is doing the 
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beating. He may mean to say `Disobedient children must be punished' or `you [the 
onlooking child] are better behaved than he is... '; but, Laplanche suggests, he `barely 
knows that he means something like "spare the rod and spoil the child"' 19-an ambiguous 
phrase in which the poles of loving and punishing merge, and behind which Laplanche 
finds deeper sado-masochistic messages: `Loving means beating, sexually assaulting, 
having intercourse with... ' (1999A [1992b] p. 190). The child may translate this message 
as `My father does not love this other child, he loves only me'. But the obscure sado- 
masochistic aspect of the message is lost; and it is this failure of translation that forms the 
(inaccessible) unconscious fantasy. The sexual significance of beating is therefore not 
generated spontaneously out of guilt and regression in the child's unconscious, but is 
already at work in the unconscious (Das Andere) of the beating father (Der Andere): in the 
other of the other. 
What is, for us, vital in Laplanche's reading of fantasy is that with this 
conceptualisation of the psychical production of a remainder in the subject he 
simultaneously reactivates Freud's notion of psychical reality and the structure of 
transmission that was relinquished with the seduction schema. Psychical reality, in 
Laplanche's reworking of Freud, describes the nature and the effects of the other's 
message. This latter is not, for its originator, reducible to its consciously intended meaning, 
but compromised in relation to the originator's otherness to himself. For its recipient, this 
enigma is necessarily subject to translation and elaboration, such that the fantasies which it 
provokes, while they may relate to the witnessing or experience of a material event, are in 
their turn not reducible to its pure materiality. 
19 In French: Qui aime biers, chatie biers: who loves well punishes well. 
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It follows, then, that the work of an analysis cannot be reduced to a `process of 
revealing'. For it can only entail a `reconstruction' which `relates to something other than a 
history of pure events' (Laplanche 1999A [1992b] p. 163). Analysis, as was said in the 
Introduction, must consist in the reconstruction of a process which includes the message, 
the attempt to translate it, and what was lost in that translation. Insisting on the importance 
of this task, Laplanche appeals to the Greek etymology of Freud's enterprise: ana-lysis- 
undoing, unloosening, de-constructing; for the aim of reconstruction `is not to restore a 
more intact past [... ] but to allow in turn a deconstruction of the old, insufficient partial and 
erroneous construction, and hence to open the way to the new translation' (1999A [ 1999b] 
p. 163). 
We have reached a kind of paradox. On the one hand, Laplanche's thesis forces us 
to reconsider Goux's claims that the unconscious and the Oedipal drives are coincident 
discoveries for Freud. To begin with, the very existence of the translation model as early as 
1896 (Freud 1985 [1887-1904] p. 208)20 bears witness to the limits of any such claim: the 
notion of repression at least was not absent before 1900 or even before 1897. The Oedipal 
drives are discovered by Freud-the external fate that compels Sophocles' Oedipus 
becomes intelligible for Freud-in the period when he reformulates his views on the origin 
of symptoms, fantasies, drives, of sexuality in the subject, in a way which will become 
progressively grounded in phylogenesis, biology, and the primordial id. We have in spite 
of, and indeed because of, this attempted to situate Freud in terms of a specific 
philosophical heritage for which the riddle-solving Oedipus has stood as an inaugural figure 
"' That is, the important passage cited in the Introduction: `a failure of translation-that is what is clinically 
known as "repression"'. 
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precisely and perversely on the grounds of his transgression: Oedipus the son-husband, the 
parricide, the autofoundational philosopher; Oedipus who claims no heritage and who relies 
on his `native wit'. On the other hand, our examination of Freud has moved in the opposite 
direction by attempting to retrieve from their obscurity some of those components in his 
thinking which Laplanche has shown must be mobilised into a schema of translation and 
transmission. Are we then to assume that the tragedy of Oedipus, as Freud reads it, is 
incompatible with the Copernican trend in Freud that Laplanche has sketched? Quite the 
contrary: Freud's very failure to answer the riddle (of the riddle) of Oedipus completely and 
without remainder discloses a great deal more about Sophocles' play and, in turn, about 
psychoanalysis than Freud was able fully to grasp. 
Goux's deprojective turn 
In order to articulate this it is necessary to make some remarks regarding one 
further, fundamental difference in the Oedipus myth, upon which Sophocles' text draws, 
from the structure of Goux's monomyth. Of the four exemplary mythemes which are 
entailed in the make up of the monomyth, the second is, we have noted, that the hero, 
having been brought up by a substitute father-king, is assigned by the latter a task or trial 
(which will lead to the hero's bloody confrontation with the mother-monster). Significantly, 
Goux elaborates this `imposition' of a trial as being in fact no imposition at all. He notes, 
for instance, that in the case of Jason, Pelias asks the mono-sandalled hero what punishment 
he would impose on someone who had conspired against his king. Jason replies that he 
would send him off to retrieve the Golden Fleece; and this 
is what Pelias promptly orders 
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him to do. 21 Similarly, it is only after everyone else has told Polydectes that the most 
appropriate gift for their king would be a horse that Perseus boasts of how he would fetch 
the head of Medusa if necessary. This then becomes the task which the king enjoins him to 
undertake. Thus, the young hero, says Goux, `indirectly and unwittingly, sets the task that 
will be imposed on him as if it corresponded-although without his knowledge (and 
initially displaced onto someone else)-to his innermost desire' (Goux 1993 p. 13). Unlike 
the prohibitive role assumed by the father in psychoanalytic theory, `in the monomyth, 
authority of the paternal type [... ] is not opposed to the masculine subject's radical desire 
[... it] instead allows its realisation' (p. 43). While the monomyth, therefore, appears to be 
organised around the sequence matricide - marriage, the Oedipus myth is organised 
around the sequence parricide - incest. Oedipus, who ostensibly avoids the initiatory trial, 
emerges from Goux's contrastive analysis not as the emblem of a universal pattern of desire 
but as a distorted, skewed version of the norm: `it is the monomyth (in its amply attested 
universality) and not the singular history of Oedipus, that contains the truth of masculine 
destiny and desire' (p. 31). Freud's formulation of the Oedipus complex-of Oedipus as a 
`representative' of unconscious desire-would thus seem to be a monumental blunder: the 
elaboration of a `universal' structure on the basis of a myth that in fact perverts and 
transgresses the normative trajectory of masculine desire. 
For beneath the impulse to avoid initiation [the Oedipean impulse], there 
is a still more fundamental desire to be initiated, to accept the task 
imposed, to confront severance (death, the trial, the cutting blade that kills 
the monster-mother but also, painfully, frees the hero form her) in order 
to be reborn, delivered. 
(p. 31) 
`' Cf. Apollodorus (1992) 9.16,108-109. 
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So, the Oedipean transgression is not simply a question of shifting the co-ordinates of the 
initiatory trial (where parricide comes to replace matricide), but, more fundamentally still, a 
transgression of what Goux's description of that shift presupposes: namely the masculine 
subject's `fundamental desire to be initiated'. 
There are two things in particular to note at this juncture. Firstly, that for Goux the 
hero's desire is primary. The trial in the monomyth is not so much `imposed' on the 
masculine subject as initiated by him, then authorised by the jealous father-king. What is 
constitutively absent from Oedipus is this very primary will to subjectivity which would 
appear to characterise the monomythic hero. Secondly, that for Goux the fundamental 
figure of this male desire, and its terror, is the mother. By making the castrating father the 
locus of male anguish, Goux states, Freud `unduly humanises the cause of the break; he 
deprives it of its prehuman, superhuman, inhuman necessity' : 
In this sense, although on a different level, [Freud] is behaving like 
Oedipus who answers the riddle of the Sphinx with the word `man'. The 
initiatory adventure frees the young man from his agonising and abyssal 
attraction to the maternal dimension. But the hero's painful and bloody 
liberation [... ] does not result from his father's vengeful rage. Incestuous 
desire is intrinsically agonising; no conventional interdiction makes it so. 
It is the young man's desire itself that creates, out of its own inclinations, 
a horrible anguish generating monster. 
(p. 36) 
The entire configuration of the monster in the monomyth is thus reduced to the status of a 
projection, and, what is more, a primary projection-one which precedes alterity, the 
interdiction of the other, king or father. Where Freud recognises the paternal interdiction as 
the locus of the law which bars incestuous desire, Goux finds `another [interdiction] that is 
not paternal, and not maternal either' (p. 36). The horror of incest belongs originarily to the 
young man, it is `intrinsic' to his desire. 
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Thus, paradoxically Goux's critique of Freud's appeal to Oedipus as the pattern for 
human desire will lead the former's analysis to an aporetic space not dissimilar to that 
which is occupied by Freud's reading of Oedipus. Reducing the monster to a primary 
projection, Goux, as we know, defines the Sphinx of the Oedipus myth in the following 
manner: 
[T]he Sphinx [is] a seductive woman and a devouring dog [... She] and 
not a father, is the being to whom is imputed the torture and death of the 
son-because of the desire she arouses. It is significant that in certain 
versions, the Sphinx is held to be an animal that makes young people 
uneasy because of the sexual relations she would seek to have with them. 
Here can be read the young man's desire for negative, dark, animal 
femininity [... ] 
ýP. 3 7) 
Here we can legitimately ask just whose desire is being talked about. If the young subject's 
desire is entirely innate (`intrinsic' to himself), then it would seem that what appeals and 
appals about the Sphinx ('seductive woman and devouring dog') is a simple mirroring back 
of the subject's own impulses (towards dangerous femininity) in a projected form. But if 
she is a (primary) projection, then why should she cause horror (`make [... ] young people 
uneasy') `because of the sexual relations she would seek to have with them'? For surely 
these latter comments imply a cleavage between the hero's desire and that of the monster, 
and render a degree of autonomy (if not priority) to the latter-precisely insofar as her 
desire is shown to be in excess of that of the initiand. And might not Goux's apparent 
scotomisation of the role of the daimonic and monstrous other in the constitution of the 
subject's desire-which does not fail to register in Goux's writing -allow us to locate his 
thinking firmly within the Oedipean heritage that he delineates and we have attempted to 
take up? Oedipus may have solved the riddle of the Sphinx by deprojection, and, as 
Nietzsche points out, have suffered the transgressions concomitant with that philosophical 
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posture; and Freud may claim to solve the riddle of the riddle of Oedipus in the same 
manner (the ostensible reduction of reality to fantasy, of an alien fate to unconscious 
desire). But Goux, after Freud, is led to make precisely the same gesture: the reduction of 
primary alterity-of daimonic monstrosity-to a facet which always and already resides in 
the human breast. Both thinkers are led, by deprojection, to suppose a certain primary 
closure of the subject and to risk reducing primary alterity to no more than a centrifugal 
expulsion. 22 
What, then, is most striking about Freud's appropriation of Oedipus is that the 
hero's appearance in his writing is coincident with his going-astray (fourvoiement). For at 
first glance it would appear that the monomyth-as it is delineated by Goux-would in fact 
be the more appropriate model, insofar as it explicitly entails a primary plenitude, a 
programme of desire that is already encoded in the subject's imagined will to subjectivity. 
There are two clarificatory points to be made in this regard. Firstly, and to reiterate, 
Freud clearly operates within an Oedipean heritage-one in which the riddle-solving and 
parrincestual transgression contained in the Oedipus myth signify philosophical insight and 
the `truth' of unconscious desire. But, secondly, Freud, unlike Goux, talks not of the 
Oedipus myth, but specifically of Sophocles' tragedy. Or more precisely, the only text to 
which Freud makes reference in discussing Oedipus is that of Sophocles; and when Freud 
does make broader references to the `myth of Oedipus', as he often does, he never appeals 
22 Marx's aforementioned critique of Feuerbach offers a particularly suggestive intervention into Goux's 
project since the latter, we might say, focuses on myths of patriarchy. Marx forces us to consider that if the 
hero's violent confrontation/initiation must entail the rejection of the maternal figure and access to 
heterosexual desire, then we should have to account primarily for the social relations which make this very 
configuration possible (and therefore for a primary-socialising-intervention from `outside'). Such a project 
demands more space than is allowed by the limits of a single dissertation. 
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to material extraneous to that which is mobilised in Sophocles' tragic rendering. 23 I want to 
suggest that a certain `truth' of desire contained in Freud's consistent, Sophoclean source 
can be mobilised to challenge the deprojective logic which Goux describes in the myth (and 
which he replicates at the level of his own argument), as well as the Ptolemaic logic which 
governs Freud's Oedipean approach to the play as a model of human desire. 
The Sophoclean `abandonment' of seduction 
Before moving on to consider Sophocles' text in detail, a further point must be 
made in connection with the specificity of Freud's source material. 
At least two fairly recent psychoanalytic investigations into Freud's appeal to the 
domain of the `non-clinical' in shoring up his formulation of the Oedipus complex have 
taken a route diametrically opposed to that of Goux. Eric Toubiana (1988) and George 
Devereux (1988) have both taken issue with Freud's own tendency to see the Oedipus tale 
as the tragedy of Oedipus alone. Both have attempted to rethink both the story of Oedipus 
and the complex that takes his name, in terms of the determining factor played by adult 
behaviour in the development of infantile desire. To that extent, these two critical texts 
have much in common with the purposes of this dissertation. 
24 But it is necessary to make 
clear a fundamental difference between the present work and the direction followed by 
Toubiana and Devereux. These two authors search outside Sophocles' tragedy to shore up 
their arguments. Both concern themselves with a tradition which posited Laius as the 
23 We must take issue with Bernard Knox's statement that Freud is concerned not so much with Sophocles' 
play as with the basic mythic material' (1957 p. 
197) since Oedipus' self-blinding, which becomes so 
important for Freud (1919b). is specific to the Sophoclean source and not for instance mentioned in Homer. 
24 Indeed, Toubiana's book was written under Laplanche's own supervision. 
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`inventor of pederasty' (Devereux 1988 p. 100). Taking material from Apollodorus25 and 
speculation regarding the lost Oidipodeia epic respectively, Toubiana and Devereux point 
to alternative versions of the Oedipus tale in which the parrincestuous child is born to Laius 
and Jocasta in retribution for Laius' earlier rape of Chryssipus, son of King Pelops. In other 
words: for both authors, the determining factor behind the crimes of Oedipus can be shown 
to have been a real event of seduction (albeit of someone else's child) on the part of 
Oedipus' father. 
I do not wish to take issue with their theses in terms of their relevance for 
understanding alternative versions of the Oedipus story. But the concern of the present 
dissertation is to comprehend from a renewed psychoanalytic perspective only those texts 
with which, for whatever reasons, Freud continued to be preoccupied. We are not 
endeavouring to pose alternative models or prototypes for existing psychoanalytic 
categories, but labouring to rethink the literary prototypes which already exist in Freud's 
thought, and to do so on the basis of a rereading of psychoanalytic categories which has 
been set in motion by Laplanche. 
It has been suggested elsewhere that a trilogic Oedipus tragedy by Aeschylus, which 
would have antedated Sophocles' text, contained in its first play material relating to the 
seduction of Chryssipus by Laius, and the curse of an evil conception incurred thereby. 26 
The trilogy is no longer extant and so, obviously enough, never could have been a 
candidate for Freud's speculation. Our concern is not to replace one model with another, 
but to respect the fact that the model of the Oedipus story which Freud does attempt to 
understand is not a trilogic but an autonomous tragedy, and one which makes no explicit 
See esp. Apollodorus (1997)111.5.5. 
26 See Jebb's editorial conunents in his Oedipus Tvrannus translation (1895) pp. xvi-x`ü. 
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reference whatsoever to the seduction of Chryssipus. The model from which Freud derives 
his information regarding Oedipus (and to which he turns so soon after his abandonment of 
the seduction theory) is a text whose author has first chosen not to dramatise the material 
event of sexual seduction by Oedipus' father. 
The loss or `abandonment' of this real seduction from Sophocles' tragedy does not, 
however, render impotent an approach to the play which is based upon Laplanche's 
reinvigoration of Freud's seduction theory. On the contrary, I suggest that Laplanche's 
reconceptualisation of psychical reality in relation to the enigmatic message provides an 
important framework in which to understand the thoroughly allogenic character of the 
Sophoclean Oedipus' story, and its presentation of a primary seduction in the more general, 
structural sense which Laplanche has conceived it. Oedipus' itinerary does not begin, in 
any simple way, with a sought-for encounter with the female monster that is the Sphinx. 
Rather, Sophocles is at pains to stress the primary, and, as we will see, double, otherness to 
Oedipus himself of the itinerary on which he has already embarked, and a certain enigmatic 
implantation of his destiny within him. Nothing in that itinerary-as Sophocles dramatises 
it, and as Freud thus reads (and fails to read) it-is reducible to its pure materiality. What is 
at stake in Sophocles' rendering of the `Oedipal' crimes is neither a prior event of real 
seduction, nor the universally repressed desire of every audience member, but a more 
complexly presented event of other-centred, parental transmission. 
The persistence of the daimon 
Let us first of all recognise a fundamental disjunction between Sophocles' Oedipus 
and the trajectory of the tragedy which bears his name. For the theological category of the 
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daimon in which the Sphinx is located from the very start of the tragedy (34), is, in spite of 
Oedipus' intellectual victory over her years earlier, never exorcised from his existence. On 
the contrary: it is precisely what governs his destiny; it is the agency of Schicksal in the 
play: 
Chorus: Doer of dreadful deeds, how did you bring yourself so to 
quench your sight? Which of the gods [daimonön] set you on? 
Oedipus: It was Apollo, Apollo, my friends, who accomplished these 
cruel sufferings of mine! 
(1327-30)27 
The deprojective posture which Goux describes in relation to the Oedipus myth may well 
be an adequate definition of even the Sophoclean Oedipus' stance towards the Sphinx and 
her kind, but it fails to encompass the tragic orientation of Sophocles' text. The Sphinx is a 
daimon, and we have already witnessed Oedipus' hubristic recollection of how he `put a 
stop to her' with gnome alone; yet his later `cruel sufferings' relate to a daimonic force 
which has persisted long after his triumph of reason, and which, as we will see, antedates 
even his encounter with her monstrous femininity. 
After Zeus and Hades, daimon is the most frequently invoked divine name in 
Sophocles. 28 Yet the category of the daimon is enigmatic in every way, and Oedipus 
29 Tyrannus engages with a remarkably broad spectrum of its possible meanings. 
The daimonic signifies that sub-category of lesser deities in which the Sphinx falls, 
and it is in this connection that the word first appears in the text. But that is not-is 
2' This notoriously complex passage concerning the question of Oedipus' agency and the will of the daimon 
will shortly be taken up in more detail, and in relation to the difficult question of the self-blinding. 
28 Budelmann (2000) p. 113. 
29 We cannot possibly hope to give an exhaustive definition of the daimonic in Greek theology. The present 
section is concerned only with the function of 
daimon in Oedipus Tyrann us. More general accounts (not all of 
which are in agreement with one another) can 
be found in: Budelmann (2000) p. 143-54 and 166-8; Burkert 
(1977) pp. 179-82 and 329-332; Dodds (1951) pp. 3941, and Mikalson (1991) pp. 22-9. A somewhat 
reductive psychoanalytic account, 
based on the work of Jung and Rollo May, can be found in Diamond (1996) 
pp. 165 if. and passen. 
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precisely not the limit of its coverage. As the play progresses, the significance of the term 
becomes deeper and more sinister. The daimonic, says Walter Burkert, `is the veiled 
countenance of divine activity' (Burkert 1977 p. 180, emphasis added). Daimonic action is 
not the direct and independent action of a god towards the terrestrial world, but a god 
working through human existence in ways that cannot be understood. 30 It is an occult force: 
occluded and occlusive; the term invoked when a protagonist is led on by a force which 
does not seem proper to him and which cannot be identified in the moment of action. It may 
imply the influence of a particular god, but one which cannot be recognised as such, except 
belatedly. Thus, midway through the text, it will be called upon again: this time to signify 
the `cruel deity' whose actions the still ignorant Oedipus envisages behind his murder of 
the apparently unknown old man on the road from Thebes (828-9). It will subsequently 
designate the strange force which guides Oedipus in his fury into Jocasta's bedchamber to 
reveal her hanging by a rope (1258-9). As we will soon see, daimonic activity is suggested 
by Sophocles to have been present in both the acts which precipitate Oedipus' tragedy- 
parricide and incest; until at last, in the passage cited above, a blinded and condemned 
Oedipus will identify this determining `other' force with the god Apollo. 
The tragedy of Oedipus is, precisely, this belated anagorisis. Paradoxically, 
Sophocles' version of the myth-the very version which Freud clings to in his exposition 
of the Oedipus complex-is entirely about the failure of its principal protagonist to affirm 
himself as the source and origin of his own destiny. The play anticipates, presupposes, the 
deprojective posture (of Oedipus the riddle-solver, and thus of Freud, in his turn) and its 
trajectory is directed towards insisting on the tragic inadequacy of the Oedipean posture. 
30 We will be returning to this point later on. 
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Let us therefore take up the play in order to witness more exactly how this proleptic 
Sophoclean challenge to Oedipean reductiveness operates. Our reading will be governed by 
an insistence (Sophocles' insistence) on what I earlier described as the double otherness of 
Oedipus to himself in his tragic itinerary: on the one hand, I wish to stress the fact that it is 
incited and provoked by a thoroughly alien force which is the daimon Oedipus will 
ultimately identify with the will of Apollo; on the other, I wish to stress the very human 
means of provocation by which its agency is transmitted to him. 
Returning to Oedipus 
When Jocasta attempts to assuage Oedipus' anxieties concerning Tiresias's 
prophetic intimations of what will soon be `revealed', she relates the ostensibly false 
prophecy that came years ago from Delphi warning Laius of his fated end: 
An oracle came to Laius once, I will not say from Phoebus himself, but 
from his servants, saying that it would be his fate to die at the hands of 
the son [auton ... moira pros paidos thanein] who should 
be the child of 
him and me. And he [... ] was murdered one day by robbers at the place 
where three roads meet. 
(711-6) 
If the tragic action of the play is focused on Oedipus, Jocasta's statement nevertheless 
forbids us to confine the fate that it plays out to Oedipus alone, and therefore from any 
simple reduction of Apollo's oracle to the unconscious parrincestual desire of the son. If the 
Oedipus myth is one of initiatory passage (perverse or otherwise), then Sophocles' 
rendering does not fail to maintain as subject to Laius' own fate (and not just as the object 
of Oedipus') the perspective of the father-king whom the hero succeeds. Although, towards 
the end of the play, the newly blinded parricide emerges from the house of his father and 
tells the Chorus that the daimon which set him on (1328) is Apollo, it is insufficient to say, 
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as R. W. B. Burton does, that Apollo's dominion has existed `from the moment when 
[Oedipus] first consulted the Delphic oracle [... ] (787-93)' (Burton 1980 p. 142). Jocasta 3s 
speech, in spite of her intentions, serves to inform us that the daimon was at work long 
before Oedipus' birth. It is Laius, first and foremost, to whom the oracle comes; it is his 
fate, his portion, his moira, to die at the hands of his son, before, as it were, it becomes 
Oedipus' to be a parricide. 
From the beginning of the play with Oedipus' first paternal address to the people of 
Cadmus (ö tekna, Kadmou toupalai nea trophe) Sophocles' text works to establish an 
ironic opposition between Oedipus the self-made autodidact-the tyrannus rather than the 
natural heir to the throne of Laius-and the other figures onstage who are genealogically 
and topographically `at home'. Unlike Oedipus the runaway (and, as he will discover, the 
outcast) those he addresses have been reared, nurtured (trophe) in Thebes. Oedipus himself 
invokes this term when, angry at Tiresias, he calls him a traitor to the polls: `What you say 
is neither lawful nor friendly to this city, which reared (ethrepse, from trephö) you, since 
you are withholding this message' (322-3). Tiresias, the Chorus of Theban elders, Jocasta, 
Creon, ultimately the old shepherd brought up in Laius' house (oikoi trapheis, 1123): 
`fatherless' Oedipus will become surrounded by figures of a community and a continuity to 
which he is ostensibly other but tragically integral-a community which already, and 
without knowing it, shelters the truth. 31 Oedipus stands over and above it as the foreigner 
who seems to be the `first of men [... ] in dealing with higher powers [daimones]' (34)- 
and he is implored by the Priest to `be the same now' in the murder investigation, which 
constitutes the action of the play, as he was in his individual encounter with the Sphinx 
(53). The discovery of his real relation to daimonic intervention is the essence of the play's 
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action; 32 but this discovery is also coincident with the realisation of Oedipus' true 
heritage-his original place in the polls and the very oikos to which he thinks he is an alien. 
The discovery of parrincest is equally, and necessarily, the discovery of his parentage. If he 
is to progress along `the track' to identify the murderer of Laius, he tells the Chorus, he will 
need `some link [symbolon] with [the Cadmean people]' (220). This link, this symbolon, 
will take the form of the marks on his feet; they will constitute the token of recognition that 
leads to the solution of this riddle, the riddle of his own familial identity-the paternal 
inscription from which he takes his name (oidein -pous = swell foot)-and the consequent 
irony of his reputation as the one who solved the riddle of the Sphinx (Oida -pons = know 
foot). 
The connection between the riddles of the murder and of the Sphinx is complex. 
Charles Segal (1981), goes so far as to say that during the course of the tragedy (during the 
course of the investigation, therefore) Oedipus `live[s] out [... ] in his own life the riddle of 
the Sphinx' (p. 246). Indeed, let us recall Tiresias' warning to Oedipus `This day shall be 
your parent and your destroyer' (358). In discovering the identity of the murderer Oedipus 
is as it were reborn into what is the same thing: the discovery of his own identity. We 
witness him progress from dipous (as man and king) to tetrapous (retrospectively, as he 
recognises himself the child on Cithaeron) to tripous (as the prematurely aged outcast, 
guided by a blind man's stick). The investigation enacts the riddle of the Sphinx, but it is 
also involved in a peculiar and vertiginous pattern of repetition. `Be the same now! ', the 
Priest entreats his king, as yet unaware of the implications of his request. When Oedipus 
demands of Creon why no investigation had earlier been undertaken, he asks, `What kind of 
31 Cf. Tiresias: `the truth I nurture (treph6) has strength' (356). 
2 Gould (1970, trans. ) 34 n. 
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trouble blocked [empodön] you from your search' (129). 33 Creon's response is that the 
Sphinx diverted Thebes from things obscure (taphane) to what lay at its feet (pros posi) 
(130-1). This punning reminder of the monstrous riddle (and its connection to Oedipus' 
name), equally anticipates the story Oedipus soon tells of his encounter with wayfarers 
(hodoiporoi, 801) at the place where three roads meet (794 ff. ) and where Oedipus too was 
blocked by the old man. For no less than will the Sphinx, Laius blocked Oedipus' access to 
Thebes, and his death, as will the Sphinx's, facilitated his accession to its throne. 34 The 
murder investigation is thus a riddle that repeats for Oedipus his interpellation by the 
daimonic riddling Sphinx whose tyranny was, moreover, already a repetition of the 
ultimately fatal scene on the highway. `Riddling'-as we have only provisionally satisfied 
ourselves with calling it-did not begin with the Sphinx, nor, precisely, did it end with 
Oedipus' `solution' (lysis (35))... 
That the Sphinx should be called a daimön (34) is profoundly significant in this 
connection; it binds her within an associative verbal network whose significance is 
generated in another ironic opposition to the posturing of Oedipus. Oedipus, the self-made 
ruler (tyrannos), is, first and foremost, a man of action. `[Y]ou are not waking me from 
sleep' he tells the suppliant Priest (65), and goes on to insist that he has acted in the cause 
of the city already, invoking the verbs dran (do/undertake) and prassein (accomplish) 
which will come increasingly to define Oedipus' character, 35 in order to suggest that there 
is nothing passive in his make-up. 36 But Oedipus, the active doer and accomplisher, has 
33 This is Thomas Gould's translation: a slightly more forceful rendering of empodön than Lloyd-Jones's 
'prevented'. 
3 Cf. 445-6 where Oedipus, enraged at the riddling (ainikta, 439) prophesies of Tiresias, calls him an 
`obstruction [empodön]' to the investigation. 
35 Dran: 72,77,145,2335,640,1327,1402. Prasseln: 69,287,1403. 
3' Knox (1957) p. 14 
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finally to surrender autonomous agency to the pressure of external fate. Let us consider an 
earlier citation a little further: 
Chorus: Doer of dreadful deeds [ö dein drasas], how did you bring 
yourself so to quench your sight? Which of the gods [daimonon] set you 
on? 
Oedipus: It was Apollo, Apollo [Apollön... Apollön], my friends, who 
accomplished these cruel, cruel sufferings [pathea] of mine! 
(1327-30) 
In a sinister pun (Apollön also means `Destroyer') Oedipus the active doer thus apparently 
recognises that he has all along been Oedipus the passive victim of sufferings inflicted by 
the daimön of Apollo. He has been acted upon: `who is the daimön that with a leap longer 
than the longest has sprung upon your miserable fate [moira]? ' the Chorus asks (1300-2, 
emphasis added). `Ah, daimon, how far have you leapt [exelou]? ', Oedipus cries in turn 
(1311, emphasis added). 37 These verbs of the daimön's leaping and swooping down onto its 
victim-frequent enough in Greek tragedy38-connect to and elucidate retrospectively an 
entire cluster of words that have signified a (divine) breaking in from the `outside' long 
before Oedipus' ostensible realisation of his essential passivity. Oedipus himself is led to 
describe what he thinks of as Laius' fate of dying childless as the result of fortune 
`swoop[ing] at his head [krat enelath' he tuche]' (264). 39 From the first, the plague is 
described as having `swoop[ed] [elaunei] upon the city' as the daimon upon Oedipus (28). 
As Segal (1981) points out, despite Oedipus' prior affirmations of his autonomy, 
concerning the plague which blights his city there is from early on in the play an insistent 
invocation of imagery which `takes the form of the penetration of the city's boundaries by 
violent outside forces' (p. 217). When, in the Parodos (151-215), the Chorus describe the 
3' In this and the previous citation I preserve the tenn daimon, rather than reproducing the English alternatives 
which Lloyd-Jones sees fit to introduce. 
38 See esp. Gould (1970, trans. ) 261 n.; Jebb (1895 trans. ) 1301 n.; Padel (1995) pp. 129 if. 
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ravages of the plague they call upon Zeus and Apollo (200 ff. ). But both appear with 
dangerous attributes: Zeus with his `lightning flashes [... and] thunderbolt' (200); Apollo 
with the shafts from his `golden bowstring' (206-7). When Oedipus is called the first of 
men in dealing with daimones (33-4), the noun for these encounters is sunallagais-more 
clearly rendered not in the sense of mutuality implied by Lloyd-Jones's `dealings with', but 
as `interventions' by or `visitations' caused by deities. (The term will reappear at 960 when 
Oedipus enquires into the cause of Polybus's death: e nosou xunallage ('the visit of 
disease'); 40 and again when the Shepherd is called in from outside the city to shed light on 
the investigation). 41 If we say that Oedipus was interpellated by the Sphinx, it is, then, 
because she was not sought by Oedipus, but herself actively intervened (was an empodön) 
in his path; he was the passive recipient of the royal mandate: `this royal power [... ] which 
the city placed [döreton] in my hands [eisecheirisen] as a gift, though I had not asked it' 
(383-5). Let us for the moment simply suggest, then, that Sophocles' text sets in play 
alongside Oedipus the tyrannus's self-fashioning autodidactic persona (the `Oedipean' 
Oedipus, we might say) an array of words and images that seem to elevate the audience (or 
reader) above the hero's rhetoric of autonomy, constantly to maintain the truth, of which 
Oedipus remains ignorant until the last: that his words and actions have from the first been 
compromised by the intentions of a daimonic force that is alien to him. 
We use the term `alien' advisedly, since Sophocles' use of the term daimön 
throughout the play-both literally as that which Oedipus will concede has presided over 
his life, and figuratively in terms of all that which actively `swoops down' and interpellates 
39 I cite Jebb's translation here, since it is truer to the original than Lloyd-Jones's 'struck down by fortune'. 
40 Jebb's (preferable) translation. 
-`1 -I who have had no dealings with [sunallaxantal him' (1110). 
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him-is careful and deliberate. As we will see, it comes ultimately to define the doubly 
other, allo-genic, character of the crimes that Oedipus commits. 
It is important to recall the famous and cryptic dictum of Heraclitus, ethos 
anthröpöi daimon ('character is, for man, destinyldaimön'). Its significance for reading 
Greek tragedy was first pointed out by R. P. Winnington-Ingram (1980)42 and has since 
been taken up by J. P. Vernant (1988b). For Winnington-Ingram the operations of the 
daimon mark `the breach between divine and human modes of existence, the frailty of man 
and his dependence on a god-given destiny' (p. 173). In Oedipus Tyrannus, daimon signals 
a certain, constitutive, ambiguity in the relationship between willed and unwilled action- 
one which comes to the fore most strongly in Oedipus' claim that his self-blinding is 
entirely his own doing (p. 177). We will return to this incident later. But let us note that 
both Winnington-Ingram and Vernant show that despite appearances Heraclitus' axiom is 
not a proto-Aristotlelian or proto-Freudian reduction of daimon to an internal- 
psychological or `scientific'-category, is not a simple `deprojection' of daimon to man's 
essential `character'. The very syntactical symmetry of ethos anthröpöi daimon suggests a 
double reading which in fact disrupts and problematises the polarity of human character - 
divine essence that is supposed by the deprojective posture; and it is on this enigmatic 
specificity of the tragic daimon that tragedy comes to rest: 
For there to be tragedy it must be possible for the text simultaneously to 
imply two things: It is character in man that one calls daimon and, 
conversely, what one calls character in man, is in reality, a daimon. 
(Vernant 1988b p. 37) 
Thus, the divinely-appointed destiny of Oedipus comes about largely through actions on his 
part which spring directly from his character: it was like Oedipus that he must leave Corinth 
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to discover the truth about his birth; it was like Oedipus to pursue his judicial enquiries with 
such energy... (See Winnington-Ingram 1980 p. 177). The distinction between willed and 
unwilled actions does not disappear: `both kinds of acts [are] drawn into the ambit of the 
operation of daimones' (Winnington-Ingram 1980 p. 176). The divine and human worlds 
interpenetrate. Crucially, for us, then, the specificity of Sophocles' tragedy resides to some 
extent in the fact that it at once stages the `Oedipean' Oedipus (the fifth-century man who 
realises that `gods, demons and other monsters are [... ] products of the human imagination' 
(Goux 1993 p. 120)), 43 but is in its fabric constituted by signals which constantly 
undermine that posture-from the moment when Oedipus first realises retrospectively that 
he has been swept down upon by a daimon, to every other moment which figures an 
analogous breaking in from outside. 
We must however attend to a certain point that is not rendered explicit by 
Winnington-Ingram. Let us recall that it is when Jocasta speaks of Laius and his fate 
(moira) that she first mentions the place where the three roads meet; and that it is this 
topographical detail which alerts her son to the possibility that he might have been the killer 
(726-7,729-30). Positioning the two descriptions of Laius' death in this manner Sophocles 
makes a striking gesture. The hero's description of how his father was, like the Sphinx, an 
impediment (empodön) in his path is as follows: 
And on my way I came to the regions in which you say this king met his 
death. And I will tell you the truth, lady! When I was walking near this 
meeting of the three roads, I was met by a herald and a man riding in a 
wagon, such as you describe; and the leader and the old man himself tried 
to drive [elauneten] me from the road by force. In anger I struck the 
driver, the man who was trying to turn me back; and when the old man 
saw it, he waited till I was passing his chariot, and struck me right on the 
42 So far as I am aware this paper is the most explicit commentary on the role of the daimon in Oedipus 
Tvrannus. 
4i Cf. Goux's reading of Sophocles' explicitly tragic rendering of the Oedipus myth (1993) pp. 182 if. 
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head with his double pointed goad [meson / kara diplois kentroisi mou 
kathiketo]. Yet he paid the penalty with interest [. ,. 
] 
(798-809) 
In this description Oedipus is of course saying more than he might intend. We recognise the 
verb Oedipus uses to articulate the old man's attempts to `drive' him off the road- 
elaunein-as that which was invoked in the description of the `swooping down' of the 
plague upon Thebes. Indeed Laius' striking down [kathiketo]44 at Oedipus' head recalls the 
`fate' that leaps at Laius' head to leave him `childless'. The thematic and verbal resonances 
of this passage work to suggest the insufficiency of referring only to the daimon of 
Oedipus, and thereby present a radical challenge to the `Oedipean' notion of Oedipus. The 
scene at the three roads occurs chronologically earlier than the encounter with the Sphinx 
the latter is, we have suggested, a repetition of this encounter (she, after Laius, is a 
daimonic impediment in his path). And just as Oedipus is interpellated by the Sphinx, so 
here it is the other, the father who beats him first. Certainly when Oedipus describes the 
encounter his description is somewhat `enigmatic' to Oedipus himself: he says more than 
he knows that he is saying, and in doing so reveals to the audience the action of the daimon 
which compromises his proud autonomy. But his description also serves to remind us that 
Laius' actions are overdetermined and similarly enigmatic to himself: possessed by the 
daimon he commits the very act (of attacking Oedipus) that causes his fated death at the 
hands of his son. Contrary to the myth of Oedipus as it is mapped out by Goux in its 
aberrance from the monomyth, Oedipus' act of parricide, as it is rendered by Sophocles, 
does not entail the rejection or disavowal of the heritage of the father. In Sophocles it is the 
very opposite: it forms a representation 
45 of the assumption by Oedipus (as son) of the fate 
as s crucial downward movement is unfortunately lost in Lloyd-Jones's translation. 
45 And, as we will see, a secondary one, in fact. 
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that marks his father. It is a radically non-Oedipean gesture which entails not a spontaneous 
act on the part of the son but his response to a prior intervention by a human other (his 
father) who is already-unwittingly-animated by the daimonic other within his own 
ethos. 
This double otherness of Oedipus' fate, as well as its Oedipean disavowal by the 
tyrannus, will become progressively more significant throughout the tragedy. Winnington- 
Ingram's study focuses on the moments after Oedipus emerges blind from the palace (1297 
ff. ). The exchange between the king and the Chorus, as we know, concerns Oedipus' 
daimon; and it culminates in the following notoriously problematic exchange which is 
worth citing once again: 
Chorus: Doer of dreadful deeds, how did you bring yourself so to quench 
your sight? Which of the gods set you on [tis s'epere daimonön]? 
Oedipus: It was Apollo, Apollo, my friends, who accomplished these 
cruel, cruel sufferings of mine! And no other hand struck my eyes but my 
own miserable hand [epaise d 'autocheir nin ou- l tis, all' ego tlamön] ! 
For why did I have to see, when there was nothing I could see with 
pleasure? 
(1327-1335) 
Winnington-Ingram finds inadequate the tendency to read and translate this passage in such 
a way as to assume, as does Lloyd-Jones's rendering cited here, that Oedipus' reply to the 
Chorus makes a definitive distinction between his own agency in the acts of parrincest on 
the one hand, and self-blinding on the other. 46 Instead, Winnington-Ingram suggests that 
certainly the reiterated name of Apollo must answer the question `what daimon? ', but also 
that "`[these] sufferings of mine" cannot exclude and may primarily denote the visible 
suffering which dominates the scene' (1980 p. 175). `It would', he says, `be tidy to suppose 
46 It is, for many commentators, Winnington-Ingram says, as if Oedipus had said: 'As to my other sufferings 
[ta men alla] they were the work of Apollo, but when I struck my eyes, the responsibility was mine alone (and 
you are wrong to ask what daimön moved me)'. Winnington-Ingram (1980) p. 175 and n. 2. 
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that while Apollo was responsible, through his oracle, for the earlier sufferings of Oedipus, 
the self-blinding was an act of independent will unmotivated by divine power. But that is 
not how it is seen by either Oedipus or the Chorus' (p. 175). Rather, in identifying the 
daimön with Apollo `Oedipus links his witting and unwitting acts, so that the self-blinding 
appears as the culmination of the evil destiny that has attended him since birth' (p. 35). 
Now Richard Minadeo (1994) has raised the objection that when the Chorus ask 
`what daimon? ' Oedipus' own physical agency is in any case taken for granted: `For 
Oedipus to insist exclusively on such agency ['no other hand but my own... '] is therefore 
otiose' (p. 99). It is not so much that Minadeo contends with the notion of a divine 
participation in Oedipus' act of self-blinding; rather that Oedipus does not intend to include 
it in `[these] sufferings of mine' which he attributes to the agency of Apollo. There is thus a 
certain cleavage between events as they are witnessed and interpreted by the 
audience/reader, and as they are experienced and articulated by the hero. 
Neither of these positions seems entirely inappropriate; but both perhaps miss the 
point that Sophocles is at pains to stress, and not least in these moments of `revelation' in 
the Exodos: namely that Oedipus' fate has not in any simple way `attended him since birth', 
but belongs to a larger (and enigmatic) destiny that has attended (the house of) Laius since 
much earlier. The separation that Minadeo implies between the audience's and Oedipus' 
experience of the self-blinding is particularly suggestive, however. For Oedipus' insistence 
on his own agency is not without a certain irony. `Epaise d 'autocheir viv ou- / tis, all' egö 
tlamön' : `the one who struck them with this hand is no one [outis] but I, in wretchedness'. 47 
In these lines it is almost impossible not to hear the Cyclops of Homer who falls for 
Odysseus's trick name, Outis (IX, 366), only to be blinded by his unwelcome guest. `No 
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one is killing me... [Outis me kteinei]! ' he calls out paradoxically, Outis signalling at once 
his intention and his inability to name the external agent of his ocular maiming (IX, 408). 
Sophocles' echo turns the Cyclopean paradox inside out, as Oedipus, who fails to register 
his self-blinding as a suffering incurred by the daimon, and instead asserts himself as the 
master and originator of the act, reveals nevertheless his own displaced, decentred, relation 
to it. 48 This ostensible moment of `revelation' for Oedipus, the one in which he appears to 
recognise the necessity of his `submission to a divine will' is thus equally and ironically a 
moment of self-centring-the assumption of the Oedipean posture of independent agency. 
As will Hegel and Freud after him, Oedipus invokes Apollo, to whose imperative of self- 
knowledge he in fact reveals himself as radically inadequate. Two further things arrest our 
attention in this connection. In the second speech Oedipus makes having emerged from the 
palace, he compares the wounding of his eyes to the pain of the crimes that he has 
committed: `Alas, alas once more! How the sting of these goads [kentrön] has sunk into me 
together with the remembrance of my troubles! ' (1316-8). The association between the 
sting of memory and the sting in his eyes contains a more sinister connection which 
problematises Oedipus' claim, not twenty lines later, to be the sole agent in his act of self- 
violence. For in describing the pins of Jocasta's broaches as kentra Oedipus unwittingly 
recalls the `double-pointed goad' with which he said the old man attacked him at the place 
where three roads meet (809). It is as if Oedipus' self-blinding is already overlaid by the 
paternal heritage that is made so explicitly a part of the son's fate in that parricidal scene. 
Moreover, and secondly, Jocasta's description of the death of Laius, `his moira', takes this 
connection back yet further chronologically: `he [... ] was murdered one day by foreign 
4' 1 cite Gould's (more literal) translation. 
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robbers at the place where the three roads meet; but the child's birth was not three days past 
when Laius fastened his ankles (arthra podoin = joints of his feet) and had him cast out 
[... ]' (715-9). Now when the Second Messenger emerges from the palace to tell the Chorus 
and the audience of the tenor that has recently occurred within, he describes Oedipus' self 
blinding in strikingly similar terms: `For he broke off the golden pins from [Jocasta's] 
raiment [... ] and, lifting up his eyes, struck them [aras epaisen arthra tön autou kuklön] 
[... ]' (1270). 49 Thus, against the tyrannus's continued, Oedipean, assertions of his 
autonomy, the fabric of Sophocles' text allows neither Oedipus' self-blinding nor, in its 
connection with it, the murder of the Laius, to be dissociated from this prior scene of the 
inscription by the father on the son's body. 
The murder at the place where the three roads meet is, says Segal, `a truly primal 
scene' (1981 p. 222). This is a particularly suggestive point, but also one that we would 
seek to clarify. In the Exodos when the wretched Oedipus makes his final call upon the 
three roads, his invocation of the murder is couched in terms of a fantasmatic logic, taking 
on, retrospectively, the characteristics one might indeed attribute to a primal scene: 
O three roads, hidden glade, coppice and narrow path where three ways 
meet, ways that drank down my own, my father's blood shed by my 
hands, do you still remember what deeds you saw me do and what deeds I 
did [hoi erga drasas humin eita deur' ion hopoi eprasson authis] when I 
came here? Marriage, marriage [... ] 
(1398-1403) 
The term authis50 (left untranslated by Lloyd-Jones) signals here an important identification 
of parricide with incest, so that neither event is reducible to its pure materiality. Oedipus 
calls upon the place to remember both the deeds he committed there and the deeds he 
48 Even in his final words in the play Creon will still have cause to remind Oedipus, `Do not wish to have 
control in everything' (11-52). 
' On this connection see Gould (1970., trans. ) 718 n., 1032 n., 1270 n. 
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committed `once more' in Thebes, as if the incest were merely a re-inscription of the 
parricide. But the topography of the scene disrupts any sequential logic of a first then 
second crime, so that the murder is so to speak already invested with the horror of incest. 
Followed as it is by the cry `Marriage, marriage [... ]', the description of the narrow path 
and hidden glade is suggestively palimpsestic, representing at once the place where 
Oedipus assaulted his father and the place (the part of the body) where he `assaulted' his 
mother . 
51 For Oedipus, retrospectively, each crime is already inscribed in the other: the 
sequential separation of their enactment becomes subordinate to the identical psychical 
horror they bear, so that both crimes come to represent and occupy for their `doer' the same 
psychical space. 
There is something bestial in the character of Laius' attack as Oedipus first 
describes it (794 ff. ). Here, the verb elaunein, invoked to describe Laius' attempt to `drive' 
Oedipus from the road (which we recognise in its connection with the plague), is 
appropriate for the `driving' of cattle, just as the `double-pointed goad' with which he 
strikes down on his son is an instrument more properly used for controlling beasts. Thus the 
savagery of the attack, recalls the `yoking' of Oedipus' ankles in Jocasta's description 
shortly before: 52 
And [Laius], as the story goes, was murdered one day by robbers at the 
place where the three roads meet; but the child's birth was not three days 
past when Laius fastened [enzeuxas] his ankles and had him cast out [... ] 
(715-719) 
We should say in addition, however, that at the close of Oedipus' first description of the 
murder, the same verb recurs, and specifically in relation to his fated incest: `Am I not a 
50 authis = again, once more. 
sl Gould (1970, trans. ) 1398 n; and cf. 70 n. 
52 Segal (1981) p. 222. 
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criminal [... ] if I must leave my country [... ] or else be joined [zugenai] in marriage with 
my mother [... ]? ' (823-6). Thus incest, no less than the parricide which in retrospect will 
take on a fantasmatic or psychical synonymity for Oedipus, is indissociable from Laius' 
initial act of violence upon his son's body, upon the arthra of his feet. If we understand 
Oedipus' later description of his two crimes as the invocation of a `primal scene', then 
Sophocles' text nevertheless forbids us from understanding them as being `primary' in any 
simple sense. The parricide and incest in which Oedipus takes an active part are secondary 
in relation to the originary moment which is that of a passivity and a breaking in from the 
outside. 
Sophocles makes a further crucial gesture in regard to this originary scene. After 
Oedipus has blinded himself, he begs to be exiled from Thebes and sent to Cithaeron, 
`which my mother and father, while they lived, appointed to be my tomb, so that I may get 
death from them who tried to kill me [m 'apölluten]' (1452-4). Now the verb apollunai 
recalls Oedipus' dark pun `Apollön [... ] Apollön' when he spoke of the daimön as the 
agency behind his crimes moments before (1329). The irony of its echo rebounds not just 
on Oedipus but more particularly on Laius whose first violence towards his son is itself 
made thereby irreducible to his own (conscious) intentions-enigmatic, then, insofar as it is 
compromised by the agency of the daimon, but, preceding the self-blinding of Oedipus 
(that it in part determines) committed nevertheless in the full self-confidence of his own 
agency. The 'Oedipal' crimes are thus figured as the effect of that which comes other-wise. 
That is to say that the moment of the father's attempted murder of the child, his casting out 
of Oedipus from the nurture (trephö) of the house, is also the moment of Oedipus' 
inscription, his `initiation' as the son of his father. Sophocles' rendering of this `initiation' 
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is such as to prohibit any notion of automatic or innate desire in the son: this first 
`encounter' is explicitly not instigated or sought-for by Oedipus. Rather, it is inscribed as a 
symbolon on his body by a human other that is his father, who is himself already, and again 
explicitly, compromised by his moira the exigencies of which both escape and yet 
constitute his action. 
We have reached a perspective from which to affirm the necessity of refusing to 
speak of a `riddle' in relation to Oedipus Tyrannus, and insisting on the word and the 
concept of the enigma. `Riddling', we have said, does not begin with the Sphinx: the 
daimon that gets in the way of Oedipus' feet is already a repetition of this primary 
encounter with the other that is the father, himself possessed by a daimon, and other to 
himself. This maiming inscription, long before the ainigma of the Sphinx, was what 
required lysis (1034) by the Shepherd, whose undoing, unloosening of Oedipus' `yoked' 
feet paradoxically did not free him but released him into a tragedy saturated by horror. The 
major events in Oedipus' itinerary-murder of the father, confrontation by the Sphinx, 
incest with the mother, self-blinding-everything is traceable to the father's original 
maiming inscription of his son from which he takes his name. 53 None of these events 
manifests simply the philosopher's dispensation from initiation, as Goux would have it, but 
rather the insistent return of a heritage to which Oedipus will remain tragically blind until 
the last. Oidipous is the ultimate `aingma' of the play as well as of everything in the play 
which, as Freud says, has already occurred before the it opens (Freud 1900 p. 363). To 
53 Cf. Chase's argument (1986) that suggests the father's primary violence towards Oedipus manifests the 
inscription of the parental Oedipus complex in the child. We cannot, however, accept her reduction of this 
moment to the Lacanian formula of the child's being endowed with the `Name-of-the Father'. Sophocles' text 
makes clear that the `maiming' is irreducible to a `naming'. The Messenger tells Oedipus that `it was from 
this occurrence that you got the name you bear' (1036)-that the enigma of Oedipus' identity, in other words, 
the symbolon that will 'put him on the track' does not come about primarily from a linguistic or 'Symbolic' 
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ignore the otherness of Oedipus' fate is to be as blind as Oedipus. As Richmond Lattimore 
puts it: `The riddle [sic] of the Sphinx was the mystery of man. But it was the specially 
private mystery of Oedipus. This-the Sphinx might have meant to him-is the mystery of 
you. Solve it. Gnöthi sauton [know thyself]' (Lattimore 1958, p. 91). The tragic irony is of 
course that Oedipus does not `know' : 
Indeed, her aingma was not one for the first-comer to explain! It required 
prophetic skill, and you [Tiresias] were exposed as having no knowledge 
from the birds or from the gods. No, it was I that came, Oedipus who 
knew nothing [ho meden eidös Oidipous], and put a stop to her; I hit the 
mark by native wit, not by what I learned from birds. 
(303-98) 
In this passage, which we have identified already in its exemplary staging of the Oedipean 
posture, the irony of Oedipus' sarcastic claim, as Thomas Gould points out, rebounds 
bitterly on himself in the grim pun on eidös ('knowing') and oida ('I know') that the 
tyrannus inadvertently sets in motion (1970, trans. 397 n. ). As he will in the moment of his 
blinding, Oedipus enunciates the truth of himself-his radically decentred relation to his 
own acts-in a moment of arrogant Oedipean self-centring. `Oedipus who knew nothing', 
signals for its speaker: `Oedipus who knew the ainigma about feet (Oida tons podas)'. For 
the audience that watch his day-long passage through the stages of dipous, tripous and 
tetrapous, it signals his ignorance: not only concerning the inadequacy of his solution 
(lysis) to the Sphinx's message but to the more fundamental ignorance that this conceals, 
the inscription of an alien fate by an other. This Oedipean moment is already subversive of 
itself, productive of a certain remainder that at once escapes and constitutes the speaking 
subject-remains unassimilated, untranslated by him. Is there not, then, something 
grotesquely and tragically ironic in the final Choral speech that offers both a kind of 
paternal intervention. Cf. Also Lacan's reduction of the symbolon to verbal discourse in Lacan (1953) pp. 43 
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epitaph for Oedipus and the institutional epigraph that is inscribed on Freud's medallion 
and beneath his bust in Vienna? Hos to klein ainigmat' erdei kai kratistos in anep. Is not 
this epitaphic pronouncement on Oedipus as he who did not divine but knew (eidei, from 
oida) the famous riddle already a profound misrecognition of the truth about Sophocles' 
Oedipus, an ironic reaffirmation of his Oedipean reputation which the text has insisted on 
forbidding? Does it not, from a Laplanchean perspective, render the translation of ainigma 
by the word `riddle' wholly opposed to the trajectory of the play? To call the demand of the 
Sphinx a `riddle' is to fail to recognise its connection to the primal intrusion by Oedipus' 
father-the first `enigmatic message' that confronts the child and to which his entire life 
has been an ill-comprehended response. 
Misrecognition and mistranslation have a central place in tragic consciousness. 54 
The irony of Oedipus' claim to solving the riddle of the Sphinx resides in all that escapes 
him. He is already himself the incarnated truth of its irreducibility. `The Sphinx defines 
man and Oedipus sequentially in the normality of his passage through the stages of life', 
says Segal, `[... ] in answering [sic] the riddle [sic], [Oedipus] finds himself the 
simultaneous combination of all three stages, a monstrous abnormality' (Segal 1981 p. 
248). To that extent, he says, `For Oedipus, more than for any other Greek hero, ontogeny 
recapitulates phylogeny' (p. 248). Yet insofar as Oedipus assumes this paradigmatic role, 
we should have to amend Segal's claim to say that, rather, in Sophocles' play dramaturgy 
recapitulates ontogeny. Now Thomas Gould, influenced somewhat by Freud's reading of 
the tragedy, has made the claim that because each spectator of Oedipus Tyrannus can 
`discover [... ] the same guilt in his own past', Sophocles engineers puns and double 
and 107 n. 
54 See Goldhill (1986) 
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meanings in order refine the audience above the action on stage, thereby to `offer [... ] the 
audience a way to escape too conscious an identification with Oedipus in his troubles' 
(1970, trans. p. 175). But it is on this point, I suggest, that, before Gould, both the Chorus 
and Freud the Oedipean riddle-solver are led astray. For the `tragic irony' of Oedipus 
Tyrannus constitutes a remarkable and self-conscious dramatic strategy on the part of its 
author: one which insists and, in the dramaturgical logic of the play, reproduces an 
irreducible dimension of enigma, and not the possibility of a final `solution' (lysis). In what 
is called the dramatic irony of the text, when the protagonists-and most of all Oedipus- 
speak and act in ways whose meaning is enigmatic, and, principally, enigmatic to 
themselves, the audience is, like Oedipus from first to last, confronted with, interpellated 
by, those enigmas-to which it may think it already knows the solution. Yet the moment in 
which the audience comes to rely on its `superior knowledge'55 will also be the moment of 
its strongest identification with ho meden eidös Oidipous-Oedipus the Oedipean, who 
mythically considers himself the centre and origin of his own meaning, yet in that 
assumption will remain consistently blind to the otherness-paternal and daimonic-of the 
fate that assails and constitutes him, and determines-the action of the tragedy. It is as if 
Sophocles' play seduces us into assuming the Oedipean posture and yet by virtue of thus 
presenting enigmas to us constitutes a dramatic insistence that, to paraphrase Laplanche, we 
have only imperfect and inadequate ways to configure what is communicated to us. 56 
Insofar as the `Oedipal' crimes are irreducible to only Oedipus' fate, if we are not, 
like Oedipus, or Freud after him, to blind ourselves to primary alterity, then, the play 
insists, any ana-lysis that we make cannot be one that is based on the simple restoration of 
ss Pucci (1998) p. 134. 
56 Cf. Laplanche 1999A [I 992b] p. 160. 
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the events that preceded the play as they are `revealed' in the course of the investigation. 
The `radical otherness' of which Segal speaks cannot be anchored to the ignorance of the 
hero alone; nor can his realisation of his crimes be regarded as the forcing of that otherness 
into consciousness. There is no `real' seduction in the play; no material `bedrock' of an 
event in the form which Toubiana and Devereux seek beyond it to identify. Rather, 
seduction, in Sophocles' play, is present in the most general sense. As an audience we do 
not witness the parrincest, the `victory' over the Sphinx, or Oedipus' self blinding; they 
come to us, already as it were `reconstructed', from the mouths of those who belong or 
belonged to the house of Laius-the Shepherd, Jocasta, Oedipus. To that extent they come 
overlaid already by the signifiers and gestures that we have tried to suggest connect them 
inextricably to one another and, fundamentally, to Oedipus' first encounter on Mount 
Cithaeron. What is `revealed' during the action of the play is something quite different 
from the real or material events that have taken place between the family protagonists. In 
speaking of arthra, kentra, swooping, yoking... they will continue to speak more than they 
know; something will continue to escape them, fail to be assimilated (or translated) by 
them, such that Oedipus' past, as it is pieced toether, remains irreducible to any non- 117 
enigmatic materiality of its events. The attempt to reduce this reconstruction to a 
`revelation' or a forcing into consciousness is to repeat the Oedipean crime of blindness in 
the face of the truly `radical otherness' to which it bears witness: namely the 
intersubjective, allo-genic, character of the Oedipal itinerary. 
*** 
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In concluding, I suggest that the post-1897 Freud is seduced into appropriating, 
assimilating Oedipus Tyrannus in the service of elaborating a model of human desire, on 
the basis of the Oedipean heritage of whose assumptions Sophocles' tragedy is already a 
critique. It is insufficient merely to say that the irony of Oedipus' claims to riddle-solving 
continues to rebound on the Freudian project, if we intend to take seriously both the 
specificity of Sophocles' rendering of the myth and Laplanche's rendering of Freud. If 
Sophocles' Oedipus enters Freudian theory by way of an Oedipean disavowal of its 
specificity-its insistence on enigma and primary alterity-it is lodged there, nonetheless, 
`inscribed' in it like a foreign body, a portion of which remains unaccounted for, 
unmetabolised, by Freud's thought. Our return to Oedipus suggests that Oedipus is itself a 
proleptic meditation on and dramatisation of the necessity of non-assimilation and 
`blindness'. It is to that extent that a rethinking of the tragedy must be placed alongside the 
Laplanchean project of rethinking the nuclear complex of psychoanalysis to which the 
name Oedipal is given by Freud-a project which labours to re-open the question of 
otherness which the Oedipean/Ptolemaic project seeks, precisely, to close down. 
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Chapter Two 
Julius Caesar: Interpreting (Freud) with Freud and Shakespeare 
It is not lived experience in general that undergoes a deferred revision but, 
specifically, whatever it has been impossible in the first instance to incorporate 
fully into a meaningful context. The traumatic event is the epitome of such 
unassimilated experience. 
Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis 
In the closing pages of the final chapter of Totem and Taboo (1913 [1912-3 ]), a text 
which Harold Bloom has proposed might be read as a rewriting of Shakespeare's Julius 
Caesar, ' Freud falls into a trap with which we are familiar. In attempting to shore up the 
historical reality of the jealous, tyrannical father's murder by the aggrieved sons of the 
primal horde, he makes a significant divergence from the stated project of the book to 
describe `points of agreement between the mental lives of savages and neurotics'. 2 Before 
taking account of this, however, let us rapidly retrace some of Freud's prior steps. 
By way of analogy, Freud's procedure thus far has been to approach the question of 
totemism in so-called primitive societies from the psychoanalytic standpoint of infantile 
totemism, which is to say, the emergence of specific and ambivalent animal `phobias' in 
children which, in spite of the fear and hatred the child directs at the animal, manifest 
simultaneously a certain love towards it. 3 On the issue of `primitive' totemism, Freud gets 
started by identifying the homologous ambivalence which saturates the festive totem meal. 
The clansmen both rejoice over the killing of the totem animal and are obliged to mourn 
1 Bloom (1998) p. 108. 
2 This is in fact the subtitle of Freud's text. 
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over it as well (1913 [1912-3] pp. 201-2). He goes on to argue that the sacrificial meal is a 
commemorative repetition of the primal deed of tyrannicide the descriptive outline of 
which he borrows from Darwin. The `violent and jealous father' of the primitive horde had 
been executed in the name of liberty for the sons (p. 202). They had certainly hated their 
tyrant, and yet, after the event `[a] sense of guilt made its appearance, which in this instance 
coincided with the remorse felt by the whole group' (p. 204), and which gave to them, for 
the first time, `the concept of "crime"' (p. 222). Totemism and the joint system of 
exogamy, Freud explains, arose out of a `deferred obedience [Nachträglichen Gehorsams]' 
to the father: if he had been hated in life, then only after the deed was committed did their 
truly `ambivalent attitude towards the father' make its emergence (p. 211). The ritual of the 
totem meal amounts at once to a festive celebration of the event which effected their 
liberation, and a sacred and mournful expiation of the cost it incurred. Freud will go on to 
demonstrate the persistence of this celebratory/expiatory procedure well beyond the 
provenance of prehistoric times-into monotheism, Christian religious rites and indeed, as 
we witnessed in the Introduction, tragic drama. 
But, he warns-and this is where we started-we must not allow our 
methodological analogy to influence our judgement too far, for there is a considerable 
discrepancy between the reality experienced and reproduced by neurotics and that which 
pertains to `savages'. As to the former, what is decisive are `psychical realities and never 
factual ones', since neurotics `react just as seriously to thoughts as normal people do to 
realities' (p. 222). Here we see the full force of Laplanche's claim that, Freud too easily lets 
the category of `psychical reality' be swallowed up into a banal conception of 
psychological reality: however real it feels to them, material reproduced by neurotics never 
3 See esp. Sandor Ferenczi's case of little 
Ärpäd (1913). 
124 
can be relied upon as having objectively occurred, as having ever constituted `lived 
experience' as such. It is in contrast to this, Freud says, that the happening of the primal 
event must be positioned: 
primitive men actually did what all the evidence shows that they intended 
to do [ ... 
] It is no doubt true that the sharp contrast we make between 
thinking and doing is absent in both [neurotics and primitive men]. But 
neurotics are above all inhibited in their actions: with them thought is a 
complete substitute for the deed. Primitive men on the other hand are 
uninhibited: thought passes directly into action. With them it is rather the 
deed which is a substitute for the thought. And that is why, without laying 
claim to any finality of judgement, I think that in the case before us it may 
safely be assumed that `in the beginning was the Deed'. 
(p. 224)4 
Relations within the primal family were objectively lived in the form by which neurotic 
patients experience them only subjectively and alloyed by fantasy. The primal father (and 
Freud never once complicates this depiction of him) was, literally, the tyrant in whose 
image the `thought' of the modern neurotic embellishes his own father. The murder, the 
deed, was an event; it objectively happened in a form of which the neurotic is content 
merely to explore and enact in fantasy. Nothing of what Freud sets out says otherwise than 
that the father was brutal, tyrannical and nothing but, or that the sons bore a quite genuine 
and real grievance, and fully expected to liberate themselves by his assassination. The deed 
was lived, objectively experienced, before guilt, crime, `thought' or fantasy were necessary 
or even possible. The parricide undertaken by the primal horde just was an uninhibited, 
unalloyed tyrannicide. 
The focus of this Chapter is what seems to be a missed literary encounter in the 
Freudian oeuvre. In spite of Bloom's suggestion, Freud never mentions Julius Caesar in his 
4 The closing citation is of Goethe's Faust. Part 1, Scene 3. 
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1913 text, and what attention he does pay it elsewhere is fragmentary and limited. 5 As we 
know, Freud never ceased his search for the `bedrock of the event', the `reality' of 
experience that lay behind patient fantasy-this to the extent of relying on a conception of 
phylogenetic heritage which would trace back an individual's truth to the relations of the 
primal horde. 6 And yet in the two great literary tragedies in which he identifies fundamental 
models of parricide, Oedipus and Hamlet, the father is already dead. The deed is never 
written, never happens as such: in both cases it is somehow missed by the son, and the text 
itself is made up at least in part by his belated efforts to reconstruct it and/or verify its 
doubtful circumstances. The decisive murders of Oedipus and Hamlet are always peculiarly 
non-present, while Julius Caesar carries, even flaunts at its centre, the enactment, the 
objective happening and experiencing of a murder the date of which would henceforth be 
remembered as the `Day of Parricide' :' 
Cassius: How many ages hence 
Shall this our lofty scene be acted over 
In states unborn and accents yet unknown? ' 
Brutus: How many times shall Caesar bleed in sport 
That now on Pompey's basis lies along, 
No worthier than the dust? 
Cassius: So oft as that shall be, 
So often shall the knot of us be called 
The men who gave their country liberty. 
(III. 1.110-8) 
Tyrannicide enacted, fraternal and filiarchal liberation and the birth of dramatic repetition 
inaugurated: 8 Freud never, it seems, gives a thought to this striking conjunction which 
Shakespeare's text sets forth and which itself appears so very `Freudian'. A remarkable 
5 There can be no doubt that the tragedy had considerable appeal to Freud. What is perhaps his most 
significant treatment of it occurs in the interpretation of a dream in 1900, which we will consider shortly. See 
also Freud (1901) p. 166 n. where he cites the murder of Cinna the poet; in (1905) p. 113 he considers 
Antony's rhetorical devices in his funeral oration for Caesar; and (1919b) p. 373 makes reference to Caesar's 
ghost as an instance of what is not uncanny. For Freud (1909b) see note 18 below. 
Laplanche and Pontalis (1967) p. 332. 
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omission? By working through the tragedy in what follows, I hope finally to propose the 
resolute answer: yes and no. 
Interpretation and sacrifice: Freud's `Non vixit' dream 
Before engaging Shakespeare's text in any detail, let us first of all follow what is 
perhaps the best-known and most suggestive of Freud's invocations of Julius Caesar, 
when, in 1900, he finds himself impelled towards it in interpreting two dreams which form 
a kind of diptych. What intrigues him most about the sequence, and what he calls the 
`centre-point' of the two dreams (Freud 1900 p. 619), is its articulation of a Latin `mistake'. 
Here is the given text of this diptych in full: -9 
I had gone to Brücke 's laboratory at night, and, in response to a gentle 
knock on the door, I opened it to (the late) Professor Fleischl, who came 
in with a number of strangers and, after exchanging a few words, sat 
down at his table. This was followed by a second dream. My friend Fl. 
[Fliess] had come to Vienna unobtrusively in July. I met him in the street 
in conversation with my (deceased) friend P., and went with them to some 
place where they sat opposite each other as though they were at a small 
table. I sat in ftont at its narrow end Fl. spoke about his sister and said 
that in three-quarters of an hour she was dead, and added some such 
words as `that was the threshold'. As P. failed to understand him, Fl 
turned to me and asked how much I had told P. about his affairs. 
Whereupon, overcome by strange emotions, I tried to explain to Fl. that 
P. (could not understand anything at all, of course, because he) was not 
alive. But what I actually said-and I myself noticed the mistake-was, 
'NON VIXIT'. I then gave P. a piercing look. Under my gaze he turned 
pale; his form grew indistinct and his eyes a sickly blue - and f nally he 
melted away. I was highly delighted at this and I now realized that Ernst 
Fleischl, too, had been no more than an apparition, a `revenant' 
['ghost'-literally, `one who returns']; and it seemed to me quite possible 
that people of that kind only existed as long as one liked and could be got 
rid of if someone else wished it. 
(Freud 1900, pp. 548-9) 
Suetonius (1957) `Julius Caesar' 88. 
8 Not to mention the implicit connection between the tyrannicide and the rites of the Christian religion: see 
Sohmer's exhaustive study (1999). 
9 The dreams are also considered by Marjorie Garber (1987) in her reading of Shakespeare's play pp. 52-73. 
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The Dramatis Personae of the dreams reads as follows: Brücke = the famous physiologist 
Ernst Brücke under whose mentorship Freud began his scientific career; Fleischl = Ernst 
von Fleischl-Marxow, a brilliant associate of Brücke's, and an admired friend and 
colleague of Freud's; Fl. = Wilhelm Fliess; P. = Josef Paneth, Freud's prematurely 
deceased friend and his successor as demonstrator in Brücke's laboratory. 1° We cannot here 
do full justice to the subtlety and complexity of the text with which Freud presents us; ' 1 but 
let us at least recall the principal points of Freud's own interpretations which emerge at two 
separate stages of the dream book (pp. 549-53 and 619-626). In the first portion of his 
analysis Freud recounts having received a remonstrative look from Brücke's `terrible blue 
eyes' for having turned up late to the laboratory-a look, he says, `by which I was reduced 
to nothing' (p. 550). `No one', he goes on, `who can remember the great man's eyes, which 
retained their striking beauty even in his old age, and who has ever seen him in anger, will 
find it difficult to picture the young sinner's emotions' (p. 550). Realising that he has 
appropriated the power of a killing look in the dream, Freud thus acknowledges his own 
death-wish against P., and dwells on the Latin parapraxis by which his triumph is registered 
across the table to Fliess: Non vixit (he did not live) instead of Non vivit (he is not alive). He 
tells us that he had taken the phrase from the inscription on the Kaiser Josef Memorial in 
the Imperial Palace: Saluti patriae vixit non diu sed totus. 12 (Here, in the word Kaiser, we 
recognise the first obvious reference to Caesar). Freud suggests that his hostile train of 
ideas had `extracted [... ] just enough [from the inscription] to imply that "this fellow has no 
10 Further detail of all of these figures can be found in Gay's biography of Freud (1989). Gay also discusses 
the dream, pp. 33-4 and 116-7. 
" For a fascinating biographical account of the diptych and what is both presented to us and obscured by 
Freud's analysis of it, see Schur (1972) pp. 153 -171. 
12 Freud makes a further Latin slip here. The correct wording has publicae , there Freud writes patriae: For 
the well-being of his country he lived not long but wholly' (1900 p. 550). 
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say in the matter-he isn't even alive"': Non vixit (pp. 550-1). He goes on, however, to 
recall that just days before the dream he had attended the unveiling of a monument to 
Fleischl, and `must have reflected (unconsciously) with regret on the fact that the premature 
death of my brilliant friend P. [... ] had robbed him of a well-merited claim to a memorial in 
these same precincts' (p. 551). He therefore interprets the parapraxis as a compromise 
formation which satisfies contradictory currents of feeling towards his friend. The exact 
nature of these is only made clear in the second part of the analysis, where he explains that 
P., who had taken Freud's position as Brücke's demonstrator, had been impatient for 
promotion. P. knew, says Freud, `that he could not expect to live long [... ] and since the 
superior [Fleischl] was seriously ill, P. 's wish to have him out of the way might have an 
uglier meaning than the mere hope for the man's promotion' (p. 623). Freud thus interprets 
the Non-vixit formation as the condensation into a single phrase of the two following trains 
of thought: `As he had deserved well of science I built him a memorial; but as he was guilty 
of an evil wish (which was expressed at the end of the dream) I annihilated him' (p. 551). 
By this stage of the dream book, Freud has already established a point that will not cease to 
define his understanding of the unconscious: namely that `the category of contraries and 
contradictions [... ] is simply disregarded' by it, such that two antithetical impulses can 
exist side by side (p. 429). 13 Asserting that `I must have had some model in my mind' for 
the contradictory currents of the Non-vixit formation, Freud reproduces Brutus's `speech of 
self-justification' in Julius Caesar (p. 552): "`As Caesar loved me, I weep for him, as he 
was fortunate, I rejoice at it; as he was valiant, I honour him; but, as he was ambitious, I 
slew him"' (III. ii. 24-7; cited in Freud 1900 p. 552). He finds further justification for 
13 Cf. Freud (191) p. 190: ' [in the unconscious] contrary impulses exist side by side, without cancelling each 
other out or diminishing each other'. 
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determining the Shakespearean model in the fact that the dream-thought that Fliess had 
come to Vienna in July had no basis in reality: `But the month of July was named after 
Julius Caesar and might therefore very well represent the allusion I wanted to the 
indeterminate thought of my playing the part of Brutus' (Freud 1900 pp. 552, emphasis 
added). 
Freud goes on to describe how as a child he once really had played the part of 
Brutus in Schiller's Die Räuber (IV. v. ), with his nephew John as Caesar. 14 The 
relationship between the boys had, he states, been profoundly ambivalent, marked by 
inseparability as well as aggressive quarrels; and Freud goes so far as to describe John as 
`my tyrant' (1900 p. 553). It left .a 
determining influence on his emotional life: `All my 
friends have in a certain sense been reincarnations of this first figure [... ]: they have been 
revenants [... ]' (p. 662). Freud expends a good deal of time demonstrating how not only P. 
but Fliess and Fleischl too fit the ambivalent mould of loved and hated friends, their status 
as revenants-all three veritable Caesars to his Brutus. 15 In spite of this, and in spite of the 
space Freud assigns to the diptych generally, he concedes that he is `incapable' of giving a 
`complete solution' to what he calls its `enigma [Rätsel]' 16 because doing so would be 
`doing [... ] what I did in the dream [... i. e. ] sacrificing to my ambition people whom I 
greatly value' (p. 549, emphasis added). Exhaustively to interpret the sequence would 
somehow be to repeat the crime(s) enacted within it. 
14 The play is to a certain extent a thematic reworking of Julius Caesar and of Hamlet. 
15 The Non-vixit fonnation, Freud proposes, might have its roots in a childhood memory of a fight with John, 
after which Freud had told his father `I hit him `cos he hit me'. The German for `to hit', `wichsen' 
(pronounced like the English 'vixen'), suggests the bridge from vivit to vixit (1900 p. 553). 
16 Strachey translates Rätsel as 'conundrums'. I reject that translation here on the basis of Laplanche's own 
consistent, and conceptually significant rendering of Rätsel as 'enigma'. See Laplanche 1999A [1992d] p. 
254. 
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If we cannot finally know what it is that Freud misses out from his interpretation 
deliberately, we can at least point to what seems like a significant omission. As well as the 
Non-vixit slip, the interpretation carries its own more general `slip' of sorts. Freud only ever 
speaks of `the dream' in the singular. Once he has established the apparent origin of the 
motif of the killing look, he appears to dispense altogether with the first portion of the 
sequence. It never occurs to him to return to or interpret it in any detail. Nothing else at all 
in relation to the dream-text is said of the stern father figure Brücke. A peculiar omission, 
for while Brücke is not present as such in the second portion, he is far from being absent. 
His ghostly presence inhabits the entirety of the section in which Freud recognises that his 
`Caesars' are all revenants. 
It does so, however, in two contradictory ways. Firstly, although Freud himself does 
not acknowledge the point, he tells us enough of Brücke for us to place him in the category 
of loved/hated acquaintances: he is a `great man', of Freud's respect for whom we are in 
little doubt; though he had nonetheless rebuked his young assistant, and it patently had an 
impact upon him. '7 Moreover, the actions of P. and Fliess in the second dream (and Freud 
also fails to acknowledge this) exactly replicate those of Brücke in the first: a 
conversational exchange followed by their sitting down at a table; though where the second 
dream continues and the dreamer directs his fatal glance, the first dream cuts off. Does it 
not, then, seem as though Brücke is the fifth of Freud's Caesars? Yes as well as no. For, 
secondly, it is with the eyes of Brücke that he makes himself a Brutus and vanquishes P. 
Between the two dreams, where the first cuts off and the second begins, there is, as it were, 
a `missing' scene which continues to be missed in the interpretations. By the second dream 
17 Freud does not only not acknowledge the point: it remains concealed behind the fact, true as it may be, that 
his death-wish against P. is in part determined by P. 's own possible death-wish against Brücke. 
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Freud has appropriated the power of the killing gaze; Brücke has, in other words, already 
been `got rid of. This Caesar is already dead; and it is not, perhaps, excessive to hear a 
testament to this in the Non-vixit formation that gets applied to the next Caesar, P. What is 
omitted from the interpretations is the paradox that Brücke is both the victim and the partial 
model of the dreamer's Brutean gesture. 
Freud's principal interpretative focus is the ambivalence of Shakespeare's Brutus: a 
conscious contradiction between somehow loving and hating the one he assassinates, which 
is the unconscious truth of every affective bond. "But beyond this there is implicit in the 
diptych a more extraordinary contradiction. In spite of what he says, Freud does not 
identify with Shakespeare's ambivalent Brutus alone. At the moment of interpretation in 
which he recognises that identification (in the killing of P. ) he fails to recognise that in 
attaining the position of Brutus by killing those about whom he feels ambivalent, he does 
so at the very same time from the position of a Caesar. 
Of all the wishful acts of `tyrannicide' to which Freud admits an unconscious desire 
in his interpretations of the diptych (of John, P., Fleischl, and Fliess), this one remains 
(deliberately or not) uninterpreted and thus `unrepeated', an omission preserved as an 
enigma (Rätsel). Turning now to Julius Caesar more specifically, it will be suggested that 
this contradictory tyrant/tyrannicide identification, which remains a remainder in Freud's 
own analyses, is strongly determined by the tragedy. Ultimately, what Freud continues to 
`miss' in his interpretations of the diptych can be traced to the paradoxes which haunt 
Shakespeare's Brutus-paradoxes which themselves open up the scope for attempting to 
1" On this more general point note that Freud makes recourse to the same passage from Shakespeare in the Rat 
Man case (1909b), where he describes to his patient the component of unconscious hostility present in every 
affectionate relation. It emerges in the context of explaining the Rat man's ambivalence towards his father, 
pp. 60-1. 
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understand why Julius Caesar appears to be such a remarkable omission from Freud's 
attempts to elaborate the drama of the primal tyrannicide. 
From tyrannus to tyrant 
What would tyranny and tyrannicide mean in The Tragedy of Julius Caesar? The 
root of the English `tyrant' returns us to, and forces us to renew questions central to the 
previous Chapter. For Plato, whose Republic (1955) furnishes the first ethical definition, 
the tyrannus is himself a parricide. '9 His emergence is figured as the paradoxical upshot of 
the libertarian objective of democracy, itself a state of chaos which Plato expresses in terms 
of filiarchal revolution. 20 The product and the emblem of excessive liberty, the tyrannos 
will shrink neither from using violence against the true father to whom he is `bound by ties 
of birth and long affection' (574c), nor, ultimately, from suppressing the very liberty that 
`fathered' him politically (569a and b). 
In Jean-Joseph Goux's reading of the Oedipus story (1993) it is thus in the 
perspective of the Republic that Oedipus' filiarchal, autotelic sovereignty comes into focus 
as the inaugural figure of modernity. For Goux, what separates Plato's philosopher-king 
from the tyrannus is that the former has undergone the qualifying trials of sovereign 
investiture (Goux 1993 p. 83). The disordered figure of the tyrannus, susceptible to 
incestuous and murderous passions (Plato 1955 571d), is one whose power carries no 
legitimacy exactly because such initiatory rituals have been circumvented: 
19 This is by no means, however, the only Greek definition. Pre-Platonic attempts to make a legal distinction 
between the tyrannus and the king (basileus or mounarchie) are to be found on Xenophon and Herodotus. The 
nuances of multifarious legal, moral and philosophical definitions of the Greek tyrannos are traced by 
Bushnell (1990). chapter one. 
20 ` [I]t becomes the thing for the father and son to change places, the father standing in awe of his son, and the 
son neither respecting nor fearing his parents, in order to assert what he calls his independence [... ]' (562e). 
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Oedipus succeeded all by himself, without soliciting either sacred 
teachings or divine help, thereby claiming he could obtain on his own 
what was supposed to be conferred on him only by initiatory 
transmission. This is why Oedipus is not a king (anax) but, in the Greek 
sense, a tyrant (tyrannus). 
(Goux 1993 p. 83) 
Goux's argument is, perhaps, overdetermined. 2' Nonetheless, and specifically with regard 
to the (domesticated) Oedipean heritage of philosophy, it offers a provocative view of the 
tyrannus as a paradigm of the usurping, liberated son which inseminates Western thought 
(p. 87). If the parrincestuous crime of Oedipus marks the inaugural vector which will propel 
philosophy, it is committed in and as the embodiment of the autonomous tyrannus. 
Doubtless the co-ordinates of Goux's model can be shown to retain a certain 
seductiveness, even beyond the provenance of classical Greece. It was to the pages of 
Suetonius and Tacitus that Renaissance writers turned when looking for illustrations of the 
horrors of despotism; and the figures that regularly turned up were Nero and Caligula- 
both of them parricides and both of them accused of incest. 22 Already in this search for 
despotic exemplars, however, an important and telling move away from Goux's Oedipean 
conception can be detected-one which is marked by a semantic shift towards the modern 
notion of tyranny as a regime of brutality and egotism or superbia, irrespective of whether 
it carries the authority of legitimate succession. With the emergence of absolutism in 
Europe, the currency of this latter definition placed monarchists in a difficult position; for 
the boundary between absolute monarch and tyrant-despot was not easily, if at all, 
delimitable. If legitimate sovereign power was absolutus (literally: released, free from 
`' While Goux's claim carries considerable interpretative force with regard to the Platonic text whose 
principal repudiation of the tyrannus is made on the grounds of his being subject to the tyranny of his own 
passions (c£ Plato (1955) 579c), it is not until Aristotle that the failure of proper investiture (in the sense of 
succession or election) is fully and explicitly conceived as the constitutive mark of tyranny per se. 
22 See Bushnell (1990) pp. 29 if. 
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external control) it risked identification with the very term against which true kingship had 
traditionally sought to constitute and assert itself. 23 It therefore suited monarchists to affirm 
the political and theological duty of subjects patiently to endure the reign of tyrannical 
despots. 24 This amounted to a marked shit, at a discursive level at least, whereby the 
signifier of the wicked filiarch comes to encompass the wicked patriarch. 25 The ideology of 
absolutism found its theological support in the relation of subordinate correspondence 
envisaged between the father as the king of the family unit and the king as a father of the 
state-a relation supposedly united in the metaphysics of God as king and father of 
humankind. And so long as the moral disposition of the sovereign was understood to be of 
only secondary importance to the legitimacy of his right to rule, the notion of the tyrant (as 
despot) had also to be assimilated into the doctrine of Paterpatriae. Thus in the `Trees Law 
of Free Monarchies' (1608), King James I responds on `Theological' grounds to the 
hypothetical charge that it might be the duty of good citizens to rid the commonwealth of 
`wicked and tyrannous Kings' who have `rent and [... ) wounded' it, stating that: `The 
23 Bushnell (chapters one and two) elegantly demonstrates that while this threat emerges with renewed vigour 
in Renaissance Europe it is no less legible in Herodotus and Plato-the latter being a touchstone for the many 
sixteenth and seventeenth century attempts, inevitably aporetic, to exorcise the spectre of tyranny from the 
sovereign body of rightful authority. Attempts to specify and delimit the powers of an absolute monarchy 
which always risks merging with its illegitimate opposite are considered by Oakley (1968) and (1998). 
2' Passive endurance rather than rebellion was advocated on the grounds that tyrant-despots who had 
legitimately acceded were the punishing scourge of God. It was thus God's duty, not the people's, to remove 
him. See W. A. Armstrong (1946) pp. 164ff. 
25 This is not the place to attempt a genealogy of tyranny from the Greek to the Roman period and into the 
Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Early modern notions of the tyrant which we are about to 
consider highlight, rather, a structural problem that inhabits Goux's model of Oedipean subjectivity and to an 
extent extends the critique of Goux begun in the previous Chapter. There we attempted to emphasise the 
ipsocentric idealism of his conception of filiarchal revolution as being essentially untouched by a prior 
alterity, as one which reinforced and extended the very domestication of Sophocles' version which made 
possible its appropriation by Freud and philosophy. The other side of this is the paradox of the affirmation and 
posterity of Oedipean filiarchy. If, as Goux says, `The autodidactic and individualistic tendency that 
characterises philosophical thought in its very essence is clearly inscribed in this liberation of the sons from 
the authority of the father and the fathers' (Goux 1993 p. 87), then it remains true that philosophy is itself 
marked 'in its very essence', by a tradition of filial repudiation. Filiarchy cannot not collapse back into a 
tradition whereby each revolutionary philosophical tyrannus is positioned as the father figure against whom 
the new son will be constrained to revolt. This issue will reappear in chapter three. 
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wickedness of the King can neuer make them that are ordained to be iudged by him, to 
become his Iudges' (p. 78). Moreover, the position which the king occupies as king, 
however `vnruly and tyrannous' may be his regime, remains ipso facto a guarantee of the 
structural order without which the commonwealth will find itself in the alternative and 
more deleterious condition of anarchy: 
[... ] if the children may upon any pretext that can be imagined, lawfully 
rise vp against their Father, cut him off, & choose any other whom they 
please in his roome; and if the body for weale of it, may for any infirmitie 
that can be in the head, strike it off, then I cannot deny that the people 
may rebell, controll and displace, or cut off their king at their own 
pleasure, and vpon respects moouing them. And whether these similitudes 
represent better the office of a King [... ]I leave [... ] to the readers [sic] 
discretion. 
(p. 78)26 
At a rhetorical level tyranny had officially to be repatriated into the model of true kingship, 
accepted as a regrettable instance of what monarchy always-might-be. So forceful is the 
pressure to acknowledge this concession that even when James I does approach the 
question of the `usurping Tyran [sic]' in Basilikon Doron (1598) his illegitimacy is figured 
as an illegitimate paternity: he is a `step-father', to depose whom thus remains a rebellion 
4 euer vnlawful' (p. 20-21). 
But the antithesis on which contemporary monarchical texts like James's depend, 
namely that between monarchy and anarchy, implicitly concedes and upholds a much 
firmer structural identification between king and tyrant. As Catherine Belsey (1985) has 
observed, insofar as such texts represent the unity of the commonwealth (the macrocosmic 
family or body politic) as requiring the monarch (father or head) to rule in such a way as to 
`6 The `Oedipean' notion of the tyrantltyrannus did not simply disappear of course. The OED shows the 
meaningful currency of both the tyrant-despot and tyrant-usurper in Shakespeare's period, and illustrates both 
by appeals to the Shakespearean corpus (senses 1 and 3). Whatever its vicissitudes, we are, nonetheless, 
136 
eliminate opposition, disobedience and thus anarchic dissolution, `tyranny becomes not 
merely the shadow of absolutism but its norm' (Belsey 1985 p. 99). 27 What is at stake in 
our shift from the Oedipus Tyrannus of fifth-century Athens to the Julius Caesar of early 
modern England, is a displacement of tyranny and its significance for the coming into being 
of `the subject'-and one which has been seen to emerge with particular vigour in tragedy. 
The normative tyranny of absolute rule provided an endless narrative resource for early 
modern drama. Yet tragedy situates itself not as a simple expression of the unity of the 
commonwealth, but rather, as both Belsey and Franco Moretti (1988) have argued, as an 
articulation of and challenge to the opposition between `sovereign' and `subject' which that 
promise of unity was called upon by monarchist texts to efface. If the apparatus of absolute 
sovereignty qua absolute must close off sedition and resistance, then the monarch occupies 
a deeply ambivalent position as both the prohibitor and the model of individual 'freedom'. 
In representing (and thus itself replicating) tyranny as well as resistance to it, tragic drama 
can be regarded as one of the `intellectual origins of the English Revolution'. 28 The 
dramatisation of rebellion and tyrannicide opens up glimpses of a third way between 
monarchy and anarchy whereby those who rebel in accordance with their conscience and 
on behalf of law, are possessed of the very liberty hitherto consecrated solely in those they 
repudiate. When `subjects execute the monarch', Belsey claims, `they become subjects in 
another [... ] sense' (1985 p. 223, emphasis added). 29 
concerned with the fact of the necessary assimilation of this slippery term, as a term, into the discourse of 
legitimate sovereignty. 
27 Belsey discusses Julius Caesar in detail on pp. 101-3 and 116-7. 
,8 This is a term which Richard Wilson (2002) purloins from Christopher Hill in the general introduction to 
his collection of various critical writings on Julius Caesar, p. 6. 
29 Cf. Moretti (1988) p. 42: 'Tragedy disentitled the absolute monarch to all ethical and rational legitimation. 
Having deconsecrated the lieg, tragedy made it possible to decapitate him'. 
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In short, the shift from tyrcmnus to tyrant, at least with regard to our concerns, might 
be construed as a shift from filiarchal promise to paternal prohibition. If the tyrannus of the 
fifth century BC marks out the (albeit aporetic) vector of an inaugural subjectivity, the 
figure of the tyrant proleptically deconsecrated by early modern tragic drama is a measure 
of the subjectivity which the sons of the realm are constitutively denied: their liberty and 
autonomy is to be attained at the cost of rising up against the absolute Father, setting him 
on the `scaffold' and cutting him off. 
Famous last words: tyranny, posterity and equivocation 
But given these cultural and historical co-ordinates regarding the `work' of early 
modern tragedy, to what extent is Shakespeare's text reducible to them? 
In Plutarch's Lives, which contain the principal sources of Julius Caesar, a cruel if 
not, perhaps, deliberate irony marks the moment of Brutus' death at Philippi. His final 
words, after military defeat and moments before his suicide, are reported thus by Plutarch: 
'[A] s for me, I think myself happier than they that have overcome [i. e. the triumvirate], 
considering that I leave [apoleiponta] a perpetual fame of our courage and manhood, the 
which our enemies the conquerors shall never attain unto [... ]' (North's Brutus pp. 189-90; 
Plutarch, Brutus, LII. 3). Events, Brutus believes, will speak for themselves; his own 
posterity will therefore remain unequivocal. His courage and manhood, affirmed at this 
moment immediately in advance of his passing, are his legacy, that which he leaves or 
bequeaths. Yet no sooner has he staked this claim to secure perpetually his own posterity, 
than he becomes radically dispossessed of his own narrative. Plutarch goes on: `He came as 
near to [Strato] as he could, and taking his sword by the hilts with both his hands, and 
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falling down upon the point of it, ran himself through' (North's Brutus p. 190). Not least of 
all the detail of this account confers an appearance of certainty on the manner of his death. 
But in the next sentence, Brutus is upright once again, and ready to die differently and in 
equal detail: `Others say that not he, but Strato (at his request) held the sword in his hand, 
and turned his head aside: and so he ran himself through, and died presently' (p. 190). 
Retrospectively, Brutus' last words already begin to look threatened. The event of his death 
is not secure, not unequivocal; how then can the events of his life be presumed to speak for 
themselves perpetually? Only a page later Plutarch invokes an extant letter allegedly 
written by Brutus which throws into doubt the precise means of Portia's death. It is a text, 
he says, which would challenge the accounts of Nicolaus the philosopher and Valerius 
Maximus. Yet the Life preserves this suggestion in the conditional; for it cannot be 
resolved, Plutarch concedes, whether or not the letter is genuine. Eiper ara tön gnesiön 
estin are the final words of the Life of Brutus (Plutarch, Brutus LIII. 5). 30 They point not to 
the Roman's dream of self-authorised posterity, but to its appropriation and 
misappropriation in his absence; his dispossession, then, of that which he `leaves', like a 
letter to be purloined or even forged. 
The ironic non-closure of Plutarch's account pertains, however, not just to Brutus, 
but to the entire posterity of the murderous event in whose occurrence he believes his 
perpetual fame to have been secured. Neither his name nor Caesar's will escape the 
vicissitudes of incalculable (mis)appropriation. Certainly they will not have acquired a 
resolute and unequivocal significance or signification by the time of Shakespeare's tragedy. 
On the contrary, the problem of posterity in Plutarch points to the fact that the question of 
what tyranny and tyrannicide would mean in Julius Caesar is chiasmatic, and makes an 
10 [ ... ] 
if indeed it is a genuine [letter]' 
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equal and unavoidable demand to be posed contrariwise. Shakespeare's text emerges 
already burdened with the legacy of innumerable literary interventions in, and political and 
philosophical treatises on, what it is that the event of Caesar's assassination brings to `the 
tyrannicide debate' of which the advent of absolutism in Europe had inaugurated such a 
vigorous renewal. 3' Long in advance of Shakespeare's tragedy, the murder was a 
retrospective and radically unresolved point of dispute by which both tyranny and 
tyrannicide could be legitimated as well as condemned. If Michelangelo had already 
sculpted a heroic bust of the courageous and manly Brutus, Dante had already confined 
him, along with Judas, to the most ignominious circle of hell. 32 `Unlike Nero, Domitian, 
and Caligula-all universally reviled as hateful tyrants', Robert Miola argues, `Caesar 
evoked the full spectrum of Renaissance opinion and so did his assassination' (1985 p. 
272). 
Shakespeare's text comes to us bound up with a certain performativity in regard to 
that event and indeed to the singularly equivocal posterity `left' by the murder which it 
dramatises. Until the 1950's, critical responses to the tragedy tended to be no less polarised 
with regard to what could be claimed as Shakespeare's attitude to the assassination 
(endorsement or condemnation) than were Michelangelo and Dante to the event itself. For 
Dover Wilson (1964), Shakespeare's Caesar represented `a monstrous tyrant who destroyed 
his country', his Brutus a noble and selfless champion of liberty whose act Shakespeare 
sanctioned and lauded (p. xxv). For Mark Hunter, on the other hand, there could be `no 
doubt that to Shakespeare's way of thinking [... ] the murder of Julius was the foulest crime 
31 See Miola (1985), and cf. M. L. Clarke (1981). 
32 Miola (1985) p. 272. Clarke (1891) points out (pp. 90-91) that Michelangelo himself was perhaps 
ambivalent towards Brutus and what he represented. His bust, executed on behalf of Cardinal Ridolfi, is 
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in secular history' (pp. 136 ff. ). Only with Ernest Schanzer's (1955) attempt to fit Julius 
Caesar to the model of the so-called `problem play' did criticism begin to confront the 
essential ambivalence of the text to which the very possibility of those earlier, polarised 
responses could not help but testify. 33 If, as Miola suggests, there is something quite 
specific inherent in Shakespeare's subject matter which refuses its being harnessed to an 
unequivocal and permanent perspective, then the same may be said for Shakespeare's 
dramatisation of it-at least with regard to its own critical reception. For Schanzer, the play 
labours to make Caesar `remain [... ] an enigma' (p. 303), such that the audience is refused 
an easily determinable hold on whether the conspirators' accusations of tyranny are 
legitimate, and thus whether the assassination is morally and politically defensible. He 
suggests, in short, that the tragedy works to hold open the very question of just what it is 
that the assassination might mean. 
The crucial point here-and Schanzer's term `enigmatic' is a fortuitous one-is that 
if the equivocal critical posterity of Shakespeare's play, for a time at least, replicated in its 
very divisiveness that which had sprung from the original murder, then it is owing to the 
fact that the tragedy, rather than attempting a partisan affirmation of or against the event 
which is its subject and its focus, dramatises an originary complexity embedded in the 
event itself. 
Apoleipö: the verb with which Brutus is claimed by Plutarch to have declared the 
bequest of his permanent reputation is adequately rendered by North's verb `leave', 34 and, 
against itself perhaps, begins to open up the space in which our reading of Shakespeare's 
nonetheless a testament to a cult of republicanism and tyrannicide in sixteenth century Florence, which 
claimed Brutus as its hero. 
33 See also Fortin (1968). Schanzer takes Dover-Wilson and Hunter as merely two illustrations of the general 
`polarity of views' produced by the tragedy. 
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text will take place. Apoleipö is to leave or leave behind, to hand down or pass on. Yet like 
North's English verb it is also to leave behind in the sense of abandoning; to omit, lose or 
forsake and leave to decay. It implies both preservation and dereliction, perhaps even the 
necessity of both as a condition for the possibility of any legacy as such. 35 It points to a 
future, an afterwardsness (apres coup), which the verb of `leaving' calls forth in Brutus' 
very act of taking his leave, but which it can neither fully programme nor exhaustively 
foresee. It points, that is, to the exigency of Nachtraglichkeit. Apoleipö announces the 
bequest of something which will continue to exert some kind of effect beyond the 
immediate provenance of its origin. Yet, with its double or equivocal signification, 
apoleipö disallows the simply teleological or programmatic future which Brutus desires and 
envisages for what it is that he leaves. Strictly speaking, neither Dante's censure of Brutus 
and, thus, of the assassination, nor Michelangelo's valorisation of them, is proleptically 
disqualified by Brutus' (alleged) last words. Nor is either simply a retrospective 
construction. On the contrary. The duplicity of the verb-indeed of the act of `leaving' per 
se-makes the moment of its articulation by Brutus in Plutarch's text complex and 
equivocal in itself to a degree that cannot be perceived by Brutus, and is not perhaps by 
Plutarch himself. 36 Encapsulated embryonically in Plutarch's ambivalent term, the 
polemical debate-political, ethical, aesthetic-which sprung up in the wake of the 
assassination, and which continued to rage in Shakespeare's day, testifies to something 
34 Though North's is, of course, not a direct translation of the Greek but a rendering of Amyot's French. 
35 The paradoxical preservation by dereliction and dereliction by preservation of the legacies of the dead will 
be of central importance to the question of memory in chapter three. 
36 The objection that Plutarch's text is, of course, written `after the event' and is a part of Brutus' legacy, and 
indeed the entire legacy of the assassination, changes nothing here. It merely displaces onto Plutarch's writing 
the fundamental point that neither the preservation of Brutus' noble reputation, nor its dereliction can be 
evacuated without any remainder from the attempt to confront and address it. 
142 
undecidable, or, to leap ahead somewhat, ä traduire, concerning Caesar's death, the event 
itself of his assassination, by which it is, and continues to be, called forth. 
In what follows I want to take up Shakespeare's tragedy, assuming a starting point 
from Schanzer's insistence that it is fundamentally non-partisan. I suggest that the 
specificity of the tragedy is to be found in its dramatic negotiation of a certain problematic 
with which we are already familiar from Freud. In its transposition of Plutarch's 
retrospective narrative into mimetic form-one which presents the `then' as `now'- 
Shakespeare's text will be seen to acknowledge its own inescapable belatedness, not simply 
in terms of anachronism and epistemological alienness, but as an effect of the event to 
which it bears dramatic witness. 37 1 began by posing the question of why it might be that 
Freud should give so little attention to such an apparently `Freudian' play as Julius Caesar 
would appear to be. In order to formulate a response to this question I suggest that what 
Shakespeare's text successfully `negotiates' might be described in terms of the 
determinism-hermeneutics polarity which we considered in the Introduction. Julius Caesar, 
it will be seen, refuses to be assimilated to the model of anachronistic back-projection 
whereby the present context of its composition would impose, in terms of its own 
epistemological purview, a single and identifiable meaning on the past event it re-presents. 
Nor, however, is it a naive archae-ological labour of presenting the ancient assassination `as 
it was', complete and meaningful in itself What will concern us in what follows is 
Shakespeare's articulation and dramatisation of the traumatic breach opened up in the 
moment of the event-the complexity of which, at the instant of its happening, is precisely 
31 On this mimetic point of the `then' as the `now', and with specific reference to the scene of the murder to 
which wie will be returning, see esp. Bates (1999) pp. 191-2 and 
Goldberg (1993) p. 166-7. 
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what calls forth the belated, equivocal posterity which both attempts and fails to secure its 
significance and its meaning. 
No last word(s): a failure of translation 
In the midst of the so-called `seduction scene' between Cassius and Brutus, and thus 
almost at the outset of the play, the text establishes its own specific relation both to that 
historical event and to the source texts from which Shakespeare derives the major portion 
of his `raw' material. 
Throughout the onstage seduction, the process of which we will come to presently, 
there are several audible interruptions from the offstage scene of Caesar's attempted 
coronation. It had seemed to Brutus and Cassius that the shouts of the plebs indicate that 
Caesar has been made `king' (I. i. 79-80); yet as the festive coronation breaks up, and fully 
breaks into the onstage scene, the evident discomfort of Caesar and the awkwardness of his 
train as they pass by contradicts, though only in part, the conspirators' pessimistic 
assumptions. By this point we have already heard Cassius' objections to Caesar who `Is 
[... ] become a god' (I. ii. 116; cf. 121) and a `colossus', under whose legs such petty men 
as Cassius must `walk [... ] and peep about/To find [... ] dishonourable graves' (I. ii. 135-7); 
and we have already listened to his recollections of Caesar's moments of frailty and 
confessed mortality (I. ii. 111-131). But in his first extended speech, an aside to Antony 
regarding his suspicions of Cassius, Caesar emerges in neither one nor the other of these 
roles exclusively. Rather his quasi-deific stature and his quotidian frailty coexist and are so 
inextricable as to mark his discourse as paradoxical, even self-contradictory: 
Would [Cassius] were fatter! But I fear him not: 
Yet if my name were liable to fear 
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I do not know the man I should avoid 
So soon as that spare Cassius [... ] 
Such men as he be never at heart's ease 
Whiles they behold a greater than themselves, 
And therefore are they very dangerous. 
I rather tell thee what is to be feared 
Than what I fear: for always I am Caesar. 
Come on my right hand, for this ear is deaf, 
And tell me truly what thou think'st of him. 
(I. ii. 197-213) 
No sooner does Caesar recognise the danger posed by Cassius to his `greater' person than 
the perceptive political acumen with which the recognition is made is banished as an 
irrelevance from the authority of his illeistic political self (`for always I am Caesar'). 
Caesar fears what Caesar qua `Caesar' need not fear. But it is qua `Caesar', the deific 
colossus, that Caesar has cause to fear. He is and is not afraid, is and is not the 
monomaniacal giant who should, and by definition cannot be, afraid. His essence, as we 
will see later, is affirmed in these very contradictions. 
As he moves off with Mark Antony, Brutus and Cassius pull the acerbic Caska 
aside as their only source, and by extension ours, of an account and an explanation of what 
has occurred offstage and made the angry spot glow on Caesar's brow. The plebs' outcries, 
says Caska, coincided not with Antony's efforts to confer the coronet on Caesar, but with 
the latter's refusal of it; and, in the end, Caesar's `falling sickness' (I. ii. 253) had got the 
better of him: he had swooned in an epileptic fit `And so he fell' (I. ii. 267). 
Three characteristics of Caska's description and what it describes deserve note. First 
is the theatricality by which the noisy coronation scene is marked overall. Recounting the 
audible participation of the plebs, `clap[ping Caesar] and hiss[ing] him according as he 
pleased and displeased them', Caska is led to recall how they `use to do' the same to `the 
players in the theatre' (I. i. 257-9). Furthermore, there is little doubt in Caska's mind that 
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Caesar's refusals are themselves a performance, for in spite of his ostensible modesty, he 
says, `he would fain have had [the coronet]' (I. ii. 238-9). The second notable trait is the 
blatant anachronicity entailed in Caska's report of these theatrics. There is no attempt on 
Shakespeare's part to achieve a sense of realistic authenticity. Instead, references to Caesar 
opening his `doublet', offering his throat to be cut (I. ii. 264), and to the `sweaty nightcaps' 
of his filthy audience-members (I. ii. 244) make the scene sound distinctly Elizabethan. 38 
The third significant characteristic is the level of non-disclosure in Caska's narrative. 
Putting on his tardy form of frustrating evasiveness, he persistently requires prompt- 
questions from his interlocutors, 39 and, indeed, makes it clear that what he has allowed to 
be cajoled from him is less than the full story (I can as well be hanged as tell the manner of 
it' (I. ii. 234)). 40 Most strikingly of all is Caska's response, at the end of his narrative, to 
Cassius' question as to whether Cicero had said anything: 
Caska: Ay, he spoke Greek. 
Cassius: To what effect? 
Caska: Nay, an I tell you that, I'll ne' er look you in the face 
again. But those that understood him, smiled at one another, and 
shook their heads; but for mine own part, it was Greek to me. 
(I. ii. 280-3) 
There is no precedent in Plutarch for Cicero's having said a word. The authoritative gloss 
of his opinion, so desired by Cassius, is invented by Shakespeare then just not rendered. 
Figured as incomprehension on Caska's part ('those that understood him [... ]'), this 
amounts to an extraordinary and tantalising refusal on Shakespeare's, who knew from 
Plutarch that the historical Caska was fluent in Greek . 
41 The last words of the offstage 
" On anachronicity and the relation between Julius Caesar and the politics of Elizabethan theatre which it 
seems directly to address, see Wilson (1996). 
39 1. ii. 216-9,223,225.230,233,250,261,275,277,279 
40 Cf. I. ii. 286. 
41 Indeed that Caska spoke in Greek at the moment he stabbed Caesar. See North's Caesar p. 101. 
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scene remain forever untranslated. There is no simple dernier mot. Or rather, the last words 
spoken during the scene of the attempted coronation are replaced by Caska's having, as our 
only source of narrative, `the last word' on the scene-one which is no last word, which 
does not secure a single and resolute perspective on the event, but rather closes his narrative 
in and by pointing to something inaccessible, untranslatable that emerged during the scene 
itself. 
Let us clarify and develop this point by suggesting that if Caska does not conceal 
the impossibility of recounting to his friends the full truth of what has happened, if he 
frames his account with admissions that it is not a satisfactorily exhaustive transposition 
and communication of the event he has witnessed, this does not presuppose a 
straightforward, classical opposition between the singular meaningfulness of the event and 
the supplementarity of his account. On the contrary, the inadequate transposition, the 
failure of translation which mark his account point us to the centrifugal force of something 
internal to the event he recounts, which is in the first instance inadequately legible, 
untranslatable, enigmatic. The theatricality which defines this public performance by 
Antony and Caesar is fully in accordance with Plutarch, who claims that the attempted 
coronation of Caesar was a `proof (North's Caesar, p. 93)-a gesture designed more to 
test the preparedness of the plebs to see Caesar crowned than actually to confer on him the 
kingship which Shakespeare's Brutus and Cassius had so feared. It is thus crucial to notice 
that, as Caska relates it, the plebs cheer only after Caesar has first made his initial 
(engineered? ) display of refusing the coronet (I. ii. 221-2). The two repetitions of its offer 
and its repudiation, which invoke further hooting approval from the mass, means that in its 
moment of obvious failure-indeed, by virtue of that failure-the theatrical effort to test 
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and secure the plebs' desire for Caesar's coronation transmutes itself seamlessly into a 
solicitation of their cheers for his (apparent) modesty. Caesar's desire, his real ambition, 
remains veiled, ambivalently (un)articulated by his and Antony's own theatrics. Does he 
desire the coronet, or does he desire to put it by? Nothing in the spectacle of 
offering/repudiating alone permits its audience to decide. The meaning, as it were, of the 
performance is not reducible to the material actions in which it consists. For, rather, in 
themselves those acts-as messages to the mass-preserve as an enigma precisely what it 
is that Caesar wants. 
The significance of this unseen scene pertains to the entire tragedy and its audience 
in turn. It is unapologetically anachronistic, and blatantly theatrical. From Caska's 
description it sounds like a piece of Elizabethan drama-a drama, moreover, in which an 
inauthentically dressed Julius Caesar, in the context of his pseudo-coronation, prepares 
himself for the sacrificial knife, and then collapses in a morbid state. In short, it `imports 
the argument of the play', as Ophelia says of the Dumbshow, 42 and sketches out nothing 
less than the substance of the larger tragedy of which it is an occulted portion. It is thus 
telling, with regard to Shakespeare's sources, that lodged within his text is the gap opened 
up via Caska, in which Greek is unnecessarily invoked and left untranslated. Like Caska, 
Shakespeare was no translator of Greek. But then nor was Thomas North. Shakespeare's 
source texts are already a translation of a translation by Amyot. Julius Caesar is already at 
three removes from Plutarch's Greek. Equally like Caska, however, from whose mouth the 
proleptic mini-tragedy reaches Shakespeare's audience, there is no attempt in Julius Caesar 
exhaustively to transpose the entirety of, or to retrieve a truth lost in, these layers of 
translation-North's of Amyot, Amyot's of Plutarch, or even Plutarch's `translation' of the 
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historical events themselves. Instead, the present tense in which its own (belated, 
anachronistic) drama operates functions to disclose the happening of events in such a way 
that they are shown in the first place to have been not exhaustively communicable or 
translatable-indeed that it is the a traduire of those events which demands their constant 
retranslation. 
As we will see, not unlike the peculiar dramaturgy of Oedipus Tyrannos, Julius 
Caesar prohibits its audience (which includes Freud the dreamer) from occupying a 
privileged position of spectatorial tyranny that would enable a decisive and resolute 
interpretation of what is reproduced-repeated and, as we will see, translated-before 
them. Rather than attempting naively to dramatise its principal protagonists in their original 
`essence` 
, 
it labours to present their essence, and thus the murderous event to which they 
give rise, as being originarily complex. The question of Caesar's enigmatic desire-his 
`ambition' or his modesty-during the pseudo-coronation will remain a bone of contention 
for the characters on stage even after the funeral orations in which it is explicitly re-invoked 
and understood in wholly contrasting ways, though neither of them wholly illegitimate, by 
Antony and Brutus. By then, however, nothing will have permitted Shakespeare's audience 
to have the last word on Caesar's alleged tyranny or the true character of his tyrannical 
desire. In short, and in contrast with Freud's description of the primal murder, it will have 
been impossible to say whether or not a tyrannicide, in the strictest sense, has occurred. 
42 Hamlet III. ii. 136. 
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Interpreting Shakespeare with Shakespeare 
As Freud recognises with regard to his dream, interpretation can entail sacrifice. 
What we have called spectatorial tyranny with regard to Julius Caesar would describe the 
hubristic posture of determining one way or another precisely what is at stake in what is on 
stage. To assert that the tragedy denies such a posture is not to say that what does happen 
either lends itself to random interpretation, or defies reading altogether; rather that the 
attempt to claim a `single' and `resolute' interpretation amounts to a sacrificing of the 
complexity of what is interpreted. Before considering in more detail the possibility of an 
interpretation of Julius Caesar, and its connection with the reading Freud gives of his 
dream, let us, then, turn to the function of interpretation within the play, and the path it 
marks out for its would-be interpretative spectator. 
The play is freighted heavily with interpretation, with readings-of people, their 
corpses, strange phenomena, dreams, prophecies, wounds... Everything lends itself to be 
read. Even Caesar's sacrificial ox, whose incomplete entrails beggar an exhaustive reading, 
does not for its lack of a heart cease to operate as a message, a sign (II. ii. 37-43). 
43 The 
most explicit statement concerning interpretation comes from, of all characters, Cicero, as 
part of his only unmediated dialogue in the play. Meeting a petrified Caska on the night 
before the murder, he listens to his friend's catalogue of the evening's prodigious horrors: 
the surly, harmless lion, men `all in fire' yet unscorched, the hooting of the night bird at 
noon (I. iii. 15-28). `When these prodigies/Do so conjointly meet', says Caska, 
Let not men say 
`These are their reasons, they are natural': 
43 Cf. Wolfreys (2000) p. x. 
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For I believe they are portentous things 
Unto the climate they point upon 
(I. iii. 28-32) 
Something threatens. As Laplanche has pointed out (1999A [1995]), one must always be 
careful to distinguish between a pure and a non-objective threat. Freud, he notes, 
consistently uses two different words, Drohung and Androhung respectively, the latter 
implying a spoken threat, one addressed by someone to someone. `A pure threat', 
Laplanche suggests, `is objective: a storm threatens, unless, of course, we posit a Jupiter 
brandishing bolts of lightening; but then, precisely, it becomes an Androhung' (p. 172). The 
prodigies of Shakespeare's storm are not pure, not `natural'; they are messages of portent 
that carry at their origin (who- or whatever it is) a meaning, however obscure, which is 
addressed, however obscurely, to its recipients. Here is Cicero's response: 
Indeed it is a strange-disposed time. 
But men may construe things after their fashion 
Clean from the purpose of the things themselves. 
Comes Caesar to the Capitol tomorrow? 
(I. iii. 33-6) 
His claim would be banal were it not so surprising and, ultimately, uneasy with itself Its 
banality resides in the fact that Cicero's initial acknowledgement that the `time' is indeed 
`strange', is followed by a rationalising dismissal ('But [... ]') of Caska's fright. Lines 34-5 
are little more than a platitude: interpret the storm how you will, meaning is in the eye of 
the beholder alone; the `things themselves' only acquire their significance from you. Yet 
having dismissed the Androhung of the storm, why should he immediately ask of Caesar's 
movements tomorrow (the Ides of March)? One suspects, at least, that he is not wholly 
convinced by his own rationalisation. The surprising character of his response-what tells 
us that it is definitively unsatisfactory-is merely 
its being Cicero's. Only a Scene before, 
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his interlocutor now had been left unable to interpret Cicero's own speech. Caska's 
narrative had certainly been delivered in his sarcastic and elusive `fashion', yet he had 
failed to produce a purely subjective account of the scene in which Cicero had taken such 
an apparently significant part. What was disclosed/secreted by Caesar's spectacle and by 
Cicero's Greek did not open a space to be filled by a subjective interpretation clean from 
their purpose: Caska's (incomplete) interpretation had itself been somehow structured (in 
its incompleteness) by the messages-spoken and performed-communicated during the 
scene. 
However inadequate it is of itself, Cicero's response to Caska puts us on the track of 
understanding interpretation in Julius Caesar. Although his role in the tragedy is largely 
Shakespeare's invention, the historical model behind him, and the texts he left behind, were 
an important focus of Elizabethan schoolboy education, and Shakespeare's use of the term 
`construe' certainly provokes associations with lessons in Latin. 44 In The Origins of 
Shakespeare (1977) Emrys Jones makes the case that Julius Caesar owes much to the 
mode of the Latin syllabus likely to have been taken by its author as a boy. He appeals to a 
note in a text by the Lutheran educational reformer Melanchthon which proposes that a 
schoolmaster take an historical question and require from his pupils a Latin response. One 
such question, Melanchthon suggests, would be whether Brutus was right or wrong in 
murdering Caesar. `The reference to Brutus', Jones argues, is interesting, 
since it suggests that the subject of Shakespeare's Julius Caesar-the 
rights and wrongs of the conspiracy and assassination-was used for 
rhetorical purposes at school. The boys would be trained to find 
arguments for and against Brutus' act: there was no question of coming 
down simple-mindedly on one side. 
(p. 16, emphasis added) 
" See David Daniell's editorial note to the Arden edition, I. iii. 34. 
152 
The pedagogically instilled demand for adversarial interpretation does not, at least cannot 
within the drama, amount to a licence to interpret wholly subjectively. When Shakespeare 
repeats Melanchthon's rhetorical exercise, in English, during the scene of Caesar's funeral 
it is necessary that for either side to have an effect on the plebs, and that for the whole to 
have any dramatic effect whatever, neither Brutus' defence nor Antony's condemnation be 
entirely disqualifiable by the event which they interpret that the event contain within it 
the possibility of both its preservation and dereliction as a noble and as an ignoble deed, an 
act of sacrifice and of butchery. We will consider Shakespeare's procedure in dramatising 
this for his audience further on. For now let us emphasise that the inability to `come down 
simple-mindedly on one side' is already internal to what happens onstage, and pertains first 
of all to those onstage who undertake the task of interpretation. The ultimate issue is not 
what something means, nor what it can subjectively be made to signify, but rather the 
originary complexity to which adversarial interpretations of it can only bear witness. 
What it signifies remains unknown, but that the storm on 14/15 March `signifies to' 
those who suffer its rage is in doubt to no one within the tragedy, even, in spite of himself, 
to the uneasy Cicero. According to Plutarch the storm produced `strange and wonderful 
signs' pointing to the imminent death of Caesar (North's Caesar p. 95); but what, regarding 
that, do they signify exactly? On the morning of the 15th Calphurnia, not known for her 
superstition (II. ii. 13-4), 45 fears that the bizarre phenomena of the preceding night are 
`things beyond all use', and augur ill for her husband: `When beggars die there are no 
comets seen; /The heavens themselves blaze forth the death of princes' (II. ii. 30-1). But 
precisely what of the following day's events is being augured? Nothing simple. When, after 
a cf. North's Caesar p. 97: ' Caiphurnia until that time was never given to any 
fear or superstition'- 
desidaimonia in Plutarch's Greek, Caesar LXIII, 7. 
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Cicero, Cassius confronts Caska in the storm, he tells him that the prodigious phenomena 
are things 
Infused [... ] with [... ] spirits 
To make them instruments of fear and warning 
Unto some monstrous state. 
(I. iii. 69-71) 
Again, something threatens. But Cassius' wording is sufficiently ambiguous as to admit 
what will be the two contradictory interpretations he gives of the storm. First: 
Now could I. Caska, name to thee a man 
Most like this dreadful night 
That thunders, lightens, opens graves and roars 
As doth the lion in the Capitol- 
A man no mightier than thyself, or me, 
In personal action, yet prodigious grown 
And fearful as these strange eruptions are. 
(I. iii. 72-8) 
Then, a little later: 
For now, this fearful night 
There is no stir or walking in the streets; 
And the complexion of the element 
In favour's like the work we have in hand, 
Most bloody, fiery, and most terrible. 
(I. iii. 126-30) 
These are not random, subjective constructions. The storm, and Cassius seems to recognise 
this, simply is not reducible to a single meaning. Is the `monstrous state' of which it warns 
that of Caesar's likely tyranny? Or that of the unnaturalness of the conspiracy in hand 
against a legitimate statesman? To whom, then, is it a fearful warning, the conspirators or 
their victim? These questions are not and cannot be satisfactorily answered. The storm is 
not an unequivocal message, it bears within it, at the time of its occurrence before the event 
has taken place, both a possible defence and a possible condemnation of the assassination. 
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So too Calphurnia's prophetic dream of Caesar's statue spouting blood, the Romans 
bathing in its abject matter (II. ii. 76-81). Decius claims that if it is understood as a cause 
for fear, the dream is `all amiss interpreted' (II. ii. 83). Yet Calphurnia's construal is no 
more or less well grounded than Decius' own (Republican) suggestion of how it `Signifies 
that from you [i. e. Caesar] great Rome shall suck/Reviving blood' (II. ii. 86-7). Nothing in 
the dream permits us only to condone or to condemn the murder. On the contrary, the 
dream calls forth both interpretative propositions, testaments to the fact that what does 
happen is in itself not soluble in an either/or fashion. 
Caska tells a notable truth when he says of the pseudo-coronation that he can as 
well be hanged as tell the manner of it. Interpretative decision in Julius Caesar is fatal. 
Caesar does not ignore the signs which augur his death: 46 he lets one set of interpretations 
seduce him into a dangerous complacency. Cassius himself will die of a misconstrual, his 
own percipience, so attuned to the enigmatic Androhung of the storm, replaced by the 
interpretative blindness of Pindarus who sees only defeat on a distant and obscure 
battlefield (V. iii. 20-47). Indeed the deaths of all the conspirators, figured as revenge for 
their deed, are arguably the result of their collective attempt wilfully to read Caesar, to 
`fashion' him as Brutus says (H. i. 30), as a tyrant; scotomising, sacrificing that complexity 
of his character which makes the nature of their deed itself (noble? indefensible? ) an 
unresolved and unresolvable question for posterity. 
46 Indeed, as Cassius says (II. i. 194-6): 
he is superstitious grown of late, 
Quite from the main opinion he held once 
Of fantasy. of dreams, of ceremonies. 
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Let us, then, move on to an interpretation of the play, attempting to hold open its 
contradictions as contradictions, its internal complexity as the playing out of the originary 
complexity of that which it dramatises. 
Eyes of a divided Rome 
For Freud the dreamer and interpreter, of course, it is the very `ambivalence' of 
Brutus towards his victim that makes him such a ready figure for identification. Yet the 
complexity of Shakespeare's Brutus is somewhat more profound than Freud consciously 
acknowledges. In this section, let us return briefly to the seduction scene, where Brutus first 
appears, and to which can be traced an echo of the other motif of Freud's dream: namely 
the fatal power of the paternal look. 
Cassius' ambiguously confessed intention in the scene, articulated the moment 
Brutus leaves the stage, is to perform on his potential co-conspirator a kind of alchemy. 
Acknowledging, in a soliloquy riddled with double meaning, that Brutus' `honourable 
mettle may be wrought/From that it is disposed' (I. ii. 308-9), he perceives that Brutus is no 
less susceptible to his own ideological (Republican) position than to sympathy for Caesar. 
We will return to this extraordinary soliloquy in the next section; let us first consider the 
seduction to which it directly refers. At the outset of their dialogue, he engages Brutus by 
an accusation against his friend's recent coolness. Brutus responds, inaugurating a visual 
metaphor which will furnish the guiding thread of the seduction by which Cassius hopes to 
secure his support: 
If I have veiled my look, 
I turn the trouble of my countenance 
Merely upon myself. Vexed I am 
Of late with passions of some difference 
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Conceptions only proper to myself 
Which give some soil, perhaps, to my behaviours. 
But let not therefore my good friends be grieved 
(Among which number, Cassius, you be one) 
Nor construe any further my neglect 
Than that poor Brutus, with himself at war, 
Forgets the shows of love to other men. 
(I. ii. 38-47) 
The explanation ('soil') of Brutus' apparent neglect concerns problems which are uniquely 
his own, `proper' only to him-a conflict without which, one commentator has suggested, 
he would not be Brutus. 47 Understated as it is throughout the scene, it remains clear that the 
`war' within Brutus concerns his ambivalence (though is not reducible only to it) towards 
the mounting threat of Caesar's stature following the victory of the latter's military war 
with Pompey. Overhearing the plebs' off-stage shouts at the pseudo-coronation, Brutus lets 
slip his `fear' that the people choose Caesar for their king: 
Cassius: Ay, do you fear it? 
Then must I think you would not have it so. 
Brutus: I would not Cassius, yet I love him well. 
(I. ii. 78-82) 
The ambivalence with which Freud claims to identify is already present in a manifest form 
here. But Brutus' earlier words seem to point to a yet more radical and more complex self- 
alienation which lies behind it as the condition of its possibility. In announcing a certain 
self-division, an internal alterity with which he is `at war', Brutus' response to Cassius puts 
in doubt the very idea of his self-propriety, the very notion of a singular self which can be 
simply identified, or, as in Freud's case, identified with. The possibility of an internal battle 
which is `proper' only to him (private, pertaining to `himself alone) presupposes a certain 
disappropriation of himself from himself, something first of all im-proper, in the conflicted 
relation with which, precisely, his private discourse is situated. The manifest love-hate 
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which makes Brutus Brutus, which makes him Freud's ('ambivalent') Brutus, is secondary 
to this prior and more radical impropriety-the precise character of which we will attempt 
to determine more fully later on. 
The function of the `seduction', from Cassius' perspective, is not to resolve Brutus' 
manifest ambivalence in favour of pure antagonism towards Caesar. It is, more exactly, to 
interpellate Brutus in such a way as to simplify this more radical self-alienation, in order to 
bring into being the great Republican conspirator whose nobility will be affirmed precisely 
in the ambivalence he bears towards his victim. What Cassius recognises is that in order for 
Brutus to become Brutus the ambivalent conspirator-to be the murderous Brutus with 
whom Freud identifies-he must first be made to identify with 'himself. Thus Cassius 
pounces on his friend's improper-properness, and relocates the constitutive role of alterity 
onto a different, interpersonal register on which, he claims, Brutus' self can be decisively 
resolved: 
Cassius: Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face? 
Brutus: No, Cassius, for the eye sees not itself 
But by reflection, by some other thing. 
Cassius: 'Tis just, 
And it is very much lamented, Brutus, 
That you have no such mirrors as will turn 
Your hidden worthiness into your eye, 
That you might see your shadow: I have heard 
Where many of the best respect in Rome 
(Except immortal Caesar) speaking of Brutus, 
And groaning under this age's yoke, 
Have wished that noble Brutus had his eyes. 
(I. ii. 51-62) 
Invoking a fairly commonplace image, the eye or the I (the self), Brutus punningly 
concedes, demands for its own definition reflection by something extraneous to it. 
48 
'' Hampton (1990) p. 219. 
48 Cf. Troilus and Cressida III. iii. 90-106. 
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Cassius' task will thus be to reorient Brutus' gaze from its internal object of alterity to one 
external. Brutus' gaze must, and he acknowledges the fact, be both active and passive, 
mediated by passing outside itself looking at himself reflected in the eye/I of an other, 
looking at (himself) being looked at. It is within this reciprocity of mutual glances that his 
internally disunited self will recognise or misrecognise its `true' self in the supposedly 
unified form reflected by the other's gaze. 49 Brutus' internal war will continue as a war at 
least until the small hours of the day of the assassination, when he receives letters forged by 
Cassius exhorting him to `awake and see thyself (II. i. 46). Cassius is his `glass' (I. ii. 
68}--the mirror which claims at least to proffer to him a unified, identifiable self, which 
would conscript him into the Republican cause by labouring to smooth over the complexity 
which characterises his (im)proper self at the outset. The paradoxes of this procedure will 
be demonstrated later on. 
The mutuality and reciprocity of gazes in which the (Republican) Brutus is 
supposedly to be (mis)recognised and made `proper' forms a visual trope of dependence on 
alterity by which the tyrannical threat represented by Caesar's nascent ascendancy is 
metaphorically defined. Soliloquising in his garden, moments before the arrival of Cassius' 
letters, Brutus figures the tyrant that Caesar might become in terms exactly contrary to 
those invoked by Cassius towards Brutus himself: 
But 'tis a common proof 
That lowliness is young ambition's ladder 
Whereto the climber upward turns his face; 
But when he once attains the upmost round 
He then unto the ladder turns his back, 
Looks in the clouds, scorning the base degrees 
By which he did ascend. 
(II. i. 21-27) 
49 On the reflective and asymptotic misrecognition (meconnaissance) of itself as unified by the disunited pre- 
subject, see Lacan (1949). 
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The tyrant (crucially, not the tyrant Caesar is, but that he might become) repudiates 
dependency; only his back parts, and specifically not his face, can be seen. His eyes look, 
and are not to be looked at. Hoping to banish Calphurnia's fears of what the day will bring, 
just hours later Caesar will himself repeat the image in a passage which we will not say is 
the literary origin of the motif of the fatal look in Freud's dream, but which perhaps shares 
a textual origin with it: 
The things that threatened me 
Ne' er looked but on my back: when they shall see 
The face of Caesar, they are vanished. 
(II. ii. 10-12)5° 
As Brücke in Freud's dream, Caesar's eyes are everything like the sun, or so he threatens. 
His words are an explicit paraphrase of God's to Moses having commanded the Law on 
Mount Sinai: `And he said, Thou canst not see my face : for there shall no man see me and 
live [... ] thou shalt see my back parts : but my face shall not be seen' (Exodus 33: 20-3). 
Conceiving himself, literally as the sovereign I AM, Caesar as `Caesar', at this moment, 
claims to be positioned outside the economy of the mutual gaze, an autotelic (Oedipean) 
giant . 
51 And this notion of his peerless exteriority brings us to the question of fratricide. 
At the opening of the play Rome has been, like Brutus, `at war'-a civil war, in 
fact, and thus, like Brutus, `with itself at war'. The first scene presents the plebs crowding 
the streets to welcome home Caesar as the victor over Pompey. The latter had actually been 
defeated at Pharsalia in 48; his sons had been defeated at Spain in 45, and the year of 
Caesar's assassination (in which the play is set) was 44. Shakespeare takes a certain liberty 
so Note that as Cassius tries to impress upon Brutus the mortal frailty of this alleged `god', invoking Caesar's 
sickness during the campaign in Spain, he describes how `that same eve, whose bend doth awe the world, /Did 
lose his lustre' (I. ii. 123-4). 
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as regards the true historical chronology of events. Not only is Caesar's return to Rome 
after the war relocated and set in the year of his death; the victories at Pharsalia and Spain 
appear ambiguously telescoped into a single triumph. 52 For Plutarch, the war had been 
something of an inevitability: 
For Crassus being killed among the Parthians [... ] nothing kept Caesar 
from being the greatest person, but because he destroyed not Pompey that 
was the greater: neither did anything let Pompey to withstand that it 
should not come to pass, but because he did not first overcome Caesar, 
whom only he feared. 
(North's Caesar pp. 43-4) 
In Shakespeare's source, at least, the civil war staged a battle between Rome's two greatest 
equals, after the power sharing arrangement of the first triumvirate had been destabilised by 
the loss of Crassus. Without the apparatus of the triumvirate, Plutarch suggests, the mutual 
dependence which it had exerted on its principal protagonists became little more than an 
enforced restraint on personal ambition. 
While there is no explicit attempt in Plutarch to frame the rivalry between these two 
ambitious equals as `fraternal', for Shakespeare it is difficult to resist. He chooses, in a 
further historical elision, to set Caesar's triumphant return (and pseudo-coronation) during 
the celebrations of the Lupercal Q. i. 68). As Plutarch states in the first book of the Lives, 
`the name of the festival has the meaning of the Greek "Lycaea" or feast of wolves', and is 
thus connected with the extraordinary suckling of Romulus and Remus, at the place of 
which the course run by the Luperci traditionally began (Romulus XM 3-4). A 
commemoration of the mythical foundation of Rome, and, by extension, its unification 
s' It should be added that the historical Caesar was made perpetual Dictator, which is to say: the one who 
speaks the law-a fact which Plutarch calls 'plain tyranny' (North's Caesar p. 85), but which Shakespeare 
chooses never explicitly to mention. 
)2 The Arden editor points out that the tribune Murellus' any rebuke to the plebs that Caesar `comes in 
triumph over Ponipey's blood (my italics) implies both the literal blood of Pompey and the triumph over 
Pompey's kin (I. i. 52 and n. ). 
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under the Romulean monarchy, 53 the Lupercal contains within it a certain `forgetting' of the 
fratricidal cost of the establishment of the very community by and for whom it is 
celebrated. 54 Conflating the Lupercal with the return of Caesar, Shakespeare at once lifts 
that forgetting and invests the Caesarean triumph with its significance. 
If we say that Shakespeare lifts the amnesia internal to the festivities of the Lupercal 
it is because, however decisive has been Pompey's defeat, the civil war is far from being 
over at the beginning of the play. The voice of the dead brother is still strongly audible in 
its opposition to the victor. Against the carnival spirit of the plebs who come to welcome 
Caesar, the tribunes Flavius and Murellus try to render explicit the internecine destruction 
at the heart of what they celebrate: 
Murellus: Wherefore rejoice? What conquest brings he home? 
What tributaries follow him to Rome 
To grace in captive bonds his chariot wheels? 
(I. i. 33-5) 
Those who have suffered for the unified establishment of `Caesar's' Rome belong to Rome 
itself, and to that extent his victory recalls as much the violence forgotten in the Romulean 
commemoration of the Lupercal as its explicit content confers the glory of antique 
precedent upon him: 
[... ]0 you hard hearts, you cruel men of Rome, 
Knew you not Pompey? Many a time and oft 
Have you climbed up to walls and battlements 
To towers and windows, yea, to chimney-tops, 
Your infants in your arms and there have sat 
The livelong day, with patient expectation, 
To see great Pompey pass the streets of Rome [... ] 
And do you now strew flowers in his way, 
That comes in triumph over Pompey's blood? 
Be gone! 
53 See Miola (1983) p. 80. 
sa On the necessary 'forgetting of that which may question the community and its legitimacy' as structural to 
commemorative practice in general see Lyotard (1988) pp. 7 if. 
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Run to your houses, fall upon your knees, 
Pray to the gods to intermit the plague 
That needs must light on this ingratitude. 
(I. i. 37-56) 
Thus in spite of the festivities, Flavius insists that the statues of Caesar hung with trophies 
of victory be stripped, because 
These growing feathers, plucked from Caesar's wing 
Will make him fly an ordinary pitch, 
Who else would soar above the view of men. 
(I. i. 73-5 my italics) 
The metaphor of sight anticipates its own elaboration in the next scenes, of course. Caesar 
has vanquished his only equal in order no longer to be `looked at'. There will, they fear, be 
no mutual gaze remaining to reciprocate great Caesar's. He has, from the Republican 
perspective at least, eliminated his (br)other. 55 
Child of... an enigma: Brutus' double coinage 
In spite of the apparent specular differentiation that is invoked to mark the 
opposition between Caesar and Brutus, it is on what equally and at the same time binds the 
two that Brutus' more radical self-alienation is founded. Here is the first part of Cassius' 
soliloquy at the close of the seduction scene: 
Well, Brutus, thou art noble; yet I see 
Thy honourable mettle may be wrought 
From that it is disposed. Therefore it is meet 
That noble minds keep ever with their likes; 
For who so firm that cannot be seduced? 
Caesar doth bear me hard, but he loves Brutus. 
If I were Brutus now, and he were Cassius, 
He should not humour me. 
(I. ii. 306-15) 
" Other parallels between Romulus and Caesar are noted by Miola (1983) p. 80; and cf. Conn Liebler (1995) 
pp. 88 if. 
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Precisely what is the `nobility', the `honourableness' to which Cassius initially refers? 
Nothing in what follows allows us to decide finally whether they pertain to Cassius' 
admiration for Brutus' Republicanism, or for his so far loving endurance, in spite of that, of 
Caesar's ongoing ascent. The complexity of the passage rests on the pronoun of 306: `If I 
were Brutus now, and he were Cassius/He should not humour me'. The ambiguity of its 
referent, following on from the observation that Caesar holds Cassius in disfavour but loves 
Brutus, makes Cassius' claim understandable in two wholly opposed ways: `If I (Cassius) 
were Brutus (and thus if Caesar loved me), and Brutus were Cassius (and was thus 
disfavoured by Caesar), he (Brutus, in the position of Republican seducer) could not 
wrench me from the love of Caesar'. Equally: `If I (Cassius) were Brutus (and thus even if 
Caesar loved me), and Brutus were Cassius (and was thus disfavoured by Caesar), he 
(Caesar, despite the love he bears me) could not wrench me from my duty as a Republican'. 
Everything turns on this difficulty. Is Brutus seducible from the mettle of his natural 
Republicanism by the adoring Caesar, or from his natural affection for Caesar by the 
machinations of Cassius? To whom, originally, is he more naturally `like' in mind? Is not 
the honourable mettle of the noble Brutus undecidably that of his innate Republicanism and 
his love for the man who allegedly threatens it? 
We can begin to grasp the full complexity of what it is to which Brutus is-and-is-not 
`disposed' by referring to a single significant device of Cassius' seduction procedure. 
Towards the end of the soliloquy, he announces his intention to send the forged letters to 
Brutus, 
As if they came from several citizens, 
Writings all tending to the great opinion 
That Rome holds of his name [... ] 
(I. ii. 316-8) 
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His name bears an illustrious history. The Brutus of 44BC was alleged to be the descendent 
of Lucius Junius Brutus, the expeller of the Tarquins and by tradition the founder of the 
Republic. 56 Earlier, in the midst of his censure of Caesar's `colossal' stature, Cassius had 
reminded his friend of the fact: 
0, you and I have heard our fathers say 
There was a Brutus once who would have brooked 
Th'eternal devil to keep his state in Rome 
As easily as a king. 
(I. ii. 157-60) 
This is the model with which Brutus must identify, before he can become the ambivalent, 
murderous `model' with whom Freud identifies in his dream. Brutus' ancient heritage is the 
first point touched on in Plutarch's Life of Brutus; and Cassius' efforts in appealing to it 
clearly help propel the trope of reflection and recognition in Shakespeare's seduction scene: 
Ara agnoeis, 6 Brute, seauton? Cassius asks (Brutus X 3). It is rendered by North, `What, 
knowest thou not that thou art Brutus' (p. 122). The paradox opened up here is familiar. In 
Plutarch's Greek we hear again the Delphic imperative discussed in the previous chapter: 
gnothi seaton (Know Thyself). 57 Do you not know yourself (to be) Brutus? To know 
himself as Brutus, he must recognise himself as a Brutus. To know and be himself he must 
acknowledge what is it is in him that is not (simply) his own self; and, chiasmatically, it is 
in that acknowledgement of the not-me that his supposedly true self is to be accomplished. 
The double-bind makes its way into Shakespeare's seduction scene without being resolved: 
Brutus: Into what dangers would you lead me, Cassius, 
That you would have me seek into myself 
56 Shakespeare had already treated this legend in The Rape of Lucrece. For Lucius Junius Brutus see esp. the 
'Argument' to the poem, and lines 1807-55. 
'' Note that a likely Renaissance source for Shakespeare's eye/I motif is Sir John Davies' poem Nosce 
Teipsuni (i. e. Know Thyself) lines 105-8. The play's relation to that section of Davies' poem is given detailed 
treatment in Simmons (1973) pp. 95ff. 
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For that which is not in me? 
Cassius: Therefore, good Brutus, be prepared to hear. 
And since you know you cannot see yourself 
So well as by reflection, I your glass 
Will modestly discover to yourself 
That of yourself which yet you know not of 
(I. ii. 63-70) 
The image of himself in which his supposedly true and unified self is to be recognised is 
both not (in) him (65), and more profoundly in himself, `of himself (70) than he yet 
knows. The moment in the small hours of the Ides of March at which his resolution 
becomes firm having read the forgeries, is the accomplishment of this paradox as paradox: 
`Brutus, thou sleep'st; awake and see thyself 
Shall Rome, et cetera. Speak, strike redress' [... 
My ancestors did from the streets of Rome 
The Tarquin drive, when he was called a king. 
`Speak, strike, redress'. Am I entreated 
To speak and strike? 0 Rome, I make thee promise, 
If the redress will follow, thou receivest 
Thy full petition at the hand of Brutus. 
(II. i. 46-58) 
Am I entreated? Again there can be no resolute answer. He makes his promise to Rome 
using the first person pronoun (56), only to relinquish it with the illeistic, third person 
invocation of the name he has inherited (58). Both inside and outside himself, I (Brutus) 
promise, he says, that the hand of Brutus (the descendant) will redress... The moment of 
centring, the accomplishment of selfhood, is equally and necessarily one of decentring. 
Brutus' seduction by Cassius is something more than an elaborate and manipulative 
trick of mirrors. At work within the commonplace trope of mutual reflection which defines 
Cassius' strategy, indeed what that seductive strategy aims to render explicit and effective, 
is a prior seduction in the more radical sense of a paternal or ancestral imprint. The word 
`noble', after all, used in Cassius' soliloquy and so often elsewhere as an adjective for 
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Brutus and his allegiance to Rome, 58 also names a coin, stamped in advance with its 
particular denominative insignia, and thus a ready metaphor in the Shakespearean corpus 
for the stamp of reproductive agency. 59 The model of autonomous selfhood which steps 
forth out of the cutting off of the pater patriae will always in Julius Caesar be 
compromised by this fact that for Brutus to become Brutus the great `tyrannicide' he must 
in the first place have been made to acknowledge to be lodged within him the presence of a 
self which is not wholly his 'own'. 
Yet we must go further. For the elder Brutus is only half the story of this coinage, 
and only half the story of what it is in/of Brutus which Cassius' seduction brings about. 
During his funeral oration for Caesar, Antony reconstructs for his audience the violence of 
Caesar's death, exposing to the plebs the torn and bloodstained mantle that the 
conspirators' victim had worn: 
Through this [tear], the well-beloved Brutus stabbed, 
And as he plucked his cursed steel away, 
Mark how the blood of Caesar followed it, 
As rushing out of doors to be resolved 
If Brutus so unkindly knocked or no; 
For Brutus, as you know, was Caesar's angel. 
Judge, 0 you gods, how dearly Caesar loved him. 
This was the most unkindest cut of all [... ] 
(III. ii. 174-81) 
An angel, like a noble, is a stamped coin. 60 The twice iterated `unkindness' to which the 
wound is required to bear testimony connotes not just cruelty but the breaching of a natural 
filial bond. The suggestion of Brutus' alternative coinage is not Shakespeare's invention; 
Plutarch makes reference to the tradition of his illegitimate paternity, then abandons the 
58 Cf. 1. ii. 62; I. iii. 141; III. i. 135; III. ii. 11; IV. iii. 158-160; V. iii. 74; V. iv. 15; V. iv. 22; V. v. 69. 
59 On the erotic significance of coinage cf. esp. Afeasure for Measure II. iv. 45-49, where `mettle' is also 
invoked as a metaphor for semen; Cymbeline II. v. 5. 
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matter, never seriously allowing it to challenge the belief that Brutus was the true 
descendant of his heroic namesake . 
61 The two heritages are mutually exclusive; and 
certainly the emphasis in Shakespeare is in favour of that stemming from Lucius Junius. 
But there is no decision made, finally, between them. The genealogy insisted on by Cassius 
and that codedly affirmed by Antony are licensed to coexist, both exerting an influence on 
Cassius' extraordinary soliloquy. 62 
Beyond the contradictory impulses of Brutus the Republican character, with whom 
Freud identifies in his dream, lies the fact that as a text the tragedy is unwilling to simplify 
ambivalence, complexity, contradiction as such, and rather allows itself to be shaped by 
them. Plutarch is not a resource from which Shakespeare merely pulls this or that fact 
which facilitates the clear and linear progress of his drama. The contradictory genealogies 
of Brutus which are expressed and judged there, are transposed into the tragedy without the 
censorship of straightforward logic. Neither is ruled out by the Olympian purview of 
retrospect or by pragmatic decision. Both are put into play in the drama/dramatisation of 
the lived moments of Brutus' life itself The reality, so to speak, of Shakespeare's text is 
definitively not historical, if we understand by that term the effort to recover what `actually 
60 For the paternal imprint on the angel cf. Merchant of Venice R. Vii. 55-9. On the metaphorical significance 
of nobles and angels more generally see the relevant passages in Webb (1989). 
61 'Some say that [Caesar protected Brutus at Pharsalia] for Servilla's sake, Brutus' mother. For when he was 
a young man, he had been acquainted with Servilla, who was extremely in love with him. And because Brutus 
was born in that time when their love was hottest, he persuaded himself that he begat him' (North's Brutus, p. 
114). Suetonius (1957) is somewhat more indirect: see his Caesar 50, and 82 where instead of the famous `Et 
tu, Brute? ' he reports Caesar's final cry as, `You too, my child? ' 
62 While it is not unusual for Shakespearean commentators to invoke the tradition of Caesar's paternity of 
Brutus in connection with Plutarch's texts, Toubiana's account (1988) is, so far as I am aware, the only one 
which directly addresses its impact on Shakespeare's Julius Caesar and its significance for our understanding 
of the tragedy. I cannot, however, agree with his attempt merely to fit Shakespeare to the source texts. He 
appears to perceive no contradiction between the two possible lineages suggested both in Suetonius and 
Plutarch (Toubiana pp. 39-40); and his citation of Suetonius' `You too, my child? [kai su, teknon? ]' (p. 39) in 
connection ýiith Shakespeare's text is something of an over-interpretation of the `real' parricidal content of 
(Shakespeare's) Brutus' deed, and thus an eclipsing of the singularity of Shakespeare's play. The more neutral 
`Et tu, Brute: " which Shakespeare chooses (and which is not attributable to any classical source) holds the 
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happened'. Nor, equally obviously, is it a wholly fantastic reworking of an historical 
moment. Brutus' double coinage points rather to a third possibility: a dramatic reality so to 
speak which, like Caska's earlier narrative, indicates and, in this case, plays out something 
unclear, unresolved at the moment of its occurrence. In the previous Chapter we witnessed 
how the beating fantasies collected by Freud from his patients were irreducible to the 
material actions in which they consisted, bearing within them, as they did, the enigmatic 
desire of the beating father. We also saw, how the ontogeny of Oedipus was repeated in the 
dramaturgy of his tragedy, such that the recovered scene(s) of binding/murder/incest 
emerged as originarily palimpsestic. So too, with regard to Brutus, Julius Caesar seeks not 
to represent the factual, material actions of what occurred so much as what of it is already 
enigmatic and prohibits the assumption that what `actually happened' is finally reducible to 
a bedrock of material facts. Certainly the audience, like the plebs before Caesar, cannot 
ultimately decide. But what is more, within the play, the decision is impossible for a Brutus 
who is consequently at war with himself. He is not in any straightforward way just a subject 
interpellated by `the' paternal other. Exactly who that other is, the paternal place itself, is 
the enigma-the gap which by its enigmatic nature issues contradictory demands: to 
whom-Caesar or the elder Brutus-should Marcus Brutus be more like in mind? What is 
it that ancestry desires of him? If these contradictory genealogies overdetermine Brutus' 
ambivalence-an ambivalence in which Freud recognises the truth of his unconscious 
desire-then we might, by extension, say that in the relationship between Julius Caesar and 
its principal source-text, the former shows itself as unwilling to resolve complexity and 
contradiction as Freud argues is the unconscious itself. 
contradiction open, as a contradiction, precisely by refusing to allow the alleged father decisively to claim 
Brutus as his son 
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Let us move on to witness the effects of Brutus' double self-alienation and the 
essential function it is assigned in his full determination as `Brutus'. 
The Ides of March are come: interpretation and identification 
Cassius is not nave. To the extent that he is enabled by Shakespeare to sustain two 
opposed interpretations of the storm, and to the extent that his seduction soliloquy allows 
the contradictory paternities of Brutus to remain in play, he is the originator of some of the 
most perspicacious insights in the tragedy. The enigma of what is demanded of Brutus by 
his double ancestry is not mobilised in the text as an obstruction to Cassius' designs, it is, 
as will be seen, the positive condition of Brutus' becoming the chief conspirator against 
Caesar. It is this doubleness, complexity as such, to which Cassius' discourse is so 
sensitive, that makes Brutus' becoming-Brutus possible. 
Before attempting to detail why, let us first try to comprehend the complexity of 
Caesar's alleged tyranny. As with the question of his illegitimate paternity of Brutus, the 
political tyranny with which he is charged-that is, his illegitimate paternity over Rome 
and the egocentrism of his rule-remains as decisively unclear to Shakespeare's audience 
as the question of what Caesar wants remains to the plebs in the forum. 
Where is there evidence of Caesar's tyranny or tyrannical desires? Everywhere and 
nowhere. The longest and most sustained allegations come from Cassius to Brutus in I. i., 
decrying the god-like status of one who is in reality no more than an ordinary mortal. Yet 
we know Cassius has his own agenda to make Brutus' resolution firm; and, what is more, 
we know that his interpretations of the storm leave undecided whether the `monstrous state' 
which they augur pertains to the unnaturalness of Caesar's rule or of the deed in hand. With 
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regard to Caesar's own political gestures, witnessed by the audience and unmediated by the 
prejudicial representations of the Republicans, the text labours not to come down simple- 
mindedly either on their side or that of their victim. There is no moment in the drama 
equivalent to the narrative judgement of Plutarch's on Caesar's being made perpetual 
Dictator, `This was plain tyranny' (North's Caesar p. 85). The issue has been addressed in 
detail by Miola (1985) who has identified moments in the plot at which Caesar fulfils the 
criteria of the tyrant as they are described in various political treatises, and others at which 
he resolutely does not. 63 One the one hand Caesar's rise has evidently been at the cost of his 
own countrymen, and, specifically, as we know, of 'Pompey' s blood'. To that extent it 
marks a violent usurpation, the progress towards an individual, rather than a shared rule, 
which was forbidden by the constitutional and legal traditions of the Republic. Like Plato's 
tyrant, Caesar expresses his fear of plots and conspiracies; 64 and like Plato's tyrant he 
elicits comparison with a wolf (I. iii. 104). 65 While in Plutarch Flavius and Murellus are 
stripped of their tribuneships for having removed the trophies from Caesar's statues 
(North's Caesar p. 93), in Shakespeare we hear only the more sinisterly ambiguous news 
that the pair have been `put to silence' (I. ii. 285-6). On the Ides of March Caesar 
demonstrates the classic superbia of the tyrant, declining to come to the Senate and offering 
no other explanation than that `The cause is in my will' (II. ii. 71). Equally, once coaxed 
there with the promise of the crown he refuses the petition for the return of Cimber's 
brother not on the basis of discussion but merely by referring to the unshakeable and 
63 Miola's sources for definitions of the tyrant which Shakespeare's text invokes, denies, or to which it 
corresponds, include: Aquinas, Aristotle, Bartolus, Buchanan, `Junius Brutus' (the pseudonymous author of 
Vindiciae Contra Tyrannus). Erasmus, La Primaudaye, Plato, Plutarch and Salutati. In what follows I will 
mention only Miola's most salient points: with the exception of Plato and Plutarch, to whose writings we have 
already made reference. specific correspondences with and discrepancies from the works of these authors, and 
the precise refinements of their definitions, should be verified by referring to Miola's essay directly. 
64See Plato (1955) 575d-576a; 578b-579c. 
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permanent authority of his past decision: his word is law. Indeed Caesar's final speech in 
the play, entirely Shakespeare's invention, reeks of the colossal arrogance and quasi-deific 
monomania of which Cassius originally had spoken to Brutus: 
I could be well moved if I were you. 
If I could pray to move, prayers would move me. 
But I am constant as the northern star, 
Of whose true-fixed and resting quality 
There is no fellow in the firmament. 
The skies are painted with unnumbered sparks; 
They are all fire, and every one doth shine; 
But there's but one in all doth hold his place. 
So in the world, 'tis furnished well with men, 
And men are flesh and blood, and apprehensive. 
Yet in the number I do know but one 
That unassailable holds on his rank 
Unshaked of motion. And that I am he 
Let me a little show even in this, 
That I was constant Cimber should be banished 
And constant do remain to keep him so. 
(III. i. 58-73) 
But if Shakespeare's text works hard to give some credence to Cassius' claims, it 
labours equally to cast doubt on them. The missives to Brutus in Plutarch are genuine; in 
having Cassius forge the letters to Brutus, Shakespeare strays significantly from his source, 
making Cassius' motivations and judgement somewhat suspicious. 66 Equally, for Plutarch 
what made Caesar `mortally hated' was his `covetous desire [... ] to be called king' (North's 
Caesar p. 90). Yet Shakespeare chooses not to depict the well-known historical conflict 
between Caesar and the Senate, `strong evidence [in the historical texts]', Miola says, `of a 
tyrant in entrance, of one who arrogates to himself unlawful prerogatives and powers' 
(1985 p. 278). Instead the Senate offer him the crown (II. ii. 92-104). If he does harbour the 
technically unconstitutional `desire' of attaining the crown (and nothing during the pseudo- 
65 See Plato (1955) 566a. 
See North's Caesar p. 94-5 and North's Brutus p. 120-1. 
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coronation invites us only to believe or disbelieve this), it is an ambition shared and 
legitimated by the Roman government. Coaxed to the Capitol on the basis of this offer and 
Decius' favourable interpretation of Calphurnia's dream (II. ii. 83-107), Caesar is accosted 
by Artemidorus who implores him to read a letter in which is contained a warning of his 
imminent death. Plutarch has Caesar accept the letter, yet says Caesar was unable to read it 
in the press of the crowd (North's Caesar p. 99). In Shakespeare, Caesar refuses to accept 
it, dismissing Artemidorus' claim that it `touches Caesar' with the ostensibly modest 
assertion that `What touches ourself shall be last served' (III. i. 7 and 8). Finally, this 
capacity for self-sacrifice and concern for public welfare emerges most forcefully after 
Caesar's death. If, on the morning of the 15"1' his `will' alone dictates that he remain at 
home, later that day Antony's reading of his last will and testament reveals a remarkable 
magnanimity and generosity towards the very citizens in whose name his assassination is 
supposedly undertaken (III. ii. 232-243). 
Later on I will return to the question of the will in order to suggest that what it 
contains and what it effects amount to an irreducible paradox which ultimately 
emblematises, and refuses to disclose any final truth regarding Caesar's ambition which is 
so ambiguously articulated within, these discrete moments of pragmatic and contradictory 
characterisation (now tyrannical, now non-tyrannical). It is a paradox which will haunt both 
the conspirators and the pro-Caesarean faction during and after the 15th. For now, let return 
to an introspective Brutus on the morning of the murder, and attempt to understand the 
process by which he seeks to organise and justify the assassination. 
It should be noted straightway that Shakespeare takes pains to draw parallels 
between Brutus and his victim-to-be. II. i. and II. ii. present Brutus and Caesar respectively 
173 
in their domestic environments. Each is shown in dialogue with his wife; each is 
entertaining at least the possibility of Caesar's death; each, in turn greets the band of 
conspirators; and each, as he does so, is in the process of interpreting signs: Caesar and 
Calphurnia attempt to interpret the latter's dream and the evening's unnatural storm, and 
Brutus reads Cassius' forged letters, illuminated by the whizzing exhalations of the 
disturbed heavens, Like (illegitimate) father, like son? Not quite. What is really at stake is 
an implicit structural parallel between `tyrannicide' and `tyranny' on which the implicit 
filial connection has a bearing. 
Once Brutus has determined to undertake the deed in hand (and we will return to the 
manner of his decision presently), and the rest of the conspirators arrive to speak with him, 
we begin to witness a striking resemblance emerge between the form of leadership for 
whose abolition Brutus is prepared to kill, and his organisation of the band who take it upon 
themselves to do the killing. There is an obscure moment when Brutus and Cassius move 
aside to talk in private, and the rest discuss the dawning day. Caska insists to Decius and 
Cinna that the sun does not rise in the east. Shifting southwards, `here', he says, `as I point 
my sword, the sun arises' (II. i. 105). The Arden editor points out in his note to the line the 
attractiveness of having Caska direct his sword at Brutus, perhaps as the revolutionary 
harbinger of a new Republican dawn. But, if we hear in Caska's words a reference to the 
rebellious `son', do we not also hear a sense of the threatening, paternal ascendance of a 
Caesar whose blazing face cannot be looked at-an identification perhaps between the 
tyrant and his slayer embedded in the play of sun/son? There is no stage direction to 
support and confirm the suggestion, but within seconds Brutus begins to behave in a 
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manner allegedly akin to his nemesis. `[L]et us swear our resolution', Cassius proposes, as 
he and Brutus turn back to the others. `No', Brutus interjects, `not an oath': 
If not the face of men, 
The sufferance of our souls, the time's abuse; 
If these be motives weak, break off betimes, 
And every man hence to his idle bed [... ] 
But if these 
As I am sure they do, bear fire enough 
To kindle cowards and to steel with valour 
The melting spirits of women: then, countrymen, 
What need we any spur but our own cause 
To prick us to redress? What other bond 
Than secret Romans that have spake the word 
And will not palter? And with what other oath, 
Than honesty to honesty engaged, 
That this shall be, or we will fall for it? 
(II. i. 113-27) 
No oath, no promise. Cassius is thoroughly overridden (he does not even respond) by 
Brutus' insistence that their deed is not simply imperative to undertake but as it were 
impossible not to accomplish. Their souls' sufferance, the abuse of the time. to swear an 
oath to end these things would be to suppose that these things only make the murder a 
necessary undertaking (something is rotten in the state of Rome: let us therefore promise to 
redress it). Refusing to swear an oath removes the deed from the realm of contingency and 
forces it into that of inevitability or law (insofar as something is rotten in the state of Rome 
it cannot not be redressed). Such is the logic of the promise: to be a promise it must by 
definition contain that threat that it always might not be fulfilled. 67 Brutus has evidently 
forgotten, or does not care to remember, that the last time he had spoken of `redress', just 
fifty or so lines earlier, it was in the context of his own promise, as `Brutus', to Rome. Yet, 
his private, Republican oath sealed, his own decision made, the deed in hand ceases to be a 
67 Cf. Bennington (2000b) pp. 42 and ? 06 n. 22. 
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question of decision or promise at all. Not unlike the deific Caesar, Brutus now speaks as if 
his word has become law. 
He will persist in this manner throughout his dealings with the co-conspirators. 
Cassius' next suggestion is that Cicero be included in their number. `Let us not leave him 
out', Caska implores; `No, by no means' adds Cinna; `0 let us have him [... ]' Metellus 
echoes. Then Brutus: 
O name him not. Let us not break with him, 
For he will never follow anything 
That other men begin 
Cassius: Then leave him out 
Caska: Indeed he is not fit. 
(II. i. 142-152) 
Brutus' position is not unlike that which will fall to Caesar in the final seconds of his life, 
surrounded by the conspirators, imploring his acquiescence on behalf of a friend. Brutus, 
unlike Caesar, at least gives a good reason for his refusal; but the reason is his concern that 
Cicero is not one to `follow' others. No sooner has he given it than the rest, precisely, 
follow. The fraternal bond of these `brothers', supposedly united against the notion of 
ultimate authority's being invested in `but only one man' as Cassius puts it (I. ii. 156), is 
entirely disrupted by the singular authority which accrues to Brutus and only Brutus: his 
role in the conspiracy looks dangerously similar to the form of power against which they all 
conspire. 
Cassius' final proposal, that Antony be assassinated too, is just as avidly 
disqualified: 
Our course will seem too bloody, Caius Cassius, 
To cut the head off and then hack the limbs- 
Like wrath in death and envy afterwards- 
For Antony is but a limb of Caesar. 
Let's be sacrificers, but not butchers, Caius [... ] 
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Let's carve him as a dish fit for the gods, 
Not hew him as a carcass fit for hounds [ ... 
] 
This shall make 
Our purpose necessary and not envious, 
Which so appearing to the common eyes, 
We shall be called purgers, not murderers. 
(11.1.161-179) 
Again overriding Cassius (and in this case fatally) Brutus words' belie his intentions. 
Caesar's death is (to be construed as) an unavoidable sacrifice to Rome. At once he thus 
acknowledges and utterly disavows the contingency of the deed. If the assassination is to be 
a sacrifice in the name of the Republic, it must not elicit or admit an alternative construal. 
Let us be sacrificers: if it were true, unconditionally true, that they are, then there could be 
no question of their being thought butchers. Attempting, needing to control in advance the 
general interpretation, the reception by posterity, of the event to come, Brutus' words 
concede, albeit implicitly, that the deed might always admit of alternative readings. The 
`common eyes' must, then, not be enabled to be active, but must be directed unilaterally, 
manipulated in their perception in order, paradoxically, for this Republican sacrifice to 
succeed. For it to be a sacrifice to Rome, it must, says Brutus, sacrifice the freedom of 
Rome to understand it in any other way. 
There are two inseparable points to clarify here. Firstly, and to repeat, as Brutus 
becomes `Brutus' the Republican, his consequent leadership of the conspiracy begins to 
resemble the tyranny against which it establishes itself The more resolutely Republican he 
is, the more tyrannical he appears to be, as if the one alleged paternity paradoxically 
confirms the other. Brutus materialises as `Brutus' not in the inevitably self-displaced 
(allocentric) relation to a single ancestor, but in relation to the very enigma that his ancestry 
is. Whether he knows it or not, he becomes `himself in the process of dispersing his 
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selfhood in the fulfilment of contradictory ancestral demands. Secondly, the Republican 
deed of which he takes charge follows exactly the same paradoxical path. It must, in the 
very name of freedom, exert a constraint on freedom. To be a Republican gesture and 
nothing but, it must also be everything but itself, it must exert a kind of hermeneutic 
tyranny over the eyes of its witnesses and of posterity. 68 
Freud's Non-vixit dream-what remains implicit within it and `missed' from its 
interpretations-is wholly saturated by the same paradoxes. In becoming `Brutus', 
Shakespeare's character explicitly identifies with an earlier model of the great Republican 
Brutus, while his pursuit of the Republican cause reveals itself to have a model in the 
tyranny (supposedly embodied in Caesar) against which he rebels. So too Freud, who 
explicitly claims to identify with (Shakespeare's) rebellious son Brutus, yet who precisely 
in order to repeat the murder committed by Brutus (killing P. ) must first have appropriated 
to himself the defining characteristic of his own paternal `tyrant' Brücke: namely the 
Biblical/Caesarean trope of the killing look. 
Returning to the text, the charge that Brutus identifies with Caesar must, however, 
be made with caution. Insofar as Brutus becomes a tyrant himself he can be said not to 
identify with Caesar as such but with that portion of Caesar which he must keep alive 
provisionally in order to be able to kill him altogether. We have already mentioned the 
soliloquy in which Brutus calls forth Lucius Junius Brutus as an ancestral model, but let us 
turn to the lines immediately preceding it (an earlier portion of the soliloquy, interrupted by 
his servant) where Brutus determines that Caesar must go. Unlike Cassius whose first 
speeches present a univocal construal of Caesar as colossal tyrant, and who then 
68Note the call of the Roman people when Brutus initially manages to convince them of the justice of the 
deed: 'Let him be Caesar' (III. ii. 5 1); `Caesar's better parts/Shall be crowned in Brutus' (III. ii. 51-2). 
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acknowledges a more ambivalent possibility in his interpretations of the storm, Brutus first 
equivocates, and only afterwards makes his resolution firm by settling for a single 
interpretation of Caesar: 
It must be by his death: and for my part 
I know no personal cause to spurn at him 
But for the general. He would be crowned: 
How that might change his nature, there's the question. 
It is the bright day that brings forth the adder, 
And that craves wary walking. Crown him that, 
And then I grant we put a sting in him 
That at his will he may do danger with. 
Th'abuse of greatness is when it disjoins 
Remorse from power; and to speak the truth of Caesar 
I have not known when his affections swayed 
More than his reason. But 'tis a common proof 
That lowliness is young ambition's ladder 
Whereto the climber upward turns his face; 
But when he once attains the utmost round 
He then unto the ladder turns his back, 
Looks in the clouds, scorning the base degrees 
By which he did ascend. So Caesar may. 
Then, lest he may, prevent. And since the quarrel 
Will bear no colour for the thing he is, 
Fashion it thus: that what he is, augmented, 
Would run to these and these extremities. 
And therefore think him as a serpent's egg 
Which hatched, would as his kind grow mischievous, 
And kill him in the shell. 
(U. i. 10-34) 
Caesar is not a tyrant. The problem is that, in his embryonic form, he shows signs that he 
may, and only may, become one, were he given the sting. He may materialise as the 
blazing-faced God in terms of which we know he already speaks of himself. But if Caesar 
is assassinated now, in advance of that materialisation, it would not, in the strict sense, 
constitute a tyrannicide. To rationalise and to justify the deed Brutus must forcibly construe 
Caesar in a particular way (`Fashion it thus [... ]'). Again this is no random construction, 
but a legitimate interpretation of the signs displayed by Caesar-in-chrysalis. But it is one 
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which, as we have seen, Shakespeare works hard to show does not delegitimise the contrary 
reading. 69 It is what Caesar always-might-, and also always-might-not-, become that need 
be prevented. His murder will always have been a premature event. Brutus must interpret 
what Caesar is in relation to what he will have become, so as to resolve himself to become 
'Brutus'. In order for the murder to be possible and necessary (for it is only as a necessity 
to Republican Rome that Brutus can countenance the possibility of the murder of his 
beloved Caesar), the -necessary possibility that the deed might be (perceived as) illegitimate 
must first have been forcibly expunged. To be `Brutus' who will lead the conspirators in the 
purge of Caesar for the `general cause', he must already have purged interpretatively 
everything of Caesar as he is which would militate against the requirement of his murder. 
To be fully and properly sacrificed at all, Caesar must in advance have been sacrificed a 
little. Caesar, in all his complexity, must, to Brutus, already be dead: Non-vixit before Non- 
vivit. 
But not yet gone: translation and the event of `tyrannicide' 
In presenting and attempting to forge or fashion the deed as no more than an 
inevitability whose meaning would be indisputable, Brutus might be said to be trying to 
confer proleptically upon the deed the transparent simplicity, the simple factuality, which 
Freud attributes retrospectively to the murder of the primal tyrant in Totem and Taboo. In 
both cases thought will have passed (or will ideally have been perceived to pass) directly 
69 Cf. the symptomatic tension in Brutus' earliest promising response to Cassius' seduction (I. ii. 171-5): 
Brutus had rather be a villager 
Than to repute himself a son of Rome 
Under these hard conditions as this time 
Is like to lay upon us. 
The awkward temporal syntax of the lines suggest that Brutus must force the threat of hard conditions (which 
are yet only 'like' to come) into die present ('these', not `those'). 
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into action, without the mediation of fantasy, without the contingency to which an oath 
could not but testify: the deed simply happens. 
After the murder of the primal father, Freud says that the sons began to feel guilty 
for their action, and that the joint systems of exogamy and totemism arose as a result. The 
first amounted to a renunciation of the fruits of the murder, the second to a covenant with 
the now absent father whose animal substitute it was generally forbidden to sacrifice (Freud 
(1913 [1912-13 ] pp. 205-6). Enforcing such constraints post mortem, these belated acts of 
contrition point to the fact that `[t]he dead father became stronger than the living one had 
been' (p. 204). `[I]n accordance with the psychological procedure so familiar to us in 
psychoanalyses', Freud explains, the sons become subject to "`deferred obedience" 
[Nachträglichen Gehorsams]' (p. 205). It would not be wholly unjustified to identify a 
parallel process at work in Julius Caesar. Not only are the Roman plebs steeled into violent 
action on behalf of Caesar after his funeral and by Antony's reading of his will; his ghost 
returns to preside over the suicides of Cassius and Brutus by means of the same instruments 
with which they had killed him (V. iii. 45-6 and 94-6; and V. v. 16-19 and 51-2). It is in 
death, and only in death, that Caesar acquires the tyrannical power which Cassius had 
attributed to him in life: the conspirators walking beneath his colossal legs and seeking their 
own graves. 70 
A question therefore imposes itself-one which is dramatically answered by Julius 
Caesar and which will force us to reconsider Freud's approach in Totem and Taboo: 
namely, that if the deed in either case simply happens, if it is complete and meaningful in 
itself, evacuated of all complexity at the time of its occurrence, how can it possibly have 
70 It may not be unreasonable to identify an implicit pun in Cassius' earlier speech, the French word legs' 
meaning `legacy' 
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any deferred (Nachträglichen) effect whatsoever? As Laplanche and Pontalis point out in 
their dictionary entry for Freud's concept of `Deferred Action [Nachträglichkeit/apres- 
coup]', `It is not lived experience in general that undergoes a deferred revision but, 
specifically, whatever it has been impossible in the first instance to incorporate fully into a 
meaningful context' (1967, p. 112, emphasis added). An event cannot by definition call for 
deferred revision if it simply happens, if it happens simply. It is precisely insofar as an 
event is not reducible to the materiality of its happening that Nachträglichkeit emerges as a 
necessity. Let us leave Totem and Taboo aside for a moment, and attempt to consider how 
it is that Julius Caesar anticipates and responds to this question. 
Taking up Laplanche and Pontalis's point, Andrew Benjamin (1992) has identified 
the forceful connection between two issues which we have followed in the tragedy thus far: 
translation and the event. He starts out from the early Freudian model of repression at the 
heart of Laplanche's enterprise: `A failure of translation-this is what is clinically known 
as "repression"' (Freud 1985 [1887-1904] p. 208). Benjamin broaches the question, begged 
by Freud's statement, of what it is in the literal as well as the psychoanalytic sense that gets 
translated, and of what is it therefore that makes translation necessary. A significant point 
of contact which Benjamin perceives between the literal and psychological domains is 
Freud's early co-authored text with Breuer, Studies on Hysteria (1893-5) and the traditional 
notion of literary translation which in particular Walter Benjamin sought to overturn in his 
paper `The Task of the Translator' (1923). 71 Both, Andrew Benjamin argues, are structured 
by an arche - telos polarity; which is to say that both the Studies and traditional translation 
theory presuppose the purity of a source, an origin, an original. The project in the Studies 
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had been to identify the precipitating cause of an hysterical attack (a forgotten traumatic 
event) and to achieve a cure by causing it to be remembered exactly as it was. The event 
was not to be the site of reworking or alteration; the cure entailed a return to the event 
which yielded the event as it actually was (A. Benjamin 1992 pp. 27-8). So too the 
traditional function of translation: it is not to bring anything new to the original; for its 
perceived success depends, rather, on its capacity not to impair the unity of what is 
translated and to be thus absolutely commensurable with it. The cure and the translation are 
to constitute or enact repetitions without difference, repetitions `dictated by the reign of the 
Same' (p. 28). 
Now, with Walter Benjamin the direction of the arrow in translation is altered. The 
translation is seen to be part of the `afterlife' of the work itself (W. Benjamin 1923 p. 72). 
Translation issues from the original. It is the `poetic' content of a work, what is elusive, 
ineffable, what it `means' beyond the transposability of individual words from one 
language to another and thus specific to its linguistic provenance, which makes translation 
necessary (p. 76). Translation ceases to be a supplement of the Same and becomes an art 
whereby the language of the translation is altered and moved from outside by the absolute 
linguistic alterity of the original. Its `nucleus' is `the element which does not lend itself to 
translation' (p. 76). 72 A connection thus emerges with Nachträglichkeit. As we witnessed 
with the case of Emma in the Introduction, within the neuroiica hypothesis, the trauma of 
sexual seduction is connected to two radically different experiences of the same occurrence 
(first: event without affect; second: affect without event). Once Freud poses the seduction 
" This essay is only cited once by A. Benjamin (p. 38), but Walter Benjamin's influence is clear. `The Task 
of the Translator' is discussed at length by Laplanche (1992b) in relation to the field of seduction and the 
psychoanalytic theory of translation. 
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theory in all its temporal complexity he must acknowledge that the original event cannot be 
returned to exactly as it was, cannot be repeated as the Same, because it was never at one 
with itself in the first place (A. Benjamin p. 31-3). It is what escaped meaningful 
contextualisation by the child in the scene of seduction which produced a deferred effect. 
Thus what Andrew Benjamin suggests that Freud and Walter Benjamin recognise is that the 
complexity of the so-called original, in itself, disrupts the logic of supplementarity: the 
afterlife of a traumatic event or of the literary work bears witness to that which escapes 
simple, meaningful containment in the original. Insofar as translation in both the literary 
and the psychoanalytic sense entails by definition a certain loss of what is translated, the 
notion of translation presupposes the untranslatable. 
As Laplanche says with regard to the beating fantasies: `What is translated, 
specifically, is not a natural, or even a historical sign, but a message, a signifier or sequence 
of signifiers. In order for there to be translation, someone must have meant something' 
(Laplanche 1999A [1992b] p. 157). The point for Laplanche, of course, is that messages 
always say more than their addresser means to say by them (p. 158), always carry a content 
which is not containable either by the receiver or by the emitter himself They always 
demand an active process of reception and thus translation precisely because something in 
the signifying act exceeds incorporation into the manifest register of intentionality. 
To return to Julius Caesar, is it not the case that the conspirators' deed is, as much 
as anything, intended as an act of signification? There is a deed in itself certainly, but also a 
message. The murder scene really is a scene insofar as it contains an intentional 
significance beyond the sheer fact of Caesar's death. `Let's be sacrificers and not butchers' 
'^ It should be noted that Laplanche (1992b) distances himself from W. Benjamin's `messianic' proposition 
that as well as translated and translation, there is a third term, that of a `pure language' where the two 
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means: `Let's be perceived as sacrificers and not butchers'. To repeat, if it were 
unconditionally true that the abuse of the time could not not bring about Caesar's death, if it 
were a deed wholly without contingency and forced by the absolute inevitability of law or 
fate, there could be no possibility of its being misconstrued. That possibility, ever present to 
the conspirators, means that the deed must contain meaning in both senses of the word: it 
cannot be an act pure and simple but must carry an implicit message to its witnesses; and 
the scope for construal of that message must be brutally limited. The murder is not (simply) 
the inescapable redress of a wrong done to Rome. Brutus fashions it as a signifying gesture 
to Rome which attempts to communicate what Rome `really' is (a Republic), what Caesar 
`really' is (a tyrant), what the conspirators `really' are (sacificers). For none of these things 
has been certain. Brutus' very need to give meaning to the deed testifies at once to the 
requirement that the murder be an act of signification, and thus, in spite of itself, to the 
possibility that it might always say more than it should. 
We are not positing the presence of an unconscious in Brutus and the rest. We are 
neither suggesting that the conspirators' hatred of Caesar amounts to some crude 
`repression' of what they know, nor that the message of the deed carries a `repressed' 
content in the clinical sense of the term. We are, however, arguing that Laplanche, and 
Andrew Benjamin after him, help us to identify the procedure by which Shakespeare 
dramatises the scene of Caesar's murder not as one merely available for retrospective 
constructions, but as one which contains within it as it happens a complexity of which it 
cannot and will not in its aftermath, or its `afterlife', ever be rid. The scene of Julius 
Caesar's murder demands translation. 
langu4ages brought together in the translation are to be united and rendered one. 
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Let us now turn to the scene in Shakespeare's tragedy, in order to explain exactly 
how and why. The immediate problem which confronts any reader is the question of where 
and in what precisely `the deed' terminates. The brute fact of Caesar's death is 
accomplished, it happens, with a straightforward stage direction: They stab Caesar (III. i. 
76 SD). With one exception (which we will come to shortly) Caesar's death takes place in 
an eerie, even meaningless silence. However brief the stage direction, the action it demands 
entails thirty-three knife-woundings (V. i. 52), and amounts to an uncomfortably prolonged 
and purely visual period of stage time. Within seconds the stage is crawling with shocked 
and panicked Senators making their exit. But, the conspirators left alone, they go on to 
perform an extraordinary ritual with the corpse: 
Brutus: Stoop, Romans, stoop, 
And let us bathe our hands in Caesar's blood 
Up to the elbows and besmear our swords. 
Then walk we forth into the market-place, 
And waving our red weapons o'er our heads 
Let's all cry, `Peace! Freedom and Liberty'. 
Cassius: Stoop, then, and wash. 
(III. i. 105-111) 
A message: awash with the blood of Caesar the conspirators are to present themselves to 
the citizens in the market-place; and to that extent the ritual figures as a kind of large-scale 
pun: the murderers are to be re(a)d like sacrifcers. 73 The ritual is wholly Shakespeare's 
addition to Caesar's story, but the conspirators' self-daubing in fact takes its character from 
Plutarch's description of the goat sacrifices at the Lupercal (Romulus XXI 4). 74 In their 
borrowing of the ancient ritual, here at the base of the (br)other Pompey's statue, the 
conspirators might be seen to be positioning themselves as the actors of a Roman rite/right, 
73 Cf Antony's comment to the corpse that the conspirators are 'Signed in [i. e. made into signs by] thy spoil 
and crimsoned in thy Lethe', III. i. 206. 
74 On this point see Conn Liebler (1995), pp. 100-1. 
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subverting the celebration procedure established in honour of Rome's first monarch and 
turning it against his new incarnation in the name of the Republic. For the conspirators the 
murder of Caesar is and must be a sacrifice. Their `deed', their `lofty scene' would not be 
complete without it. 
Yet it is for exactly the same reason that this message, this scene of murder, will 
always bear within it the possibility of, even the call for an alternative construal, no less 
than did Calphurnia's nightmare of which, after all, it is no more than a literalisation. The 
scene of sacrificial ritual which is necessitated by the prematurity of the deed is thoroughly 
haunted and compromised by it. When Antony enters, the first witness of any gravity, he 
demands `reasons/Why and wherein Caesar was dangerous' (I11. i. 221-2). Brutus 
immediately concedes: `Or else this were a savage spectacle' (III. i. 223). Whether the 
murder amounts to sacrifice or to savage butchery is wholly dependent on whether it can be 
proved that Caesar represented a tyrannical danger. The possibility that the deed could 
represent one thing or another thus rests on what is within Shakespeare's text a fundamental 
impossibility. The ritual scene is not and cannot be reducible to the intentional significance 
which motivates it. `Or else this were a savage spectacle' : the status, the meaning of the 
murder-scene will always have yet to be determined. It is not that the scene on stage can be 
understood as sacrifice or butchery. It is, as it happens, not at one with itself; it will never 
have been unless or until the danger of Caesar were unequivocally established. What makes 
the meaning of `sacrifice' necessary is equally what prohibits it from being `sacrifice' pure 
and simple, even as it is given. The ritual (as message, and qua message) is perpetually 
inhabited and corrupted by an inaccessible kernel that would be the truth of what Caesar 
was or had ambitions to become. The two diametrically opposed funeral orations before the 
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people which will shortly follow the assassination are in no way heterogeneous to it. Their 
very possibility (as diametrically opposed) is already present in the scene; the latter is 
already heterogeneous to itself. 
The blood-ritual entails and brings us immediately to the metadramatic passage 
which we cited near the outset: 
Cassius: Stoop, then, and wash. How many ages hence 
Shall this, our lofty scene be acted over 
In states unborn and accents yet unknown? 
Brutus: How many times shall Caesar bleed in sport 
That now on Pompey's basis lies along, 
No worthier than the dust? 
Cassius: So oft as that shall be 
So often shall the knot of us be called 
The men who gave their country liberty. 
(III. i. 111-118) 
Are the audience watching one of the belated dramatic repetitions (actings-over) forecast at 
the `real' murder scene, or the `real' inaugural moment of that forecasting? It is important 
that this remarkable, self-reflexive moment of `putting into the abyss' which aims to disrupt 
the polarity between the `then' of the historical murder and the `now' of its (re-)enactment, 
not be understood as one of mimetic naivety. For it is, paradoxically, in the very appeal to 
mimesis that the notion of a simple origin fully disappears. To suggest that the text works 
only to generate the illusion that what the audience witness onstage is no more than a pure 
repetition of the original historical murder scene as a repetition of the Same, would be to 
ignore the complexity of what is already at stake. The possibility of a simple repetition and 
an original to be simply repeated is thrown into doubt by the irreducibility of the 
conspirators' ritual practice. If we accept the historical and dramatic illusion that we are 
watching the `original' we should have to concede that it is already not the same as itself. If 
we accept the mimetic illusion that we are witnessing one of the deferred repetitions 
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forecast at the `original' scene, then of what exactly would it allow us to say that it is a 
repetition? Sacrifice? Butchery? The more mimetically alike we suppose Shakespeare's text 
to be to what it `repeats' (or claims to be repeating), the further away recedes the possibility 
of what it `repeats' having had, even as it happened, any finally determinable meaning 
whatever. That of which Julius Caesar posits itself as a repetition, by positing itself in these 
lines as a repetition, cannot have been unequivocally meaningful in the instant that it 
`actually' happened. For what the text `repeats', or claims to, is merely and exactly the 
conspirators' forecast of future repetitions. If the text is supposed mimetically to act over 
`what actually happened', then the `what actually happened' that it repeats is not the 
meaning of the assassination, but the conspirators' desire for the assassination to have a 
meaning: so oft as this scene is repeated, Cassius predicts (is, paradoxically, repeated as 
predicting), 
So often shall the knot of us be called 
The men who gave their country liberty. 
For the murder-scene to be repeatable, as Cassius wishes, as the moment Rome received its 
liberty, Caesar's tyranny would have to have been irrefutable ('or else this were a savage 
spectacle'). What Cassius and the conspirators desire to have accomplished (desire to be 
re(a)d as having accomplished) must have been unequivocally accomplished for it to be 
repeated as such. But this is not the case. What it is possible to re-enact, to `repeat', is not 
the greatness of the deed but the intention that the deed be great. The materiality of their 
words and their deeds is repeatable (is `repeated' in the `now' of Shakespeare's drama), but 
their ultimate meaning ('now' and therefore `then', `then' and therefore `now') remains 
unavailable, deferred-and will continue to be, however many times it (the drama and the 
original it just `repeats') is repeated and re-performed. The metadramatic device, far from 
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posturing to give us direct access to `what actually happened', opens up the possibility that 
`what actually happened' (what is now `repeated') was already yet-to-be-determined at the 
moment of its occurrence. 
Note, moreover, that the conspirators are dramatised ('repeated') by Shakespeare 
not only forecasting the repetition of their action in posterity, but also, in the most literal 
sense, its translation: in states unborn and into accents yet unknown. 75 The murder-scene of 
Julius Caesar is figured as a repetition and a translation: Brutus and Cassius are `repeated', 
dramatically, forecasting dramatic repetition, and forecasting, in translation (in English), 
the necessity of their being translated (from Latin). The blood-ritual is repeated ('now'), the 
conspirators' words are translated (into English), but that is the limit and precisely the 
problem. Repetition and translation will not, do not in the repetition and translation that is 
Julius Caesar, amount to the repetition and translation of the meaning of the murder, only 
of the material actions and words surrounding it which seek to give it the meaning of 
sacrificial tyrannicide. Shakespeare's metadrama seems to say that the deed can be 
repeated, the scene reconstructed, the words spoken translated, but that this alone will not 
give us access to what the scene means. The effort to define the murder is repeatable and 
translatable, but in being repeated and translated it will always and only reappear as an 
effort and not a definition, not a meaning which is wholly at one with itself We know why, 
of course: because the claim of sacrifice rests on an impossible foundation, no less than 
does that of butchery. It is not without significance, then, that to that extent what 
Shakespeare repeats and translates (claims to repeat and translate) entails an untranslated 
remainder which emerges out of the prolonged silence of the stabbings: 
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Caska: Speak hands for me! They stab Caesar. 
Caesar: Et tu, Brute? -Then fall Caesar. Dies. 
(III. 1.76-7) 
Caesar's last words, which entail a shift into Latin then from Latin into English, are the 
pivotal moment of the tragedy. What is translated, again, preserves the meaning of the 
murder in suspension. `Then fall Caesar': does `Then' signal Caesar's abject horror that 
even Brutus' love and loyalty are not sufficient to restrain him from butchery, or the 
concession that if (even) beloved Brutus seeks his death, then his death is inevitable and 
deserved? 76 Sacrifice or butchery? Everything would hang on the significance of the `Et tu, 
Brute? ' Plutarch has him say nothing to Brutus, and Shakespeare chooses not to reproduce 
here Suetonius' proposition of Caesar's explicit claim to paternity. 77 His own choice78 is 
not difficult to translate in any literal sense; and if it were materially translated, word for 
word, it would bring us no closer to the truth of Caesar's understanding of the event, But in 
choosing to render the first of Caesar's last words ä traduire, in a text which in part poses 
itself as a translation, Shakespeare, like his Caska, relinquishes any hubristic effort 
exhaustively to `tell the manner' of Caesar's death. The deed is shown to bear at its very 
core as it happens and as it is repeated a kernel which cannot be translated, and will not be 
in any re-enactment (repetition) or indeed translation of Shakespeare's tragedy. The 
possibility of unequivocal meaning remains suspended from the scene, deferred from the 
moment it takes place. 
'Accents' = languages, III. i. 111-3 n. 
76 Cf. III. i. 77 n. 
" See note 62 above. 
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The possibility of `deferred obedience'; or, interpreting Freud with Freud and 
Shakespeare 
The rhetorical battle between Brutus and Antony at Caesar's funeral, which 
precedes and ultimately inaugurates the violence of the Civil War that will take up the 
whole of Acts IV and V, amounts to a struggle to claim access to the truth of Caesar's 
desire. Both statesmen vie for the Romans' support of contradictory perspectives, neither of 
which is, finally, exclusive of the other. The murder having been premature, it is the always 
elusive question of Caesar's erstwhile `ambition' which must be proved or disproved for 
the assassination to be received as an event worthy of celebration or of mourning. 
Immediately before the battle of Philippi, as they discuss the possibility of their own 
deaths, Brutus tells Cassius: `this same day/Must end the work the Ides of March begun' 
(V. i. 112-3). The Civil War is the product of the assassination; and what is at stake in 
victory, for either side, is a means of settling just what the assassination meant: politically 
justified sacrifice or savage and indefensible butchery. The Ides of March are not yet gone; 
`tyrannicide' is neither done nor done with. The assassination does not put an end to 
tyranny: without tyranny ever having been hatched, the assassination `begins' a large-scale 
and even bloodier contention over precisely what it signified, and precisely what had been 
inside the shell. 
What we have said of the assassination amounts to the simple fact that there can be 
no single interpretation made of it, since it depended on a particular interpretation of 
Caesar-not a wholly illegitimate one, but one which had first to exclude or sacrifice 
another which was no less justifiable. Tyranny is something Caesar might-always-have and 
It is true that the phrase was not uncommon in the period, though the first use of it appears to have been in 
Shakespeare's own Richard Duke of I-ork (3 Henry I7), V. i. 81, where it already appears ... untranslated. 
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might-always-not-have attained: occurring before either possibility can be affirmed 
conclusively, the murderous deed will not itself permit of one interpretation at the expense 
of another. What necessitates the conspirators' message, and that of Antony to the plebs at 
the funeral, is this foundational aporia which also makes neither adequate in itself or even 
to itself. The Civil War, which one way or another is supposed to end the work begun by 
the Ides of March, constitutes an extension of this battle for hermeneutic dominance. In this 
final section, I want to focus on two inseparable parts of what we might call Julius Caesar's 
afterlife: his ghost and his will. It will be seen that they haunt the conspirators' and the pro- 
Caesareans' projects respectively, and render the attempt to secure the meaning of the 
assassination interminable, whoever should win the day at Philippi. 
In the deed was a 'beginning'. Antony, the plebs and Octavius call specifically for 
`revenge' (III. i. 270; III. ii. 198 and 236; V. i. 53), and the deaths of Brutus and Cassius 
will indeed be figured as acts which will lay to rest Caesar's unsettled spirit (V. iii. 45-6; V. 
v. 51-2). The assassination amounts to the incurring rather than the calling in of a debt. By 
virtue of the prematurity of the deed, the debt of Caesar's tyrannical transgression will 
always have yet to be incurred. If Caesar's spirit and the pro-Caesarean faction seek 
vengeance, it is because the deed itself, in its premature moment, was not unequivocally 
justifiable: just like the message of `sacrifice' there would be no need, no call for the deaths 
of Brutus and Cassius were their action nothing but a tyrannicide from which Rome could 
only suck reviving blood. Their deaths are figured as the deferred effect of a deed whose 
significance was not resolutely definable; they are hunted and haunted, quite literally, by 
what their deed could not contain. 
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The upshot of this, as we suggested earlier, is that Caesar becomes more powerful in 
death than he had been in life-but not just more powerful: his returning spirit manifests 
the very power of which earlier he had only ever vainly spoken. If Caesar had, in life, 
identified himself with God, the giver of the law whose glance alone could make danger 
vanish, then the revenge taken on the two chief conspirators, whose danger he had 
dismissed, is threatened and accomplished with the dissipation of their own eyesight. The 
ghost does not physically appear at the site of Brutus' death, but the latter acknowledges, 
even as he asks for assistance in his suicide, that the earlier visitations had been harbingers 
of the death he is about to face: 
The ghost of Caesar hath appeared to me 
Two several times by night: at Sardis once, 
And this last night, here in Philippi fields: 
I know my hour is come. 
(V. v. 16-9) 
Significantly, we see nothing of the second night-time encounter, but the first, which 
Shakespeare does represent, takes place in Brutus' tent as he tries to read a book: 
Let me see: is not the leaf turned down 
Where I left reading? Here it is, I think. 
Enter the Ghost of Caesar 
How ill this taper burns. Ha! Who comes here? 
I think it is the weakness of mine eyes 
That shapes this monstrous apparition. 
It comes upon me: art thou anything? 
Art thou some god, some angel, or some devil? 
That mak'st my blood cold, and my hair to stare? 
Speak to me what thou art. 
Ghost: Thy evil spirit, Brutus. 
Brutus: Why com'st thou? 
Ghost: To tell thee thou shalt see me at Philippi 
Brutus: Well: then I shall see thee again. 
Ghost: Ay, at Philippi. 
Brutus: Why, I will see thee at Philippi then: 
Now I have taken heart thou vanishest. 
(IV. iii. 271-85) 
194 
Once he finds, or thinks he has found, his page Brutus cannot see to read ('How ill this 
taper burns'). He believes, for a moment, that his eyes project the apparition; but on the 
contrary it is the apparition which dictates what he sees. Its appearance appears to be 
redundant: it comes to tell him that he must prepare to `see me' (at Philippi). It appears, it 
seems, only to warn of its own reappearance. But in what must that `reappearance' consist? 
The stage direction makes clear that the apparition is the ghost of Caesar, and, as we have 
noted, Brutus will confirm his recognition of the fact in the seconds before his death. Yet 
here, at Sardis, he makes no mention of the likeness of the spirit to his once-beloved Julius. 
He only questions what the `thing' might be (276-9). 79 `Well: then I shall see thee 
again'/' Why, I will see thee at Philippi then' : oscillating between these not-quite-identical 
rhyming lines is a crucial difference suggested in the ambiguity of Ghost's threat. 
According to Plutarch, the `monstrous spirit' appeared at Philippi `in the self same shape 
and form' that it took at Sardis (North's Brutus, p. 183). With Shakespeare's Brutus so 
visually impaired here, the Ghost of the tragedy implies another possibility. `[T]hou shalt 
see me at Philippi', says both: you will see me return at Philippi; and, no less forcefully, 
you who cannot see me clearly now, will see me (see me truly, recognise me) for the first 
time only at the second visit. During the encounter at Sardis, Brutus takes heart, and the 
Ghost `vanishes', he says, echoing Caesar's erstwhile verb for the his eyes' power to banish 
79 Cf. Hamlet: the second line spoken after the Ghost's first appearance in the text is Barnardo's recognition 
that it comes `In the same figure like the King that's dead' (I. i. 44). Similarly, in a passage comparable to 
Brutus' rapid questioning in lines 276-9, Hamlet, in spite of his confusion does not hesitate to give the alien 
thing a familiar name (I. iv. 40-5): 
Be thou a spirit of health or goblin damn'd 
Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell, 
Be thy intents wicked or charitable, 
Thou com'st in such a questionable shape 
That I will speak to thee. I'll call thee Hamlet, 
King, father, royal Dane! 
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danger. Yet after the later visitation, Brutus will have recognised the apparition to be and to 
have been Caesar, and will as a consequence have lost heart altogether. Brutus senses death 
and embraces it having seen (again) and recognised (for the first time) the ghost of Caesar: 
that is how he knows his hour is come. The second encounter, which Shakespeare chooses 
to withhold from the eyes of the audience and which remains wholly mysterious within the 
play, literalises the threat which Caesar had purloined from Exodus: `there shall no man see 
me and live'. 
Cassius' death is comparable. On witnessing his corpse, Brutus muses: 
O Julius Caesar, thou art mighty yet. 
Thy spirit walks abroad and turns our swords 
Into our own proper entrails 
(V. iii. 94-6) 
Cassius has committed suicide, but Caesar, post mortem, has had a hand in the act. Cassius 
never sees the ghost, as Brutus does; and as with Brutus it is not visibly present during his 
suicide. But its presence is felt precisely through the question of vision which arises in the 
moments before Cassius' death. He sends Titinius out to `regard' the situation on the field 
(V. iii. 21), and orders Pindarus up the hill to `behold' Titinius' progress (V. iii. 33). 
Cassius determines to end his own life on the basis of Pindarus' misperception that Titinius 
is taken captive by the enemy. Why this small chain of substitute eyes, one soldier 
dispatched to observe, another to observe him? Because, says Cassius, `[m]y sight was ever 
thick' (V. iii. 21). Mighty Caesar's belated revenge is attained because Cassius' eyes fail 
him. Hearing the ill-report, Cassius orders Pindarus, and thereby himself, to `behold no 
more' (V. iii. 33). Mediated and corrupted as it is, a scene is presented to Cassius which he 
cannot see and live: `0 coward that I am, to live so long, /To see my best friend ta'en before 
my face' (V. iii. 34-5). 
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If we are to cite these deaths as instances of what Freud calls `deferred obedience', 
we must accept a certain discrepancy between the procedure dramatised by Shakespeare 
and the account given by Freud of Nachträglichen Gehorsams in Totem and Taboo. 
Revenge, by definition, is the righting of a wrong. `Then fall Caesar' : if this were to have 
signified only his acceptance that his death was deserved, he would never have needed to 
return as revenant. The tyrannical power which accrues to Caesar in seeking his ghostly 
revenge is a measure of the tyranny he had neither attained nor resolutely signalled that it 
was his desire illegitimately to attain in life. His avenging strength post mortem (like the 
very presence of the pro-Caesarean faction) testifies (though only in part, as we will see) to 
his having never acquired by the time of the assassination the status for the rest of Rome, in 
its entirety, which he had for Brutus, Cassius and the rest. For Freud, on the other hand, the 
death of the primal father is an unequivocal event. If the father becomes still more 
tyrannical in death, it is, it seems, no more than a continuation and confirmation of the 
tyrant that he just was in life. It will be seen shortly why Freud's model is problematic, and 
first of all for Freud himself 
Before getting to this, it must be emphasised that the discrepancy is not total. It 
would be inconsistent with everything we have said thus far to accept that the ghostly 
afterlife of Caesar testifies to no more than the always-possible injustice of the deed. If the 
deaths of Brutus and Cassius signal the victory of the pro-Caesarean faction, the work 
begun by the Ides of March is nevertheless not (simply) ended; for Caesar's tyrannical 
revenge is no less equivocal than the deed it avenges. Departing from Plutarch, 
Shakespeare identifies and personifies the revenant: the tyrannical ghost of Caesar is, after 
all ... of 
Caesar. There is, in Shakespeare, a certain paradoxical continuity between always- 
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potential-(non)-tyrant who is prematurely put to death, and the daemonic figure who enacts 
vengeance. 8" Why should it be that `revenge', which presupposes injustice (for Caesar 
never was a tyrant) should be overseen by the tyrannical spirit of a victim whose 
supporters those who launch military `revenge' in his name-insist that he had no 
tyrannical ambition? If Caesar's ghostly `revenge' testifies to the possibility of an injustice 
done to Caesar, does not Shakespeare's characterisation of the ghost not just as Caesar but, 
more specifically, as Caesar the tyrant, demand that we understand the haunting of the 
conspirators to be itself somehow haunted? The afterlife of Caesar gets us no closer to the 
truth of Caesar's alleged ambition (or therefore to the truth of the deed, its justice or 
injustice) than did his and Antony's theatrics during the pseudo-coronation before the 
plebs. Its characterisation will not allow us to understand its significance in an either/or 
fashion. It is not, qua revenge, a belated testament only to the injustice of the deed: 
Caesar's avenging ghost, in its very tyranny, continues to testify to the might- 
always/might-always-not which marked Caesar in life. As revenger-as tyrannical 
revenger-Caesar continues, post mortem, to resist simple interpretation. 
This fact places the project of the pro-Caesarean faction on no less `slippery 
ground' than that of the conspirators. The assassination was, specifically, undecidable: if it 
was not unequivocally justifiable, then by the same token, neither was it unequivocally 
unjustifiable, as Antony must attempt to make the people of Rome believe it was. Indeed 
his brilliantly manipulative speech to the plebs at Caesar's funeral will be marked by an 
ineluctable paradox that preserves Caesar's will-his desire, his ambition-as wholly 
80 Note too that it is the ghost which enacts vengeance. Caesar's spirit is spared the usual impotence of the 
revenge-ghost who must call upon the living to requite the crime which cut him off in life. The pro-Caesarean 
faction certainly inaugurate Civil War, but it is Caesar's ghost which ultimately drives his erstwhile 
N-anquishers to their deaths. 
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unreadable, even and especially as Antony reads the last will and testament of his 
colleague, the posthumous effect of which document is at once and irreducibly a refutation 
and a confirmation of `ambition'. 
In spite and because of what Antony says to his auditors, standing before the 
bleeding piece of earth that is now Caesar, he does speak to disprove what Brutus has 
spoken (III. ii. 101). As Freud points out in the Jokes and their Relation to the 
Unconscious, Antony's technique is to make himself understood by insisting, over- 
insisting, on the reverse of his repeated refrain: `For Brutus is an honourable man; /So are 
they all, all honourable men [... ] And Brutus is an honourable man t... ]' etc. (III. ii. 83-7; 
Freud 1905 p. 113): 
You all did see, that on the Lupercal 
I thrice presented him the kingly crown, 
Which he did thrice refuse. Was this ambition? 
Yet Brutus says he was ambitious, 
And sure he is an honourable man. 
(III. ii. 96-100) 
His friends and countrymen accept the subtly articulated charge without question: `Mark ye 
his words? He would not take the crown; /Therefore 'tis certain he was not ambitious' (III. 
ii. 113-4). Antony then drops like a piece of bait the real proof of Caesar's modesty and 
non-tyranny-the issue of the will. 
But here's a parchment, with the seal of Caesar. 
I found it in his closet. 'Tis his will [... ] 
I must not read it. 
It is not meet you know how Caesar loved you. 
You are not wood, you are not stones, but men: 
And being men, hearing the will of Caesar, 
It will inflame you, it will make you mad [... ] 
I have o'ershot myself to tell you of it. 
I fear I wrong the honourable men 
Whose daggers have stabbed Caesar: I do fear it. 
(III. ii. 129-153) 
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Passed from Antony to the eager plebs the word `will', `the favourite Shakespearean phallic 
pun' as Richard Wilson puts it, is picked up and repeated twenty-seven times in just thirty 
lines (Wilson 1996 p. 25). Antony refrains awhile from revealing its contents, choosing 
first to ventriloquise the cuts in Caesar's mantle, reconstructing the bloody murder scene as 
one of treacherous butchery, evacuated of all sacrificial meaning (III. ii. 167-190). But, as if 
to gesture towards a revelation of truth, his dramatic overture to the reading of the last 
testament is an unveiling of the corpse: 
Kind souls, what weep you when you but behold 
Our Caesar's vesture wounded? Look you here, 
Here is himself, marred as you see with traitors. 
1 Pleb: 0 piteous spectacle! 
2 Pleb: 
.0 noble 
Caesar! 
3 Pleb: 0 woeful day! 
4 Pleb: 0 traitors, villains! 
1 Pleb: 0 most bloody sight! 
2 Pleb: We will be revenged! 
(III. ii. 193-8) 
Caesar's naked will is being laid bare. It is not, Antony urges the Romans, I who speak, but 
Caesar: his `wounds, poor dumb mouths/ [... ] speak for me' (III. ii. 218-9), just as he says 
the words of Caesar's will alone would be enough to inflame them against the `honourable' 
`traitors' who stabbed Caesar. It is not I but Caesar, in his naked bleeding body and in his 
last signed text, who speaks posthumously. 81 Here, Antony declares, already fighting to 
restrain the crowd, is the real reason `[w]herein Caesar hath deserved your loves' : 
To every Roman citizen he gives, 
To every several man, seventy-five drachmas. 
81 The phallic pun which connects the text of the 'will' to the bleeding, naked body may in part be determined 
by Plutarch's claim that 'Brutus [... ] gave [Caesar] one wound about the privities' (North's Caesar p. 101). 
There is no indication in Shakespeare's text of the bodily location of Brutus' attack, except, perhaps, for 
Antony's famous description of the castrative gash made by Brutus as `the unkindest cut of all' ('cut' = slang 
for 'cunt') (III. ii. 181). 
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2 Pleb: Most noble Caesar, we'll revenge his death. 
3 Pleb: 0 royal Caesar! 
Antony: Hear me with patience. 
All: Peace ho. 
Antony: Moreover, he hath left you all his walks, 
His private arbours and new planted orchards, 
On this side Tiber. He hath left them you 
And to your heirs forever: common pleasures 
To walk abroad and recreate yourselves. 
Here was a Caesar: when comes such another? 
1 Pleb: Never, never. Come, away, away. 
We'll burn his body in the holy place, 
And with the brands fire all the traitors' houses. 
Take up the body. 
2 Pleb: Go fetch fire. 
3 Pleb: Pluck down benches. 
4 Pleb: Pluck down forms, windows, anything. 
(III. ii. 229-50) 
The fist time Caesar is seen on Shakespeare's stage in Act I during the festivities of the 
Lupercal, he is concerned that he has no legitimate son, and therefore no heir (I. ii. 1-9). By 
the time of his death everything has been decided: Caesar renders what is Caesar's to the 
people of Rome. 82 We mentioned above Miola's proposition that, as Antony wishes, the 
content of the will militates against the claim of Caesar's tyranny. `In direct contrast to the 
typical tyrant's greed', argues Miola, `Caesar's posthumous generosity unites all Romans 
as familial legatees and characterises him as the magnanimous pater patriae' (Miola 1985 
p. 282). True as it may be that the will brings to the fore a magnanimity which would be 
thoroughly untyrannical, it and Miola's proposition are heavily freighted with 
contradiction. There is an insoluble difference between what the content of the will says 
and what it enacts. As Toubiana (1988) has pointed out in his chapter on Caesar's 
testament: 
8 Note that Shakespeare underlines this point heavily. The factual content of the will comes directly from 
Plutarch (North's Caesar p. 137). but Shakespeare chooses never explicitly to mention Caesar's wish that his 
201 
[In ancient Rome] lorsque 1'heritier est etranger ä la famille, il est 
habituallement adopter le personne adoptee porte alors les tria nomina de 
1' ädoptant et, en meme temps que les biens, il herite symboliquement des 
noms et des qualites du testateur [... ] Le testament place le peuple, en le 
designant comme heritier, dans une position Filiale et c'est pourquoi [... ] 
la journee des Ides de mars devient sacree et sanctifiee comme j ournee 
parricide'. 
(p. 48, emphasis added) 83 
In the moment Caesar's naked will becomes seen and known it folds back upon itself, 
concealing the final truth of what it reveals. As Antony produces this final piece of 
evidence of Caesar's innocence of the charge of tyranny, of never having had the ambitions 
for which he was assassinated, Caesar becomes, makes himself, pater patriae: `0 royal 
Caesar! ' The ultimate and unmediated `proof of Caesar's never having been illegitimately 
ambitious for the crown-and there can be no doubting his material generosity to Rome- 
is covertly and at the same time a means of accession to it that does without, even 
circumvents the constitutional process of the Senate. Even as it gestures towards, and 
effects an equitable redistribution of the things which are Caesar's, it removes Caesar from 
any relation of equality and fraternity to the people. Caesar makes himself the peerless, 
br(other)less, father of Rome in the very same move by which his non-tyranny is affirmed 
before and accepted by the people. The text of the will is an oxymoron, and irreducibly so: 
it preserves the question of Caesar's ambition as a question. As a gesture it is both an 
independent and unconstitutional bid for the crown on Caesar's part, and proof of Caesar's 
never having wished to make such a bid; both a magnanimous act and a belated, kingly call 
for obedience. Nothing which we have seen of Shakespeare's living Caesar, and nothing in 
principal legatee in fact be his great-nephew Octavius. Instead, he shows Antony and Octavius intending to 
'cut off for themselves `some charge in the legacies' (IV. i. 8-9). 
83 It should be mentioned that the first passage which I have elided in the above citation specifically concerns 
Octavius as Caesar's symbolic enfant adoptif-an issue which, as I have suggested in the previous note, 
Shakespeare's version of the story chooses to submerge somewhat beneath the more strongly emphasised 
issue of Caesar's posthumous 'adoption' of the whole of Rome. 
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the Scenes which follow the funeral, allows us access to the `will' behind the will, to any 
one true animating purpose for which it was written. 
If Shakespeare refuses to represent Caesar as an unequivocal tyrant in life, he is 
consistent in maintaining the truth of Caesar's ambition as elusive, even in and beyond 
death. Neither those who rejoice in his passing, nor those who mourn it can exorcise the 
undecidable remainder which compromises their respective positions in relation to the 
dead. Celebration or condemnation alone cannot do justice to the irreducible complexity of 
the deed. Neither is illegitimate and neither is sufficient in itself The work begun on the 
Ides of March was interpretative: its rhetorical and its bloody continuation will testify not to 
what Caesar was, but only to both what he might-always and might-always-not have been. 
The deed itself will continue to resist any attempt to make it proper to itself, one thing or 
another, sacrifice or butchery. 
In closing, then, we return to the text with which we first began: Totem and Taboo. 
Freud never once raises any question concerning the `will' of the primal tyrant father-his 
intention, his desire does not figure at all. If, as Harold Bloom claims, the text can be read 
as a rewriting of Julius Caesar, then it is one which writes out any complexity on the part 
of the alleged 'tyrant'. As Laplanche has stressed, in a passage which was evoked in the 
previous chapter, Freud's ipsocentrism habitually and characteristically leads him to deny 
complexity to the parent figures whom he invokes-in the case histories, throughout Moses 
and Monotheism, and especially in regard to the primal father: `The father of the horde 
communicates nothing; he has no unconscious' (Laplanche 1999A [1995] p. 190). Let us 
reiterate that when Freud poses the question of why it should be that in the ritual killing of 
the totem animal (the father's substitute) the band of brothers at once rejoice at the 
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repetition of their deed and mourn over it as well, he proposes that it is the result of `[t]he 
ambivalent emotional attitude which to this day characterises the father-complex in our 
children [... ]' (Freud 1913 [1912-3] p. 202). `[The sons] hated their father', he says, `[... ] 
but they loved and admired him too' (p. 204). Yet, Freud goes on, `[w]e know nothing of 
the origin of this ambivalence' (p. 219). He does not rule out the possibility that it is 
instinctual and essential, `a fundamental phenomenon of our emotional life'; but he also 
advances, somewhat vaguely, the more suggestive proposition that an answer might be 
sought in the possibility that ambivalence is not originary but was `acquired by the human 
race in connection with their father complex' (pp. 219-20). 84 
Freud's speculation ceases and he moves on. But his second proposition perhaps 
allows us to question, with Freud, his own procedure elsewhere in the text. Ambivalence is 
always on the side of the sons. He describes their `ambivalent attitude towards the father', 
their `current[s] of feeling towards him' (p. 211 and 207, emphases added), but never 
anything from the father towards the sons, except jealous aggression and tyranny. But does 
not the ambivalence of the sons indicate a blind-spot on Freud's part with regard to the 
primal father, rather than a predicament of whose origin we can only say we know nothing? 
If the sons feel ambivalently towards their father, is it not because he will have behaved not 
with unequivocal tyranny but at least somehow ambivalently towards them? Must there not, 
in the first place, have been ambivalence coming from the parental other towards the sons? 
If he was loved as well as hated, then jealous aggression and tyranny cannot mark the 
absolute limit of his attitude towards them, as Freud wants to insist. For them to need to 
rejoice as well as to mourn, after the event, there must have first been something about the 
84 Laplanche (1999A [ 1992d]) takes Freud to task for the more general tendency in Totem and Taboo to settle 
for the option of instinctual ambivalence. See esp. pp. 245-8. 
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father the termination of which is a cause for rejoicing, and something of which to mourn 
the loss. 
Nachträglichen Gehorsams: what Julius Caesar dramatises is the complexity of an 
event of `tyrannicide', which Freud cannot perceive in his own reconstruction of the drama 
of the primal horde. In order for there to be any `deferred obedience' in the Freudian drama, 
the event which he describes cannot in itself and as it happened have objectively constituted 
a `tyrannicide' pure and simple, cannot have been `lived experience' unalloyed in the first -- 
instance by guilt, uncompromised by interpretative embellishment and `thought'. It must 
always have been tyrannicide and not-tyrannicide, necessary and excessive. How else could 
any Nachträglichkeit be possible? The complexity of the primal father cannot, without 
remainder, be scotomised any more successfully than can Caesar's by Brutus before and 
during the murder or even by Antony at the funeral. The afterlife of the one thought to be 
the `tyrant'-which emerges in mourning, rejoicing, civil war, revenge-is not 
heterogeneous to what his death entailed, but testifies, rather, to the heterogeneity of that 
event to itself. 
*** 
Julius Caesar is at once the most `Freudian' and the most `unFreudian' of texts. 
Certainly it is one which begs comparison with Totem and Taboo, or with which Totem and 
Taboo itself tacitly begs comparison. But moreover, what it dramatises, `repeats', 
`translates' and fails to `translate' is the possibility of an occurrence whose logic Freud had 
already long claimed to have abandoned by 1912: namely the occurring of that which is not 
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at home with itself in the first instance, which bears within it an otherness of which it 
cannot simply be rid. Not only refusing either to condemn or to condone (to rejoice or to 
mourn) the assassination of Caesar, Shakespeare represents it as an event the status and the 
meaning of which never was reducible only to the material reality in which it consisted. 
To say so does not amount to the charge that Julius Caesar is somehow apolitical 
a refusal to come down on one side or the other in a period in which the radical posture of 
tragedy has been regarded as an active intervention in a political scene whose `Father' 
would soon indeed be `cut off. On the contrary. What the text brings to the `tyrannicide 
debate' is the very question of the undecidability which makes possible `debate' per se. 
Complex, not the same as itself in the very first instance, the event, like the experience of 
trauma, makes possible and necessary the deferred and constant returns to it of which 
Shakespeare's text is only one of innumerable instances. The posture of coming down 
simplemindedly on one side only will always be haunted by the unassimilable remainder of 
what it must sacrifice from the basis of its own interpretation. 
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Chapter Three 
Hamlet: Too much in the sun 
The modern subject is he who feels free to forget the dead. 
Ferdinand Tönnies, Custom: An Essay on Social Codes 
The madness of Oedipus has become Western reason. 
Jean Joseph Goux, Oedipus, Philosopher 
Doubt that the sun doth move. 
Hamlet 
The sins of the father 
In the early portions of our previous two chapters, and with reference to The 
Interpretation of Dreams, we have so far followed Freud's identifications with the tragic 
figures of Sophocles' Oedipus and Shakespeare's Brutus-each a parricide in his own way. 
I wish to inaugurate this final chapter by pointing to a third, comparable identification on 
Freud's part. We are concerned, of course, with Hamlet who, like Oedipus, is a bereaved 
son-though it will take us most of the chapter to grasp precisely what is or could be 
described as `parricidal' in the orientation of this fatherless hero. 
First, it is worth briefly recapitulating the familiar interpretation of Hamlet which 
Freud proposes in 1900. It is little different from the one he offers Fliess in October 1897: 
that the play bears within it, has as its undisclosed nucleus, the Oedipal themes of parricide 
and incest. Yet in 1900, Freud is keen to stress the historical separation between Sophocles' 
tragedy and Shakespeare's: whereas in the former the infantile desires which supposedly 
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motivate it are `brought out into the open and realized as they would be in a dream' (p. 
366), Hamlet's libidinal nucleus remains undisclosed because it is a modern play. We learn 
of the hero's Oedipal conflict only `from its inhibiting consequences' (p. 366). It is 
`repressed just as in the case of a neurosis' (p. 366). For Freud, this fact represents the 
difference in mental life between the separate epochs of civilisation in which the two 
tragedies were produced. To paraphrase a passage from Totem and Taboo which we cited 
in the previous chapter, we might say that with Oedipus thought turns directly into action: 
the hero just is driven to carry out parricide and incest. '[T]he more modern tragedy', 
however, bears the marks of what Freud calls `the secular advance of repression in the 
emotional life of mankind' (1900 pp. 367 and 366): everything Oedipal remains concealed. 
We are confronted only with the peculiar fact that Hamlet cannot motivate himself to 
undertake the task set for him by his father. What is concealed by the play, and what, Freud 
argues, has remained concealed from its readers for so long, is that Claudius has not only 
taken the political and familial place once occupied by Old Hamlet: he has also usurped 
young Hamlet's innermost desires: 
What is it [... ] that inhibits [Hamlet] in fulfilling the task set him by his 
father's ghost? [... ] Hamlet is able to do anything except take 
vengeance on the man who did away with his father and who took that 
father's place with his mother, the man who shows him the repressed 
wishes of his childhood realized. 
(p. 367) 
Towards the end of his interpretation, Freud observes a biographical point that 
`Hamlet was written immediately after the death of Shakespeare's father (in 1601)' (p. 
368). The tragic hero thus has something fundamentally in common with his creator. But 
this point immediately resonates with one we mentioned in the chapter one: namely that 
The Interpretation of Dreams was written in response to the death of Freud's own father, in 
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mourning for him. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Freud: each shares the experience which Freud 
describes prefatorially as `the most important event [... ] of a man's life' (1900 p. 47)- 
Shakespeare as a precipitating factor in the composition of Hamlet; Hamlet as a 
precipitating factor in his famous melancholia; Freud as a precipitating factor in the 
composition of the dream book in which these other bereft figures are analysed. 
The implicit identification by Freud with Hamlet has been underlined by Marjorie 
Garber in her book Shakespeare's Ghost Writers: Literature as Uncanny Causality (1987). 
(It is a text with which we will shortly be dealing in some depth). In particular, Garber 
draws attention to a dream of Freud's recounted in The Interpretation of Dreams, and 
regarding his father's funeral (pp. 428-9). 1 Let us quickly set forth its details. 
Freud describes dreaming of a notice-board on which a double inscription is printed, 
such that it reads either: `You are requested to close the eyes', or `You are requested to 
close an eye'. Insisting that both possibilities are pertinent, Freud chooses to write it in the 
following form: 
the 
You are requested to close eye(s) 
an 
(Freud 1900, p. 429) 
The ambivalence of the sign's meaning, Freud argues, captures his own anxieties at the 
time of its occurrence. He had been required to arrange his father's funeral, to see to the 
rites of passage: that is, to close the eyes of the dead. But Freud had ensured that in 
accordance with what he believed to be his father's wishes, the service was kept simple-a 
fact to which not every family-member had been sympathetic. Thus, Freud had also risked 
' What appears in 1900 is a modified version of details which he sent to Fliess in a letter of 1896 (1985 [1887- 
1904 1, p. 202). In summarising the dream I will be drawing implicitly upon both texts. 
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being thought to have closed his eyes to-to have `winked at' or to have `overlooked' his 
duty towards-a father who perhaps deserved a more elaborate send-off. 
Garber perceives something else rather more dubious here. It should be mentioned 
immediately that she is content to regard fantasy and the Oedipus complex as mere 
substitutes for the reality of sexual abuse and seduction theory-a position which we 
attempted to refute in the Introduction. 2 It was, she points out, just less than a year after the 
death of Freud's father Jacob (28 November 1896) that Freud abandoned the seduction 
theory. Moreover, she says, in the letter of September 1897 where Freud had informed 
Fliess of the reasons for his change of heart, he had mentioned to his friend the fact that 
`[with the neurotica] in all cases the father, not excluding my own, had to be accused of 
being perverse' (Appendix to this thesis). As Garber explains, until Masson's translation of 
the correspondence in 1985, the earlier published version of the letter had omitted the `not 
excluding my own' of Freud's original (Garber 1987 p. 167-8). Jacob Freud was tacitly 
edited out. For Garber, this hitherto omitted detail is an important ingredient to Freud's 
unconscious anxieties regarding his father's funeral: it suggests that the abandonment of a 
theory based on traumatic sex abuse, and its `substitution' by a theory of infantile fantasy 
was, at least partially, Freud's way of `winking at' a certain perversity on the part of his 
own father. Thus she wonders whether, in accepting Freud's notion of Oedipal fantasy, and, 
by extension, his `Oedipal' reading of Hamlet, we in our turn are being requested to close 
an eye to the sins of the father (p. 168). 
There are good reasons to quarrel with the specifics of Garber's argument, for it 
depends upon a naive understanding of the transformations which took place in Freud's 
thought during 1897. Nonetheless, her fundamental point is an important one. Whether or 
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not we wish to reject the biographical grounds of Garber's charge concerning the sins of 
Jacob Freud himself, it remains true that from 21 September1897 onwards Freud's eyes do 
close to the sins of the fathers, at least in the most general sense of continuing to leave 
unacknowledged the significance of parental desire in the constitution of the subject's 
psychic life. And as we saw in the Introduction, Freud's interpretation of Hamlet appears 
only after this shift is announced in the letter of the equinox. 
I do not wish to rely on biographical information or supposition pertaining to Freud, 
Shakespeare and their fathers. But Garber's point enables us to propose a suggestive 
parallel between Hamlet and Freud, a mutual factor which implicates the tragic malaise of 
the former with the interpretative approach of the latter towards it. In 1900, Freud, a bereft 
son, directs his analytic attention to a dramatic tragedy concerning another famously bereft 
son. What interests him is why this tragic figure is unable to act upon his ghostly father's 
word, why Hamlet cannot carry out his father's desire. Yet Freud had first turned his 
interpretative attention to this drama in 1897, and not at a random moment, but when he 
himself had begun to exclude the question of adult/parental desire from his conception of 
psychic development. If Hamlet seems constantly to wink at the duty demanded of him by 
his father, then Freud approaches this problem from a theoretical position which has 
already begun to wink at the difficult question of the constitutive role of adult desire as 
transmitted to the subject. In short, if Hamlet is seen persistently to overlook the desire of 
his father, so Freud-and his interpretative postulation of an Oedipal solution-overlooks 
the question of the father's desire in relation to Hamlet. 
In this chapter I want to move away from the classical psychoanalytic assumption 
that Hamlet's notorious hesitancy can be attributed to an undisclosed Oedipal content. My 
2 Indeed, her argument is flagrantly indebted to Masson (1984). 
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principal focus will concern not what it is already `in' Hamlet that makes him wink at his 
paternally-assigned duty, but that which is exogenously placed within him by his ghostly 
father's message of assignment and which, paradoxically, brings about the paralysis that 
Freud-after, and only after, September 1897-is led to attribute to the internal necessity of 
Oedipal wishes. Freud's account of the dream of closing the/an eye(s), I will propose, can 
be put to work precisely in the service of understanding this paradox, and, indeed, the very 
logic which Shakespeare's text sets forth as the motor of its composition. 
Let us begin afresh, then, with reference to the critical heritage of the play, by 
taking up the problematic character of Hamlet's relation to his father-a relation which is, I 
suggest, inseparable from the text's perceived 'modernity'. 
Remember me 
Ferdinand Tönnies' claim, cited as our first epigraph, offers an important, 
complicating, and ultimately very telling adjunct to the paradigm of modern subjectivity 
which `bourgeois' critics, like Freud, have continued to identify in Hamlet's self-conscious 
display of elusive, subjective depth. 3 
In a recent book on renaissance tragedy Michael Neill (1997) argues that the virtue 
of Shakespeare's Hamlet, itself a critique of the revenge genre, consists in its emphasis on 
remembrance. 4 Neill remarks, aptly, that `Hamlet has become so much the best-known 
example of revenge tragedy, whose premises it explores and questions, that it is difficult to 
3 See in particular Barker (1984), whose demarcation of `bourgeois' criticism we will remain with 
provisionally; also Belsey (1985) and Mousley (1994). On Hamlet, modernity and the Modernists, see 
Britzolakis (1994). On the role of the Reformation and the abolition of Purgatory in the parallel progress 
towards modern subjectivity and forgetting the dead, see esp. Low (1999). 
4 On this point cf. John Kerrigan (1981), where the author also points out that the word `memory' occurs more 
than twice as often in Hamlet than in any other play by Shakespeare. For other critiques which, like Neill's, 
notice the equation in Hamlet between revenge and remembrance, see also Kerrigan (1996) and Sacks (1985). 
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recognize how significantly it reshaped the genre to which it belonged' (p. 244). He then 
points out that one important surviving detail of the prior and so-called Ur-Hamlet comes 
from Thomas Lodge's description of its Ghost crying `like an oyster-wife, "Hamlet, 
revenge! "' In a deliberate contrast with this famous shriek, he suggests, Shakespeare's 
Ghost replaces the traditional injunction in its call, `Remember me! ' (I. v. 91). By means of 
a subtle but dramatically anomalous, and Neill suggests, outrageous alteration, Hamlet is 
thus sworn not to revenge, but to remember. 5 Behind this adjustment, argues Neill, lies the 
`great discovery' of Hamlet: namely the recognition that `revenge tragedy, at the deepest 
level, is less about the ethics of vendetta than it is about murderous legacies of the past and 
the terrible power of memory' (Neill 1997 p. 244). For the sixteenth-century's exhumation 
of the revenge genre has been productively linked by several authors, including Neill, to 
what Natalie Zemon Davies (1977) refers to as the doing away with the dead as an `age 
group' in Protestant societies. 6 The Reformation's abolition of Purgatory and the doctrinal 
injunction against mourning or praying for the dead meant that `[a]il the forms of exchange 
and communication between souls in the other world and the living were to be swept away' 
(Davies 1977 p. 95), 7 Deprived of the intercessory means of masses, prayers and 
indulgences to act on the behalf of its deceased, the Protestant conscience was left with an 
intolerable burden of remembrance. Revenge drama, Neill suggests, was just one of the 
`fantasy response[s] to the sense of despairing impotence produced by the [... ] 
displacement of the dead' (Neill 1997 p. 246). 8 At the heart of the revenge project, it is 
5 Cf Kerrigan (1981) passim. 
6 The connection between Protestant doctrine and the genesis of revenge tragedy is also taken up by Brown 
(1979), and Low (1999). The theological complexities and ambiguities of the post-Reformation Ghost of 
Hamlet are discussed in detail in Dover Wilson (1935) and Prosser (1971). 
' These transformations became entrenched in English Law in the Chantries Act and Royal Injunctions of 
1547, and registered in the Edwardian Prayerbook of 1549. 
8 Cf. Low (1999) passim. 
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suggested, is the need to `set right' a failed rite of passage, to `intercede' on behalf of the 
dead ancestor. The revenger is one haunted by ghosts because he is possessed by memory. 
His role is thus essentially that of a `remembrancer' : `he is both an agent of memory and 
one whose task it is to exact payments for the debts of the past' (p. 247). Doctrinal 
transformations in commemorative practice amounted to an imperative that the living 
forget the deceased. To revenge is to remember. 
We shall return in detail to the general question of commemorative practice later on. 
In the meantime let us note that in the very act of dramatising and stressing this `great 
discovery' Hamlet will not cease simultaneously to complicate and trouble it. For it is 
precisely in the deferral of revenge that the fabric and action of the play have been 
supposed to consist. According to a simple binary logic Hamlet's duty to revenge has 
traditionally been opposed in an either/or fashion to his notorious procrastination. It is in 
the gap between the injunction and the final murder of the King (not, then, in revenge, but 
in its opposite, hesitancy) that, as Francis Barker (1984) has pointed out, traditional 
criticism has intervened with all the character-based explanatory diagnoses (Romantic, 
post-Romantic, Oedipal) of modern subjectivity (p. 164). Yet even Barker's own 
ideologically astute reading of Hamlet concludes with the affirmation that the Hamlet of 
modernity (which he carefully and rightly argues to be no more than the site of an 
embarrassing `absence') is mutually exclusive with the Hamlet who fulfils his filial duty. 
So much so that he argues: 
in order that the play may end, a second Hamlet must be introduced [... ] 
The Hamlet who delays (and whose delaying is but the linear deployment 
of the `vertical' absence within) is replaced by one who simply waits [... ] 
[T]he challenge of Hamlet's incipient modernity is extinguished [... ] and 
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the prince recuperated to the order of the spectacle which his opacity has 
troubled. 
(pp. 165-6) 9 
According to the binary logic supposed by Barker's thesis-revenge versus delay-Hamlet 
articulates himself as a modern subject only so long as he does not carry out the traditional 
paternal imperative of vengeance. But the specificity of the Ghost's anomalous injunction 
inflects such a supposition in advance. To delay is not to revenge (says the reader of 
Hamlet); but to revenge is to remember (the Ghost has already said): to hesitate is therefore 
not to remember, it is to forget. 1° None of this refutes the foundation of Neill's claim, 
however. On the contrary, the thesis of his chapters on Hamlet helps us to recognise, 
retrospectively, that whether it has known it or not, criticism has always already been 
marked by the singularity of the Ghost's injunction. That is to say that, for instance, even 
Freud's meditation on Hamlet's inhibition in carrying out the desire of his dead father (and 
the Oedipal solution which he offers) is, according to the specificity of the Ghost's demand, 
already and of necessity a meditation on Hamlet's failure to remember his father and his 
father's desire. Our point is not, then, to disavow the great critical matter which has been 
made of the excessively strong attachment Hamlet shows to his father's memory. Rather, it 
is to suggest the traditional co-ordinates within which such an observation might be 
made-namely those set by the question: `why does Hamlet (not revenge but) delay? ', or, 
in Barker's case, `just what (if anything) is revealed of Hamlet while he delays? '-will 
already be prescribed and defined by the singular ghostly injunction of Shakespeare's text 
as an acknowledgement (albeit inadvertent) of Hamlet's `forgetting'. In short, insofar as 
9 On this 'second Hamlet' cf. Belsey (1985) p. 49. 
10 Although we will not deal with it at length, it is significant that in Barker's later book (1993) the author 
devotes several pages to the issues of ruptured commemoration of the dead and `the impossibility of memory 
as such' in Hamlet: p. 41; cf. pp. 31ff. 
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Hamlet the subject of modern consciousness is traditionally presumed to be Hamlet the 
procrastinator, he seems condemned to have been remembered as the one who `forgets' the 
dead. 
Tonnies' definition of the modern subject could, in this sense, be read like a gloss 
on critical disquisitions on Hamlet's modernity. But the posture which it outlines is far 
from unique. Not least of all, Nietzsche's `Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life' 
(1874) as it has been taken up by Paul de Man in his own paper `Literary History and 
Literary Modernity' (1969), erects a comparable conceptual account, pitting Life against 
History. For Nietzsche what appears to be the privilege of the placid state of the animal 
herd, in contrast to restless human society, revolves around the differential function of 
memory: `[... ] the man says, "I remember" and envies the animal who at once forgets, and 
for whom every moment really dies, sinks back into night and fog and is extinguished 
forever' (Nietzsche 1874 p. 61). 11 Yet the condition of animality remains a constitutive 
part of man, specifically in fact `as the foundation upon which alone anything sound, 
healthy, great, anything truly human, can grow' (p. 63): 
As he who acts is, in Goethe's words, always without a conscience, so is 
he also always without knowledge; he forgets most things so that he can 
do one thing; he is unjust towards what lies behind him, and he recognises 
the rights only of that which is now to come [... ]. 
(p. 64) 
For de Man, Nietzsche's ruthless forgetting in the name of action, of doing-the blindness 
with which he throws himself into an action lighted of all previous experience, `captures 
the authentic spirit of modernity' (de Man 1969 p. 147). The modern soul is erected by and 
upon the annihilation of all anteriority. A veritable tradition of the anti-traditional, then, 
" Since later in the chapter we will have occasion to quote Nietzsche's paper independently I refer to R. J. 
Hollingdale's translation rather than de Man's own as it appears in his paper. 
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modernity is secured in the disavowal and dismissal of ancestry. Little wonder that Hamlet 
the `modern soul' is also Hamlet the delayer, and thus implicitly the forgetter. Little wonder 
too that one of those modern `recensions', as Barker calls them, identified in Hamlet has 
been the tragic desire of Oedipus the parricide. `The tragedy of Oedipus', Jean Joseph Goux 
tells us in the closing pages of the text we discussed in Chapter One, `indicates [... ] the 
folds of the symbolic that shape every passage from heteronomy to autonomy'(Goux 1993 
p. 202). 
Foreclosure: Marjorie Garber's Lacanian reading 
Now, one of the most interesting attempts to co-ordinate the challenges of Hamlet's 
delay, the singularity of his father's injunction, and the issue of modernity, is made by 
Marjorie Garber in her aforementioned Shakespeare's Ghost Writers. In the service of her 
argument Garber invokes both Nietzsche and de Man; but it is the work of Jacques Lacan 
which orients her thought most strongly. I do not wish to engage with her book in its 
entirety; I intend only to outline briefly the problematic drift of her reasoning with regard to 
Hamlet. For this tragedy is represented by Garber as `a play that articulates [... ] the 
construction of the modern subject' (1987 p. 157), but in such a way, I suggest, as to exert a 
pressure on the Lacanian framework which the latter cannot contain. 
Garber takes as her starting point Lacan's Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis (1964), together with his own Seminar on Shakespeare's text, `Desire and 
the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet' (1982). She takes up the suggested equivalence 
marked by Lacan between the Ghost of Hamlet pere and the `veiled phallus'- 
[T]he very source of what makes Hamlet's arm waver at every moment, 
is the narcissistic connection that Freud tells us about in his text on the 
217 
decline of the Oedipus complex: one cannot strike the phallus, because 
the phallus, even the real phallus, is a ghost 
(Lacan 1982; cited in Garber 1987 p. 130) 
From this Garber argues that Hamlet represents a turning around of the anxiety about the 
general cultural failure of the `paternal metaphor' legible elsewhere in the Shakespearean 
corpus: namely the anxiety concerning paternity, legitimacy, inheritance, primogeniture and 
succession (Garber 1987 p. 133). For Lacan the Name-of-the-Father is the dead father. 12 
But the presence of the Ghost signals the failure of the Prince's initiation into the Symbolic 
order. `[F]ar from providing Hamlet with the prohibitions of the Law that would allow his 
desire to survive', Lacan tells us, `[his] too ideal father is constantly being doubted' (Lacan 
1964; cited in Garber 1987 p. 131). In other words, says Garber, the Ghost, by virtue of 
being a ghost, is `incompletely a representative of the Law' : 
He puts in question his own being as well as his message [the tale of 
fratricide]. Is he a spirit of health or goblin damn'd? Is this the real Law? 
Is this the truth? As long as the Law of the father is doubted or put in 
question it cannot be (or is not) internalized, not assimilated into the 
symbolic, and therefore blocks rather than facilitates Hamlet's passage 
into the symbolic where he will find his desire. 
(p. 131) 
Hamlet's father is thus in a certain sense `not dead enough' . 
Now at this point in her description of the prince's haunted filial relation Garber 
invokes a crucial conceptual distinction which is not unproblematic. Following Lacan, she 
distinguishes between the pathological defence mechanisms of repression and foreclosure 
(forclusion). Through the notion of foreclosure Lacan has attempted to stabilise 
conceptually the term Verwerfung (repudiation) as it appears at significant moments in 
12 Cf. `[T]he symbolic Father is, insofar as he signifies [the] Law, the dead Father', Lacan (1955-6a) p. 199. 
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Freud's thinking on psychosis. 13 Unlike other psychical mechanisms of defence 
Verwerfung, as Lacan takes it up, is a definitively psychotic procedure that entails the 
primordial expulsion of a fundamental signifier. It is thus, as Laplanche and Pontalis 
explain, distinct from repression in two ways. Firstly because foreclosed signifiers are 
never integrated in the subject's unconscious; and secondly because, therefore, they do not 
return `from the inside', but rather, re-emerge in `the real', for instance in the form of 
hallucinations (Laplanche and Pontalis 1967 p. 166). 14 Garber sums up the distinction in the 
following manner: `Repression submerges or covers over unconscious thoughts that 
foreclosure does not permit' (Garber 1987 p. 132 emphasis added). In the Lacanian 
aetiology of psychosis the Name-of-the-Father has not been inscribed and then repressed: 
the psychotic subject has simply not admitted the paternal signifier into his symbolic world 
at all. In this connection, Garber cites another of Lacan's works, `The Freudian Thing': 
It is in the lack of the Name-of-the-Father in that place which, by the hole 
that it opens up in the signified, sets off the cascade of reshapings of the 
signifier from which the increasing disaster of the imaginary proceeds, to 
the point at which the level is reached at which signifier and signified are 
stabilized in the delusional metaphor. 
(Lacan 1955; cited in Garber 1987 p. 132) 
Neither Garber nor Lacan goes so far as to reduce the presence of the Ghost to a 
hallucination. Nevertheless, it is crucial to stress that, within Garber's Lacanian framework 
at least, Hamlet pere's not being dead-enough-the repetitious appearance of the Ghost to 
his son-cannot be thought to signal in any simple way an excessive domination of Hamlet 
fils by his father. Quite the contrary, the presence of the Ghost as the figure of incomplete 
13 See Lacan (1955-6a) passim, and his Seminar on the psychoses (1955-6b). On the Freudian lineage of this 
term and the itinerary of its resumption by Lacan see the entry for `Foreclosure (Repudiation)' in Laplanche 
and Pontalis's dictionary (1967). In Freud it is most closely expounded, of course, in the Schreber case (1911 
[19101). 
'' See Lacan (1955-6b), p. 13: `Whatever has been refused in the Symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, 
reappears in the real'. 
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Law whose status Hamlet can only doubt (and therefore hesitate before) is a symptom of 
precisely the lack of the Name-of-the-Father. Hamlet might insist his father so loved his 
mother `That he might not beteem the winds of heaven/To visit her face too roughly' (I. ii. 
141-2), might re-envisage him bearing 
Hyperion's curls, the front of Jove himself, 
An eye like Mars to threaten and command, 
A station like the herald of Mercury 
New-lighted on a heaven-kissing hill 
(III. iv. 56-59) 
-while acknowledging from the first that he was but `a man' (I. ii. 187). In short, Hamlet 
might well idealise his father. He might also, as Garber reminds us, be the son for whom 
psychoanalytic readers have not failed to identify myriad substitute father-figures, in 
Claudius, Polonius, even old Fortinbras and Norway (Garber 1987 p. 133). '[Me is' in 
these points, Garber says, `too much in the son, but where is paternity, where is the law? ' 
(pp. 133-4). The excess of paternity that so strongly seems to colour and overdetermine 
both Hamlet's elaborate descriptions of his father and his connections with Claudius and 
the rest, in fact only testify to the prior repudiation of paternal law: 
Indeed [Garber says], as in the case of the Medusa, where a multiplicity 
of penises is imagined to cover the unimaginable horror of no penis, of 
castration, so here the multiplicity of fathers covers over the fact of the 
lack. Covers it, in Hamlet, by foreclosing rather than repressing it. 
(p. 13 4) 
So far Garber's thinking appears to conform to the pattern that we have attempted to 
outline above: namely that of identifying the figure of modernity as a self-fashioning, self- 
authoring subject whose very selfhood-such as it is-is constituted by and in the absence 
of ancestry, paternity, or in Nietzsche's sense, History. Her invocation of the psychotic 
mechanism of foreclosure is particularly telling, however, and for two reasons. Firstly 
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because by virtue of its function as a constitutive and, as it were, normative aberrance the 
absolute rejection and thus lack of the paternal signifier described by Garber gives her 
thesis a strong affinity with that of Jean Joseph Goux's notion of the Oedipean (1993). 
Hamlet is not `clinically' diagnosed as schizophrenic or psychotic as if he were a patient on 
the analytic couch. Rather, the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father is seen to be the 
general condition of modernity, normative in its very perversion. The absence of the 
paternal signifier `in' Hamlet -his failure to have been initiated by the paternal sanction of 
the symbolic-thus captures the trajectory of the modern subject precisely in its aberrance. 
As Jean Joseph Goux puts it, the modern subject can be `characterised' by a `permanent 
break with tradition, a type of knowledge that is structured by the Oedipean avoidance that 
has become an active mode of historicity' (Goux 1993 p. 202). Garber's ostensibly 
pathological description of Hamlet's modernity would appear to lend support to Goux's 
claim that `the madness of Oedipus has become Western reason' (p. 202) 
The second thing to note, however, is that when Garber considers the Ghost's 
injunction, `Remember me! ', her analysis, in spite of itself, problematises-or rather shows 
Hamlet to problematise-the concept of foreclosure as such. 15 Having heard the Ghost's 
commandment, Hamlet announces and affirms his commitment, pledges his `word' by an 
act of inscription. He `sets down' the `commandment' in his `tables' (I. v. 95-112). 
Situating this moment of inscription within a de Manian paradigm of Gedächtnis 
('memory') versus Erinnerung ('recollection'), 16 Garber argues that the language of 
internalisation or interiorisation in Hamlet concerns metabolisation: digestion and eating. 
Hamlet's `table' of memory must take the place of the `table' which was coldly furnished at 
15 It also problematises the implicit ipsocentrism of Goux's thesis. 
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his mother's wedding by the `bak'd meats' of his father's funeral (I. ii. 180-1; cited in 
Garber 1987 p. 150). 17 But such a procedure is imperfect. In a phrase redolent of Lacan's 
formulation that `whatever has been refused in the Symbolic order [... ] reappears in the 
real', she suggests, Hamlet will himself ultimately be positioned `between cannibalism and 
anorexia, spewing forth in language what he cannot swallow, taunting Claudius with a 
reminder of "how a king may go a progress through the guts of a beggar" (IV. iii. 30-1)' (p. 
150). For now, Garber says, Hamlet is caught in a trap by what she calls the `double pull of 
the paternal imperative, an imperative so indigestible that it must be written down' (p. 150). 
Why is the pull of the command indigestibly double? Because in contrast with Michael 
Neill for whom `Remember! ' assumes a critical synonymity with `Revenge! ', Garber's 
reading, propelled by her Nietzschean paradigm, claims that the two are radically 
opposed-the annihilation of memory is a prerequisite for the possibility of action: 
[T]he more Hamlet remembers, the more he meditates the `word' that he 
takes as the Ghost's `commandment' and inscribes on his tables, the more 
he is trapped in a round of speculation. Far from goading him into action, 
the Ghost's twice iterated instruction, `Remember me', `do not forget', 
impedes that action, impedes revenge. What Hamlet needs to do is not to 
remember, but to forget. 
(p. 154) 
The `externalised' act of writing thus becomes a figure for the failure to internalise the 
Name-of-the-Father-the latter being internally contradictory and thus `indigestible'. Yet to 
bring her argument back within an explicitly psychoanalytic domain, Garber attempts to 
link the notion of remembering to Freud's elaboration of the dynamics of transference and 
the repetition compulsion. She invokes the extraordinary moment immediately after the 
16 The terms come from de Man (1982). While Garber's invocation of this text is extremely suggestive we 
need not concern ourselves directly with its implications. 
17 We shall have cause to return to Garber's insightful suggestion, and specifically to metabolisation, later in 
the chapter. 
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encounter with his father's ghost when Hamlet appears in Ophelia's closet, looking `As if 
he had been loosed out of hell/To speak of horrors' (II. I. 83-4), and his peculiar statement 
to Horatio in the final act, `I am dead' (V. ii. 338). In order to address what would seem to 
be the Prince's inadvertent repetition of his (ghostly) father's appearance, Garber cites the 
following passage from Freud's `Remembering, Repeating and Working Through' (1914): 
We may say that the patient remembers nothing of what is forgotten and 
repressed, but that he expresses it in an action. He reproduces it not in his 
memory but in his behaviour; he repeats it, without of course knowing 
that he is repeating it. 
(Freud 1914; cited in Garber 1987 p. 159) 
Significantly, she goes on to cite in succession three moments from Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (1920) in which Freud describes the power of repetition as `daemonic', and states 
the following: `In terms of Hamlet, this "daemonic" force or power, if it is to be ascribed to 
or even personified by the Ghost, is the compulsion which repression substitutes for 
remembering' (Garber 1987 p. 162). In other words, confronted with the command 
`Remember me! ' `Hamlet remembers that he is commanded to remember, but displaces 
that which he is unable to remember into compulsive behaviour of a kind that translates him 
into a daemon, into a ghost' (p. 162). 
Garber's argument has thus undergone a shift of registers of which the Lacanian 
framework is intolerant. Originally the presence of the father's ghost (the Father-as-Ghost) 
signifies the failure of the paternal metaphor, its foreclosure: a process which Garber, 
following Lacan, dissociates from repression as one which refuses to permit unconscious 
thoughts per se. Yet Hamlet's failure to carry out the enjoined task, far from signalling the 
failed registration of the injunction, is ultimately shown to be an effect of its repression. If 
Garber's analysis is initially motivated by a familiar paradigm which co-ordinates the 
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modern hero with the absence of paternal sanction, nevertheless and in spite of itself, it 
progresses by insisting that Hamlet's tragic hesitancy is incited by the problematic content 
of the message which comes primarily from the other that is the father's ghost. His 
injunction, she claims, is `indigestible'; yet-and to remain within Garber's terms-how 
can Hamlet `spew' what he has never `swallowed'? More precisely, how can he forget, 
repress, or (therefore) repeat that which he has already foreclosed, since each of these 
procedures involves the principle of repression which the latter mechanism precludes? 
Excessive inscription 
In a brief but suggestive paper entitled `Implantation, Intromission' Laplanche 
offers a critique of, among others, the concept of Verwerfung that elucidates Garber's 
problematically sequential move from foreclosure to repression and opens up the possibility 
of a fundamentally different reading of the modern hero Hamlet. Foreclosure, he argues, 
participates in the idealist, ipsocentric tendency of psychoanalysis in which everything 
comes from the interior, `emerg[ing] like rabbits or doves from the magic box of tricks' 
(Laplanche 1999 [1992a] p. 133). To foreclose, Laplanche says in the same paper, shares 
with other verbs used by psychoanalytic theory to describe psychical processes (to project, 
to introject, to identify, to disavow... ) the feature of `having as subject the individual in 
question: I project, I disavow, I foreclose, etc. ' (p. 135). In other words, the concept of 
foreclosure, insofar as it is a process in which the individual takes an active part, 
presupposes, even as it scotomises, the prior constitution of the subject (the `I') who does 
the foreclosing. The absolute rejection or expulsion of paternal Law can thus only ever be 
secondary to the anterior moment of its provisional registration. Put simply, the subject 
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cannot project, hallucinate (Lacan) or spew (Garber) what has not already been somehow 
internalised. If Garber's analysis of Hamlet `the modern subject' moves towards a 
description of the internalisation (in the form of repression) of the ancestral ghost which she 
has described as having already been foreclosed, it is because although her text labours, 
along Lacanian lines, to dissociate the two, internalisation is as it were already and of 
necessity internal to the possibility of foreclosure. 18 
In the project to break from the illusionist's trap of ipsocentrism Laplanche, as we 
know, proposes the concept of implantation to describe the normal process of the originary 
intervention of the other (who will be the subject of the verb) that incites and allows for 
primary repression and translation. Alongside his critique of the mechanism of foreclosure, 
however, he also sets forth as a `violent variant' of implantation, the notion of 
intromission-the insertion by the other of a message whose traumatising content resists 
binding and blocks translation-repression. This intromission, this excess of message, is, as 
Laplanche conceives it, the centripetal movement to which the desperate expulsionary 
gesture of foreclosure can only be a defensive, secondary response. If the enigmatic 
signifier is enigmatic by virtue of its carrying a repressed content, the signifier of 
intromission is not repressed enough to facilitate active translation. The intromitted 
message emanating from the other is indeed, to appropriate Garber's term, indigestible by 
the subject in whom it must nevertheless primarily become lodged: 
While implantation allows the individual to take things up actively, at 
once translating and repressing [... intromission... ] short-circuits the 
differentiation of the agencies in the process of their formation, and puts 
into the interior an element resistant to all metabolisation. 
(Laplanche 1999A [1992a p. 136) 
18 The symptomatic tension of Garber's reading is most clearly legible in her mixed metaphor of digestion: 
the anorexic refuses food; it is the bulimic that spews, having first ingested. 
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Garber's text is unable, or unwilling, to sustain the conceptual distinctions between 
foreclosure, forgetting and repression. They figure as if they amount to the same thing: 
namely the absence from the (modern) subject of the (Name-of-the) father, while any such 
rejection in fact must presuppose the prior inscription of the Law, albeit in some 
provisional or perverse manner. The subject must know in advance just what it is he 
forgets, represses, or attempts to banish from his psychical life altogether. Whatever 
Hamlet will do with his ghostly father's singular injunction (and this will be our subject in 
what follows) will be secondary to its inscription, not just on the `external' tables at hand, 
but in the `book and volume of his brain' : 
Remember thee? 
Ay, thou poor ghost, whiles memory holds a seat 
In this distracted globe. Remember thee? 
Yea, from the table of my memory 
I'll wipe away all trivial fond records, 
All saw of books, all forms, all pressures past 
That youth and observation copied there, 
And thy commandment alone shall live 
Within the book and volume of my brain, 
Unmix'd with baser matter [ ... 
] 
My tables. Meet it is I set it down 
That one may smile, and smile, and be a villain- 
At least I am sure it may be so in Denmark. 
Writes 
So, uncle, there you are. Now to my word. 
It is `Adieu, adieu, remember me'. 
I have sworn't. 
(I. v. 95-112) 
The moment of inscription is carefully divided into an interiorised and an exteriorised act, 
figuratively yoked together by the notion of writing. Now what Hamlet physically `Writes' 
upon his tables, let us note, is in any case not the Ghost's commandment, but rather his own 
axiomatic surmise which his father's revelation about Claudius has authorised-that one 
may smile and smile and be a villain. An external act of writing, then, an aide de memoire: 
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the function of which is vilified elsewhere in Shakespeare. The speaker of Sonnet 122-a 
poem which elaborates as a conceit the figuration of memory and writing in the above 
passage-disposes of the `tables' the Lady has given him as a gift, since to write, to require 
a written aide, signifies a weakness of pure memory: To keep an adjunct to remember 
thee', he assures her in his final couplet, `Were to import forgetfulness in me' (Sonnet 122, 
13-4). In Hamlet the metaphorisation of the first, mnemonic, inscription (I. v. 95-104), the 
trope of `interior' writing which bears solely and explicitly on the father's injunction, rather 
than being a rhetorical device by which Hamlet distances, exempts himself from or 
bastardises the committal of the commandment to his memory-(the `imperative [is] so 
indigestible that it must [albeit metaphorically] be written down')-in fact fleetingly shows 
itself to be intolerant of any simple opposition between internal and external writing 
altogether, but ultimately will signify the excessive receptivity of the former. 19 Both at this 
moment in Hamlet and in Sonnet 122 Shakespeare's writing sets forth memory as (already) 
a tabular writing-surface; but not, we must add, in a deconstructive move designed to 
convey the primary supplementarity of the 'original'. For finally the interiorised trope of 
writing will recuperate and reinforce the privileged superiority of memory over its aid. In 
the Sonnet the speaker strategically tropes and interiorises the tabular image of the writing 
surfaces. Rather than keep the gift, he will, he says, `character' them in the `tables' of his 
own mind: 
This gift, thy tables, are within my brain 
Full charactered with lasting memory, 
Which shall above that idle rank remain 
Beyond all date, even to eternity; 
Or at the least so long as brain and heart 
Have faculty by nature to subsist, 
19 On the metaphysical opposition between the `self-presence' of memory and the supplement of graphic 
inscription see Derrida, (1966a). 
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Till each to razed oblivion yield his part 
Of thee, thy record never can be missed. 
That poor retention could not so much hold, 
Nor need I tallies thy dear love to score; 
Therefore to give them from me was I bold, 
To trust those tables that receive thee more. 
(1-12) 
The singularity of this Sonnet ought to be noted: elsewhere in the sequence Shakespeare 
will have more frequent recourse to the traditional Renaissance privilege of the posthumous 
permanence accorded to the poet's written word over human memory. 2° But here, as in 
Hamlet's pledge, the speaker describes two writing surfaces, the one exterior, the other 
interior; and if the separation between them is ostensibly submerged by the shared image of 
`tables' (lines 1 and 12), it is, after all, only the better to bastardise the latter as a poor 
retention. The poem discards writing and valorises memory even as the speaker has 
disposed of the written tables and committed their content to his brain. For memory, pure 
memory, implies the absence of the memorised thing itself. Thus while it seems as if the 
opposition between memory and writing is momentarily collapsed (in a recognition that 
memory is only a writing) the poem in fact stages what might be described as a scene of 
tropic usurpation. The place and function of exterior writing is at once appropriated 
metaphorically to the processes of memory {just as the written content of the tables is 
mnemonically interiorised) and/in order that it can (like the tables themselves) be purged 
away. What is significant for us is that in this contextually singular poem the connection 
established between writing and memory is a strategic manoeuvre by which the speaker, at 
least, will insist on the superior capacity of his mind to `receive' the other. Far from 
reducing memory to the mere and ephemeral secondarity of its `supplement', it underwrites 
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a reception of the other that is initially signalled as excess (an imprint that will last `Beyond 
all date' until `eternity') which the speaker finds himself having to master and rationalise 
('Or at the least so long as brain and heart/Have faculty [... ] to subsist'). So too in Hamlet's 
speech, where the son analogously qualifies his urgent promise to 'Remember': `whiles 
memory holds a seat/In this distracted globe'. What Hamlet commits to the poor retention 
of his tables, or notebook, are his own words; and this action occurs after and in opposition 
to the act of purely mnemonic inscription to which it is indeed tropically linked. As in the 
Sonnet the exteriorised written tables exist for the sake of their own bastardisation; memory 
and writing are metaphorically yoked the better to affirm their differential receptiveness. 
For Hamlet has just promised to erase and keep out of his memory `all trivial fond records', 
therefore he writes his own thoughts down on the next best thing. 21 If it is `meet' Hamlet 
`set down' that one can smile and smile and be a villain, this is because he has promised to 
preserve the memory of the Ghost 'unmix'd' with `baser matter'. The presence of the 
writing tables during Hamlet's pledge-the metaphorical presence of writing per se- 
hardly signals an unwillingness or inability to receive (i. e. a foreclosure of) the father's 
word. On the contrary, it enforces Hamlet's oath to allow the commandment to live alone in 
the privileged volume of his mind. 
Let us say, then, that the possibility of Hamlet's existence as a figure of modern 
subjectivity on the grounds of his being one who rejects or expels the ancestral call can 
only be secondary. Fundamental to the scene of Hamlet's oath-taking is a strategic 
20 See Sonnets 16-19,54,55,60,63,65,81,100,101,107. This, more usual, privilege is ultimately grounded 
in the same metaphysical opposition, since it assumes the necessary possibility of repetition and citation (i. e. 
therefore permanence in the absence of an animating intention) to pertain only to exteriorised writing. 
-1 It should be remarked that the privilege accorded here to human memory as against the written supplement 
breaks down even as it is affirmed, since Hamlet's promise to expunge all else to make space for his father's 
command means that the new inscription of the latter must equally contain the necessary possibility of erasure 
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metaphorisation of memory which not only insists upon the primary inscription of the 
father's message but attempts to restrict that `writing' to a valorised mnemonic domain. In 
addressing the radical question of the primary inscription of the paternal injunction might 
we not posit that what is at stake is, in fact, not too little but too much? Does not Hamlet's 
response to the Ghost's command, the promise to erase all else from the book and volume 
of his brain but the command so that it may live alone and unmixed, sound closer to the 
intromission of an excess of message rather than its supposed foreclosure? This will be the 
subject of the following section. 
Repetition/transmission: the poisonous message 
Hearing, when it occurs, breaks the continuity of an undifferentiated 
perceptual field and at the same time is a sign (the noise waited for and 
heard in the night) which puts the subject in the position of having to 
answer to something. 
Laplanche and Pontalis, `Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality' 
We noted above that it is when Garber attempts to account for what she calls 
Hamlet's `daemonic' repetitions of the Ghost (repetitions which, she concedes, require 
some form of unconscious inscription) that the initial encounter between son and father 
necessarily shows itself intolerant of the Lacanian paradigm of foreclosure. Over the next 
few pages I want to take up and elaborate the notion that the Ghost's message to Hamlet 
already constitutes a repetition, and what is more, a performative repetition of the very 
scene of murder which it describes. Neither the first nor the only repetition but the decisive 
one in a dominant network throughout Hamlet which will depend upon the same imagistic 
centres of gravity, the introduction of poison through the ear-which is central to the 
or being forgotten. None of which alters our fundamental point about the significance of this speech: that any 
erasure or forgetting of the father must of necessity presuppose its prior or provisional inscription. 
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content of the spectral injunction to revenge-becomes, I will suggest, a figure for the 
traumatising and paralysing introduction (intromission) of the other's message (as message) 
into the ear of the addressee. 
Now the opening of the first Act hardly constitutes a `beginning' at all. The Ghost's 
dreaded appearance will already be a return ('What, has this thing appear'd again tonight? ' 
(I. i. 24 emphasis added)) but, moreover, one whose motive will continue to be withheld 
until the final Scene. The exchanges among the Soldiers, and subsequently between them 
and Horatio, thus become situated both in an inadvertent relation of apres coup to the 
murder of the old King and in anticipation of the spectral revelation of its details whose 
character already marks the protagonists' discourse: 
Barnardo: Who's there? 
Francisco: Nay, answer me. Stand and unfold yourself 
Barnardo: Long live the King! 
Francisco: Barnardo? 
Barnardo: He. 
Francisco: You come most carefully upon your hour. 
Barnardo: 'Tis now struck twelve. Get thee to bed, Francisco. 
Francisco: For this relief much thanks. 'Tis bitter cold, 
And I am sick at heart. 
(I. i. 1-7) 
We will never receive a definitive diagnosis of Francisco's sickness of heart beyond its 
synecdochic connection with the general rottenness at the core of the state which Marcellus 
will identify the following night (I. v. 90). His cryptic malady thus serves to locate the 
present moment in which he speaks as the aftermath of an event whose happening is not yet 
recognised but whose symptoms have already taken hold. Furthermore, the words of the 
two men on the guard platform are haunted by the auricular character of the still-occluded 
murder. Consumed as they are by darkness it is the ears of the two men that are poised to 
sense any local disturbance in an otherwise bafflingly undifferentiated perceptual field. 
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Self-identification is registered in an auditory fashion. Barnardo must 'unfold' himself with 
a perfunctory (and ironic) declamation (`Long live the King! ') that formally affirms his co- 
allegiance with Francisco and facilitates the latter's recognition of the signature of his voice 
(`Barnardo? '). 
To be sure, to those on stage the Ghost will be the only definitively visible figure- 
both recognisably `like the King that's dead' (I. i. 44) and furnishing the scholar Horatio 
with the necessary `sensible and true avouch/Of [his] own eyes' (60-1). More striking, 
though, is how the Soldiers identify Horatio's prior scepticism as an auditory resistance: 
Marcellus: Horatio says 'tis but our fantasy, 
And will not let belief take hold of him, 
Touching this dreaded sight twice seen of us. 
Therefore I have entreated him along 
With us to watch the minutes of the night, 
That if again this apparition come, 
He may approve our eyes and speak to it. 
Horatio: Tush, tush, `twill not appear. 
Barnardo: Sit down awhile, 
And let us once again assail your ears, 
That are so fortified against our story, 
What we have two nights seen. 
Horatio: Well, sit we down 
And let us hear Barnardo speak of this. 
Barnardo: Last night of all, 
When yond same star that's westward from the pole, 
Had made his course t'illume that part of heaven 
Where now it burns, Marcellus and myself, 
The bell then beating one- 
Enter GHOST. 
Marcellus: Peace, break thee off. Look where it come again. 
(I. i. 26-43, emphasis added) 
In spite and because of the ocular proof of itself that the Ghost gives to Horatio and the rest, 
its (re)appearance consolidates a vertiginous series of repetitions anchored to the auricular 
crime committed before the opening of the play. What is significant in the exchanges 
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before the arrival of the spectre is not so much the fact of the Ghost's appearance to its first 
witnesses as the figurative transmission of a specific violence which it generates between 
the witnesses and Horatio. Absent from the earlier encounters, Horatio has only heard their 
stories; yet Barnardo describes them as nothing less than acts of auricular violence, 
repeated `assailments' of Horatio's ear. The present assault, however, must be broken off. 
For, uncannily like Barnardo at midnight, the Ghost whose second appearance he now 
relates `once again', comes, for the third time, most carefully upon its hour. At the moment 
the Ghost should enter Barnardo's story of the previous night (already a repetition of the 
night before), his story is interrupted, precisely by the entrance of the Ghost. With the same 
star burning `now' in the same part of heaven and the same bell beating, the Soldier's 
retrospective narrative thus merges into its own re-enactment. To the dismay of his 
comrades, for a moment the startled Horatio, who has in part been invited along in order to 
get the thing to `unfold' itself in speech, does nothing: 
Horatio: [... ] It harrows me with fear and wonder. 
Barnardo: It would be spoke to. 
Marcellus: Question it, Horatio. 
(I. i. 48)22 
Amidst the Ghost's enigmatic silence, the synchronicity which is established between the 
narration of the previous nights' phenomenon and its re-enactment before the scholar 
signals a displacement even as it signals a repetition. The moment Horatio ceases to be 
purely an auditor and becomes thus newly situated as another witness upon whom 
`sensible' belief has at last taken hold, the position which he has vacated is taken by 
another: 
222 Note that Horatio's hesitation echoes that of the soldiers on the previous nights, who (I. ii. 204-6) 
distill'd 
Almost to jelly with the act of fear, 
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Horatio: Break we our watch up, and by my advice 
Let us impart what we have seen tonight 
Unto young Hamlet; for upon my life 
This spirit, dumb to us, will speak to him. 
Do you consent we shall acquaint him with it 
As needful in our loves, fitting our duty? 
(I. i. 173-6) 
Not only is it that the `need' and `duty' of imparting the Ghost's presence slips along the 
chain to the erstwhile auditor; as Horatio makes clear in the following Scene, it is again an 
auricular organ, this time young Hamlet's, that must receive the message: 
Horatio: Season your admiration for a while 
With an attent ear till I may deliver 
Upon the witness of these gentlemen 
This marvel to you. 
Hamlet: For God's love let me hear! 
Q. ii. 192-195)23 
The oral dissemination and aural reception of the phenomenon of the Ghost thus 
entail a figurative and displaced repetition of the crime for whose expiation we have yet to 
learn it walks the night. Hamlet will attempt to block or `cut off the ostensible cycle of 
which he has inevitably become a part, immediately urging his informants that they `Let it 
be tenable in [their] silence still' (248). Yet, as we will see, the audience which Hamlet 
eventually gives his ghostly father in Scene V, and the latter's insistence that all the 
witnesses `Swear' themselves to silence (I. v. 149-89), recast this initial imperative to 
secrecy as already being the effect of a paradox; for the chain of repetitions which is 
inaugurated by the coming of the Ghost is itself, I want to suggest, precisely a cycle of 
blockage, of cutting off 
Stand dumb and speak not to him. 
23 It should be remarked that twenty lines earlier, and in response to his friend's self-accusation of truancy, 
Hamlet has already identified his own ear as a locus of verbal assault (I. ü. 170-3): 
I would not hear your enemy say so, 
Nor shall you do my ear that violence 
To make it truster of your own report 
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It would not be unreasonable to liken what we have suggested so far concerning the 
permeation of certain moments of the first Act by the details of the crime whose exposition 
remains deferred until Scene v, to the suspenseful progress of Oedipus Tyrannus. As we 
saw in chapter one, the discourse of Sophocles' protagonist is saturated by images of 
parrincest and paternal violence (the binding of the son's feet), the traumatic significance of 
which is only made legible to Oedipus retroactively in the belated moment of anagorisis. In 
Hamlet, similarly, it is what Freud describes as the ability to `understand and react [... ] in 
retrospect [nachträglich]' (Freud 1916-7 [1915-7], pp. 416-7) which is conferred by the 
Ghost's revelations in Scene v upon Hamlet and the play's audience with regard to the 
strangely auricular detail that is threaded into the protagonists' verbal exchanges about the 
spectre. The Ghost's belated revelation of the crime thus functions aetiologically, 
disclosing as it were the text's prötarchos ate, its `primal crime724 in which seems to be 
inaugurated the entire concatenation of verbal and literal poisonings that constitute the 
motivation and fabric of the revenge story. 
Before discussing the Ghost's disclosure in detail, let us make a few provisional 
remarks concerning the singular character of the murder in the overall scheme of Hamlet as 
a revenge tragedy. The prötarchos ate remains `absent' from Hamlet. It is never witnessed 
as such within the limits of the tragedy itself; it is only ever reconstructed in an 
overdetermined way by the posthumous recollection of one of its protagonists. Yet this 
traumatic core remains radically uncontained by Shakespeare's text. As Claudius reminds 
us, contending with his conscience, the murder of his brother `bath the primal eldest curse 
upon't' (III. iii. 37). What lends his crime its horror, its very need for vengeance, is its 
Against yourself. 
Cf. Miola (1992) pp. 33ff. 
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Biblical precedent, its position in relation to an anterior legacy of guilt. 
25 The act of 
fratricide is at once primal and always already secondary, a repetition of `the first murder' 
While this may sound familiar from the anterior legacies of violence and revenge which 
generically haunt revenge plots, it is in fact crucially different. Numerous studies have 
attempted to root the genealogy of the Hamlet story to the Oresteian cycle in which the 
bereft son is required to murder his `incestuous' uncle in recompense for his father's 
death. 26 Yet the transgression of Hamlet's uncle marks a singular departure from the 
classical paradigm. Guy Rosolato (1969) presents that paradigm as a series of fatal but 
`symmetrical' responses, a progressive `genealogy' of murders, each a repayment for the 
one which precedes it (pp. 186-7). Thus the murder of Agamemnon which it befalls Orestes 
to avenge is an act of vengeance in itself, the exaction of a payment for a prior crime- 
namely, the Thyestean banquet. The latter, in its turn, is an act of vengeance spurred by 
Pelops' fury towards his homophagic father Tantalus... This anterior history of cyclical 
debt and repayment is, however, precisely what is absent from the `primal' crime of 
Shakespeare's text. We will not say that the fratricide constitutes a pure repetition of the 
Biblical murder, a repetition `without difference'. But it is figured as a repetition, 
nevertheless, in such a way as to obviate the progressive or `tit for tat' development 
between crime and crime which characterises the classic revenge model. Claudius's crime 
resolutely does not operate in any reciprocal relation to the distant act of Biblical violence 
by which it is defined. 27 Claudius does not repay the earlier murder of one brother by the 
murder of another (avenging Abel on Cain): he replays it. The inaugural transgression at 
2' Cf. I. ii. 105; V. i. 75-6. 
,b See esp. Kott (1974) pp. 240-67, and Kerrigan (1981) and (1996) chapter seven. 
27 Indeed, the killing of Abel which it repeats, in itself repays nothing: it is the `first' homicide, the originary 
creation of murderous debt. 
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the core of the revenge action in Hamlet does not amount to the incurring of a debt in the 
process of repaying an ancestral wrong, as does that of, say, Aeschylus' Aegisthus. It is 
simply a renewal of the ancestral debt, a static and unmodified repetition of the primary 
(Biblical) aggressor's violence. 
Thus the `daemonically' repetitious pattern which Garber identifies in Hamlet's 
relation to the Ghost-a pattern of acting out rather than acting on-is already legible in the 
very secondarity of the text's `primal' scene. The Ghost, the revenant, which comes again 
and again most carefully upon its hour, and about which there is no doubt that it will come 
again (I. iii. 243), is itself the effect of a repetition. If in her bedchamber Hamlet 
reconstructs before Ophelia the appearance of his ghostly father, the scene which the Ghost 
has just reconstructed for him is, after all, nothing more than a reconstruction itself. 
We might say the notion of a `static' compulsion to repeat does not, then, pertain 
solely to Hamlet, or at least it does not pertain to Hamlet as the consequence of a refusal of 
his father's command. Repetition is something that marks and is marked by a passing on, 
an inheritance. From Claudius to the Ghost to Hamlet repetition is transmitted; but, what is 
more, in such a way as to compel its recipient to repeat the very scene of transmission in 
which he has been caught. Here is the Ghost's description to Hamlet of the `primal' murder 
for whose expiation he walks the night: 
But soft, methinks I scent the morning air 
Brief let me be. Sleeping within my orchard, 
My custom always of the afternoon, 
Upon my secure hour thy uncle stole 
With juice of cursed hebenon in a vial, 
And in the porches of mine ear did pour 
The leprous distilment, whose effect 
Holds such an enmity with blood of man 
That swift as quicksilver it courses through 
The natural gates and alleys of the body, 
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And with a sudden vigour it doth posset 
And curd, like eager droppings into milk, 
The thin and wholesome blood. So did it mine, 
And a most instant. tetter bark' d about, 
Most lazar-like, with vile and loathsome crust 
All my smooth body. 
Thus was I, sleeping, by a brother's hand 
Of life, Of crown, of queen at once dispatched, 
Cut off even in the blossoms of my sin, 
Unhousel' d, disappointed, unanel' d, 
No reck'ning made, but sent to my account 
With all my imperfections on my head. 
0 horrible! 0 horrible! Most horrible! 
(I. v. 58-80) 
The most significant characteristic of the Ghost's lengthy speech-not only here but, as we 
will see, throughout-is the performative relation in which it stands to the crime that it is 
intended to disclose. Old Hamlet, his ghost tells us, was killed in the act of repeating 
himself: sleeping in the orchard as was his `custom always'. His `secure hour' has since 
become that signalled by the beating of the bell at night. The Ghost is no simple revenant 
which returns again and again. It walks, repetitiously, in order to tell of having being cut off 
even in the midst of its repetitions. Moreover, the disclosure is itself framed 
circumstantially by a cutting off The Ghost prefaces his account with a warning of the 
threatening approach of morning (58-9), and his speech will indeed be truncated by the 
dawn: 
Fare thee well at once: 
The glow-worm shows the matin to be near 
And gins to pale his uneffectual fire. 
Adieu, adieu, adieu. Remember me. 
(I. v. 88-90) 
While appearing to act upon the wrong done him by Claudius, Old Hamlet in fact acts it 
out. Cut off in his description of being `cut off, his is not a constative account but a 
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performative repetition of his own death. 28 Like the crime that made a ghost of him, his 
speech is a replay, a static repetition of the static repetition that killed him. Shakespeare's 
Ghost is thus not simply suspended repetitiously, as ghosts generally are, in the moment of 
its passing; for that suspension, that ghostly repetition without movement or reshaping, is 
internal to the very wrong for whose expiation the Ghost is doom' d to return. 
Thus compelled to re-enact the re-enactment that is its death, however, it functions 
in excess of its role as revenge ghost. It is no coincidence that Horatio describes the 
spectre's rapid departure at the crowing of the cock as the departure of `a guilty thing' (I. i. 
153). For, as we have suggested, the coming of the Ghost inaugurates a repetitive 
concatenation of auricular violence, perpetuating at the level of the soldiers' discourse the 
infraction it has suffered. The singular effect of Shakespeare's more-than-generic Ghost is 
most clearly glimpsed in the blazon of the afterlife which it both does and does not `unfold' 
to Hamlet: 
Pity me not, but lend thy serious hearing 
To what I shall unfold [... ] 
I am thy father's spirit, 
Doom' d for a certain time to walk the night, 
And for the day confin'd to fast in fires, 
Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature 
Are burn't and purged away. But that I am forbid 
To tell the secrets of my prison-house, 
I could a tale unfold whose lightest word 
Would harrow up thy soul, freeze thy young blood, 
Make thy two eyes like stars start form their spheres, 
Thy knotted and combined locks to part, 
And each particular hair to stand on end 
Like quills upon the fretful porpentine. 
But this eternal blazon must not be 
To ears of flesh and blood. List, list 0 list! 
Cf. Neill's (1997) analysis of `narrative abruption' with regard to the Ghost's speech and the play's broader 
frame of anxieties of 'telling': pp. 216-242. 
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If thou didst ever thy dear father love [... ] 
Revenge his foul and most unnatural murder. 
(I. v. 5-25) 
It is not difficult to recognise here both Shakespeare's invocation of and his departure from 
the Senecan model of the self-presentation of the revenge ghost. 29 But let us restrict our 
attention to what is ostensibly `cut off in the Ghost's speech from the topology of hell that 
is traditional to the genre from which it emerges. While the revenge ghost has its roots in 
Greek drama, it is in Seneca's Agamemnon that we find the template after which the 
Renaissance spectre was principally designed. 30 There, the Ghost of Thyestes, prefacing his 
call for blood with an inventory of the torments of Hades-alluding to Ixion, Sisyphus, 
Tityus, and Tantalus-31 set the standard for the patterning of ghostly prologues and 
speeches on the English stage. 32 Yet it is exactly this commonplace inventory of his prison- 
house that, commentators habitually point out, the Ghost claims to be forbidden to 
elaborate. 33 In his note to what the Ghost goes on to say, Harold Jenkins exclaims in his 
Arden edition of Hamlet, `How much more effective than the explicit narrative of the Ghost 
of Andrea [... ] !' (I. v. l 5n. ). Implicit in Jenkins' rapture is an important recognition that 
what Shakespeare's Ghost is prohibited from conveying is no more significant than the 
dimension which is added to it by that very blockage. It causes a kind of `effect defective', 
as Polonius would say (II. ii. 103). The inventory of hell is not, after all, just expunged. 
Rather, the Ghost focuses on Hamlet as the recipient of a message, and replaces the generic 
-9 The model was to some extent already a cliche by the time of the writing of Hamlet. A discussion, of 
considerable breadth, both of the model and of its resumption by Renaissance tragedians can be found in 
Boyle (1997) pp. 153ff. 
3° And, to a lesser extent, the Thyestes. See Miola (1992) p. 34. 
31 Seneca's. -lgamemnon 11-28. 
32 Cf in particular the Prologue given by the Ghost of Andrea in Kyd's own supposed reworking of the Ur- 
Hamlet, The Spanish Tragedy. 
33 Miola (1992) p. 34; and Neill (1997) p. 224. 
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catalogue with a conditional description of its effects upon his auditor. Cut off as he is from 
detailing hell's torment, the Ghost articulates five precise descriptive lines of what it 
`would' do to Hamlet were he to hear it (16-20). It is thus in foregrounding the effect of 
what it thereby claims to keep secret that the Ghost's speech manages to achieve its greater 
effect. In those generically `defective' lines with which the spectre replaces the content it is 
forbidden to disclose, it unfolds the terrors of the afterlife all the better in and by its act of 
failing to unfold them. 34 
Now we have so far suggested that the Ghost's narrative not only reconstructs but, 
in reconstructing, replays the moment of poisonous infraction which cut off Old Hamlet's 
life. But this cutting off of his narrative which at once makes it defective (as a generic call 
for revenge) and yet more effective therefore, does not simply repeat but carries over the 
singular character of the crime (the `primal' repetition) for which it is supposed to be 
seeking vengeance. In being condemned to give less information than the normal generic 
speech of the revenge ghost, Shakespeare's spectre gives more performatively. That with 
which it replaces the generic itinerary lends a descriptive symmetry to the two main 
portions of its message, one which establishes an equivalence between the effects of 
Claudius's poison on Old Hamlet's blood, and the effects which the Ghost's discourse will 
have on Hamlet's. What must not be to ears of flesh and blood precisely and nevertheless 
serves to identify Hamlet's ears as a locus of penetration ('List, list, 0 list'). This 
performative equivalence is described succinctly by Michael Neill: `[the Ghost's] narrative 
[... ] begins to act with something of the efficacy of Claudius' poison, the "leprous 
distillment" poured "in the porches of [the] ears" which transforms its victims with "a most 
34 On the Ghost's 'saying without saying', his `folding-unfolding' cf. Rovle (1995) p. 98. 
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instant tetter"' (Neill 1997 pp. 221-2). 35 It is crucial to recognise the significance of Neill's 
point. What is at stake in the Ghost's symptomatically cut off tale of being cut off is not a 
simple conveyance of information and a call for a reciprocal act of vengeance which we 
will witness Hamlet spending the best part of four Acts refusing or failing to undertake. It is 
rather the transmission and (auricular) reception of a message whose internal paradox is 
what makes Hamlet's prospective task so problematic. The Ghost is not just suspended 
repetitiously at the moment of its own death, speaking of being cut off (literally) under the 
pressure of being cut off (through prohibitions and the threat of the dawn). If the Ghost's 
speech is marked by a performative relation to the scene which it describes-a scene in 
which Old Hamlet is the victim of Claudius's primal repetition-it nevertheless repeats, in 
the act of describing it, the very gesture of Old Hamlet's own aggressor. Not only 
figuratively, that is, because it introduces its overdetermined message through Hamlet's ear 
just as Claudius had introduced the leprous distilment into his victim's; but also 
structurally, because, as the victim of the re-enacted murder, Old Hamlet-in re-enacting 
it-becomes the bearer and the legator of repetition, himself re-enacting, as Claudius had 
done, a preceding act of violence. As. Claudius repeats Cain, so the Ghost repeats Claudius 
repeating him. 
If we are attentive to the performative dimension of this encounter, it would appear 
that repetition, far from being a symptom of Hamlet's failure to carry out the command of 
his dead father, might rather manifest exactly what is passed on-transmitted auricularly- 
35 Note too that the 'harrowing' effects which the Ghost's proleptic disclaimer gestures to avoid, have already 
been shown to have taken hold in the responses of those he has earlier interpellated who are `distill 'd/Almost 
to a jelly' and 'harrow[ed] with fear' even before he announces his purpose. Cf. also Gertrude's description of 
the effects on Hamlet at the Ghost's second appearance to him (III. iv. 119-22): 
Forth at your eyes your spirits wildly peep, 
And, as the sleeping soldiers in th'alarm, 
Your bedded hair, like life in excrements 
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from Hamlet pere to his son; that just as the father is made a ghost of by his brother's 
poison, so is Hamlet made a ghost of by his father's. We will return to the peculiar scene of 
repetition in Ophelia's bedchamber in a moment. Let us first try to tease out more precisely 
the relationship of the literal to the verbal poisoning, and indeed the significance of the 
particular orifice which is singled out in both the prötarchos ate and its re-enactment as the 
locus of the aggressors' violence. 
In the paper from which the epigram for this section is taken-`Fantasy and the 
Origins of Sexuality' (1964)-Laplanche and Pontalis stress that in Freud a `privileged 
position [is] accorded to hearing' as a sensory locus of external stimulation in the 
production of the primal fantasies (p. 18). They offer two explanatory suggestions. The 
first, which directly concerns the sensorium in question (at least in opposition to vision), is 
that the ear is always open-even in sleep. If the phenomenon recurs in Freud's texts of a 
child awakened, and traumatised, by the noises of its parents, it is because the ears remain 
sensitive to any break in the continuity of an undifferentiated perceptual field-for 
instance, the silence of the night. 36 Their second suggestion is that hearing is also the sense 
which receives `family sounds or sayings [... ] going on prior to the subject's arrival, [and] 
within which he must find his way' (p. 19). It is in the realm of hearing that the history and 
legends of parents, grandparents and ancestors, are introduced to the subject. What unites 
these two suggestions-the one synchronic, the other diachronic-is that the ear in general 
remains the site par excellence of the subject's interpellation by the other. It is, as Jacques 
Derrida urges, also thinking of Freud, `the most tendered, the most open organ', the one 
Start up and stand on end. 
36 Note that Laplanche and Pontalis, still with a certain Lacanian bias, thus claim that `the prototype of the 
signifier lies in the aural sphere' (Laplanche and Pontalis 1964 p. 18). It will of course be Laplanche's later 
charge that any stimulus incited by the other, in whatever form and to whichever sensorium it relates, cannot 
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which may be `lent' or `offered' to the other, and never anything but open to his message 
(Derrida 198 5 p. 33). 37 
Yet the very openness of this liminal sensory organ, to whose effects Freud's texts 
are so sensitive, is necessarily compromised. In a dense and provocative paper entitled 
`Shakespeare's Ear' Joel Fineman (1991) proposes a deconstructive reading of the auricular 
organ as the privileged motif of a certain `Renaissance textuality' (p. 229). 1 do not wish to 
engage with the full complexities of Fineman's argument here; but it is necessary to 
reproduce his invocation of a portion of the Renaissance poet John Davies' work Nosce 
Teipsum ('Know Thyself) (1599), in which Davies describes the process of 'Hearing'. It 
follows and deliberately contrasts with a poem on the `immediacy of vision', identifying 
the ear both as the conduit of the other's voice and as the organ of delay: 
These wickets of the Soule are plac'd on hie, 
Because all sounds do lightly mount aloft; 
And that they may not pierce too violently, 
They are delayed with turnes and windings oft. 
For should the voice directly strike the braine, 
It would astonish, and confuse it much; 
Therefore these plaits and folds the sound restriane, 
That it the Organ may more gently touch. 
As Streames, which with their winding banks do play, 
Stopt by their creeks, run softly through the plaine, 
So in the Eares labyrinth the voyce doth stray, 
And doth with easie motion touch the braine. 
It is the slowest yet the daintiest Sense. 
(1005-1017; cited in Fineman 1991 p. 230) 
be differentiated from a `Symbolic' realm of signification, but must rather be relocated with the latter into the 
broader category of the message. 
37 This inevitably includes the subject's own address to himself. The question of signature and 
countersignature by which Derrida (1985) interrogates Nietzsche is taken up in relation to `Shakespeare's' 
Hamlet by Lukacher (1994) pp. 126-141. 
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What is crucial about this poem is that the ear is figured as the most receptively sensitive 
organ ('the daintiest') and that the very structure of its receptive apparatus is therefore `the 
slowest'. It is designed to receive the other and to protect against his `too violent' 
penetration, which would paralyse the auditor altogether. For Fineman the ear is thus to be 
perceived as the locus and motif of, dilation, deferral, spacing: `that which slows the logos, 
leading it astray within [its] labyrinthine folds and plaits [... ] saving the brain from a too 
quick arrival of the sense or voicing of speech' (p. 230). Thus, he argues, `we can 
understand the ear, a specifically Renaissance ear, as instrument of delay and deferral- 
what Derrida calls the differance, both spatial and temporal, that is prior to any difference 
whatsoever' (p. 230). 38 This, he suggests, helps to explain `why for Shakespeare the ear is 
so often a figure of momentous suspense, as in Hamlet when the fall of Ilium "takes 
prisoner Pyrrhus' ear"' (p. 230). 39 
What we have so far said concerning Claudius's poison and the Ghost's repetitious 
message makes inadequate, though not irrelevant, any simple claim that Hamlet delays 
because the exhortation to revenge/remember specifically arrives through the organ of 
delay itself Fineman's text is significant because it identifies a standard or normative 
Renaissance function of the auricular organ: one which Shakespeare's tragedy affirms itself 
in breaching. For Davies, the `porches' of the ear (as Shakespeare's Ghost calls them), the 
labyrinthine folds which manifest it externally, and into which the other's voice speaks, 
equally mediate that voice and sustain the other as different, as other. Without being 
interrupted and delayed the other's message would, says Davies, `too violently pierce' the 
38 The Renaissance ear, according to Fineman, is what `determines Derrida's [1985] account of the reader's, 
any reader's, relation to a text, any text': Fineman (1991) p. 230. 
39 The suggestion remains undeveloped in Fineman's text. We shall return to the significance of this 
momentary paralysis in the following section. 
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auditor's brain. The ear's labyrinth maintains the other at arm's length. The other's 
difference, the mediation of his message by the folded maze of the ear, its delay and 
deferral, is not an aberrant communicative eventuality, but the condition of possibility for 
the `proper' reception of his message. 
In Hamlet everything which we have suggested about `unfolding' concerns not just 
the verbal unfolding of the addressor's message to his addressee but also the effective 
unfolding of the `folds' of the latter's ear, a direct bypassing of them and a too violent 
penetration of, or intromission into, the book and volume of the auditor's brain. During 
what the Ghost unfolds and `fails' to unfold to Hamlet's `serious hearing' he describes even 
as he re-enacts upon his auditor the violent introduction of something into the porches of 
his ear. In the symmetrical descriptions which the Ghost gives of the effects of his own 
words (I. v. 15-20) and the effects of Claudius's poison (I. v. 64-73) it is precisely the ear's 
winding defence against a paralysing exogenous penetration, which Davies valorises, that is 
rendered redundant. In the 'effective' description with which the Ghost proleptically 
replaces the blazon of the afterlife, his ostensibly hypothetical auditor is figured as one 
unequipped to process even the lightest word of his tale. The latter is literally petrifying, 
'freez[ing]' its potential hearer and rendering him inert. In other words, the ear into which 
the Ghost `would' speak is envisioned as incapable of mediating or, in Davies' term, 
'Stop[ping]' the violence of the message. It cannot halt or dilate it: the auditor is halted and 
petrified-`Stopt'-by `something too much' in the message itself. As we have noted, the 
Ghost claims to spare his son such trauma, and instead only to relate the trauma of his own 
death. Yet the description of Old Hamlet's bodily response is analogous to the hypothetical 
one he has just recounted. The porches of his ear offer no protection against the distilment 
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that is introduced into them; the poison rather `courses through/The natural gates and alleys 
of the body', rapidly stopping his blood (I. v. 66-7). With a `sudden vigour' it possets and 
curds, blocking his circulation altogether (I. v. 68-9). It is not without significance that the 
detail of the effects of Claudius's distilment is preceded by that of the effects of speech. For 
the Ghost's description of the violence done against himself thus becomes inseparable from 
the violence with which that description introduces into Hamlet's ear the demand for 
vengeance-such that Hamlet will need to `wipe away all trivial fond records', that it might 
`live alone' in his mind (I. v. 99-103). The poison administered by Claudius and the 
message carried and conveyed by the Ghost thus stand in a mutual metaphorical 
relationship to one another, the literal `leperous distilment' coursing violently through Old 
Hamlet's undefended body, just as the narrative distilment of that event seizes and 
consumes Hamlet's brain. 
Now from the moment Hamlet's comrades appear on the scene, immediately after 
Hamlet has sworn to act upon his father's word (I. v. 113), he is already acting his father 
out. As they approach, they, as had Hamlet, impatiently call to hear the Ghost's news: 
Marcellus: How is't, my noble lord? 
Horatio: What news, my lord? 
Hamlet: 0, wonderful! 
(I. v. 119-21) 
If Hamlet admits that there is news, nevertheless and just like his father's Ghost, he at once 
cuts them off from hearing its full content and thus also, like Hamlet himself, from relaying 
lt: 
Horatio: Good, my lord, tell it. 
Hamlet: No, you will reveal it. 
(I. v. 122-3) 
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In keeping secret the message of his dead father-in cutting it off-Hamlet does what is 
desired by the Ghost (who will demand that the others `Swear' themselves to silence), but 
at the same time does nothing but capitulate to, which is to say repeat (in its peculiarity), 
the gesture to which we have suggested his dead father has been condemned by the manner 
of his death: namely to perpetuate the abruptive effects of Claudius's poison. 40 Like his 
father he is paralysed into repetition. As the Ghost in reiterating itself as passive victim 
replicates before its auditor the active gesture of aggression which killed Old Hamlet, it is 
that bi-valence of active-passive by which his auditor thus becomes poisoned, or 
contaminated. The performative character of the Ghost's speech places its auditor-the one 
to whom it makes its call for revenge-in the paradoxical situation, whereby fulfilling the 
Ghost's wish for the news not to be unfolded repositions Hamletfils as the one who cuts 
even as he is cut of 41 
Repetition, paralysis, blockage are those things which in Hamlet mark not the 
failure of a subject's inscription by an other, but the very transmission of something from 
one subject to another in its most traumatic form. It is precisely in the subsequent paralysis 
of the one who is interpellated that one can identify transmission as such. 
Yet if the play establishes as the privileged trope of this transmission, or traumatic 
intromission, the image of auricular violence, the breaching of the function of what 
Fineman calls a `specifically Renaissance ear', and even if, as we will suggest, it continues 
to affirm this trope until the last, it remains no more than a trope. So much should already 
be clear from our suggestion that the poisoning of Old Hamlet is just as much a metaphor 
40 Cf. Royle (1995) p. 99: `[... ] in the Ghost's speeches, one could trace all the sounds of "e(a)r(e)"-right 
through to the critical injunction to remember and to the final repetitions of "Swear"'. 
`" Note that although Hamlet has earlier urged his comrades to `give [ ... ] an understanding 
but no tongue' to 
the phenomenon of the apparition (I. ii. 250), he assures himself in his second soliloquy that the truth will out 
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for the violence Old Hamlet commits `verbally' on his son's ear, as vice versa. But it is 
important to stress further that the traumatic communication of a message in Shakespeare's 
text is not reducible to a merely verbal exchange. Poisoning in the aural sphere-literal or 
verbal-does not mark the limit of traumatic interpersonal exchange, but rather functions in 
Shakespeare's text as the privileged emblem for (or `prototype' of, to invoke Laplanche and 
Pontalis's term) the traumatic reception of the other's message as such, verbal or otherwise. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the uncanny encounter between Hamlet and Ophelia. Just. 
like the `original' poisoning of the King, this scene is a reconstruction. 42 It is articulated, 
and more than articulated, by a traumatised Ophelia to her father: 
Ophelia: My lord, as I was sewing in my closet, 
Lord Hamlet [... ] 
As if he had been loosed out of hell 
To speak of horrors, he comes before me [... ] 
Polonius: What said he? 
Ophelia: He took me by the wrist and held me hard. 
Then goes he to the length of all his arm, 
And with his other hand thus o'er his brow 
He falls to such perusal of my face 
As a would draw it. Long stay' d he so. 
At last, a little shaking of mine arm, 
And thrice his head thus waving up and down, 
He rais'd a sigh so piteous and profound 
As it did seem to shatter all his bulk 
And end his being [ ... 
] 
(II. i. 77-96, emphasis added) 
Significantly, what has taken place between Ophelia and Hamlet has done so in silence. 
Shakespeare even emphasises the point in Polonius's question, `What said he? ' Ophelia 
notably declines to remark that Hamlet `said' nothing verbally, that what passed between 
them-or rather passed from Hamlet to her-did not in any literal sense concern something 
by a kind of effect defective: 'murder, though it have no tongue, will speak/With most miraculous organ' (II. 
ii. 589-90). 
4` Therefore a reconstruction of a reconstruction... 
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directed through her ears, but continues her account such that Hamlet's gestures carry no 
more or less force of signification. Moreover, they cease to be simply the gestures of 
Hamlet. `Thus [... ] thus [... ] so': we emphasise these indexical signifiers because they 
point to Ophelia pointing to herself Not only does she describe to her father Hamlet's 
ghostly appearance, which we know to be a repetition of Old Hamlet's; she herself repeats 
it-acts it out-before him. This scene of reconstruction is not just concerned to show the 
transmission of repetition from Old Hamlet to his son; Ophelia literally dramatises the 
silent repetition of that transmission which takes place from Hamlet to her. 43 
From Claudius to Old Hamlet, Old Hamlet to his son, and young Hamlet to Ophelia 
and beyond, there is circulated a disabling or paralysing force of repetition by which the 
one who is interpellated becomes condemned to doing nothing but `the same', replicating 
the singularity of the static relation which the tragedy's `primal' crime bears to its Biblical 
antecedent. Ophelia repeats Hamlet repeating his father repeating his own brother, whose 
aggression is so peculiarly a non-reciprocal, unmodified repetition of Cain's. The stopping 
of the old king's circulation by the `primal' auricular infraction of Claudius's poison 
becomes the defining trope of a circulation precisely of stoppage, of blockage and 
repetition, which it initiates. 
We might seem to be faced, then, with a kind of paradox: namely that the text of 
Hamlet `begins' with and sustains itself on the basis of the transmission among its 
protagonists of a compulsion to repeat-one which inhibits Hamlet from beginning the task 
of revenge that is assigned to him, compelling him to act out, rather than upon, the 
43 It should also be remarked that it is as a consequence of Ophelia's ghostly communication, and others `All 
given to mine ear' (II. ii. 127), that Polonius volunteers to secrete himself with the King 'behind an arras' (II. 
ii. 163) so as to 'hear [... ] all' that passes between Hamlet and his daughter (III. ii. 182). He will of course 
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traumatic message from his father. To call it a paradox would seem to presuppose a 
distinction, which would only ever be artificial, between Hamlet and Hamlet, the Prince 
and the text which carries his name. But it is a distinction that is decisively and 
suggestively drawn in the metadramatic scenes in which the tragedians of the city become 
the focus of Court interest. It is these, and the texts which the Players are called upon to 
enact, that we will consider in the following section. It is necessary, however, to delimit the 
Question of the texts which the tragedians play in Hamlet and are called upon to play by its 
eponymous protagonist. A great deal has already been written-and not all of it without 
involving a certain degree of speculation-with the intention of determining the specific 
poetic and dramatic antecedents (classical or otherwise) of Shakespeare's text which it 
invokes in a more or less explicit manner during the Player's speech (II. ii. 464-514) and 
the inset drama itself Rather than attempting to advance another textual genealogy of the 
play, we will be concerned with a more structural question. That is to say, not primarily 
with which antecedents Shakespeare invokes, so much as the fact of invocation and the 
manner in which it is undertaken. It is a line of enquiry which, I suggest, makes legible a 
similitude between the ear of Hamlet and the ear of Hamlet, between the relationship of 
Shakespeare's hero to his dead father and Shakespeare's text to it own (albeit nominal)44 
literary paternity. 
Hamlet and Hamlet: revenge and the literary 
The coming of the Players is formally announced to Hamlet (who thanks to 
Rosencranz and Guildenstern knows already) by Polonius who, in a famous phrase, 
fatally repeat this gesture hidden in Gertrude's closet, as she speaks to her son, 'm the ear/Of all their 
conference' (III. ii. 186-7). 
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explicitly identifies them with the classical traditions of drama: `Seneca cannot be too 
heavy, nor Plautus too light' (II. ii. 396). Yet if the Players are accounted the best for 
delivering the works of these two generic exemplars, Polonius concedes that they are 
equally adept at handling both the most absurd sub-genres (`tragical-historical-comical- 
pastoral' (II. ii. 394-5)) and texts for which no generic category can account ('scene 
individible, or poem unlimited' (II. ii. 395-6)). Thus, anticipating their performance of a 
revenge text into which Hamlet will insert his own interpolation, it is made clear that `the 
best actors in the world' (II. ii. 392) are accounted such because of their aptitude not only 
for the demands made of them by classical dramatic models, but also for texts which 
exceed or transgress the generic codes which govern the latter: `For the law of writ, and the 
liberty, these are the only men' (II. ii. 397-8). 
Now, Aeneas' tale to Dido, the recitation of which Hamlet requests immediately he 
has welcomed the Players, seems at first to be an obvious selection, given Hamlet's own 
preoccupations, and the fact that the matter of the speech concerns Pyrrhus whose violent 
progress represents a kind of `law of writ' for the revenge hero. As Eleanor Prosser (1971) 
has remarked, stressing what she regards as the intended parallel between Hamlet and 
Pyrrhus, the latter's slaughter of his father's killer upon the altar of Zeus in Troy generated 
a tradition predating Hamlet in which `Pyrrhus became the symbol of the remorseless and 
blasphemous revenger' (p. 152). Of the several possible textual grafts which have been 
identified in the speech, 45 perhaps the most venerable of those literary antecedents 
upholding the tradition to which Prosser refers is Virgil's Aeneid. Yet, in his notes on 
4' And therefore no less fictional than the Ghost of Old Hamlet. 
's Prosser (1971) cites Marlowe and Nashe's Dido, Queen of Carthage, George Peele's Tale of Troy, and 
Ovid's IvIetamorphoses. Luckacher (1994) makes an original and compelling case for Euripides' 
(untranslated) Hecuba: pp. 137-8. 
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Shakespeare, Coleridge who finds the whole speech `admirable', is not altogether correct in 
perceiving it as a `substitution of the epic for the dramatic' (Coleridge 1808-19 p. 167). 
After all, Hamlet makes clear that the narrative speech belongs to a drama, albeit one which 
`was never acted, or if it was, not above once' (II, ii. 430-1). 46Nevertheless, Coleridge 
alerts us to a peculiarity which belies the obviousness of Hamlet's selection and calls us to 
reassess the status of this inset fragment within the play: namely that Hamlet does not 
choose a speech of Pyrrhus, but a speech about him. The role the actor is called upon to 
play is not that of Pyrrhus, the remorseless filial avenger, but Aeneas who retrospectively 
reproduces for his lover the tale of the former's vengeance in narrative form. Here is how 
Hamlet begins to motivate the First Player to speak the desired lines: 
If it live in your memory, begin at this line-let me 
see, let me see- 
The rugged Pyrrhus, like th 'Hyrcanian beast- 
'Tis not so. It begins with Pyrrhus- 
The rugged Pyrrhus, he whose sable arms [ ... 
] 
(II. ii. 443-448) 
In Hamlet's exhortation, we witness him (try to) remember the Player's original recitation 
which-as is clear from his reference to the Player's memory (443)-was no less than a 
feat of recollection itself Yet the role he remembers the Player remembering is exactly that 
of the one who remembers: Aeneas. The enacting of the Trojan's narrative of Pyrrhus' 
revenge is the reproduction of what was originarily a reproduction, the remembrance of a 
remembrance. Thus the swift and gory model of the avenging son which is presented in the 
Player's speech cannot just be regarded as a kind of built-in ideal of revenge which Hamlet 
may or may not live up to. The text which the Player is asked to recite is one in which the 
46 The question mark over the fictitious text's performance history might define it either as a closet drama, or 
following on from Polonius's introduction, pseudo-Senecan. 
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model of revenge-its law of writ-is itself always already a memory. By definition, 
Pyrrhus is encrypted within Hamlet as an anachronism. 
Moreover, even once he has heard again the tale of Pyrrhus, Hamlet refuses to 
identify with him, preferring rather, in his soliloquy, to compare his own inaction with all 
that the Player himself might accomplish had he the same paternal `motive and [... ] cue' 
(see II. ii. 555 ff. ). Might this apparently perverse identification with the Player-(the 
double remembrancer: he who to `act' must remember his lines, and in doing so fulfils the 
role of the epic remembrancer)-be determined by the singularity of his own father's 
mnemonic demand for vengeance? 47 The answer, I suggest, resides in the fact that just as 
Hamlet's dead father calls to his son for remembrance, so is the violent literary model of 
revenge encrypted within Shakespeare's Hamlet already a ghost, both present and absent, 
which calls for a very specific kind of `remembrance' . 
The similitude between these two potential scenes of ancestral demand (the one 
familial, the other textual) is clarified by Ned Lukacher. In his Daemonic Figures (1994), 
he focuses on a crucial moment in the Player's speech which marks the central division 
between Hamlet and Pyrrhus-that is, the notorious but transitory moment of the 
revenger's delay, the moment of his `doing nothing' in which Hamlet appears to get stuck: 
Pyrrhus at Priam drives, in rage strikes wide; 
But with the whiff and wind of his fell sword 
Th 'unnerved father falls. Then senseless Ilium, 
Seeming to feel this blow, with flaming top 
Stoops to his base, and with a hideous crash 
Takes prisoner Pyrrhus' ear. For lo, his sword, 
Which was declining on the milky head 
Of reverend Priam, seem 'd i 'th 'air to stick; 
So as a painted tyrant, Pyrrhus stood, 
And like a neutral to his will and matter, 
47 Hamlet's hope that the speech still `live[s] in [the Player's] memory', of course recalls his own pledge that 
the memory of his father 'alone shall live/Within the book and volume of [his] brain'. 
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Did nothing. 
(II. ii. 468-78) 
The silent moment of nothingness in which this passage culminates is ultimately overcome 
by the Greek as he takes vengeance like a storm after `A silence in the heavens' (II. ii. 480). 
But in the noise of Ilium's fall which transitorily paralyses him, Lukacher hears, as `a 
signature-like effect', the name of Shakespeare strewn like an acrostic through the (albeit 
fictional) text he invokes (Lukacher 1994 p. 135): 
and with a hideous crash 
Takes prisoner Pyrrhus' ear. 
In the moment-which is only a moment-of Pyrrhus' delay we read a signature: 
`Sh... akes... Pyr... ear': `Shakespyrrhus' ear' (Lukacher 1994 p. 135). Shakespeare's name 
appears in the moment his text claims to cite its literary antecedent, as if his ear, or rather, 
the ear of Shakespeare's Hamlet, is taken prisoner by the crash of its textual ancestor. As 
Hamlet with his `tables' before the ghost of his father calling for vengeance, so is the book 
and volume of Shakespeare's Hamlet inscribed by its own `paternal' other which carries the 
generic model of a vengeful son. 
Now insofar as Hamlet has requested to hear a text in which revenge is already a 
memory, and, further, finds more with which to identify in the actor than the violent subject 
of his recited tale, he would seem self-consciously to position himself at two removes from 
the archaic Greek model. Yet the inscription of that model within the text which bears his 
name-even its `presence' as a memory-cannot but mark its resurrection and continuation 
in some form. Even as an anachronism the revenge model of Pyrrhus remains inscribed 
within Hamlet, if only as the model of what Shakespeare's text is not; which in being 
inscribed by it as an anachronism Shakespeare's text is already not simply repeating, but in 
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whose wake it nevertheless declares itself to function as a revenge text. The `crash' in the 
Player's speech marks the destruction and decline of Ilium even as it makes, literally, 
Shakespeare's name, as if the figurative decomposition of the antecedent is necessary for 
the composition of Shakespeare's play as a signable (i. e. unique) text in its own right. That 
Shakespeare's signature should thus become readable within the ephemeral moment of the 
archaic revenger's paralysis signals a curious bifurcation between the trajectory of Hamlet 
and its eponymous hero, although paradoxically the two divergent paths are absolutely co- 
dependent. I am not suggesting that we take Lukacher's point on the Shakespearean 
cryptonym literally; it is unclear quite how literal Lukacher himself perceives it. But I do 
propose that it helps us to formulate a structural basis for the understanding of Hamlet's 
notorious tardiness. In Hamlet's very act of failing to identify with Pyrrhus-and even 
actively distancing himself from him-or, in other words and more generally, in failing to 
assume the role of the revenger, Shakespeare's text affirms itself as Shakespeare's text in 
not statically repeating its nominal literary ancestor. The more Hamlet `does nothing' the 
more Hamlet does something in transgressing and exceeding the law of writ which it 
preserves within itself in the tale of Pyrrhus' revenge. If Hamlet were to lay his father's 
ghost to rest by avenging him without delay (without `doing nothing'), Shakespeare's 
Hamlet would be a static-un-reshaped-repetition of the tale of Pyrrhus. 48 It is insofar as 
Hamlet does, for four acts `do nothing', that Shakespeare's text reshapes/is enabled to 
reshape and extend the pattern of literary revenge which it claims as its textual heritage. 
`8 We could, perhaps, say that it would not therefore be `Shakespeare's' text, just as Hamlet is no longer 
himself but a ghost (the Ghost) or daemon (as Garber says) as he bids `adieu' to Ophelia in her closet. The 
upshot of this claim would not be to imply that even the most commonplace revenge tragedies are absolutely 
identical with one another, but, rather, to insist on what Derrida has formalised as the law of genre' (1979): 
any text, in order to be recognised within the genre to which its forebears belong, must, in however small a 
way, be singular. transgressive and non-generic: in short: somehow different. 
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Hamlet's identification with the Player can thus be seen to signal a metadramatic 
turn in which is revealed the paradoxical relationship of Hamlet to itself, or rather to its 
eponymous hero. Both Hamlet and Hamlet are figured as having an ancestral voice 
auricularly inscribed within them. Yet it is precisely inasmuch as Hamlet is unable to act 
upon his dead father's word that the text of Hamlet is prohibited/prohibits itself from 
simply acting out-repeating-its own (textual) antecedent. Even as Hamlet refuses to 
identify with Pyrrhus and valorises the Player, Polonius' s formal introduction of the troupe 
becomes a gloss on the very text which bears the hero's name, preserving as it does within 
it the generic law of revenge even as it dramatises and is itself `the liberty', the constitutive 
transgression of those codes of that law. 
This contradiction between the fates of Hamlet and Hamlet, whereby only one 
`Hamlet', as it were, can be relieved from becoming the repetitious ghost of his or its 
forefather, has everything to do with the questions of legacy and tradition, and the 
possibility of the anti-traditional, with which we began. Shakespeare's tragedy affirms 
itself-and affirms its modernity-in dramatising the impossibility not just of repetition 
without difference, but of difference without repetition. As we saw earlier, by way of 
Nietzsche Paul de Man identifies the posture of modernity as the forgetting of history, the 
severance of the present from anteriority and tradition. It is a posture to which de Man, after 
Nietzsche, is led to ascribe that most Oedipean of symbolic acts, parricide (de Man 1969 
pp. 149-50). Yet he goes on to show that far from being an anti-traditional gesture, this 
figurative parricide is the enabling principle of tradition as such. `If history', he says, `is not 
to become sheer regression or paralysis, it depends on modernity for its duration and 
renewal' (p. 151). If modernity aims parricidally to sever itself from history, to attempt the 
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`new', then we must not overlook the fact that severance and difference are nevertheless the 
conditions of possibility for the history which it claims to reject. Without them history 
would not be history but pure repetition: modernity may kill its father, but that father killed, 
had to have killed his. De Man thus presents us with a paradox: tradition would be 
impossible without difference; but by the same token, in differing from, forgetting, or 
murdering one's predecessor one is already repeating him, remembering him, perpetuating 
his legacy. Now for de Man, this paradox characterises `the distinctive nature of literature' 
as such (p. 161). His principal focus, to be sure, is such modernist figures as Baudelaire and 
Artaud. Their claims for a `new beginning' he rapidly shows to belong equally to the 
literary ancestors from whom they declare their independence. Thus that declaration, while 
it heralds something `new', constitutes a repetition, if only, and especially, of the desire not 
to repeat. 49 The more a text affirms its difference-and is `different'-from what has gone 
before, the more strongly it repeats its ancestor in its gesture of differing. This double-bind, 
for de Man, constitutes an `unbearable' condition which is both necessary for literature but 
from which it cannot escape (p. 162). Yet, however artificial it may ultimately be, the self- 
division and contradiction which Hamlet establishes with itself (or between itself and its 
hero), while it cannot of course escape from it sets forth this double-bind both as the 
condition of its composition and the determining factor of its action (and inaction). Firstly, 
because it bears within itself (at Hamlet's request) an antecedent text whose form 
Shakespeare's own will affirm itself in being different from. In being a `new' and signable 
text Shakespeare's does not just do away with ('forget' or `murder') the ancestral revenge 
49 Note in particular de Man's citation (p. 162) of Derrida's paper on Artaud (1966b): "'[Artaud] was unable 
to resign himself to a theater based on repetition, unable to renounce a theatre that would do away with all 
forms of repetition"'. See also Derrida (1966b) p. 314, where the `pure presence as absolute difference' 
aspired to in Artaud's theatre is linked explicitly with the murder of the father. 
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model; it preserves within it the memory of that over which it asserts its own identity and 
whose heritage it therefore extends. Secondly, because entailed in Hamlet's very difference 
from that ancestral model is the cost that its namesake must bear of doing nothing less than 
repeat his father. Hamlet differs in that Hamlet repeats. Internal to its difference, its identity 
as `Shakespeare's' text, is repetition. The more Hamlet does something, the more Hamlet 
will be doing nothing, and vice versa. Through its divided relation to itself-Hamlet's 
relation to Hamlet-Shakespeare's text mobilises de Man's `unbearable' double-bind as its 
sustaining force. 
Thus, in the most blatant moment before Act V in which Hamlet will be presented 
with the gift of an opportunity to take his revenge, an extraordinary `nothing' is made to 
happen. When Claudius attempts to pray for forgiveness, Hamlet comes upon him. With 
Claudius kneeling, vulnerable, Hamlet `could [... ] do it pat' (III. iii. 73). Indeed, this 
opportunity is one which would make his revenge most akin to that of Pyrrhus whose aged 
victim dies seeking refuge at the altar of Zeus. But having drawn his sword, Hamlet pauses: 
And am I then reveng'd, 
To take him in the purging of his soul, 
When he is fit and season'd for his passage? 
No. 
(III. iii. 84-7) 
His self-restraint seems well motivated, preferring as he does to wait until Claudius is 
`about some act/That has no relish of salvation in't' (III. iii. 91-2). On his exit, however, the 
King breaks off: 
My words fly up, my thoughts remain below. 
Words without thoughts never to heaven go. 
(III. iii. 97-8) 
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The ear of God, unlike any other in the text, has been closed. `After all', says Dover 
Wilson, `there had been no "relish of salvation" in the King's act of prayer; Hamlet need 
not have hesitated [ ... 
]' (193 5 p. 246). It is as if Hamlet has had its own jest at Hamlet's 
expense. It is not that Hamlet is congenitally unable to kill Claudius, but rather that the text 
generates the tantalising possibility of Hamlet's becoming a Pyrrhus then contrives to 
withdraw it and thus perpetuate itself a little longer. Hamlet is led to remain cut off, his 
own sword seeming to stick i'th'air, at the very moment of `doing nothing' in Aeneas' tale 
where Shakespeare's signature takes shape. 50 Like his father's ghost, cut off at the moment 
of cutting off, Hamlet is frozen into another repetition. 
Ingesting poison/poisoning in jest: The Mousetrap 
The singular relationship of Hamlet to the ghost of his father, which we have 
attempted to define in terms of intromission, might, then, be considered as the flagrant 
exhibition within Hamlet of that which de Man claims to be essential to, yet consistently 
disowned by, `modern' literary writing-namely the fact of inevitable repetition. So what 
of the Prince at the expense of whose ability to carry out the Ghost's command, to take up 
the legacy of vengeance left by his dead father, Shakespeare's text takes up `its' legacy, at 
once announcing the death of the archaic revenge model yet acting in its name, preserving 
its memory and extending its tradition? And what are the stakes of this quasi-competitive 
relationship? 
50 That the cause of Hamlet's hesitation is thus a kind of structural joke-though also of course a structural 
necessity-rather than a congenital lack of will on his own part, is confirmed by his ready zeal in killing the 
secreted Polonius in Gertrude's closet, the one `in the ear/Of all their conference' (see note 43 above) whom 
Hamlet takes for his better (III. iv. 33). Even in this murder which is carried through to completion, Hamlet, 
who as revenger will have done nothing again in mistakenly killing Polonius, himself produces a second 
laugh at his own expense, exclaiming even as he thrusts his sword through the arras and into what he thinks is 
the Mouse trapped by his play, 'A rat! ' (III. iv. 23). 
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Before taking up these questions directly, let us make a few provisional remarks 
concerning the contemporary cultural transformations which are often invoked in support 
of the aforementioned critical claim that revenge equates to a remembering. 
If Protestant upheavals in commemorative practise amounted to a doctrinal 
imperative that the living forget the deceased, it is crucial to recognise-and to understand 
that Shakespeare's text recognises-that this new duty of amnesia complicates rather than 
enables the posture of modernity-forgetting the dead-in the terms by which we have 
suggested Hamlet has been construed. Indeed, in the paper cited by Michael Neill, Natalie 
Zemon Davies points out that the doctrinal transformations of the Reformation were 
profoundly counterproductive: 
Especially the living [she explains] were left with their memories, 
unimpeded and untransformed by any ritual communication with their 
dead. Some memories bite the conscience. Paradoxically, in trying to lay 
all ghosts forever, the Protestants may have raised new ones... the ending 
of Purgatory and ritual mourning, whatever energies were thereby freed 
for other work, may have left Protestants [... ] less removed from their 
parents, more alone with their memories, more vulnerable to the prick of 
the past, more open to the family future. 
(Davies 1977 p. 96)51 
It is not difficult to see how the early modern revenge ghost might be understood as one of 
those raised by the newly frustrated consciences of the living. Equally importantly, 
however, it should be remarked that the burden left with the living that Davies describes, 
which is recognisably the burden carried by Hamlet even before his encounter with the 
Ghost, is not one of liberation from the dead. For Hamlet, as for the laden Protestant 
conscience in general, there is remembrance, there is no end of remembrance; but that is 
exactly the point. Insofar as the new impotence of the living is envisioned as paradoxically 
having given rise to more ghosts, the function of commemorative action-be it sacred ritual 
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or a secular substitute like revenge-shows itself to be both grounded in and the grounds 
for a necessary amnesia. Duties done in the name and memory of the dead are, 
simultaneously, rituals of separation, procedures of laying to rest, disposing, and in short, 
forgetting. Prayers, masses, indulgences: the posthumous rituals outlawed by the 
Reformation left the living at one stroke without means of remembrance and without means 
of attenuating the `biting' of memory of the deceased therefore. In forbidding mourning and 
requiring the living to forget, the new theological doctrine requires the impossible; the one 
is the means to the other. As Freud puts it in 1917: `[In commemorative rituals, ] [e]ach 
single one of the memories and expectations in which the libido is bound to the object is 
brought up and hyper-cathected, and detachment of the libido is accomplished in respect of 
it' (Freud 1917 [1915] p. 245, emphasis added). The subject remembers, ritually, (in order) 
to forget. In this connection, let us recall Freud's earlier account of his dream regarding his 
own father's funeral. The double inscription addressed to the dreamer reads: 
the 
You are requested to close eye(s) 
an 
Setting aside Marjorie Garber's biographical understanding of the meaning of the 
message, 52 can we not perceive in its double imperative the very structure of mourning? In 
closing the eyes of the dead, enacting a rite of passage on the behalf of the dead, the 
mourner begins to bid farewell: he begins to detach himself from the dead other, to `wink 
at' the lost object and forget. The message is written doubly because mourning presupposes 
an inseparably double function: the ritual carried out for the dead other, on the other's 
behalf, is equally a valedictory gesture from the living. Mourning operates, ideally at least, 
51 Also cited by Neill (1997) p. 244. 
52 Though not necessarily to invalidate it. 
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in the name of the living as well as the dead: it is a laying to rest in order to accomplish a 
letting-go. 
With this in mind (and it is a model which we will shortly be attempting to develop 
and complicate), let us suggest that the co-ordinates within which Hamlet must operate if 
he is to act upon his father's demand and not just act it out become legible during the 
metadramatic scenes in which the (already artificial) distinction between himself and 
Hamlet is most patently dissolved: that is, during The Murder of Gonzago, for which he 
becomes by turns, playwright, chorus, prompter and epilogue. 
It is as a direct yet tellingly ambiguous result of Hamlet's encounter with the Ghost 
that, confronted with the fortuitous arrival of the Players, Hamlet resolves to have staged 
his amended version of The Murder of Gonzago. This ambiguity concerns Hamlet's 
ultimate motivation. Having just heard the First Player's recitation of Aeneas' tale, Hamlet 
appears in his second soliloquy spontaneously to strike upon the idea of the play as no more 
than a trick to catch Claudius's conscience: 
About, my brains! Hum-I have heard 
That guilty creatures sitting at a play, 
Have, by the very cunning of the scene, 
Been struck so to the soul that presently 
They have proclaimed their malefactions [... ] 
I'll have these players 
Play something like the murder of my father 
Before mine uncle. 
(II. ii. 584-592) 
Yet his resolution seems to produce a second bird to kill with the same stone: 
The spirit I have seen 
May be a devil, and the devil hath power 
T'assume a pleasing shape, yea, and perhaps 
Out of my weakness and my melancholy [... ] 
Abuses me to damn me. I'll have grounds 
More relative than this. 
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(II. ii. 594-600) 
The double motive behind the staging of the play-testing Claudius's conscience and the 
veracity of the apparition-elicits two significant factors which we shall have to bear in 
mind. The first concerns the fact of Hamlet's doubting his father, or at least the latter's 
ghost. 53 For the reception of the father's message is, naturally enough, the primary 
condition of possibility for its being doubted. Indeed, insofar as The Murder of Gonzago 
dramatises an auricular poisoning, it replicates the moment of aggression we have 
witnessed replicated upon Hamlet himself. The traumatising message is both necessarily 
prior to Hamlet's doubt of its truth, and determines (or overdetermines) the character of the 
test which Hamlet engineers. It should be remembered, furthermore, that even as the best 
players of Seneca are enacting their tragedy, Hamlet assumes a radically `un'-Senecan 
posture. Whereas, say, the Thyestean banquet in Titus Andronicus, or `Soliman and 
Persida' in The Spanish Tragedy constitute elaborate stagings which, faithful to the 
Senecan model, work to achieve revenge, however much Hamlet's dramatic test seeks to 
secure the motivation for his revenge, the acting of Gonzago ultimately defers it, repeats the 
repetitious scene(s) of poisoning rather than avenges the `primal' crime. The second factor 
to consider, one which will expand considerably, is that of identification. The rhyme with 
which Hamlet's speech closes-'the play's the thing/Wherein I'll catch the conscience of 
the King' (II. ii. 600-1)-follows on directly from his words about the dubiety of the Ghost, 
and remains sufficiently ambiguous, in its invocation of the titular `King', as to refer 
potentially both to Claudius and Old Hamlet. The double motive of the test-itself a re- 
enactment of the poisoning performed on Old Hamlet by Claudius, then on young Hamlet 
am referring here in particular to Lacan's notion, taken up by Garber, that Hamlet's doubt is a symptom of 
the failure of paternal inscription. See Lacan (1964) pp. 34-5: Garber 1987 pp. 131-2. 
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by his father-thus establishes an implicit identification between the dead king who has 
made the call for vengeance and the living king upon whom that vengeance is to be taken. 
If the dumbshow and the play which follows it are repetitions of the `primal' crime, 
they cannot, of course, be just its neutral re-staging. Like the Ghost's repetition which 
determines the dramatic production, in expressing the manner of the king's poisoning the 
dumbshow and the play themselves constitute, or reconstitute, the form of a poison. `Will 
the King hear this piece of work? ' Hamlet asks Polonius (III. ii. 46-7), invoking, 
unremarkably, the sensorium by which Shakespeare's contemporaries would `take in' a 
play, though one which the pattern of the text has already overdetermined as the locus of 
violent, traumatic entry. `And the Queen too', Polonius responds (III. ii. 48); and during the 
play Hamlet will gloss that portion which most pertains to his mother-the Player Queen's 
protestations of eternal fidelity-as `wormwood' to her, a poisonous test of the conscience 
of the Queen (II1. ii. 176). 54 More explicit, however, is his response to Claudius's query, at 
a suitable break in the action, as to whether there is `any offence' in the play: `No, no, they 
do but jest-poison in jest' (III. ii. 227-8). In what is ostensibly a claim about the action 
onstage a pun is concealed, and marked, by the hyphen which separates the feigned gesture 
of reassurance about the fictitious character of the action ('it is but in jest, in play, that they 
poison') from what is made a darker warning of its effects on the guilty: there is poison in 
jest, poison in play: the play is poisonous. Thus Hamlet's response sounds rather like an 
anticipation of the imperative with which he will ultimately finish off his uncle, `Drink off 
this potion' (V. ii. 331): they do but poison in jest-hear more and ingest poison yourself. 55 
'a Note that as well as the identification which the play, as test, sets up between Claudius and Old Hamlet, 
Hamlet's renaming of the play The Mousetrap means that its effects are equally to be sought upon Gertrude, 
for whom `mouse' is Claudius's term of endearment (III. iv. 185). 
Cf. Anderson (1991) p. 306. 
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So in re-enacting the poisoning the play re-enacts the Ghost's re-enactment: it poisons; 
even as it recapitulates the crime of the past, it renews and repeats it in the `present' . 
56 
Moreover, the dumbshow which precedes the play proper is unique in Renaissance drama 
in being little other than an anticipatory pantomime of what will follow. 57 Unlike others of 
its kind, it is distinctively not an introductory allegory or symbolic staging to be unpacked 
and elaborated in the spoken play. Even if in Hamlet the latter makes the dumbshow 
verbally `explicable', it is never more than a replaying of it, a repetition, just as the Ghost's 
speech to Hamlet repeats Claudius's silent crime in and by giving voice to it. Gonzago thus 
stands as a repetition of the poisoning, but also, in repeating itself repeating, as the 
repetition of its very repetition. The King, oddly untroubled witnessing his own crime in 
the dumbshow, 58 rises perturbed only when its re-enactment reaches his ear, figuratively 
poisoned, like Hamlet, `[u]pon the talk of the poisoning' (III. ii. 284, emphasis added). Like 
the `primal' crime done to Old Hamlet, and replicated by him to his son, it is less the act of 
poisoning revealed in the play than its status as a static repetition which here engenders and 
perpetuates its traumatising-poisonous-force. 
But if Claudius is traumatised (poisoned) by the repetitious performance of his own 
repetitious crime, it is often remarked that he is frighted by the repetition to come which the 
ambivalent figure of its poisoner, Lucianus, heralds. In the play, having spoken three 
bloodthirsty preparatory couplets, Lucianus `Pours poison in the sleeper's ears' (HI. ii. 254 
S. D. ): 
56 Like the other performative repetitions we have witnessed, the poisoning which Hamlet's Gonzago re- 
enacts transmits like a poison to its principal auditor the very compulsion to repeat that motivates the re- 
enactment and that which is re-enacted. His own conscience sharply pricked by the play, Claudius, whose ear 
has been Hamlet's manifest target, can only seek salvation in a paradox. He is seized by a compulsion to pray: 
which is to say, to repeat his crimes, albeit futilely, in the ear of God (III. iii. 36-72). 
'' See Mehl (1965) pp. 112-3. Cf. Dover Wilson (1935) pp. 144-5. 
58 On the consternation this has caused among critics and directors see Edelman (1994). 
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Hamlet: A poisons him `i'th'garden for his estate. His name's 
Gonzago. The story is extant, and written in very 
choice Italian. You shall see anon how the murderer 
gets the love of Gonzago's wife. 
Ophelia: The King rises. 
(III. ii. 255-9) 
In poisoning the King's ear, and attaining his wife and estate, Lucianus is clearly a cipher 
for Claudius the regicide. Yet Hamlet has already informed the auditors that Lucianus is 
`nephew to the king' (III. ii. 239), such that he also becomes a potential figure for Hamlet 
whose task is the murder of his own uncle. Thus it has been argued elsewhere that what 
frights Claudius as much as witnessing the repeated re-enactment of his own crime, is the 
promise which it carries of its re-enactment as revenge. Indeed, for Michael Neill, precisely 
this implicit threat generated by the ambivalence of Lucianus embeds Hamlet in the 
constitutive paradox of revenge tragedy: `The dream of re-membering the violated past and 
destroying a tainted order is fulfilled only at the cost of repeating the violation and 
spreading the taint' (1997 p. 251). However, do not the terms by which the staging of the 
inset play is defined demand a more careful assessment of the kind of `repetition' which 
would be involved were Hamlet literally to poison his uncle and avenge his father? After 
all, The Mousetrap is in itself evidence of the fact that Hamlet is so busy `repeating' the 
crime that he cannot avenge it. Insofar as the play is a repetition, the scene of Lucianus' 
poisoning the King's ear, which so pricks Claudius's conscience-which poisons his ear- 
would seem to double up rather as a representation en abyme of the fact of Hamlet's staging 
of it, his acting out of, rather than upon, the scene of which his father's ghost has 
performatively informed him. The Mousetrap, that is, even as it snaps shut, seems to 
suggest that repetition, while it is structural to the possibility of revenge, is purely in itself 
267 
not just an insufficient means of attaining it, but a means by which, in theory, it could very 
well be endlessly deferred. 
Equally, though, the play-within-the-play encodes the logic only according to which 
Hamlet's vengeance, the taking up of his legacy, might become a. possibility: the very logic 
by which the text has sustained itself in order not to become a ghostly repetition of its 
ancestor. 
If Lucianus embodies both Claudius and Hamlet, then the Player King whom he 
poisons must embody both Kings of whom the Gonzago play is a test: Claudius and Old 
Hamlet. Beneath the usual construal of the enacted murder representing at once Claudius's 
poisoning of Hamlet pere and Hamlet fil's figurative/theatrical and entirely repetitious 
poisoning of Claudius, a third possibility is opened up by the ambivalence of the victim: 
namely the suggestion that if Hamlet were literally to poison Claudius, to take vengeance in 
the name of his father, he would be repeating the `primal' crime not only in the moral sense 
of reinscribing the violation for which he seeks payment from the King, but in the symbolic 
sense that he would be killing his own father the King again. This ostensibly perverse 
suggestion finds support elsewhere in the Gonzago play, and specifically in relation to the 
mnemonic character of the Ghost's demand. 
The Player King, so clearly a cipher for Old Hamlet, is equally an embodiment of 
his ghost. Indeed, by the time he speaks in the play proper, his murder has already taken 
place once in the dumbshow. When he speaks to his wife concerning her future after his 
death, his words are already posthumous, articulated, as it were, from the perspective of the 
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dead. 59 Yet, unlike the Ghost, who calls only to be remembered, the already dead Player 
King advocates pragmatic amnesia. In his long and dense speech to the Player Queen ('I do 
believe you think what now you speak' (III. ii. 181ff. )) he forewarns that however strong her 
intentions of fidelity once he has departed, they will deteriorate inevitably in his absence, 
and she will remarry: `most necessary 'tis that we forget' (III. ii. 187). For Hamlet, who 
clearly has one eye on his mother (III. ii. 176,219 and 226), the speech and the Player 
Queen's insistent protestations that the memory of her first husband will endure eternally 
('In second husband let me be accurst' (III. ii. 174)) function principally to jab at 
Gertrude's conscience. In so perceiving the situation, however, he ignores the fact that her 
forgetting and remarrying are nevertheless the desire of her present husband. This, allied to 
the further fact that the Player King's speech bears crucial elements of equivocation and 
ambiguity that make it equally an address to Hamlet himself, but to which he remains 
similarly deaf: 6° `Purpose', the Player King pronounces, `is but the slave to memory' (III. 
ii. 183). With regard to Hamlet's expectant glances at his mother, the line is manifestly 
intended to articulate what he regards as her infidelity: the intention (purpose) of remaining 
faithful to your first husband lasted only so long as his life; it faded with your memory of 
him. Yet it is also difficult not to hear in this, contrariwise, a diagnosis of the condition 
which inhibits and blunts Hamlet's purpose of revenge: namely that it is enslaved by the 
domineering memory of his father, suspended and unactable so long as all Hamlet does is 
remember, re-embody, and repeat his traumatic address. Similarly, the Player King's 
couplet, `Most necessary 'tis that we forget/To pay ourselves what to ourselves is debt' (III. 
s9 Note also that throughout her references to her husband's death the Player Queen assumes, without question 
from the Player King, that the manner of his death will be murder, as if both, like the audience, are only 
awaiting its (re)enactment. 
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ii. 187-8) reads like a gloss on Gertrude's 'infidelity'. Harold Jenkins tries to secure the 
term `necessary' as referring to what is in the nature of things, to what is `most natural' : 
thus, `Our resolves [in this instance, posthumous fidelity], being debts to ourselves only, 
inevitably remain unpaid' (III. ii. 187-8 n. ). Again, this sounds like a peculiar way of 
unsettling Gertrude, given that the Player King is in fact condoning and describing as 
natural precisely what she has done in remarrying. Yet the equivocation of `necessary' 
invites a second, quite different construal, again most pertinent to Hamlet and his paternally 
assigned task: it is morally requisite that we forget the dead (close one eye to them) in 
order to pay our debts to ourselves, in order not to remain eternally indebted to the 
deceased. 
Now both these equivocal axioms, sound in their implicit meaning rather like the 
Nietzschean principle identified by Garber-the necessity of `forgetting' in order to 
undertake any action. But they are ultimately more complex. When the Player King 
addresses his wife and urges her to forget him, he is not urging the exact opposite of what 
the Ghost urges in calling upon Hamlet to `Remember me'. Being forgotten is the will of 
the ('dead') Player King; it is therefore no less a mnemonic injunction. What is at stake 
here is not a freedom but a duty to forget. 1/you/he forget(s): the closed relation between the 
subject and the verb in its usual conjugation is troubled once `forget' becomes an 
imperative. He who forgets fails to recall, is unable to remember, he neglects something or 
leaves it behind by mistake. He who is told to forget cannot, by definition, fail or neglect to 
recall, but rather must succeed in actively not recalling. He must not forget to forget, he 
must remember to forget. But also, and insofar as this forgetting is the will of the `dead' 
60 Niell (1997) suggests that the speech is Hamlet's own inserted composition (p. 260). If it were at all 
provable it would only strengthen our argument by revealing Hamlet to be deaf even to his own insights. 
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other, he forgets the other in the other's name: he forgets in order the better to remember 
him. 61 The will of the Player King is thus structured as a double-bind: remember to forget, 
forget (in order) to remember: close my eyes (ritually) and your eyes (valedictorily); for the 
two things are not separable, but symmetrical and symmetrically necessary. This is not, 
however, to imply that the Player King's will demands the impossible. On the contrary his 
double-bind expresses an enabling principle that is all but evacuated from the Ghost's 
imperative to Hamlet. The morbid figure in black at the beginning of the play already can 
do nothing but remember his father; and the visitation from the Ghost does nothing to alter 
this. The son who is told to revenge is disabled in advance in being compelled also only to 
remember (and `not forget' (III. iv. 110)). It is insofar as Hamlet does (nothing but) 
remember, repeat and re-enact the encounter with his dead father, that he is unable to 
avenge the horror imparted performatively to him. In contrast with the disabling injunction 
of the Ghost, the logic of the Player King's speech (close my/your eyes) recapitulates that 
by which we have said the progress of the text of Hamlet is sustained: the double-bind that 
is the `unbearable' yet necessary condition of history and tradition, in which the forefather 
must be forgotten or killed precisely so that his legacy may be taken up and not simply re- 
enacted. So long as Hamlet remains compelled solely to remember, his father's perturbed 
ghost cannot be lain to rest. 
Now as the Player Queen persists in her protestations, as deaf as Hamlet to the 
revealing logic of her husband's will, the Gonzago play continues, on a manifest level, to 
hold a minor of guilt up to Claudius and Gertrude: 
P. Queen: [New] love must needs be treason in my breast. 
In second husband let me be accurst; 
61 This paradoxical formulation is discussed and elaborated by Geoffrey Bennington (2000a) in relation to 
modernity, Sade's legacy and the instruction in his will that he be forgotten. 
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None wed the second but who killed the first [ ... 
] 
A second time I kill my husband dead, 
When second husband kisses me in bed. 
(III. ii. 173-80) 
It is easy to see why Hamlet has selected The Murder of Gonzago. For it establishes 
through the Player Queen's pronouncements of her faithful `purpose' an identification 
between the one who kills the king and the one who forgets him and, in forgetting him, 
repeats the act of murder, kills the king a `second time'. 62 The play's villain Lucianus thus 
embodies the forgetful Player Queen (and, by extension, Gertrude) as well as Claudius 
('None wed the second but who killed the first'). 
The irony, however, is that what Hamlet so loathes about others who are not his 
father's son and whose transgressions he stages in The Mousetrap-those who, like 
Gertrude have forgotten him, and indeed Claudius who made a ghost of him in the first 
place-is the key to the possibility of his really becoming a Lucianus, one who will literally 
poison the King and thereby send his own father the King back to the grave. To say so is 
not to attempt a moral condonation of the actions of Claudius or his new wife. It is to 
suggest that the representation of the ambivalent Lucianus poisoning the ambivalent Player 
King presents-even as the trap snaps shut and the play is cut of the possibility of 
revenge which has not been made available by the singularly mnemonic demand of his 
father that lives alone in his brain. Hamlet `does nothing' because he can do nothing but 
remember his father, act him out. Insofar as he (only) remembers he repeats, and the ghost 
of his father returns, both to him and through him. Vengeance, that which will lay his 
father's spirit to rest, is thus also that which the overpowering (poisoning) presence of his 
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father's ghost inhibits. As such, `doing something', avenging the memory of his father, is 
only possible at the cost of not purely repeating him, not only remembering him, as the 
Ghost seems contradictorily to desire. Hamlet cannot carry out his father's `law of writ' 
without a degree of `liberty'. If, as Michael Neill suggests, the Ghost articulates Hamlet's 
`great discovery' of the equivalence between revenge and remembrance, the double-bind 
which remembrance of the dead must of necessity entail is expunged entirely from the 
traumatic message to his son. Pure remembrance is pure repetition-that which inhibits the 
revenge which in consigning his father's ghost to the grave would make him, precisely, no 
more than a memory. The cost of acting in his father's memory is that he must forget him a 
little if he is to avenge him at all. He must forget if he is to remember: 
the 
You are requested to close eye(s) 
an 
It is in forgetting, precisely, that he will kill his father `a second time', laying his ghost 
finally to rest; and it is in that quasi-parricidal gesture that he will act in rather than out his 
father's traumatic posthumous memory. 
What Hamlet will later say of the Gravedigger's riddling language applies equally 
well to the `dead' Player King's speech in relation to the text of Hamlet: its equivocation 
has the power to undo it (cf. V. i. 134). The latent message which it carries, and to which 
Hamlet, busy watching his mother and uncle, seems unable to attend, articulates the 
necessitous double-bind that the dead father's imperative omits, marks out the paradox of 
remembering/forgetting without which Hamlet's revenge would be impossible and 
Shakespeare's text therefore interminable. Whether or not it is true, or even empirically 
62 Later, in his mother's closet, Hamlet will signal his agreement with the Player Queen's self-accusations, 
responding to Gertrude calling the mistaken slaughter of Polomus `a rash and bloody deed' : `Almost as bad, 
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verifiable, the tradition that Shakespeare acted the role of the Ghost on stage is telling. The 
repetitious call of the Ghost which compels Hamlet to repeat is the very motor of the 
difference of Shakespeare's Hamlet as revenge text. The more Hamlet (just) repeats, the 
more strongly Hamlet outdoes, exceeds, thus heralds the death of its literary ancestor whose 
tradition it thereby perpetuates all the better. The less Hamlet is able to grasp the double- 
bind of the Player King's speech, the more the text in relation to its nominal literary 
paternity is enabled by its fundamental principle. 
Killing (for) the father: a `Copernican revolution' 
When, at the outset, Hamlet announces cryptically to the Court that he is `too much 
in the sun' (I. ii. 67), he is, according to Harold Jenkins, delivering a punning blow against 
his uncle. As the emblem of royalty, the sun connotes King Claudius, whose presence 
Hamlet finds stifling. As a pun, it connotes Prince Hamlet, whom Claudius wishes to make 
more his `son' than he really is. 63 Yet as a response to his uncle's charge that the clouds of 
filial mourning `still hang upon' him (I. ii. 66), Hamlet's wordplay says at least as much 
about his relationship to his dead father-the King he considers to be truly royal (I. ii. 191 
and I. v. 44-5), and whom he will consistently align with the sun-god Hyperion (I. ii. 139- 
40 and III. iv. 56): 
King: How is it that the clouds still hang upon you? 
Hamlet: Not so, my lord, I am too much in the sun. 
(I. ii. 66-7) 
If we attend to this brief exchange, we hear what will be the inhibiting factor in Hamlet's 
revenge to be already in operation with regard to his grief Dressed as he is in black, as if to 
good mother, ' he says, As kill a king and marry with his brother' (III. iv. 27-9). 
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soak up the sun, Hamlet is not the only figure at Court who still mourns his father: he is the 
one for whom mourning has not even begun. The blazing visage of his royal father remains 
too strong to be in the least obscured by the separative clouds of mourning. Even before he 
has properly witnessed the Ghost, Hamlet is already still too much in the presence of his 
not-quite-dead father; the latter is not sufficiently `gone', not absent enough, for the 
processes of detachment to have got underway. Even, and especially, in death, his father 
remains the centre of Hamlet's universe. 
When the Ghost at last makes its appearance to Hamlet in order to call for 
vengeance, its imperative excludes that which his son most requires if he is to mourn and/or 
revenge at all: namely that he forget, and especially all the paradoxes which this carries as 
an imperative. It is the double-bind of remembering/forgetting (closing the/an eye(s)) that 
connects revenge with commemoration of the dead-each a duty of separation from the 
dead which maintains a link with them; a preservation of a link, by that duty, which 
facilitates separation. In order to tease out the profundity of this equation, however, it is 
necessary to make some further remarks on the cultural `work' that early modern tragedy 
has, in some critical quarters, been understood to perform, and to place Hamlet's peculiar 
predicament alongside the paternal loss suffered by his zealous counterpart in the text, the 
revenger Laertes. 
It would not be difficult to relate the co-ordinates of modernity of which we earlier 
gave a very specific ('Lacanian') account to the general `change in the intellectual, social, 
psychological, and aesthetic structures that govern the generation of identities' charted in 
Stephen Greenblatt's seminal text on early-modern writing Renaissance Self-Fashioning 
(1980 p. 1). Indeed, in a recent article on Hamlet and its place in post-Reformation culture 
63 See Jenkins's notes to the Arden edition: I. ii. 67 LN. Cf I. ii. 106-8 and 117 
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Anthony Low (1999) describes the will to selfhood mapped by Greenblatt as an effect and a 
cause of that madness of Western reason (whose temporal specificity we are beginning to 
challenge)-the repudiation of paternity: `Before the modern autonomous individual can 
step forth in all his glory, he must first free himself [... ] from the past, from tradition, from 
ancestral piety, and especially from the father and the paternal lineage' (pp. 444-5). Such, 
he argues, is the project of Coriolanus who desires to `stand/As if a man were author of 
himself (Coriolanus. V. iii. 36-7). Yet within Shakespeare's tragic paradigms, Low argues, 
the modern will to subjectivity remains a transgression, a madness or delusion which even 
the protagonists themselves cannot help but realise is no more than an `As if': 
The arc of the action reveals this gesture to be an act of hubris, for which 
[the hero] will be tragically punished. Yet we know that such acts of self- 
fashioning, although they begin as role-playing, can issue 
in authentic change, first in the individual, then in the culture. 
(p. 445)64 
Low need not announce to what cultural change he is referring here, for he is 
already building on sociological and materialist accounts of the part played by tragedy in 
the cultural history immediately preceding the English Revolution. As was discussed in the 
previous chapter, the political dimension of the gesture of filiarchal liberation has been 
addressed by several authors who have recognised the relation of subordinate 
correspondence, inherent in early modern political theory, between the father who is a king 
64 For Low the imaginative possibility of autonomous self-hood, however restricted, was enabled by the 
Protestant imperative of forgetting the dead; and he identifies legible traces in Hamlet of the Protestant duty 
of amnesia- In particular he relates Claudius's speech at court against Hamlet's `obstinate condolement' (I. ii. 
87-106) to a sermon by Matthew Parker in 1551 which had warned that `it agreeth not with the rules of faith 
[... ] for a christian man to bewayle the dead' (Low 1999 p. 462). But in claiming that the new Protestant 
imperative is `the transformative event that led to [... an] essential paradigm of modernity, a necessary adjunct 
to autonomous individualism, for which the brutally appropriate name is killing the father' (p. 443) he 
perhaps fails to recognise that the imperative to forget is already inscribed within Hamlet as a paradox-and 
one whose consequences it thrives in dramatising. 
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in the family, and the king who is a father in the state. 65 Not least of all, Franco Moretti's 
study `The Great Eclipse' (1988) connects the re-emergence of tragic drama in the 
sixteenth-century to the decline of a medieval order centred on God and the emergence of a 
subjectivity able to challenge and appropriate the authority of absolutism. The power of 
tragedy, for Moretti, lies in its recognition that since absolute sovereignty is by definition a 
power released from control, having its origin in itself, it also contains the possibility of its 
own usurpation and replication. Let us recall what was said in this connection regarding 
Julius Caesar. Within tragic drama the monarch occupies a deeply ambivalent position as 
both the prohibitor and the model of what Kierkegaard calls `the individual left entirely to 
himself [... ] his own creator' (cited in Moretti 1988 p. 45)-a subjectivity which we might 
identify in Laplanchean terms as ipsocentric. Tragedy takes the claim of absolute power at 
its word. Less than a century before the revolution, tragedy was paying the monarch `an 
ambiguous homage', at once elaborating to the letter his self-determining power and, 
therefore, undermining his singular and superior legitimacy and so putting the possibility of 
self-determination up for grabs. It foreshadowed and rehearsed the delegitimisation of the 
absolute monarch and the installation of the subject as sovereign. `Tragedy', says Moretti 
provocatively, `disentitled the absolute monarch to all rational and ethical legitimation. 
Having deconsecrated the king, tragedy made it possible to decapitate him' (p. 42). Belsey 
(1985) has further argued that this coincidence of the emergence of the sovereign subject 
with the repudiation of the paternal absolutism of the monarch achieves its supreme 
expression in revenge tragedy, where the motivation for the protagonist's action emerges 
from the monarch-figure's failure to administer justice, or, as in the case of Hamlet, his 
own transgression of the law. Betsey concedes that revenge is always represented `in excess 
65 On this correspondence with regard to Hamlet see Barker (1984) p. 159. 
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of justice', as a bloody, hellish disobedience to Christian conscience (p. 116). But she 
claims that since the quest for vengeance is always inaugurated by the moral or judicial 
deficiency of the king, revenge nevertheless `seems to the revenger (and to the audience? ) 
an overriding imperative' (p. 116). The action of vengeance becomes a restraint on 
tyrannical power, a `purging [of the] corrupt social body' which establishes the individual 
subject as an `autonomous agent of retribution' (p. 116). The revolutionary gesture of 
modernity thus carries the symbolic force of parricide. 
Considered as a politically charged adumbration and facilitation of regicide and the 
freeing of the subject as sovereign (absolutum), tragedy (or at least revenge tragedy) as 
such would seem to entail in its very structure the co-ordinates that Garber pursues in the 
exemplar of Hamlet. Yet with its Ghost, Shakespeare's text, or indeed revenge tragedy in 
general, surely presents us with a paradox. That the ghost of Old Hamlet occupies a 
position, however embellished and modernised, among a series of other revenge ghosts 
whose classical lineage is introduced into early modern drama by way of Seneca is beyond 
question and has been intelligently written about elsewhere. 66 But this heritage qua heritage 
anchors the radicalness of early modem dramatic vengeance in a code that is doubly 
traditional. The revenge ghost makes its posthumous demand as the individual blood 
ancestor of the protagonist and as the generic literary ancestor of the dramatist in whose 
fiction he is inscribed. Whether or not Hamlet defers, or rather is disabled from undertaking 
the violent task called for, the fact remains that the `purgation' he must undertake is 
demanded by way of an injunction that is ancestral. If revenge drama performs the 
66 The two classic essays on this topic are by F. W. Moorman (1906a and 1906b). 
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historical 'task 67 of opening up the space for practising the rehearsal of the revolutionary 
gesture of modernity, then it does so, nevertheless, in the name of the father. 68 
Reading Hamlet is not a question of resolving this paradox, but rather of witnessing 
precisely how its operations are mobilised by the text and through the Ghost's immobilising 
injunction to his son. Nowhere does this become clearer than in relation to Laertes' revenge 
quest which emerges as a result of the mistaken murder of the `Rat' Polonius, and 
Ophelia's madness. 
`[B]y the image of my cause', Hamlet says to Horatio of Laertes, `I see/The 
portraiture of his' (V. ii. 77-8); and so he does. During the Scenes in the wake of Polonius's 
death and upon Laertes' return from France, the text labours to evoke and sustain parallels 
between the nature of paternal loss which characterises the situation faced by Hamlet, and 
Laertes and Ophelia. What is stressed in particular, and notably by Claudius, is the familiar 
trope of a poisoning infraction. Ophelia's psychosis, Claudius diagnoses, `springs/All from 
her father's death', and is a symptom of `the poison of deep grief (IV. v. 75-6). 69 Similarly, 
Laertes' return has, he says, been fuelled by 
buzzers [who] infect his ear 
With pestilent speeches of his father's death, 
Wherein necessity, of matter beggar' d 
Will nothing stick our person to arraign 
In ear and ear. 
(IV v 90-4) 
67 Moretti (1988) p. 42. 
`8 The paradox should be pointed out that the first revenge ghost to make an appearance on the dramatic stage 
is that of Clytemnestra in Aeschylus' Oresteia (Eumenides 97ff. ). As the ghost who calls upon the Erinnys for 
the vengeance of mother-right, Clytemnestra is at once the model and the detritus of the form of the revenge 
ghost: both the angry spectre who calls for blood and whose outline will become so familiar to the English 
stage, and a unique figure whose call to arms will be overruled in the Aeropagus in favour of the paternal 
rights of Agamemnon whose posthumous Vengeance receives divine sanction. 
69 He remains of course ignorant of her frustrated love for Hamlet; though on this point see note 75 below. 
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The death of Polonius is thus figured as a traumatic poison and one which replicates and 
multiplies itself, spreading a pestilence throughout the ears of Denmark and beyond. 
Certainly Claudius has his own interests at heart. It is his name that is being 
`arraigned' in the `general' ear. But his diagnoses do point to a more fundamental 
similitude between the character of his nephew's loss and that of Polonius's offspring. For 
what makes the death of Polonius so poisonous is that he did not make what Ophelia 
wishfully calls `a good end' (IV. v. 183). Like Old Hamlet cut off in the blossoms of his 
sin, 
Unhousel' d, disappointed, unanel' d, 
No reck'ning made, but sent to my account 
With all my imperfections on my head 
(I. v. 77-9) 
it is not just the truncation of Polonius's life, but in particular the truncated manner with 
which his passing has been marked that has so disturbed his filial survivors. 70 Claudius is at 
pains to point out regretfully that it is the `hugger-mugger' character of Polonius's 
interment which Ophelia's sanity cannot bear and which has generated the gossip now 
inflaming the avenging rage of Laertes (IV. v. 83-94). Thus, the insistent theme of 
Ophelia's fragmentary songs and verbal meanderings is the issue of her father's 
commemoration and remembrance: 
Ophelia: There's rosemary, that's for remembrance- 
Pray you, love, remember. And there's pansies, 
that's for thoughts. 
Laertes: A document in madness: thoughts and 
Remembrance fitted. 
(IV. v. 173-7) 
70 On Hamlet's melancholia over his father's truncated mourning cf. I. ii. 137-59 and 176-8 1; 11. ii. 55-7; III. 
ii. 124-133. On the failure of rites of passage and the revenger's melancholy more generally, see Sacks (1985) 
p. 85. 
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Similarly, when Laertes blusters his demand for recompense it is the maimed rites" of his 
father's passage that engender a parenthetical proliferation of motives for revenge: 
Let this be so. 
His means of death, his obscure funeral- 
No trophy, sword, or hatchment o'er his bones, 
No noble rite, nor formal ostentation- 
Cry to be heard, as t'were from heaven to earth, 
That I must call't in question. 
(IV. v. 209-13) 
In light of these sexually differentiated responses to the abjection of improper mourning, 72 
it is tempting to re-affirm Michael Neill's point about the equivalence between revenge and 
remembrance. Cut off prematurely, both Polonius and Old Hamlet require intercession; yet, 
in accordance with the contemporary outlawing of commemorative ritual, they are 
impotent, save for the secular means of revenge. 
But if Shakespeare's tragedy legibly bears the impact of the Protestant upheavals in 
commemorative practice, then the mirror image which it establishes between its two 
revengers, I suggest, amounts less to a `fantasy response' to the resultant impotence of the 
living than to a critical exploration of its paradoxical limits. 
The relation between Hamlet and his counterpart is ultimately asymmetrical. 
Laertes has no hesitation (at least hypothetically), where Hamlet does, of becoming a 
Pyrrhus and cutting the throat of his father's aggressor `i'th'church' (IV. vii. 125). 
Believing Claudius to be responsible, Laertes makes his way to Denmark without delay. 
There is no second Mousetrap: in order to establish the veracity of the poisonous tales that 
have reached his ear, he simply demands the truth from the King (IV. v. 112-. 
King: Good Laertes, 
If you desire to know the certainty 
'' The same fate awaits Ophelia's corpse, of course: V. i. 211-231. 
72 On Ophelia's insanity as against the male trajectory of active revenge, see Showalter (1985). 
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Of your dear father, is't writ in your revenge 
That, swoopstake, you will draw both friend and foe, 
Winner and loser? 
Laertes: None but his enemies. 
King: Will you know them then? 
Laertes: To his good friends thus wide I'll ope my arms, 
And, like the kind life-rend'ring pelican, 
Repast them with my blood. 
King: Why now you speak 
Like a good child and a true gentleman. 
(IV. v. 139-48) 
The gory tenor of Aeneas' tale to Dido seems to come to Laertes naturally; and, not without 
good reason, it pleases Claudius. I suggest that the King's flattering response that 
Polonius's son speaks as both a good child and a true gentleman intimates precisely what is 
at stake in the differential alacrity with which he and Hamlet set about undertaking their 
equivalent tasks of violent, secular `remembrance', and how that very asymmetry demands 
that rather than placing Shakespeare's tragedy back within what we have identified as the 
amnesiac/parricidal Oedipean paradigm of modernity, we read it as a radical and proleptic 
critique of that very posture. 
In Act I, by the time we witness Hamlet dressed in black and unable to mourn his 
`loss', we already know that his father, far from being absent, has been repeatedly making 
his spectral presence felt to the petrified guard of Elsinore castle. In the case of his rival, 
however, something quite different is apparent. Once Hamlet has lugged away Polonius's 
guts, we never hear from or see him again. The finality of his death is underscored by 
Hamlet who dwells upon the old man's decomposition: 
King: Now, Hamlet, where's Polonius? 
Hamlet: At supper. 
King: At supper? 
Hamlet: Not where he eats, but where a is eaten. 
(IV. iii. 16-9) 
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Developing a conceit of digestion, wittily morbid as it may be, Hamlet proposes a 
significant corporeal alternative to the fate of his own father's spirit, suspended inert at the 
moment of death. Dead and gone to those he leaves behind, Polonius `lives' on as both 
more and less than what he was: food for worms. His death, like death in general (IV. iii. 
21-3), though with the exception of Old Hamlet's, is doubly metabolic. It literally alters 
him, makes him something else, namely food; 73 and that transformation in turn makes 
possible an endless cycle of further productions of change through the digestion and 
metabolisation of maggots: 
Hamlet: Your fat king and your lean beggar is but 
veritable service-two dishes, but to one table. 
That's the end. 
King: Alas, alas. 
Hamlet: A man may fish with the worm that has eat of a 
king, and eat of the fish that hath fed of that worm. 
King: What dost thou mean by this? 
Hamlet: Nothing but to show you how a king may go a 
progress through the guts of a beggar. 
(IV. iii. 27-31) 
If death is figured as the grim leveller which reduces the king and the beggar to the same 
state, that is and is not `the end' as Hamlet pointedly calls it: for he continues nevertheless 
to recount the further progress of the dead. In decomposing, Polonius's body will be 
interminably recomposed: digested by a worm that is digested by a fish that is digested by a 
man whose fate is to be digested by worms. `The end' is a beginning; decomposition is the 
process of recomposition, and vice versa. 
While much will be made by his children of their father's memory, there is never a 
mention of Polonius's spiritual return. 74 Instead, in IV. v. there is a conspicuous insistence 
'3 
ýtfetaballö: lit. to undergo a change, to alter. 74 The possibility of his spiritual survival in heaven or hell is joked about by Hamlet (IV. iii. 33-5); though 
this is an entirely different matter from his return in the manner of Old Hamlet's ghost. Note that while no 
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upon the irrevocable absence of the decomposed body of Laertes' father. The good child's 
first demand when Claudius gives him audience is `Give me my father' (IV. v. 116). It is 
soon followed up by Ophelia's melancholically repetitious dirges: 
And will a not come again? 
And will a not come again? 
No, no, he is dead, 
Go to thy death-bed, 
He never will come again. 
His beard was as white as snow, 
All flaxen was his poll. 
He is gone, he is gone, 
And we cast away moan. 
God a mercy on his soul. 
(IV. v. 187-96)75 
Shakespeare thus announces the crucial difference in relation to the genesis of Hamlet's 
will to revenge, when Laertes says of the picture of his sister's madness: `Hadst thou thy 
wits and didst persuade revenge, /It could not move thus' (IV. v. 167-8). For is it not the 
very character of the revenge ghost to preserve his wits and verbally persuade his survivor 
to posthumous violence in his name? What makes the difference between Hamlet and 
Laertes as revengers is the Ghost. Bodies decompose, alter, are metabolised: such is the fate 
of Polonius and King Hamlet; both may go a progress through a beggar's guts. Yet in the 
case of Hamlet's father, the old King is not (decomposing/recomposing) with the body. His 
ghost remains suspended, unchanging. Hamlet, he who cannot mourn, it seems, cannot 
revenge because of the continuing and overdetermined `presence' of his father; Laertes 
mention is made of Purgatory, Worms was the site of the `Diet' of 1521 at which Luther defended his 
doctrine. 
'' That the lost object of certain of Ophelia's words elsewhere in this scene remains undecidable between 
Polonius and Hamlet only re-enforces, in the light of Hamlet's imminent return from England, the 
permanence of her father's absence. See e. g. lines IV. v. 161-3 and n 
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claims to be more easily moved to vengeance in the very absence of the generic ghostly 
demand. 
This peculiar circumstance, I suggest, has a certain basis in the parallel scenes of 
parental inscription in Act I. We have already discussed at length the mnemonic writing 
which the Ghost's message performs on the tablets of Hamlet's brain. But by the time of 
the re-appearance of the Ghost we have already witnessed Polonius, earlier the same day, 
deliver his notorious `few precepts' to Laertes (I. iii. 58 and ff. ). Urging his son to 
remember them, he invokes the metaphor of writing: 
There, my blessing with thee, 
And these few precepts in thy memory 
Look thou character. 
(I. iii. 57-9) 
Whatever the virtue or otherwise of their content, Polonius's axioms are delivered in order 
to assert his authority as father. Yet he concludes with what seems to be a gesture not 
towards Laertes' subjection, but his liberation: 
This above all: to thine own self be true, 
And it must follow as the night the day 
Thou canst not then be false to any man. 
Farewell, my blessing season this in thee. 
(I. iii. 78-81) 
A striking conclusion, at once Ptolemaic and thoroughly Copernican, in Laplanche's 
understanding of these terms. For it is difficult not to hear in the old man's words an 
advocation of what has been construed as the ipsocentric posture of the modern subject. 
The dictum `to thine own self be true', at this moment of valediction, ostensibly points to 
the possibility of Laertes' autonomy-to the consistency of his `own self in the imminent 
absence of his father: above all-as well as and/or in spite of what I have just urged- 
ultimately it must be to yourself, not to your father, whom you must be true. The posture of 
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filial amnesia would appear to pertain first and foremost in Hamlet to Laertes. Polonius's 
imperative certainly sounds quite different from Old Hamlet's performatively poisoning 
demand that his son 'Remember'. Indeed it sounds rather more like the enabling double- 
bind of the dead Player King's speech to his wife: `To thine own self be true' : You may 
forget me so long as you be yourself-your `own self. Indeed, be yourself and forget me, 
for that is the best way to remember me (who am urging you to forget). Laertes cannot be a 
true gentleman, as Laertes calls him, without being a good son, and vice versa. 
We can say, in fact, that Laertes' reception of the maxim means that long before he 
has been made edible guts, Polonius is already more dead than Old Hamlet. In order to 
explain this, let us invoke a comparative situation in the domain of metapsychology 
described by Dominique Scarfone (1994). Following Laplanche, Scarfone suggests that 
intromission-the implantation of an unmetabolisable foreign body-has a role to play in 
the formation of the superego in general. For Laplanche, the superego, which is made up of 
parental messages, gives rise to categorical imperatives that `cannot be diluted, and cannot 
be replaced by anything else' (Laplanche 1987a p. 139). Now Scarfone goes on to elaborate 
two possible kinds of superego relating to the differing positions assumed by the message- 
sending parental other towards the subject: the hollowed-out superego (surmoi en creux) 
and the filled-in superego (surmoi en plein). The latter concerns what happens in psychosis, 
the former is what happens in other cases. In the `non-pathological' situation `the 
translatory function of the adult carries for the child the prohibitions of the surrounding 
culture' (Scarfone 1994 p. 105); 76 but what is more, those messages in turn invite a degree 
of translation by the receiving subject. What Scarfone calls `blanks in the parental 
76 I cite from Fletcher's unpublished translation of Scarfone's paper. Page numbers refer to the French 
original. 
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discourse' require `the child as translator to make for himself a morality in relation to 
which he keeps a certain freedom of manoeuvre' (p. 105). In the other case, there are no 
blanks, no enigmas, there is no translation/repression on the side of the adult who sends the 
message; only `a constraining [and] invading presence' which blocks translation and `takes 
over' entirely the subject's attempts at any undertaking; is a centre, the centre, of his 
psychical universe (p. 105). 1 do not wish to map Scarfone's distinction in any schematic or 
pathologising way onto Laertes' and Hamlet's respective and contrasting scenes of parental 
inscription. But I do suggest that it offers a productive way of conceptualising the 
consequences of their difference. Scarfone writes of a psychotic patient of his who said 
"`We live [... ] according to the definitions others have of us"'. `The other that defined 
him, ' Scarfone glosses, `prevented him from translating, from betraying or misrepresenting. 
He cannot betray that other [... ] by fashioning [for] himself a private version of his life. 
The other is in him but cannot be metabolised' (p. 106). With the body of his father 
decomposing in the grave, Hamlet is nonetheless constrained by the indigestible message of 
his resolutely unchanging spirit into repetition and sameness: to remain too much in the 
sun. Revenge in the name of his father is only possible at the cost of a partial betrayal of the 
singular command that he `remember' and `not forget'. In Polonius's dictum we have a 
kind of `hollowed-out' imperative: a separative command that Laertes live by his own 
command. The permanence of the inscription is assured precisely and only by Polonius's 
`absence'. Laertes obeys, and preserves `undiluted' the parental other in fashioning himself 
It is in his not (just) being his father that the will of his father is carried out. In a figurative 
way, and at his own demand, Polonius has already begun decomposing/recomposing well 
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before his corporeal death; remembered in being forgotten and forgotten in being 
remembered. 
In this connection, we must recognise that Polonius's dictum represents a strong 
signal of Hamlet's refusal to fit an interpretative frame based on an (Oedipean) notion of 
filiarchal revolution and the installation of an ipsocentric, sovereign subject. The throwing- 
off of the father is already situated at the level of the father's desire; and it is, moreover, in 
that very throwing-off that his law is preserved. The possibility of Oedipean revolution is 
compromised in advance because it is already called forth by the father. 
I suggest that we attempt to understand this in two complementary ways: one 
remains what might be described as metapsychological; the other, political. 
As regards the first, Laplanche suggests that the superego, insofar as it is in part 
constituted by intromission, forms a kind of `psychotic enclave'- an internal-alien voice of 
law which demands compliance. But let us take a certain liberty with Laplanche's 
formulation. In non-pathological cases the unmetabolisable parental imperative would, like 
Polonius's, have to include the demand that the child `find out for himself. A self- 
perpetuating negativity, then; a double-bind, which calls not for simple repetitious 
compliance ('do exactly as your father does and nothing but'), but assures compliance 
through difference, transgression. The law of writ must confer an enabling liberty. Its 
permanence is the absence of the parental other. On the other hand, the pathological 
formation, which resonates with the situation faced by Hamlet, is caused by an excessive 
presence: the parental other is too much `remembered', too much... alive. Might we not say, 
then, that the madness-the psychosis-which modernity claims to be its own is an internal 
necessity of the structure of paternal transmission which it wishes to throw off'? Must not 
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the absenting, the forgetting, the death of the father be internal to the demand of the father 
if he is to have any legacy at all? Must not a kind of `parricide' always have been, in the 
first place, the desire of the father, the enabling negativity implanted in the non- 
pathological superego? 
In order to develop this suggestion on a political register, let us note by way of 
something more than a comparison, that in his tract on modern man and the rejection of 
History, Nietzsche produces an echo of Polonius as he calls upon `Youth' to reach the 
target of Life: 
And how can we attain our goal? you will ask. At the beginning of a 
journey towards that goal, the god of Delphi cries to you in his oracle: 
`Know yourself [... ] [Each one of us] must organise the chaos within 
him by thinking back to his real needs. 
(Nietzsche 1874 pp. 122-3) 
It may appear extraordinary that Nietzsche should find himself recalling, of all people, the 
elderly retainer to the King, Polonius. But perhaps it is rather that Shakespeare's text 
perceives and anticipates the paradox of the Nietzschean affirmation of Life qua 
`imperative', and in particular an imperative addressed to Youth. Once the annihilation of 
historical anteriority is identified as the grounds for the modern condition, its advocation to 
the succeeding generation can only itself become a historical gesture. As de Man puts it, in 
connection with this Nietzschean aporia: `modernity cannot assert itself without being at 
once swallowed up and reintegrated into a regressive historical process' (de Man 1969 p. 
151). The imperative structure of the maxim `Know yourself, no less than Polonius's to 
thine own self be true', defeats its ostensible object in advance, and the rhetoric of 
autonomous selfhood becomes engulfed by the condition of its generational transmission. 
The difference between Nietzsche's text and Shakespeare's is that the latter wears this 
289 
paradox on its sleeve: the imperative of modernity is already placed firmly in the mouth of 
the eldest and most thoroughly traditional of fathers. 
We are suggesting, then, not simply that Shakespeare's tragedy reads modernity in 
terms of an inevitable falling back into the mode of the traditional; but, what is more, that it 
shows the traditional to be already marked by the aporia of modernity (which, in 
Nietzsche's case, modernity itself disavows). The requirement that he be `forgotten' must 
already be structural to the position of the father, must always already have been so, if 
tradition is to be tradition and not pure, un-reshaped, repetition. The pathologically 
`normal' son, or the prince who comfortably succeeds his father to the throne will always 
have been enmeshed in a paternal double-bind. Reshaping is internal to the possibility of 
legacy and tradition; and revolutionary reshaping cannot but turn out to be a traditional 
gesture, a repetition and an affirmation of difference: a repetition in being an affirmation of 
difference. Notice that when Laertes returns from France with his vengeful rabble there is 
no question that he intends a full-blown revolution. It is as if, a frightened Messenger warns 
Claudius, `the world were now but to begin, /Antiquity forgot, custom not known' (IV. v. 
103-4). Yet, the rabble calls him 'lord'- `They cry "Choose we! Laertes shall be King [... ] 
Laertes shall be king, Laertes king' (IV. v. 106-8). The new beginning which Laertes 
heralds is only a new beginning. In killing the King he will himself succeed the King, 
enforce and perpetuate the `custom' of a paternity of state which the revolutionaries claim 
no longer to know. With whatever force the revolution will be carried out, it cannot not 
constitute a succession. 
This is not to deny the event of revolution as such, nor what Low calls the 
possibilities of `genuine change' which it consolidates and brings about. The point is that 
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Shakespeare's text recognises that the supposed gesture of autonomous filiarchal 
revolution-be it conceived in terms of forgetting, foreclosure, parricide, regicide-is 
never radical, because none of these things is not already structural to tradition. `The king is 
dead. Long live the king! ' The death of the king makes necessary the transmission of his 
legacy; symmetrically, transmission itself requires his death. Hence the uncharacteristically 
grotesque words of the ever-allegiant Guildenstern to Claudius: 
Most holy and religious fear it is 
To keep those many many bodies safe 
That live and feed upon your Majesty. 
(III. iii. 8-10) 
As well as the banal sense that the family of his subjects draws sustenance from the father 
of the state, Guildenstern's weird image figures a more perceptive vision of the normal 
macrocosmic family of the kingdom. Like Hamlet's worms, the family is sustained through 
death, it feeds off the death of the father, maintains itself through, and `lives' on the basis 
of, his death. Tradition is already enabled by the gesture of revolution. 
If Hamlet is constrained by his father's inscription to remain too much in the sun, 
then let us hear all the valencies that this heliocentric trope of blockage connotes. Ever 
dominated by his Hyperion-like father (too much in the sun), Hamlet remains caught in a 
peculiar filial relation (too much... the son). Yet in being his father's son and nothing but- 
in carrying out to the letter the imperative to remember-he becomes himself too much the 
sun, too much a repetition, a performative re-embodiment, of his ghostly father, and just as 
impotent as is his father to exact his revenge. The `better' a son, and only a son, he is, the 
more the sun he must be-and therefore unable to take up the legacy of his Hyperion. Thus, 
not radical difference, but non-difference confounds legacy. `Long live the king' are the 
words with which Barnardo `unfolds' himself The absence of the preface that `the king is 
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dead', is telling; less as a signal that Denmark has begun to forget King Hamlet's passing, 
than because that king remains too much alive. 
Doubt thou the stars are fire, 
Doubt that the sun doth move, 
Doubt truth to be a liar, 
But never doubt I love. 
(II. ii. 115-8) 
As Garber points out, the punning complexities of `doubt' in Hamlet's poem to 
Ophelia put in question the very process of putting something in question. The word seems 
to shift from meaning `dispute' or `challenge' to `suspect' or `fear' (Garber 1987 p. 132); 
but the play of its connotations cannot be halted in such a way as to secure any of the 
ostensible certainties which Ophelia is invited to `doubt'-the better to affirm the super- 
certainty of his love-as delimitable certainties at all. If we understand Ophelia to be 
invited straightforwardly to `doubt' that the sun moves, the poem would seem to suppose 
the certainty of the Ptolemaic system which claims that it does. If, on the other hand, she is 
to `suspect' that the sun moves, then the certainty which is presupposed and questioned is 
the Copernican claim that it does not. " 
What Hamlet may not realise 78 lust as he does not realise that the key to his 
revenge is presented in his own staging of The Mousetrap-is that the poem is thus less 
about hypothetical doubts of specific certainties than the absence of certainty as such, the 
absence of a centre; 79 and it is no coincidence that the centrality of the sun is invoked only 
to be left undecidable. 
77 The same inevitably goes for the claim that the stars are fire. Both this and the movement of the sun were 
78 
uestioned by Renaissance science. See Garber (1987) p. 132. 
Cf. Jenkins 's Arden note: II. ii. 116 n. 
79 Cf Laplanche (1999A [ 1992f1 p. 56: `the Copernican revolution, to some extent, opened up the possibility 
of the absence of a centre. In a world of quasi-infinite distances it becomes absurd to persist in trying to 
preserve one star among others-the sun or solar system-as centre. ' 
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That, as Jenkins points out, `the sun' of Hamlet's words at Court contains a 
reference to Claudius is a telling symptom of the stakes of Hamlet's revenge task. 
Following the sermon against excessive grief to which the King subjects him before the 
Court, Hamlet privately valorises his father, labouring to extricate his uncle from the 
former's sun-like glory: 
That it should come to this! 
But two months dead-nay, not so much, not two- 
So excellent a king that was to this 
Hyperion to a satyr, so loving to my mother 
That he might not beteem the winds of heaven 
Visit her face too roughly. Heaven and earth, 
Must I remember? 
(I. ii. 137-43) 
This classical polarisation of the two father-kings has elsewhere been read in Oedipal terms 
as the transformation of ambivalent filial wishes into `good' and `bad' fathers: 80 the pure 
and blazing paternal ideal, and the incestuous satyr-like beast. It is somewhat more 
complex, however. The attribute with which Hamlet wishes to define his incestuous uncle 
is in fact what characterises Hyperion: the sun-god married his own sister, Theia. 8' 
Certainly the son's idealisation of Old Hamlet is shown here to be no more than an 
idealisation. He is not `unfallen'; so much is clear. More significant is that if both Claudius 
and Old Hamlet can be identified in Hyperion, the distinction between the murdered father 
and the father-substitute to be murdered begins to blur. The murder of Claudius is the 
murder of the father. Not-or at least, not only-in the sense that regicide carries the 
symbolic force of parricide (the murder of the father of the kingdom). But because the 
'30 See Ernest Jones (1949) p. 122. 
8t It is no coincidence that the parents of the couple Ouranos and Gaia ('Heaven and earth') are invoked, 
perhaps unwittingly. immediately after the comparison is made. 
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precondition as well as the consequence of Hamlet's taking any vengeance for his father is 
the elimination of his father's ghost. 
The double reference of the sun/Hyperion to Claudius as well as Old Hamlet, means 
that killing the King would not be a simply Ptolemaic gesture, a displacement of the 
sovereign sun (the king) by the son (the subject), who thereby becomes his own centre. It 
would be as Copernican as it is Ptolemaic; which is to say that, like the poem, it would 
surpass the notion of a centre altogether. The moment the royal sun (Claudius) is 
overthrown is the moment that the desire of the other sun (the father) is satisfied. Thus the 
supposed moment of liberation would be one of subjection: in killing the royal sun Hamlet 
would become the `good son'. At the same time, in order for Hamlet to be the `son' (the 
avenger of his father), he must cease to be the sun (the repetition of his father): he must, in 
other words, take liberties with his father's law of writ. Thus, inversely, his ostensible 
subjection (acting upon the word of his father), would also be his liberation, an overthrow 
of the blazing centrality of his father (such that Hamlet no longer simply acts him out), 
which nevertheless is done in remembrance of him. 
Hamlet's aberrant situation is a kind of pathologised or exoskeletal one which 
shows revenge in general to be neither reactionary nor revolutionary as such, but the 
meeting point of the co-dependency of these modes. The revenger kills the sovereign at the 
behest of the other, which means that he cannot be `true to himself (the Oedipean or 
Ptolemaic posture which supposedly arises from regicide) without being true to the other; 
and that he cannot be true to the other, unless he is true to himself (and not the other's 
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simple repetition). The revenger would not thus recentre sovereign power in the subject, but 
decentre subjectivity altogether. 82 
Ending 
In drawing towards a conclusion-and towards the possibility of Hamlet's 
conclusion-I would emphasise that Hamlet will never set about killing Claudius. He will 
never plan the King's death, never orchestrate and direct it as do generic revengers like 
Kyd's Hieronimo, or Shakespeare's own Titus. In an inversion of the more usual scheme of 
things, the killing of the King happens just happens-within a scene that is thoroughly 
orchestrated by the one upon whom vengeance should be taken, and which, like everything 
else in Hamlet's tragic itinerary, is governed in advance by the intromission of poison: 
namely, the duel between the two rivalrous sons. 
In what always appears to be yet another repetition of the repetitious `primal' 
crime, 83 let us suggest that, with the murder of Claudius which emerges from the ill-fated 
duel, the text shows a displacement to have occurred that is fully in accordance with the 
necessary movement of decentring which we have attempted to outline above. 
It is to be noted that having absorbed the poison from Laertes' foil, and having-at 
last-poisoned Claudius, Hamlet begins to look, and now perhaps more than ever, like a re- 
embodiment of the Ghost. In having killed for his father, he explicitly assumes in relation 
to Horatio his own father's earlier place in relation to him: 
I am dead, Horatio. Wretched Queen, adieu. 
You that look pale and tremble at this chance, 
82 The recentring which would seem to occur were Laertes to kill Claudius and become king. would be 
compromised in advance by its process: the Ptolemaic dream of the individual left entirely to himself [... ] his 
own creator' is one conferred upon him already by the self-negating demand of his father-the father who, 
precisely in killing the king and assuming his paternal title in Denmark. Laertes further negates and thereby 
Freserves the better. 
3 Indeed, Hamlet refers to them as 'brother[s]' (V. ii. 239). 
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That are but mutes or audience to this act, 
Had I but time-as this fell sergeant, Death, 
Is strict in his arrest-O, I could tell you- 
But let it be. Horatio, I am dead, 
Thou livest. Report me and my cause aright 
To the unsatisfied. 
(V. ii. 338-45) 
At moments, Hamlet directly echoes his own ghostly father's speeches in the first Act: `I 
am dead, Horatio' ('I am thy father's spirit [ ... 
]' ); `Had I but time [ ... 
]' ('I could a tale 
unfold [... ]'); `Report me and my cause aright' ('Revenge [my] foul and most unnatural 
murder'). Even in the wake of his paternally-assigned task's having been accomplished, 
everything seems to affirm Hamlet's continued occupation of the position earlier filled by 
his poisoned father, transmitting and perpetuating a message to the living, and demanding 
to be remembered therein. 
But there emerges, in this very repetition, the presence of a crucial and decisive 
disjunction: 
Horatio: Never believe it. 
I am more an antique Roman than a Dane. 
Here's yet some liquor left. 
Hamlet: As th'art a man 
Give me the cup. Let go, by Heaven I'll ha't. 
O God, Horatio, what a wounded name, 
Things standing thus unknown, shall I leave behind me. 
If thou didst ever hold me in thy heart, 
Absent thee from felicity awhile, 
And in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain 
To tell my story. 
(V. ii. 345-54) 
Horatio, having heard the first portion of Hamlet's last words, is on the brink of being 
annexed to the repetitious chain inaugurated by Claudius's `primal' repetition, and its 
subsequent transmission: for now he (Horatio), in his turn, feels impelled to make a ghost 
of himself with the remainder of the poison set by Claudius. Yet that remainder stays a 
296 
remainder, and, significantly, at Hamlet's deathly insistence. Certainly, in his response to 
Horatio, we again hear a ghost of the Ghost: `If ever thou didst hold me in thy heart' (Jf 
ever thou didst thy dear father love [... ]'). But if Hamlet addresses Horatio just as the 
Ghost had once addressed Hamlet himself, it is precisely, and paradoxically, in order not 
(just) to repeat his father that he does repeat him: he speaks posthumously' in order to halt 
the threat of Claudius's distilment being transmitted further. At the risk of repeating 
ourselves, let us re-affirm that so long as Hamlet is only the sun (the simple repetition of 
his father) he perpetuates, as we have seen, the `primal', poisoning infraction first 
transmitted to Old Hamlet. In having now become the ('good') son (in having fulfilled his 
father's demand), his own echoing and quasi-posthumous demand (that his cause be set 
aright) is one in which Hamlet is positioned neither as a figure of autonomous filiarchal 
liberty nor abject filial subjection alone. After the death of the King it is no longer a 
question of statically repeating, and of thus merely perpetuating, the poisonous message of 
his father. The son and no longer the sun, he displaces the father's posthumous message in 
repeating it; repeats it in the very act of displacing it. 
Just as the material introduction of poison into Old Hamlet's ear earlier defined the 
violence of his message to his son, so too Hamlet's intervention to stop Horatio's ingestion 
of Claudius's poison has its correspondence in the very character of Hamlet's posthumous 
message to his still-living addressee. Some commentators have protested that when Horatio 
does preface Hamlet's `story' to Fortinbras and the English Ambassadors, his version of 
things seems inadequate to the complexity of the events which the audience in the theatre 
have just witnessed onstage: 
And let me speak to th'yet unknowing world 
How these things came about. So shall you hear 
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Of carnal, bloody and unnatural acts, 
Of accidental judgements, casual slaughters, 
Of deaths put on by cunning and forc'd cause, 
And, in this upshot, purposes mistook 
Fall' n on th'inventors' heads. All this can I 
Truly deliver. 
(V. ii. 384-91) 
Anne Barton (1980), in particular, has argued that Horatio's version of things `leave[s] out 
everything that seems important, reducing all that is distinctive about this play to a plot 
stereotype' (p. 52). But according to the logic of the play itself, is not this very inadequacy 
a condition of possibility for Hamlet's tragedy being told by Horatio at all (and not 
perpetuated)? There is nothing in Horatio's brief adieu to Hamlet, after he makes his last 
request, which would compare with Hamlet's own over-receptiveness before the Ghost: 
Now cracks a noble heart. Good night, sweet prince, 
And flights of angels sing thee to thy rest. 
(V. ii. 364-5) 
It is an adieu, and that is all. There is no mnemic inscription in the book and volume of 
Horatio's brain, for there is no poisonous constraint in Hamlet's last words. If the Ghost's 
message in Act I had been notable for its poisonous and traumatising excess (even and 
especially as it failed and did not fail to `unfold' the secrets of its originator's prison- 
house), Hamlet's last words in Act V (even and especially as they recall those of his father) 
are thoroughly enigmatic and, to employ Scarfone's term, en creux. `The rest is silence' (V. 
ii. 363): in a marked contrast with the climactic imperative of the Ghost's long speeches 
('Remember me'), Hamlet departs with a statement that acknowledges a space of non- 
disclosure, of that which will never be remembered beyond his life. Horatio's subsequent 
preface may well `overlook' or `wink at' all that is distinctive in the drama that has just 
passed, but that is exactly the point: Hamlet's very tragedy has consisted in nothing less 
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than a prolonged over-adherence to the demand of the dead-one in which, we have seen, 
the gesture of `overlooking' the dead is shown to be structural to the possibility of their 
attaining any `rest' whatsoever. 
Is it not, moreover, thoroughly fitting that Hamlet should end on this note which 
Barton finds reductive and banally generic? That this text which affirms itself in its 
difference from its generic precursors-a difference which comes about precisely in its 
hero's prolonged incapacity to differentiate himself productively from his own familial 
antecedent-should be reduced by Horatio to a `plot stereotype' at the behest of a Hamlet 
who has finally accomplished the long-deferred deed? Only one `Hamlet', we have 
suggested, can be relieved from becoming the repetitious ghost of his/its ancestor. We 
should not, therefore, be surprised that once Hamlet does cease in being no more than the 
repetition of his father, the `distinctiveness' of Shakespeare's text becomes submerged in 
its turn, reduced-with the attainment of vengeance-to a repetition of the generic models 
of filial violence from which it has, for so long, laboured to differ. 
*** 
We have come a long way from Freud's Oedipal reading of Hamlet. As with our 
previous two tragedies, in this text it is, first and foremost, in the bearing of the occupier of 
the paternal place towards the son/subject that the specificity of the tragedy consists. And 
equally, the priority of that paternal other's message is what governs the son/subject's 
orientation: even and especially his orientation towards a 'self. Such is the paradox which 
Laplanche's return to Freud discovers as the movement of ontogenesis in general. 
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If we have moved away from Freud's explicit reading of the play, however, we have 
nonetheless attempted to remain `with' him, and with the possibilities contained in the 
funeral dream which Garber links with Freud's identificatory relation to the bereaved Dane. 
What has concerned us is not Oedipal sexuality, but the function of the role of the other at 
the very limit of the category of otherness: the message of the dead. Freud's dream, I would 
suggest in closing-whatever its biographical relation to the abandonment of seduction 
may or may not be-provides one persisting, minor trace, among many in the Freudian 
corpus, of the radicality of his early discoveries which was never fully exorcised, even after 
1897. Like the speech of the Player King and, finally, Hamlet's speech to Horatio, it 
articulates an alien voice which persists even after the annihilation of its bearer: an alterity 
and an enigmatic message which continues to haunt and inhabit its addressee in the very 
absence of its original sender. 
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Conclusion 
By way of a conclusion I wish merely to restate the central themes and arguments 
which I have tried to present, and to suggest, on the basis of their overall implications, 
what I consider to be the significance of this thesis for the study of psychoanalytic theory 
and its relation to cultural production. 
A restatement first: 
1) I began by arguing that Freud's appeal to tragic drama appears on the very cusp 
of a general, tectonic shift in his thought, which is inaugurated by the official 
abandonment of the seduction theory in September 1897. On the basis of Laplanche's 
return to Freud-its conclusions as well as its systematic methodology-it was 
maintained that the Freudian approach to the privileged domain of tragic drama can and 
must be rethought in relation to some of Freud's earliest and most radical discoveries: 
even, and especially given that the development of his thought seeks to occlude them. 
2) It was seen that the Ptolemaic drift of Freud's enterprise operates within the co- 
ordinates of the Oedipean posture which has been assumed by Western philosophy. This, 
in such a way as to blind Freud towards the challenge posed by Sophocles' tragedy to the 
deprojective reasoning of its central protagonist. The very specificity of Oedipus 
Tyrannus was shown to consist not in its presentation of the triumphant riddle-solver with 
whom Freud identifies in The Interpretation of Dreams, but of one confronted-and first 
of all in relation to his father-by a constitutive and insoluble enigma. The Oedipal 
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crimes of parricide and incest were thus shown to be secondary to a more fundamental 
(and double) intervention from the outside. 
3) Chapter two took up a moment from one of Freud's elaborations of a 
foundational event in the genesis of the human psyche: the murder of the primal tyrant. 
Suggesting that this elaboration excluded from it any concession to complexity and self- 
alterity on the part of the primal father, the chapter sought to explore Julius Caesar and 
its dramatisation of an historical `event'. It was argued that the prematurity of the 
(dramatised/repeated) deed of murder rendered it intrinsically plural, and in such a way as 
to necessitate the mechanism which Freud describes as `deferred action' 
(Nachträglichkeit). Julius Caesar was thus positioned as a text which threatens the pure 
materiality which marks Freud's account of the primal deed, since it articulates a certain 
otherness (both of the `tyrant' to himself, and thus of the deed to itself) which the logic of 
Ptolemaism seeks to exorcise. 
4) The final Chapter was an attempt to shift away from the tendency of Freud, and 
criticism more generally, to repeat in the interpretative approach to Hamlet the very 
repudiation which has been perceived to be at the heart of Hamlet's prolonged delay: 
namely the repudiation of the dead father's message. By way of critiquing traditional 
psychoanalytically-conceived mechanisms of repudiation ('foreclosure'), the chapter set 
forth a reading of Hamlet's relation to his father and his father's message which was 
governed not by Hamlet's failure to internalise the call for revenge, but by his abject and 
paralysing domination by that overdetermined demand. Suggesting that Hamlet's 
paralysis in relation to his familial paternity is the motor of Hamlet's status as a 
recomposition and metabolisation of its generic forebears, it was shown that the 
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attainment of revenge renders the revenge-hero neither an autonomous filiarch nor a 
subject wholly eclipsed by the other, but one whose subjecthood is paradoxically 
achieved only in relation to an alterity which never cases to inhabit him. 
For each of the three tragedies I have sought to advance beyond a merely Oedipal 
reading, which means (especially with regard to Oedipus and Hamlet) that I have sought 
to advance beyond Freud's own readings of them. This does not, of course, imply a 
rejection of the validity of the Oedipal framework within psychoanalysis, or within the 
domain of literary interpretation. Nor does it imply a rejection of Freud's own 
interpretative approaches to these tragedies. Rather, I have taken the privileged motif of 
parricide as the index within them of a relation whose significance is at once more radical 
and less well debated within both psychoanalysis and literary studies: viz. the subject's 
fundamental and constitutive relation to the other. 
We have consistently seen the emergence in or in relation to these three tragedies 
of the Delphic imperative (Know Thyself), which appears at such a crucial moment in 
Freud's discussion of his `Copernican' discovery. In each case we have attempted to bear 
witness to the appearance of this `self as an effect of an alterity which makes it 
thoroughly inadequate. This procedure, let us insist, is not one which is motivated by a 
desire to demonstrate that Freud `got it wrong'. On the contrary, we have attempted to 
take seriously Laplanche's charge regarding the necessary connivance of Freud's thought 
with its object, and thus to articulate in the name of Freud's earliest and most radical 
discoveries ('with Freud', therefore) as much as possible of what, in the tragedies, 
Freud's own path inevitably leads him to circumvent. 
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In the broadest sense, this thesis has maintained the need to question the `self- 
the identity-of the Freudian enterprise. Again, not in order to repudiate its claims, but so 
as to attempt to understand better the cultural messages by which Freud himself was 
interpellated, and in relation to which psychoanalysis, implicitly as well as explicitly, has 
established it-self and continued to shore up its theoretical apparatus in endeavouring to 
translate. It is precisely what, in these cultural `foreign bodies', has remained 
untranslated, unintegrated that has preoccupied us. 
The relationship between psychoanalysis and tragedy-or indeed psychoanalysis 
and literature and cultural production in general-is one that cannot be sustained by the 
interpretative domination of the former over the latter. Nor can it just be conjured away 
on the assumption of a fundamental disjunction or diremption between them. Both of 
these positions scotomise the constitutive role which cultural production plays in the very 
foundation and formation of psychoanalysis: a fact which by definition makes the 
demand for further, patient mutual analyses. Between the familiar questions of `what can 
psychoanalysis say about this or that cultural work? ', and `how has psychoanalysis 
misconstrued and misrepresented this one? ', a third, imperative question must be posed: 
4 what has this or that cultural work-what has cultural production in general-brought, 
in the first instance, to psychoanalysis? ' 
The present thesis is the first full-length study of literary texts to have drawn, in a 
sustained and consistent way, on the thought of Jean Laplanche. It is intended as an 
attempt to begin, at least, to respond to the urgency of this third question from within a 
theoretical framework where the unassimilated, the unintegrated are perceived as the sites 
of an alterity which demands neither exclusion, nor domestication, but productive 
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comprehension and development. The urgency of pursuing all that remains unassimilated 
in the Freudian enterprise, as well as the vastness of such an undertaking, should not be 
underestimated. 
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Appendix 
(From Freud (1985 [1887-1904]) pp. 264-6)1 
September 21,1897 
Dear Wilhelm, 
Here I am again, since yesterday morning, refreshed, cheerful, impoverished, at 
present without work, and having settled in again, I am writing to you first. 
And now I want to confide in you immediately the great secret that has been slowly 
dawning on me in the last few months. I no longer believe in my neurotica [theory of the 
neurosis]. This is probably not intelligible without an explanation; after all, you yourself 
found credible what I was able to tell you. So I will begin historically [and tell you] where 
the reasons for disbelief came from. The continual disappointment in my efforts to bring a 
single analysis to a real conclusion; the running away of people who for a period of time 
had been most gripped [by analysis]; the absence of the complete successes on which I had 
counted; the possibility of explaining to myself the partial successes in other ways, in the 
usual fashion-this was the first group. Then the surprise that in all cases the father, not 
excluding my own, had to be accused of being perverse-the realization of the unexpected 
frequency of hysteria, with precisely the same conditions prevailing in each, whereas surely 
such widespread perversions against children are not very probable. The [incidence] of 
perversion would have to be immeasurably more frequent than the [resulting] hysteria 
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because the illness, after all, occurs only where there has been an accumulation of events 
and there is a contributary factor that weakens the defense. Then, third, the certain insight 
that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish 
between truth and fiction that has been cathected with affect. (Accordingly, there would 
remain the solution that the sexual fantasy invariably seizes upon the theme of the parents). 
Fourth, the consideration that in the most deep-reaching psychosis the unconscious memory 
does not break through, so that the secret of childhood experiences is not disclosed even in 
the most confused delirium. If one thus sees that the unconscious never overcomes the 
resistance of the conscious, the expectation that in the treatment the opposite is bound to 
happen, to the point where the unconscious is completely tamed by the conscious, also 
diminishes. 
I was so far influenced [by this] that I was ready to give up two things: the complete 
resolution of a neurosis and the uncertain knowledge of its etiology in childhood. Now I 
have no idea where I stand because I have not succeeded in gaining a theoretical 
understanding of repression and its interplay of forces. It seems once again arguable that 
only later experiences give the impetus to fantasies, which [then] hark back to childhood, 
and with this the factor of heredity regains a sphere of influence from which I had made it 
my task to dislodge it-in the interest of illuminating neurosis. 
If I were depressed, confused, exhausted, such doubts would surely have to be 
interpreted as signs of weakness. Since I am in the opposite state, I must recognize them as 
the result of honest and vigorous intellectual work and must be proud that after going so 
deep I am still capable of such criticism. Can it be that this doubt merely represents an 
episode in the advance toward further insight? 
1 All interpolations in square brackets are by the translator of the correspondence. 
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It is strange too that no feeling of shame appeared-for which, after all, there could 
well be occasion. Of course I shall not tell it in Dan or speak it in Askelon, in the land of 
the Philistines, but in your eyes and my own, I have more the feeling of a victory than a 
defeat (which is surely not right). 
How nice that your letter has arrived just now! It induces me to advance a proposal 
with which I had intended to close. If during this lazy period I were to go to the Northwest 
Station on Saturday evening, I could be with you at noon on Sunday and then travel back 
the next night. Can you clear that day for an idyll for the two of us, interrupted by an idyll 
for three and three and a half [of us]? That is what I wanted to ask. Or do you have a dear 
guest in the house or something urgent to do elsewhere? Or, if I have to leave for home the 
same evening, which would then not be worthwhile, do the same conditions obtain if I go 
straight to the Northwest Station on Friday evening and stay with you one and a half days? 
I mean this week, of course. 
Now to continue my letter. I vary Hamlet's saying, `To be in readiness. to be 
cheerful is everything! I could indeed feel quite discontent. The expectation of eternal fame 
was so beautiful, as was that of certain wealth, complete independence, travels, and lifting 
the children above the severe worries that robbed me of my youth. Everything depended 
upon whether or not hysteria would come out right. Now I can once again remain quiet and 
modest, go on worrying and saving. A little story from my collection occurs to me: 
`Rebecca, take of your gown, you are no longer a bride'. In spite of all this, I am in very 
good spirits and content that you feel a need to see me again similar to mine to see you. 
There remains one small anxiety. What can I still understand of your matters? I am 
certainly incapable of critically evaluating them; I shall hardly be in a position to 
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comprehend them, and the doubt that then sets in is not the product of intellectual work, 
like my doubt about my own matters, but is the result of mental inadequacy. It is easier for 
you; you can survey everything I bring and criticize it vigorously. 
I have to add one more thing. In this collapse of everything valuable, the 
psychological alone has remained untouched. The dream [book] stands entirely secure and 
my beginnings of the metapsychological work have only grown in my estimation. It is a 
pity that one cannot make a living, for instance, on dream interpretation. 
Martha came back with me to Vienna. Minna and the children are staying in the 
country another week. They have all been exceedingly well. 
My pupil, Dr Gattel, is something of a disappointment. Very gifted and clever, he 
must, nevertheless, owing to his own nervousness and several unfavourable character traits, 
be classified as unpalatable. 
How all of you are and whatever else is happening between heaven and earth, I 
hope-anticipating your reply-to hear soon in person. 
Cordially your 
Sigm. 
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